of a strategic character, and such as are employed in war to deceive an enemy, delay his forces, repair a weak place, or gain a position of advantage.

must be looked into, and it is haps these other motives are of nobody's fault if, the scheme a different character-possibly being really the Czar's, investigation must take the same somewhat rude cross-examining shape as if Count Muravieff or M. de Witt were known to be the author. Only one means of scrutiny is available.

Thus the inquiry begins; and as soon as it begins we perceive that the existence of unmentionable motives is less surprising than their absence would be. They need not be set forth anew, being already familiar to the mind of every reader of these pages. With a thousand apologies to the Czar, they have been often mentioned in the public press as not quite negligible. How could they be slighted, indeed, when all the while that his English missionaries were proclaiming the Czar's heartfelt anxiety for arrest of armaments, his own dockyards and arsenals were the busiest of any? Others were busy too, but there was seen the most violent, most "feverish activity." Considering that Russia is of all European countries the safest from attack and most constant in aggression, considering too that it is her war-preparation which sets the standard for other Powers nowadays, what is the fair inference from that? To speak within bounds, let us say that after inquiry, as before, the motives of the Czar's proposal may be suspected with propriety. In particular we may suspect without blame that our first suspicion was correct. England, for example, is asked to bind herself not to increase her armaments for a while because Russia, content Per- with bringing her own prepara

The first-occurring observation is, that there is no peculiarity in the assigned motives of the proposal. Though a great many people on platforms seem to think otherwise, these motives are no more divine in a czar than in a schoolmaster or a shoemaker-unless we are to take it that a czar must be celestially good if he wishes to fight his battles at a reduced cost, and with weapons no more horrible than he is storing at present. In truth, the Russian Emperor is so little singular in having these desires that every sovereign, every Minister, every soldier, sailor, and citizen in Europe, shares them. There is no such thing as a Government that does not wish to have its own way in peace, nor one that would not rejoice to lessen its war-office charges and still be able to beat off any attack; neither is there one of them but loathes the thought of spending more money upon more awful means of slaughter. It is the Czar only, however, who comes forward to propose the agreement that we know of. Then perhaps he feels the horror and the expense of modern warfare more acutely than do other Governments. Or it may be that in addition to this motive, which is named, there are others unmentioned.

may begin at once, "if the present moment is considered opportune," the specific proposals of the Russian Foreign Office. are made known: (1) Arrest of armaments for a certain fixed period-which, for reasons indicated above, could not be agreed to. (2) Mitigation of the horrors of modern warfare: an unspeakably desirable object, made ridiculous by interdict of submarine torpedo - boats, ships built to ram without danger to themselves, and other scientific means of attack and defence beyond hope of being given up. (3) "Acceptance in principle of the employment of good offices in mediation and optional arbitration, in cases which lend themselves to such means." This

tions to a point now almost attained, wishes to employ some years and all available cash "in consolidating, colonising, arming, and fortifying her enormous acquisitions in the Far East." These might be described without much exaggeration as actual operations of war. Immediate operations for war they certainly are. "Of such is the laying of strategic railways, the construction of fortified harbours, the establishment of military colonies, the enlistment and the drilling of native soldiery where all these things may be turned into distant means of further acquisition, further coercion." It is incredible that these unique advantages are not contemplated by the Russian Government as a result of would be mere superfluity. carrying the peace proposal into effect.

What purported to be a second circular of the Czar got into publication last month, with assurances that it was entirely genuine; and it was SO treated for days. But whether because it was ill received, or for some better reason, its authenticity has since been denied. Possibly (the truth is not known when we print) this second circular may have been meant for the Governments alone, not for the public. We read in it, indeed, that it is thought better to begin with "a preliminary interchange of ideas on the subject between the Cabinets, in order to prepare the way for diplomatic discussion " -or perhaps to ascertain whether there is anything to discuss. And in order that such preliminary interchange of ideas

Every Government knows the value of good offices, &c., in cases which (in its own opinion) lend themselves to such means. No Government is willing to accept good offices against its own judgment, and compulsion is out of the question.

To the deplorably large number of Englishmen in this age who bring good hearts and bad judgments to all such affairs, the publication of these proposals was a prodigious disappointment. They really seem to have persuaded themselves— being mostly of a Radical turn

that problems which have outworn the brains of thousands of philosophers and statesmen might easily be solved by a czar if he once applied his mind to the task. They may still hope that the second Nicholas will succeed in it; but as for the suggestions recited above,

and believed to be his, they persuaded as their correlatives were immediately condemned in statesmanship that toleration as vague, utopian, impracti- may be carried to a vicious cable, and for some part absurd. extreme. The bishops need But they are really not more not be vituperated. Decency so than the best that are likely enjoins that they should be to come from St Petersburg. addressed in terms of respect even when their worst shortcomings are complained of. Yet if they, too, are to be faithfully dealt with, it must be said that they are chiefly to blame for the present troubles in the Church. But there is another and a better reason for displaying that truth before them, which is that they do not seem heartily convinced of it even yet; and since there is little hope of clearing the Church of the treacheries that infest it unless by their hands, they cannot understand too well how much the growth of these treacheries and the insolence of them are due to allowance: that is to say, allowance by the guardians and justiciaries of the Church, the bishops themselves.

Yet the Czar might do more for peace than any potentate on earth, could he turn his mind in another direction. He might make a new map of his enormous dominions, including Manchuria, itself large enough, fertile enough, rich and populous enough, to form a little kingdom. And, map in hand, he might proclaim that, in return for a pledge of noninterference with any part of his possessions, or with their government in any shape, he would bind himself in similar engagements to all the worldseeking no extension of territory or dominion for twenty years. Nothing that he can invent would do half as much for peace as that, if truly meant. know of two great and powerful communities, at the least, who would listen gladly to such an offer; while as for Russia herself, it is certain that all the resources and energies of her Government, fully employed for twenty years, could not overimprove her vast estate. But we need not look for such a Russian peace proposal as that.

We

The heads of the Church, like the chiefs of the State, have been taking lessons from the laity; and after long resistance to conviction the bishops are nearly as much

How truly that is the case came out at a meeting of the Upper House of Convocation in May last. On that occasion a petition from the brawling Mr Kensit was discussed-a petition resting on the charge that services "largely those in use in the Church of Rome, and taken from the Roman Missal and other books belonging to that Church," were in many places imported into the Reformed Church of England. The Archbishop of Canterbury presided, twenty-two bishops were present to hear the accusation, and not one of them denied it by so much as a word. It was