DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND-REPORT OF CAS- Fourth Army Corps― Major-General Granger: First division, Major-General Stanley, 19 killed, 85 wounded-aggregate, 104; Second division, Major-General Sheridan, 135 killed, 1151 wounded-aggregate, 1286; Third division, BrigadierGeneral Wood, 150 killed, 851 wounded-aggregate, 1001. Total, 2391. 869. ORDNANCE OFFICER'S REPORT. ORDNANCE OFFICE, HEADQUARTERS Department of THE CUMBERLAND, Brigadier General W. D. Whipple, Assistant SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a list of all ordnance and ordnance stores captured from the enemy, together with a list of expenditures and losses by our own troops in the recent battle of Chattanooga. Captured from the en emy: CANNON, FIELD-GUNS, AND HOWITZERS. Smooth Bores.-Six-pounder guns, 8; twelvepounder guns, light, confederate pattern, 13; twelve-pounder guns, model 1857, Leeds and howitzers, 3. Total smooth bores, 30. Company, New-Orleans, 6; twelve-pounder field Rifled Guns.-Three-inch, confederate pattern, six-pounder field, 2; six-pounder James, 1. To1; ten-pounder Parrott guns, model 1861, 4; tal rified guns, 8. Twenty-four pound guns, 2. Total number of pieces captured, 40. Fourteenth Army Corps-Major-General PalArtillery carriages, .28; caissons, 26; battery mer: First division, Brigadier-General Johnson, A good many 46 killed, 258 wounded-aggregate, 304; Third wagons, 4; travelling forge, 1. division, Brigadier-General Baird, 97 killed, 461 parts of harness were captured, but no complete wounded and missing-aggregate, 565. Total, sets; 2336 rounds of artillery ammunition; 6175 stand of small arms, mostly Enfield; 28 Eleventh Army Corps-Major-General How-cavalry sabres, 549 infantry accoutrements, 511 ard: Second division, Brigadier-General Stein- bayonet-scabbards, 1911 cartridge-pouches, 439 wehr, 25 killed, 176 wounded, 124 missing-ag gregate, 325; Third division, Major-General Schurz, 1 killed, 14 wounded, 10 missing-aggregate, 25. Total, 350. Twelfth Army Corps-Major-General Slocum: First division, Brigadier-General Williams, not engaged; Second division, Brigadier-General George, 56 killed, 255 wounded, 4 missing-aggregate, 345. Total, 345. Grand Total, 529 killed, 3281 wounded, 141 missing-aggregate, 3955. The following is a copy of a telegram just received from Major-General Granger at Knoxville. The list of casualties in the Fourth army corps, on the previous page, is compiled from the statement of staff-officers at this place. The discrepancy cannot be explained until General Granger's report is received: [By telegraph from Strawberry Plains, January sixteenth, 1854, via Calhoun, Tenn.] To General G. H. Thomas, Chattanooga, Tenn.: men; in Stanley's, about 200. G. GRANGER, REPORT OF REBEL DESERTERS AND WAR RECEIVED AND CAPTURED 20, 1863, TO DECEMBER 1, 1863. PRISONERS OF Aggregate. 573 5569 cartridge-box belts, 165 waist-belts, 149 waistcartridge-boxes, 149 cartridge-box plates, 165 belt plates, and 55,000 rounds infantry ammunition. Our own troops lost and expended 211 stand of small arms, 171 infantry accoutrements, 1977 rounds artillery ammunition, 1,560,125 rounds infantry ammunition. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS, Brigadier-General W. D. Whipple, A. A. G., GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the operations of the army which resulted in driving the rebel forces from their position in the vicinity of Chattanooga, and of its participation immediately afterward in their pursuit. In order that these operations may be distinctly understood, that the troops concerned be known and receive the honor due them, it is necessary to premise by stating that the general attack was ordered to be made on the enemy's extreme right at daylight on the twenty-first of November, and that preparatory orders were sent through me on the eighteenth, for the Eleventh corps to cross to the north bank of the Tennessee River on the twentieth. At this time the Eleventh corps and a part of the Twelfth corps were encamped in Lookout Valley, opposite to the left of the enemy's line. In consequence of Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's the non-arrival of the force mainly relied on to brigade, of Cruft's division, was ordered to prolead off, the attack was postponed until the fol-ceed up the valley, cross the creek near Waulowing morning, and again postponed until the hatchie, and march down, sweeping the rebels twenty-fourth, for the same reason. Meanwhile from it. The other brigade of the Fourth corps orders were received for the Eleventh corps to go was to advance, seize the bridge just below the to Chattanooga, where it reported on the twenty- | railroad, and repair it. Osterhaus's division was second. This divided my command, and, as the orders contemplated no advance from Lookout Valley, application was made by me to the Major-General commanding the department, for authority to accompany the Eleventh corps, assigning, as a reason, that it was my duty to join that part of my command going into battle. This was acceded to, and, preparatory to leaving, invitation was sent for Brigadier-General Geary, who was the senior officer in my absence, to examine with me the enemy's position and defences, and to be informed at what points I desired to have his troops held. This was to enable me to make use of the telegraph in communicating with him