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fact that their country was penetrable by our forces in every direction. And nothing would have made them more uneasy in regard to the status of their peculiar institution than a raid of that kind. We might not have said one word to the negroes, or interfered with them in any respect. And still there is no calculating the powerful effect such an expedition would have had upon those counties, and upon the rebel army there. These men in their army at Fredericksburg have families and slaves all through these counties; and let them have even learned that a raid had passed through there, carrying, as they would have supposed, the President's proclamation, and neither the conscription, nor the bayonet, nor anything else could have kept all those men in the army. Many of them would have gone home.

Question. Then you think your proposed movement would have greatly increased the chances of success in an attack upon the rebel forces at Fredericksburg?

Answer. Yes, sir; there never has been a movement of that kind made that has not increased-in some cases doubled-the chances of success. The enemy operated in the same way against us in the late battle with General Rosecrans, and in their operations against General Pope. They interrupted our communications in the rear, disordered our plans, and greatly crippled our movements. And our cavalry raids in the west had the best effect against them. In Virginia here, it seems as though the rivers run, and the railroads and canals are constructed through there, just for the purpose of being crossed and destroyed by us in just such a raid. I felt personally and professionally anxious to do this, in reference to these rebel cavalry officers who were then north of the Rappahannock. I could not have dealt them a heavier blow than to have made this raid around through their own country while they were trifling about our lines. And this is the second proposition I nave made in regard to their cavalry.

Question. State what the first one was, if you please.

Answer. That was when Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania and Maryland. At that time I was at Green Spring, below Cumberland, on the Potomac. I proposed to General Marcy, General McClellan's chief of staff, that I should go down through Romney, south of the Potomac, attack and destroy as much as practicable the force there under Imboden; turn to the left through Manassas Gap and recross the Potomac at or near the very place where Stuart recrossed it. That would have been going around their army at the same time they were going around ours. If I had been allowed to carry out that proposed plan, I see no reason why I should not have succeeded in passing around the rear of their army; and it is quite likely I should have met Stuart at or about the time he recrossed into Virginia.

Question. Why did you not make the movement you proposed?

Answer. I was not allowed to do it. I was ordered to return at once. although Stuart was 100 miles from me, and endeavor to intercept him. It was supposed there that he would endeavor to recross the Potomac up about Cumberland. I knew, from the water being in the canal all the way down to near Harper's Ferry, that it was impracticable for Sutart to cross the Potomac except where he could cross the canal at the culverts. It happened that at that time General Cox's division was at Hancock. I was ordered to see that it was properly placed and posted, to afford him information, &c. All I had to do was to put a sufficient number of men at these culverts to defend them, and Stuart never could have got back in that direction. I had less to encounter in getting around their army than they had in getting around ours, and a better force to do it with.

Question. Was General McClellan aware of your proposition?

Answer. I do not think that General McClellan himself ever knew of it. He was absent in Philadelphia at that time, I believe, and the correspondence, by telegraph, which took place, was between General Marcy, his chief of staff, and myself. I do not think that General McClellan ever knew anything at all about it. I have never asked him. I came down to the Potomac then, made the dispositions of the infantry, and wandered about there, able to do little or nothing. I got some of the young farmer boys up in that country, and in the southern part of Pennsylvania, who were well acquainted with all that country, and got them to mount their horses and go in every direction and bring me information as quickly as possible of Stuart's position and movements. They were to hover about him continually and let me know all about him. I ascertained in a few hours that he never intended to return in that direction. I do not think that Stuart carried out the purpose of his raid. I think he should have struck for the Pennsylvania railroad. That was where I supposed he would go. He was within fifty miles of it after crossing the Potomac. The nearest point on the road to the Potomac was exactly opposite the place where he crossed; and upon looking at the map, I supposed that would be his point of attack. I was nearly one hundred miles west of that. I had been sent up there to punish Imboden, who had made a little raid and destroyed a bridge across a railroad that was not used. It was a matter of no importance to draw me up there. I was sent up there, however, but affected nothing but the posting of an efficient line of pickets along the south side of the Potomac.

Question. Have our cavalry accomplished what they ought to have accomplished, and what they could have accomplished? If not, why have they not?

Answer. My answer would be a mere opinion

Question. Of course; that is what I expected, and what I want.

