may be inflicted, by means which would otherwise be contemptible, on a government, which has so long a line of mountainous country to defend, and whose chiefs have been so accustomed to a life of lawless turbulence, that they do not hesitate to array themselves in opposition to authority upon the slightest provocation, and without a hope of ultimate success.

18. We have learned, by the experience of this rebellion, one important fact, which is, that our regular European and Hindostanee troops fight against Affghans, in their native hills, to a great disadvantage. The superior agility of the latter enables them to evade pursuit, and their fuzils, or long guns, carry with deadly precision to a distance, where our muskets are harmless. There is now no enemy to oppose us in the open plain, and should we hereafter be forced into hostilities, the desultory mountain warfare will doubtless be that with which we shall have to contend. Should his Lordship in Council therefore resolve on increasing his Majesty's force, with a view of recalling the regular regiments from this coun

try, I would suggest that, instead of organizing any more Hindostanee troops, three infantry corps should be raised from the Eusufzyes, Suhaks, Undurees, Kohistanees, Kyberries, and the inhabitants of other mountainous regions, to undergo a moderate degree of discipline, and to be armed with the jezzail of the country. By a judicious admixture of different tribes, by attention to their prejudices, and by regular pay, I should have little fear of fidelity. In the meantime, endeavours will be made to impart as great a degree of efficiency as possible to his Majesty's Jezzailchees, who are a very useful body of men. In the above opinion I am supported by the authority of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., of LieutenantColonel Sir A. Burnes, C.B., and of Brigadier Anquetil.

19. It is my intention to forward a copy of this letter for the information of the honourable the Secret Committee, through the Government of Bomba.

have, &c.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Envoy and Minister.

Fort William, December 3, 1841.
Sir,

Since addressing your Excellency yesterday we have received an express from Mr. Clerk, of the 23rd ultimo, containing information of the events at Cabul to the 9th, and at Jellalabad to the 15th ultimo.

2. These accounts exhibit a most unfavourable state of affairs at Ca

bul, but they do not lead us to alter the views and intentions which were stated in our yesterday's dispatch. Your Excellency will, therefore, expedite the movement of whatever may be required to complete one brigade, efficiently provided with all necessaries of equip ment and supply, in the direction of Peshawur, to be stationed there, with orders of the tenor which we yesterday fully explained, so as to

give succour to our troops in the event of their retiring. We do not now desire to send a second brigade in advance, for we do not conceive it to be called for, for the objects of support and assistance which we contemplate; and we think it inexpedient to detach any greater number of troops than may be absolutely indispensable from our own provinces.

3. It would be vain to speculate upon the issue of the contest at Cabul; but in the extreme event of the military possession of that city, and the surrounding territory, having been entirely lost, it is not our intention to direct new and extensive operations for the reestablishment of our supremacy throughout Affghanistan.

4. We can scarcely contemplate in such case that there will be any circumstances or political objects of sufficient weight to induce us to desire to retain possession of the remainder of that country, and, unless such shall be obvious as arising from the course of events, we should wish our military and political officers so to shape their proceedings as will best promote the end of retiring with the least possible discredit. Of course it will be desirable that this retirement shall be deliberate, and the result of arrangements that will leave some political influence in the country; but it is impossible to shut our eyes to the probability that the first impulse of the population in the southern districts, upon hearing of our having suffered disaster at Cabul, will be to rise and surround our different positions, cutting off the communication. In this case the commanding officers will be instructed to make it their first aim to fall back on the nearest support, and so to save

their troops from the risk of being isolated; it being, of course, a paramount consideration to provide for the safety of the different detachments as far as possible. MajorGeneral Nott, or the officer commanding at Candahar, will be directed, in the event of the loss of Cabul, to take the force at Ghuznee under his orders, and to provide Colonel Palmer with suitable instructions. With regard to the regiment at Ghuznee, we shall instruct Mr. Clerk to arrange with the Sikh government for giving every aid in its power, should the retirement of that corps to Dhera Ismael Khan, or other point on the frontier, be determined upon. We shall cause a copy of this paragraph to be conveyed to Major Rawlinson, Major General Nott, and Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, both through Major Outram in Upper Scinde, and Capt. Mackeson in Peshawur.