advisedly during the progress of the fight, should a favorable opportunity present itself for him to advance. THE ADVANCE UPON AND CAPTURE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. to march up from Brown's Ferry, under cover of the hills, to the place of crossing; also to furnish supports for the batteries. The Ohio battery was to take a position on Bald Hill, and the NewYork battery on the hill directly in the rear. The Second Kentucky cavalry was despatched to ob serve the movements of the enemy in the direction of Trenton, and the Illinois company to perform orderly and escort duty. This disposition of the forces was ordered to be made as soon after daylight as practicable. THE ENEMY-LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN AND THE VALLEYS. tinuous line along the right bank of Lookout At this time the enemy's pickets formed a conCreek, with the reserves in the valleys, while his main force was encamped in the hollow, half-way up the slope of the mountain. The summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson's division, and these were comparatively safe, as the On the twenty-third, the commander of the only means of access from the west, for a distance department requested me to remain in Lookout of twenty miles up the valley, was by two or Valley, and make a demonstration as early as pos- three trails, admitting of the passage of but one sible the next morning on the point of Lookout man at a time, and even these trails were held at Mountain, my command to consist of the parts of the top by rebel pickets. For this reason no ditwo divisions. Later in the day, (the twenty-rect attempt was made for the dislodgment of third,) a copy of a telegram was received from the this force. On the Chattanooga side, which is Major-General commanding the military division less precipitous, a road of easy grade has been of the Mississippi, to the effect that in the event made, communicating with the summit by zigthe pontoon-bridge at Brown's Ferry could not zag lines running diagonally up the mountainbe repaired in season for Osterhaus's division of side; and it was believed that before our troops the Fifteenth corps to cross by eight o'clock A.M. should gain possession of this, the enemy on the on the twenty-fourth, the division would report top would evacuate his position, to avoid being to me. Soon after, another telegram, from the cut off from his main body, to rejoin which headquarters of the department instructed me, in would involve a march of twenty or thirty miles. the latter case, to take the point of Lookout Viewed from whatever point, Lookout Mountain, Mountain, if my demonstrations should develop with its high, palisaded crest and its steep, ragits practicability. At two o'clock A.M., word ged, rocky, and deeply furrowed slopes, presentwas received that the bridge could not be put in ed an imposing barrier to our advance, and when serviceable condition for twelve hours; but, to to these natural obstacles were added almost inbe certain on the subject, a staff-officer was de- terminable well-planned and well-constructed despatched to ascertain, and a quarter-past three fences, held by Americans, the assault became A.M. on the twenty fourth, the report was con- an enterprise worthy of the ambition and renown firmed. of the troops to whom it was intrusted. On the northern slope, midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a plateau or belt of arable land GENERAL HOOKER'S ACTUAL COMMAND. to repel an assault from the direction of the river. On each flank were rifle-pits, epaulements for batteries, walls of stone, and abattis to resist attacks from either Chattanooga or Lookout valley. In the valleys themselves, were earthworks of still greater extent. As now composed, my command consisted of enriches the crest. There a continuous line of Osterhaus's division, Fifteenth corps; Cruft's, of the Fourth, and Geary's, of the Twelfth, (ex-redans, and pits appeared lower down the slope, earthworks had been thrown up, while redoubts, cepting from the two last-named divisions such regiments as were required to protect our communications with Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry ;) Battery K, of the First Ohio, and Battery K, First New-York, of the Eleventh corps, (the two having horses but for one;) a part of the Second Kentucky cavalry, and company K, of the Fifteenth Illinois cavalry-making an aggregate force of nine thousand six hundred and eightyone. We were all strangers, no one division ever having seen either of the others. THE ADVANCE OF THE UNION TROOPS THE MOUN TAIN TAKEN. Geary commenced his movement as instructed, crossed the creek at eight o'clock, captured the Our Be on reaching this high ground; but, fired by suc entire picket of forty-two men posted to defend it, marched directly up the mountain till his right rested on the palisades, and headed down the valley. At the same time Gross's brigade advanced resolutely, with brisk skirmishing, drove the enemy from the bridge, and at once proceeded to put it in repair. The firing at this point alarmed the rebels, and immediately their columns were seen filing down the mountains from their camps, and moving into their rifle-pits and breastworks. At the same time numbers established themselves behind the embankment of the railroad, which enabled them, without exposure, to sweep with a fire of musketry