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somest manner, with great slaughter. General Sumner, who was with General Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kearney's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss.

# * * * ♦

"This attack commenced about 4 P.m., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery, directed with great precision, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, 200 paces wide, was tilled with the enemy; each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the 63d Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the 87th i\ew York volunteers."

General McCaH's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Captain De Russy's battery was placed on the right of General. Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. General Bnrns'a brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return from the White Oak swamp.

Later in the day, at the call of General Kearney, General Taylor's 1st New Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, was sent to occupy a portion of General MeCall's deserted position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after give up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 o'clock at night General Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his corps, and soon afterdaylight both of his divisions, with General Slocum's division, and a portion of General Sumner's command, reached Malvern hill.

On the morning of the 80th General Sumner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and, upon a call from General Franklin for reinforcements, sent him two brigades, which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. General Sumner says of this battle:

44 The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the buttle of Fair Oaks. About 3 o'clock P.m. the action commenced, and, after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the ene mv was routed at all points and driven from the field."

The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern hill about 4 P.m. At about this time the enemy began to appear in General Porter's front, and at 5 o'clock, advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren%s command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hand^ of Colonel Warren.

The gnu-boats rendered most efficient aid at this time,and helped to drive back the enemy. It

was very late at night before my aides returned to give me the result of the day's fighting aiong the whole line, and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear, from General Franklin before sending orders to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that General Franklin was falling back; whereupon I sent. Colonel Colburn of my staff with orders to verify this, and, if it were true, to order in Gem ral Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers sent from General Franklin's headquarters with the information that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were given as to the movement, which was to commence on the right The orders met these troops already en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow.

General Barnard then received full instructions for posting the troops as they arrived. I then returned to Haxall's and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak, accompanied by several general officers. I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity.


The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy on the 1st of July, was with the left and centre of our lines resting on *' Malvern Hill," while the right curved backwards through a wooded country toward a point below Haxall's on James river. Malvern hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile area, well cleared of timber, and with seyeral converging roads limning over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the wood-land, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Toward the northwest the plateau falls off more abrubptly into a ravine which extends to James river. From the position of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack would come from the directions of Richmond and White Oak swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops, and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line (Sykes's division on the left, Morrell's on the right) with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted; and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground, that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeded in getting ten of his siege «runs in position on the highest point of the hill.

..Couch's division was placed on the right oi Porter, next came Kearney and Hooker, next Sedgwick and Richardson, next Smith and Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes's corps, ex

tending by a backward curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania Reserve corps was held in reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and

canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward

Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was<l with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colthrown to the left on the low ground, to protect .*."... - - the flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau; but from thence to the extreme right, the troops were more deployed. This formation was imperative as an attack would probably be made upon our left.

The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber and barricading the road. Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on James river, placed his gun-boats so as to protect our flanks, and to command the approaches from Richmond.

Between 9 and 10 A.m. the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing with his artilery and skirmishers, as far to the right as Hooker's division.

About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving towards our right, within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter; but though the column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared, and was not again heard of. The presumption is, that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterwards made on our left.

About 3 P.m. a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearney's left, and Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our. own, and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musketry range, when they sprang to their feet, and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking force, and drove them in disorder back over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our line some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position, and a better fire.

Shortly after four o'clock the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy co withdraw from the field.

Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was stationed upon Couch's right, by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the generals, and everything held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries; but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case, sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several ii stances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking columns, which rushed through the storm of

ors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field.

About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops to reinforce that part of the line and hold the position. These brigades relieved such regiments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended; but despite his vastly superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle of Malvern hill, though it was not until after nine o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire.

During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy by throwing shells among his reserves and advancing columns.

As the army, in its movement from the Chickahominy to Harrison's landing, was continually occupied in marching by night and fighting by day, its commanders found no time or opportunity for collecting data, which would enable them to give exact returns of casualties in each engagement. The aggregate of our entire losses, from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, inclusive, was ascertained, after arriving at Harrison's landing, to be as follows:

List of the killed, wounded and missino, in the army of the Potomac, from the 26th of June, to the 1st of July, 1862, inclusive.


Although the result of the battle of Malvern, was a complete victory, it was nevertheless necessary to fall back still further in order to reach a point where our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gun-boat flotilla, this could only be done below City point; concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrison's bar as the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage and ammunition made it imperative to reach the transports immediately.

The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's landing, during the night of the Suth of June, and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern hill.

The order prescribed a movement by the left

an J rear. General Keyes's corps to cover the manoeuvre. It was not carried out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear-guard between his command and the enemy. Golonel Averill, of the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, was entrusted with this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan's brigade of regular infantry, and one battery. By a judicious use of the resources at his command, he deceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remaining himself on the previous day's battle-field until about 7 o'clock of the 2d July. Meantime, General Keyes having received his •rders, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement of the entire army, and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, General Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues, and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassible by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel I

an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words: "I do not think more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy, instead of away from him; and when it is understood that the carriages and teams belonging to this afmy, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an ♦ nemy vastly superior in numbers, will be appreciated."

The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Harrison's bar, until after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear guard did not move into their camp until every thing was secure The enemy followed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly dispersed by our batteries, and the fire of the gun-boats.

Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes, for the skill and energy which characterized his performance of the important and delicate duties entrusted to his charge.

High praise is also due to the officers and nien of the 1st Connecticut artillery, Col. Tvler, for the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days, and from Malvern hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads, the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind.



On the 1st of July, I received the following from the President:

"washington, JiJy 1, 1862—3.30/7. m.

"It is impossible to reinforce you for your present -emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to give you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security and wait, rest and repair.

"Maintain your ground if you can, but save the armv at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out.

u A. Lincoln. "Maj. Gen. Geo. B. Mccleu Vn."

In a despatch from the President to me on the 2d of July, he says;

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Trv just now to save the army materiel and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can.

41 The governors of eighteen (18) states offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept."

On the 3d of July, the following kind despatch was received from the President:


"Washington. July 3, 1862—5 p. m.

"Yours of 5.30, yesterday, is just received.

I am satisfied that' yourself, officers and men

have done the best you could. All accounts say

better fighting was never done. Ten thousand

thanks for it.


u A. Lincoln.

"Major General G. B. Mcclellan."

On the 4th, I sent the following to the President:

"Headquarters Army Of The Potomac,

"Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 18G2.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2d instant.

"I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much require.

"After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lusting until night; they were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded, the consequences would


have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting which had continued from the afternoon of the 2tith ult., in a daily scries of engagements, wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both sides.

"The mutual loss, in killed and wounded, is enormous. That of the enemy certainly greatest. On Tuesday evening, the 1st, our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point. Our line of defence there, being too extended to be maintained by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 A. M., on the 2d, a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day, and until the forenoon of yesterday.

"The road became horrible. Troops, artillery and wagons, moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and materiel, was finally brought safe into this camp. The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its morale, and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to make.

"We now occupy a line of heights about two miles from the James, a plain extending from there to the river. Our front is about three miles long. These heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The gunboats can render valuable support upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front, we must hold our ground as best we may and at whatever cost.

"Our positions can be carried only by overwhelming numbers. The spirit of the army is excellent. Stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiery exhibit the best results of discipline. Our position is by no means impregnable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground, from our centre to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and if so our front will be the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be decisive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded and prisoners. I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not beaten in any conflict. The enemy were unable by their utmost efforts to drive us from any field. Never did such a change of base, involving a retrogade movement, and under incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more numerous foe, partake of so little disorder. We have lost no guns, except 25 on the field of battle, 21 of which were lost by the giving way of McCall's division under the onset of superior numbers.

"Our communications by the James river are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or mus

ketrv and command the river, and where it is not certain' that our gun-boats can drive them out In case of this, or in ease our front is broken, I will still make every effort to preserve at least the personnel of the army, and the events of the last few days leave no question that the troops will do all that their country can ask. Send such reinforcements as you can. I will do what I can. We are shipping our wounded and sick, and landing supplies. The navy department should co-operate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power, in the kindest and most efficient manner.

"When all the circumstances of the case are known, it will be acknowledged by all competent judges, that the movement just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Under the most difficult circumstances we have preserved our trains, our guns, our materiel, and, above all, our honor.

"George B. Mcclellan,

"Major General."

To which I received the following reply:

"washengtox, July 5, 1862—9 a. m. "A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of 12 and 1 P. M. yesterday, gave me. Be assured, the heroism and skill of yourself, officers, and men, is and forever will be appreciated.

"If you can hold your present position we shall hive the enemy yet.

"A. Lincoln. "Major General G. B. Mcclellan,

'* Commanding Army of the Potomac."

The following letters were received from his excellency the President:

"War Department,

"Washington City. D. C, July 4th, 1862.

"I understand your position, as stated in your letter, and by General Marcy. To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from-the Potomac (about ten thousand, I suppose), and about ten thousand I hope you will have from Buvnside very soon, and about five thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I c;m send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army first, where you are, if you can, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that with the aid of the gunboats and reinforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position; provided, and so long as you can keep James river open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James river open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I" do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

"Yours, very truly,

u A Lincoln.

"Major General Mcclkllan.

"P. S.—If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. A. L."

The following telegram was sent on the 7th:

"headquarters Army Of The Potomac,

"Berkeley, July 7, 1862—8.30 a. m.

"As boat is starting, I have only time to acknowledge receipt of despatch by General Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position ig very strong, and daily becoming more §o. If not attacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I have been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-officer Goldsborough last night; he is confident he can keep river open. He should have all gun-boats possible. Will see him again this morning. My men are in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it agttin.

u Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army.

G. B. Mcclellan,
Major General

"A. Lincoln, President."

While general-in-chief, and directing the operations of all our armies in the field, I had become deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and carrying out certain views regarding the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were essential to its objects and its success. During an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country, these were so fully confirmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we then occupied not to withhold a candid expression of the more important of these views from the commander-inchief whom the constitution places at the head of the armies and navies, as well as of the government of the nation. The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln:

"Headquarters Army Of The Potomac,

u Camp near Harrison's Landiiu], Va~, "July 7, 1862.

"mr. President: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions, or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency, for your private consderation, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this armv, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cau^e must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. "The time has come when the government must determine upon a civil and military policy

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