5. We doubt not that your Excellency will have felt it desirable to superintend personally the execution of such measures on our frontier as the exigency of events may have rendered necessary, and will, therefore, have proceeded to establish your head-quarters at one of the advanced stations.

6. It is of high importance at this juncture that we should act in a clear and cordial plan of co-ope ration with the government of Lahore, and a dispatch has been this day in consequence addressed to Mr. Clerk, of which we enclose a copy for your Excellency's information.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND,
W. W. BIRD,
W. CASEMENT,
H. T. PRINSEP,

Fort William, Feb. 19, No. 16, 1842.

Honorable Sirs,

In continuing the narrative of events in Affghanistan since the date of our latest despatch on that subject of the 22nd of last month, we have to deplore the occurrence of heavy calamity to the British arms, and at the same time to lament the great obscurity which still hangs over many of the most important circumstances connected with the causes and course of the disasters which have been suffered. 2. In our despatch of the 22nd ultimo, we stated, that the last date of our intelligence, then received from Cabul, was the 25th of December, when Major Pottinger reported the murder of Sir Wm. Macnaghten, and the continuance of negotiation for the retirement of our troops from that place.

3. From the papers now sent, your honourable Committee will learn, that on the 28th of December Major Pottinger wrote to Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, stating the arrangement with the leaders at Cabul to be still incomplete. That on the 29th of December, Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone wrote of ficially to Captain Macgregor and Major-General Sir Robert Sale, directing them, in pursuance of stipulations made at Cabul, to retire from Jellalabad to Peshawur, -that on the 4th of January let ters were received at Jellalabad from the cantonment at Cabul, announcing that a march towards the former place was immediately intended, and that on the 6th of January the troops actually marched, devoid, as far as we learn, of all provision for food, for shelter,

or for safety; and that thus exposed to the attacks of enemies in the mountain defiles, and in the worst severity of a winter season, they became, after two or three marches, dispirited and disorganised, and were as a military body, ultimately wholly destroyed or dispersed.

4. We do not know the strength in effective men that marched from Cabool on this melancholy retreat, but the force there must have been greatly reduced by the casualties of a protracted contest; and we should believe that the retiring body could scarcely have exceeded 4,000 men fit for service, and placed at much disadvantage by the loss of many officers killed or wounded.

5. The details of which we are in possession regarding this disastrous march, will be learned by your honourable Committee, from the private letters of Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, of the 13th January, and subsequent dates, and from a private letter from Captain G. St. P. Lawrence, late Military Secretary to Sir William Macnaghten, to his brother, written from a fort in the Lughman country, near to Jellalabad, where he, with other British officers and some ladies, were prisoners, under the care of Mahomed Akhbar Khan, the son of Dost Mahomed Khan, whose prominent participation in the struggle was stated in our dispatch of the 22nd ultimo ; but your honourable Committee will remember that these details proceeding from single parties, cannot in any degree be regarded as furnishing us with an authentic and complete narrative

of events, and are not to be referred to as being of authority, beyond the testimony given to events happening under the immediate observation of the writers.

6. We learn from the letter of Captain Lawrence, that MajorGeneral Elphinstone, who commanded the Cabul force, was also a prisoner in the same fort at Lughman; but we have no communication from Major-General Elphinstone of any kind, nor have we received any since the disturbance at Cabul first commenced.

7. In a letter from Jellalabad, of the 25th of January, Captain Macgregor refers to the receipt of two long letters from Major Pottinger, likewise a prisoner at Lughman, copies of which Captain Macgregor intended to send on to Peshawur on the next day; but these communications have not yet reached us, and we fear that the transit of letters between Jellalabad and Peshawur may have become interrupted.