the field over which our troops would be compelled to march for a distance of three or four hundred yards. These dispositions were distinctly visiible, and, as facilities for avoiding them were close at hand, Osterhaus was directed to send a brigade, under cover of the hills and trees, about eight hundred yards higher up the creek, and prepare a crossing at that point. This was Brigadier-General Wood's brigade. Soon after this, Cruft was ordered to leave a sufficient force at the bridge to engage the attention of the enemy, and for the balance of Gross's brigade to follow Wood's. Meanwhile a section of howitzers was It was now near two o'clock, and our operaplanted to enfilade the position the enemy had tions were arrested by the darkness. The clouds, taken, and Osterhaus established a section of which had hovered over and enveloped the sumtwenty-pounder Parrotts to enfilade the route by mit of the mountain during the morning, and to which the enemy had left his camp. The bat some extent favored our movements, gradually tery on Bald Hill enfiladed the railroad and high-settled into the valley and completely veiled it way leading to Chattanooga, and all the batteries from our view. Indeed, from the moment we and sections of batteries had a direct or enfilad-rounded the peak of the mountain, it was only ing fire, within easy range, on all the positions from the roar of battle, and the occasional glimpse taken by the rebels. Besides, the twenty-pound- our comrades in the valley could catch of our er Parrotts could be used with good effect on the rebel camp on the side of the mountain. With this disposition of the artillery, it was believed we would be able to prevent the enemy from despatching relief to oppose Geary, and also keep him from running away. At eleven o'clock, Wood had completed his bridge; Geary appeared close by, his skirmishers smartly engaged, and all the guns opened. Wood's and Gross's then sprang across the river, joined Geary's left, and moved down the valley. A few of the enemy escaped from the artillery fire, and those who did ran upon our own infantry and were captured. The balance of the rebel forces were killed or taken prisoners, many of them remaining in the bottom of their pits for safety until forced out by our men. lines and standards, that they knew of the strife in its progress, and when, from these evidences, our true condition was revealed to them, their painful anxiety yielded to transports of joy, which only soldiers can feel in the earliest movements of dawning victory. Deeming a descent into the valley imprudent, without more accurate information of its topography, and also of the position and strength of the enemy, our line was established on the east side of the mountain, the right resting on the palisades, and the left near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, and this we strengthened by all the means at hand, working until four o'clock, when the commander of the department was informed that our position was impregnable. During all of these operations the batteries on Simultaneously with these operations the troops Moccasin Point, under Captain Naylor, had been on the mountain rushed on in their advance, the busily at work from the north bank of the Tenright passing directly under the muzzles of the nessee River, and had contributed as much to enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over our assistance as the irregularities of the ground ledges and boulders, up hill and down, furiously and the state of the atmosphere would admit of. driving the enemy from his camp and from posi- From our position we commanded the enemy's tion after position. This lasted until twelve line of defence, stretching across Chattanooga o'clock, when Geary's advance heroically rounded valley, by an enfilading fire, and also, by a direct the peak of the mountain. Not knowing to what fire, many of his camps, some of which were in extent the enemy might be reënforced, and fear- our immediate vicinity; also, direct communicaing, from the rough character of the field of op- tion had been opened with Chattanooga, and at a erations, that our lines might be disordered, quarter-past five o'clock Brigadier-General Cardirections had been given for the troops to haltlin, Fourteenth corps, reported to me, with his brigade, and was assigned to duty on the right of the line, to relieve Geary's command, almost exhausted with the fatigue and excitement incident to their unparalleled march. To prevent artillery being brought forward, the enemy had undermined the road and covered it with felled timber. This was repaired and placed in serviceable condition before morning. During the day and till after midnight, an irregular fire was kept up along our line, and had the appearance at one time of an effort to break it. This was on the right, and was at once vigorously and handsomely repelled. In this, Carlin's brigade rendered excellent service. His report is herewith forwarded. Before daylight, anticipating the withdrawal of the rebel force from the summit of the mountain, parties from several regiments were despatched to scale it; but to the Eighth Kentucky must belong the distinction of having been foremost to reach the crest, and at sunrise to display our flag from the peak of Lookout, amid the wild and prolonged cheers of the men whose dauntless valor had borne it to that point. During