Answer. We have tried two or three different organizations of the cavalry. I think that we now have in the army of the Potomac the best organization for cavalry. It is one we have not had before for any length of time. The cavalry is now consolidated into one corps and made an independent command. Heretofore it has been distributed, and tied down, as it were, to brigades and divisions and corps of infantry. It has not had sufficient independence. It has had very hard work to do, picketing, &c. The duty it has done has been very arduous and dangerous. I think we have not done enough in the way of expeditions. Our cavalry have never met the cavalry of the enemy in a fair fight without whipping them. We never have been driven back, even where the enemy have been in superior numbers. They have stolen considerable of our cavalry, in consequence of their intimate knowledge of the country, and the readiness with which they could get information from the citizens and from their spies. That has enabled them to occasionally surround a picket, and pick up a small force of our cavalry here and there that was not acquainted with the country; but that I regard as simple stealing-no fighting at all. Whenever we went to fight them, they have always given way. I think Stuart never would have made his first raid if our cavalry had been properly armed. The regiment that he met had no carbines-only pistols and sabres. And as it was they came very near whipping him, though there were only two squadrons of ours against twelve hundred men of the enemy. Our cavalry has been confined very much to details, and had a great deal of duty to do which did not properly belong to it. In the army of the Potomac we have done a great deal of picketing, independent of the infantry. To do that it requires a much stronger force of cavalry constantly on duty than it would if the picketing was done in conjunction with infantry. That has worn down our Rep. Com. 108—48

horses and worn out our equipments, and has accomplished nothing except keeping the enemy from gaining information of our positions and movements, which could have been done quite as well with less cavalry and more infantry. Our cavalry has been confined too much to details, and has not done enough in the way of independent expeditionary duty.

Question. At whose suggestion was the present organization of the cavalry in the army of the Potomac adopted?

Answer. It has been a matter that has been talked over a great deal. I myself conversed with General Hooker upon that subject. I was absent, however, at the time the organization took place.

Question. When was that?

Answer. Since General Hooker has been placed in command. Just at the time he took command there came on a terrible snow storm, and I availed myself of the prospect of no immediate movement to take my first leave of absence since the army was organized I have not before had a moment's leave of absence.

Question. Who is in command of the cavalry corps of the army of the Potomac.

Answer. General Stoneman, I believe, now is in command of it. I have had no official notification to that effect, however. It is organized, I understand, in three divisions.

Question. You are in command of one of those divisions, I suppose? Answer. I have heard that I shall have command of one of them as soon as I rejoin the army.

Question. Who are to be the other division commanders?

Answer. I think General Pleasonton and General Gregg. There will be a better prospect for our cavalry in the spring, I think, than there ever yet has been. The enemy's cavalry are pretty much worn out and worn down. As both our cavalry and that of the enemy use cavalry equipments, they get pretty much worn out in two years. We have been supplied pretty regularly, while the enemy, I think, have not been. Enough has not been done to shelter our horses. I made propositions two or three times before the winter came on to get the condemned canvas in the Navy Department. I made out an estimate of the number of yards required, and proposed that my own men should put up the frames and put on the canvas. I under stand that after canvas has been used a certain time in the navy it is condemned. Sometimes a portion of it is sold to merchantmen who use it a year or two longer. But I have been informed that a great deal of it is laid up in storehouses, where it is left to rot. I estimated that 400,000 yards would afford a shelter for all the horses in my command, and the number of horses that have died from exposure this winter, and which would have been saved if they had been under shelter, would have paid for that much new canvas. We have no horse-covers, and the men have to use their horse blankets on cold nights to keep themselves warm. And the horses that have been bought have been very indifferent ones. I bought myself about 700 horses up in Pennsylvania-having got authority from the quartermaster general-for from $96 to $102, that were better horses than I ever got from the corral that had cost $120 each. I had no contract work about it, but sent my own officers to inspect them, and see to all that. Some of the horses that are sent to us are not over three years old, and cannot stand this exposure. We ought to have horses from six to ten years old, well built, and able to stand the hard work and exposure to which they are liable.

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Correspondence concerning the Peninsula campaign.

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Doubleday, General Abner.

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Fox, Captain G. V., (Assistant Secretary of the Navy)

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