8. We would point the attention of your Committee to a statement in the private letter of Captain Lawrence, which gives the first clear intimation of a division of the force at Cabul, that must most dangerously have impaired its strength. It appears, that immediately after the insurrection broke out, nearly two corps of infantry, with a troop of horse artillery, were thrown into the Bala Hissar, where the king resided, and which we understand to be a position that could not have been successfully assailed by an enemy unprovided with an efficient force in guns. The extensive works of the cantonments were thus left with only three tegiments of infantry to guard them, and to be directed against

an enemy without, and almost the only effective portion of the field artillery which was at that time at Cabul, was diverted from the service on which it could apparently have been most usefully employed.

9. We do not wish to prejudge proceedings of which we know so little, but it is at the same time right to mark such facts in the correspondence before us, as seem to be of obvious importance.

10. Your honourable Committee will remember that the battery of foot artillery with horses, under the command of Captain Abbott, had left Cabul before the insurrection, and formed a portion of Sir Robert Sale's force proceeding to Jellalabad.

11. For the artillery that remained at Cabul, there were abundant supplies of ammunition of all kinds calculated for a year's use. It is to the absence of any sufficient force, in the different arms, held available for action beyond the line of our defensive works, and to the early loss of the unpro tected commissariat stores, that we must attribute, in a great measure, the ultimate triumph of the enemy.

12. The letter from Lieutenant Conolly at Cabul, of the 17th of January, sent with Captain Macgregor's letter from Jellalabad, of the 24th January, gives the latest intelligence of the state of affairs at the capital after the departure of our troops. It will be perceived that Shah Shooja had been accepted as king by the chiefs of the insurgents generally, and that Mahomed Zemaun Khan Barukzye, a brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, who had been placed as leader of the insurrection, had resigned the name at least of the authority to which he had been raised, and

been appointed to the post of chief minister under the Shah. There are conflicting parties of Barukzye and other Dooranee chiefs at Cabul, and it is not probable that this compromise or union of interests, supported as it would seem to have been by an expenditure of money on the part of the Shah, can be of long continuance.

13. In a letter from Shah Shooja to Captain Macgregor, sent with a letter from the latter officer, of the 22nd January, your honourable Committee will find a statement by the Shah with respect to his own position and views. It will be seen that he asks for pecuniary aid to enable him to maintain his authority.

14. From the 13th to the 25th of January, which is our last date from Jellalabad, no attack has been made on that post, which is stated to have been then supplied with two months' provisions for the troops, though only with one months' forage for the cattle. The spirit and fortitude with which the position at Jellalabad has been held and strengthened, for a period of two months, under circumstances of pressing difficulty and discouragement, have entitled our officers and troops there, under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, and aided by the able and determined political management of Captain Macgregor, assistant to the Cabul mission, to our highest admiration.

15. Mahomed Akhbar Khan had no strong force with him near to Jellalabad, and it is not known whether any effective means and materiel will be sent to him from Cabool; but we must regard the position of the gallant garrison of Jellalabad with very deep anxiety. It appeared to be the plan of Ma

homed Akhbar Khan to proceed to the Khyber defiles in order to prevent the approach of succour to Jelialabad by troops moving from Peshawur.

16. The efforts at first made by the detachment of British troops, consisting of four regiments of native infantry, with some details of irregular horse, and a native company of foot artillery, using four inefficient guns, obtained from General Avitabile, at Peshawur, to advance through the Khyber Pass for the relief of Jellalabad, or to hold the Pass in strength so as to cover the retirement of the Jellalabad garrison to Peshawur, have unhappily ended in failure.

The despatches in the political and military departments, connected with this subject, are sent as inclosures to this letter; and we will refer your honourable Committee to them for all details. Two papers of remarks, by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in regard to no guns having been sent from Ferozepore, with either of the two detachments in which these regiments marched, are also amongst the inclosures, and will engage the particular attention of your honourable committee. We certainly see much reason to regret that some guns were not attached both to the second detachment of these regiments, and to the brigade which subsequently marched with Major-General Pollock; with this last brigade three 9-pounders were indeed sent, but we cannot feel confident that they will prove sufficient for the service required from them. We shall communicate a copy of this paragraph to his Excellency.

17. At the same time we think it right to add, that the instructions given by his Excellency to