the night the enemy had quietly abandoned the mountain, leaving behind twenty thousand rations, the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades, and other materiel. An impenetrable mist still covered the face of the valley. Prisoners reported that the enemy had abandoned it; but, deeming it imprudent to descend, a reconnoissance was ordered, and soon after nine o'clock a report came in that the rebels had retired, but that their pickets still held the right bank of Chattanooga Creek, in the direction of Rossville. Soon after the fog vanished, and nothing was to be seen in the valley but the deserted and burning camps of the enemy. were laid, Osterhaus managed to throw over the Twenty-seventh Missouri regiment, and soon after all of his infantry. The former deployed, pushed forward as skirmishers to the gorge in Missionary Ridge, and drew the fire of the artillery and infantry holding it, and also discovered that the enemy was attempting to cover a train of wagons, loading with stores at the Rossville House. As the position was one presenting many advantages for defence, the skirmishers were directed to keep the enemy engaged in front, while Wood's brigade was taking the ridge on the right and four regiments of Williamson's on the left. Two other regiments of this brigade were posted on the road leading to Chattanooga, to prevent surprise. In executing their duties, the troops were necessarily exposed to the enemy's artillery, but as soon as it was discovered that his flanks were being turned, and his retreat threatened, he hastily evacuated the gap, leaving behind large quantities of artillery and small arms, ammunition, wagons, ambulances, and a house full of commissary stores. Pursuit was made as far as consistent with my instructions to clear Missionary Ridge. Meanwhile, the bridge had been completed, and all the troops over, or crossing. Osterhaus received instructions to move, with his division, parallel with the ridge, on the east; Cruft on the ridge, and Geary in the valley, to the west of it, within easy supporting distance. The batteries accompanied Geary, as it was not known that roads could be found for them with the other divisions, without delaying the movements of the column. General Cruft, with his staff, preceded his column in ascending the ridge, to supervise the formation of his lines, and was at once met by a line of the enemy's skirmishAmong the fruits of the preceding operations ers, advancing. The Ninth and Thirty-sixth may be enumerated the concentration of the Indiana regiment sprang forward, ran into line army, the abandonment of the defences, upward under their fire, and, instantly charging, drove of eight miles in extent; the recovery of all the back the rebels, while the residue of the column advantages in a position the enemy had gained formed their lines; Gross's brigade, with the from our army on the bloody field of Chicka- Fifty-first Ohio and Thirty-fifth Indiana, of mauga, giving to us the undisputed navigation Whitaker's, in advance, the balance of the latter of the river and the control of the railroad; the closely supporting the front line. It was, howcapture of between two and three thousand pris-ever, soon found that the ridge on top was too oners, five stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, upward of five thousand muskets, etc. Of the troops opposed to us were four brigades of Walker's division, Hardee's corps; a portion of Stewart's division, of Breckinridge's corps; and on the top of the mountain were three brigades of Stevenson's division. THE PURSUIT-THE FIGHT ON THE RIDGE. In conformity with orders, two regiments were despatched to hold the mountain, Carlin's brigade was directed to await orders on the Summertown road, and at ten o'clock my column, Osterhaus's (being nearest the road) leading, marched for Rossville. On arriving at Chattanooga Creek, it was discovered that the enemy had destroyed the bridge, and, in consequence, our pursuit was delayed nearly three hours. As soon as the stringers narrow to admit of this formation, and the division was thrown into four lines. By this time the divisions of Geary and Osterhaus were abreast of it, and all advanced at a charging pace. The enemy had selected, for his advanced line of defence, the breastworks thrown up by our army on its return from Chickamauga; but such was the impetuosity of our advance, that his front line was routed before an opportunity was af forded him to prepare for a determined resistance. Many of the fugitives, to escape, ran down the east slope to the lines of Osterhaus; a few to the west, and were picked up by Geary. The bulk of them, however, sought refuge behind the second line, and they, in their turn, were soon routed, and the fight became almost a running one. Whenever the accidents of the ground enabled the rebels to make an advantageous stand, Geary and Osterhaus-always in the right place would pour a withering fire into their flanks, and again the race was renewed. This continued until near sunset, when those of the enemy who had not been killed or captured, gave way, and, in attempting to escape along the ridge, ran into the arms of Johnson's division of the Fourteenth corps, and were captured. Our enemy, the prisoners stated, was Stewart's division. But few escaped. Osterhaus alone captured two thousand of them. This officer named the Fourth Iowa, Seventy-sixth Ohio, and Twenty-seventh Missouri regiments as having been especially distinguished in this engagement. Landgraber's battery of howitzers also rendered brilliant service on this field. tery and two or three thousand infantry. Instructions were sent him to attack them at once; and, while forming his lines to the left for that purpose, the remaining part of the column was massed, as it came up, to the right of the road, and held, awaiting the movements of Palmer. His enemy was discovered to be a battery of three pieces, with a small escort, and was the rear of the rebel army on the road from Greysville to Ringgold. Three pieces of artillery were captured, and subsequently an additional piece, with, I believe, a few prisoners. I have received no report, from this officer, of his operations while belonging to my command, although mine has been delayed six weeks in waiting. We were now fairly up with the enemy. This was at ten o'clock at night. Cruft's division advanc Here our business for the day ended, and the troops went into bivouac, with cheers and re-ed, and took possession of the crest of Chickajoicing, which were caught up by other troops in the vicinity, and carried along the ridge, until lost in the distance. THE PURSUIT CONTINUED-RINGGOLD-THE ENEMY OVERTAKEN. mauga hills-the enemy's abandoned camp-fires still burning brightly on the side-and we all went into bivouac. My artillery was not yet up; and, in this connection, I desire that the especial attention of the Commander of the department may be callSoon after daylight, every effort was made, by ed to that part of the report of General Osterreconnoissance and inquiry, to ascertain the haus which relates to the conduct of the officers whereabouts of the enemy; but to no purpose. who had the pontoon-bridge in charge. I do not The field was silent as the grave. Knowing the know the names of the officers referred to; was desperate extremities to which he must be re- not furnished with a copy of their instructions, duced by our success, with his retreat seriously nor did they report to me. The pontoons were threatened by the only line left him with a hope not brought forward to the point of crossing at of success, I felt satisfied the enemy must be in all, and the calks and chess-planks only reached full retreat; and accordingly suggested to the their destination between nine and ten o'clock commander of the department that my column P.M.-distance from Chattanooga ten miles, and march to Greysville, if possible, to intercept him. the roads excellent. Then trestles had to be This was approved of, and, reënforced by Palm-framed, and the bridge was not finished until er's corps, all moved immediately in that direction, Palmer's corps in advance. On arriving at the west fork of the Chickamauga River, it was found that the enemy had destroyed the bridge. To provide for this contingency, Major-General Butterfield, my Chief of Staff, had in the morning prudently requested that three pontoons, with their calks and chesses, might be despatched for my use, but as they had not come up, after a detention of several hours, a bridge was constructed for the infantry, the officers swimming their horses. It was not until after three o'clock that the regiments were able to commence crossing, leaving the artillery and ambulances to follow as soon as practicable; also a regiment of artillery as a guard, to complete the bridge, if possible, for the artillery, and also to assist in throwing over the pontoonbridge as soon as it arrived. Partly in consequence of this delay, instructions were given for Palmer's command to continue on to Greysville, on reaching the La Fayette road, and for the balance of the command to proceed to Ringgold, (Cruft now leading.) as this would enable me to strike the railroad five or six miles to the south of where it was first intended. Palmer was to rejoin me in the morning. Soon after dark, word was received from Palmer, through a member of his staff, that he had come up with the enemy, reported to be a bat six o'clock the following morning. The report of Lieutenant H. C. Wharton, of the engineers, and temporarily attached to my staff, who was left behind to hasten the completion of the bridge, is herewith transmitted. No better commentary on this culpable negligence is needed than is furnished by the record of our operations in the vicinity of Ringgold. The town was distant five miles. At daylight the pursuit was renewed-Osterhaus in the advance, Geary following, and Cruft in the rear. Evidences of the precipitate flight of the enemy were everywhere apparent; caissons, wagons, ambulances, arms, and ammunition were abandoned in the hurry and confusion of retreat. After going about two miles, we came up with the camps he had occupied during the night, the fires still burning. A large number of prisoners were also taken before reaching the east fork of the Chickamauga River. We found the ford, and also the bridge to the south of Ringgold, held by a body of rebel cavalry. These discharged their arms, and quickly gave way before a handful of our men, and were closely pursued into the town. I rode to the front on hearing the firing, where I found Osterhaus out with his skirmishers, intensely alive to all that was passing, and pushing onward briskly. He informed me that four pieces of artillery had just left the rebel camp, weakly escorted, |