In 1956 the terminal for the supply of fuel oil for the powerplants in Dade County was shifted from Miami to Port Everglades. This transfer accounts for about 750,000 tons of the increase between 1955 and 1956. The balance of the increase is believed to be general growth. Excluding this 750,000. tons. from consideration, the rate of growth for the 6 years, 1950 to 1956, has been computed as 222 percent. The computation was based on an increase of 701,200 tons over 316,508, the average for the years 1946 to 1950. This rate is equivalent to an annual rate of 14 percent per year. When the survey by the Corps of Engineers, which led to the authorization of the 12-foot project, was made in 1942, the data available at that time showed that the annual commerce on the waterway was approximately 453,000 tons and 17 million ton-miles. The report estimated an ultimate increase in traffic upon provision of a channel improved to 12 by 125 feet of 257,000 tons and approximately 2 million ton-miles. The savings to result from the improved waterway were estimated at $208,300 based on the level of commerce referred to above. The project is only partly complete and the increase in commerce has been nearly 1 million tons or 5 times as much as the estimate by the Corps of Engineers and an increase in traffic of 40 million ton-miles. It is evident that transportation savings will be far greater than they were when the project was authorized. As construction progresses and as more of the deepened waterway becomes available, traffic can be expected to increase at least at the present rate of 14 percent per year. Other intracoastal waterways after deepening to 12 feet have shown a comparable increase in commerce. The Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway north of the St. Johns River was completed to a 12-foot depth just before World War II. The tonnage on the sections of this waterway in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida was 2,559,000 in 1947 and 6,180,000 in 1956 for an increase of 10 percent per year. The Gulf Intracoastal Waterway was completed to 12-foot depth during the war. The commerce on the sections in Florida between Apalachee Bay and Pensacola has increased from 814,000 tons in 1949 to 3,566,000 in 1956 for an annual rate of growth of 23 percent. In conclusion I find the Florida east coast region served by the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway should continue to grow economically in accordance with the rate of growth maintained over the last 10 years. There are reliable forecasts that the population of this region in 1970 will more than double the 1955 population. Other determinants of economic growth reviewed in my study show a corresponding or greater rate of economic development. If the enlargement of the Intracoastal Waterway, Jacksonville to Miami, is continued and completed in accordance with an orderly construction program I believe that commerce will grow for the next 5 years at the current annual rate of about 14 percent to a level of 2,100,000 tons per year. During this period considerable new traffic will be diverted to the waterway, particularly steel-mill products and other manufactures. In the following 10 years the growth of traffic will be consistent with the growth in population and general economic development of the Florida east coast. It is estimated that the rate of growth will be about 7 percent per year and will reach a level of 4,200,000 tons per year by 1973. It is urged that funds be made available for continuing and completing this waterway for the major benefits won't be realized until the enlarged channel reaches the ports in Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade Counties. It is especially important that construction funds be made available for engineering in the section south of Fort Pierce in order to plan the future program. Mr. CANNON. Mr. Fascell, we shall be glad to hear from you at this time. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, all I would add to that would be to emphasize the national defense aspects of the program, tying in the great Navay facilities at Jacksonville, Fla., the very important missiles base at Cape Canaveral, the SAC base at Homestead Fla., which is just south of Miami, and the tremendous naval installation at Key West, Fla. This waterway would connect all of those defense installations and, in conclusion, I would point out that everything in Florida is growing phenomenally, including commercial traffic on this partially completed waterway. Every estimate has been exceeded by far, and I am confident that future growth will more than amply justify the amount of money that is put into this project. Mr. KIRWAN. Is this project in the budget, Congressman Rogers? Mr. ROGERS. Yes, sir; it is to the extent of $1.1 million. Mr. KIRWAN. For this intracoastal waterway? Mr. ROGERS. Yes, sir. Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. EVINS. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which our colleague, Mr Overton Brooks of Louisiana, and our colleague, Congressman Bennett of Florida, have asked to be included in the record at this point. Mr. CANNON. The matters will be included in the record at this point. (The matters referred to follow:) Representative JOE L. EVINS, Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C. WASHINGTON, D. C., May 4, 1958. DEAR JOE: Here is the material which we discussed on the Florida intracoastal barge canal. I intend to use this material on a series of articles on this important national defense project. I previously gave you a map showing what the German submarine fleet did to our cargo and tanker fleet in a blitz campaign during the early days of World War II. Enclosed is a marked copy of a significant speech on the present Russian submarine menace, given by our friend, Congressman Overton Brooks, of Louisiana, before a waterway gathering in Jacksonville, Fla. Enclosed also is a brief legislative history of the Florida barge canal-a project which would link the great intercoastal systems of the Gulf and the Atlantic seaboards. Of course you are well aware of the inland waterway development of the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers. You have been a prime mover in developing our great Tennessee rivers. Thinking in terms of national defense and national development, Florida is no further away from Tennessee than Tennessee is from Florida. Our water development problems are mutual, and I think that we in Tennessee will find many mutual friends in Florida. I'd appreciate your studying this material. Sincerely, J. LACEY REYNOLDS. STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE OVERTON BROOKS During the course of World War II, I had the opportunity of flying along the Atlantic seaboard and up and down the coast of Florida. I saw many tragic scenes, the memory of which will live in my mind as long as I live. I saw a submarine attack on one of our merchant vessels farther down to the south in the Caribbean Sea. I saw our airplanes take off from a local naval base and fly out to attack and to destroy the submarine. I witnessed some of them return to the base, some shattered and some barely able to get back. I saw our tankers torpedoed along this seabord and our sailors struggling in the water to survive the attack. German submarines sank oil tankers and ecargo ships within sight of land on our eastern seaboard. Deep down in the sands of your Florida beaches, traces of the oil from those sunken ships still can be found. German subs were so deadly effective that the transportation of petroleum from the oilfields in the gulf area by water was virtually halted. New England shivered because there was not enough fuel oil to heat homes and operate industries. You may recall how damaging this submarine campaign was to our transportation system. This lasted to the point that there were few seagoing American tankers left to be sunk. During World War II, the GerToday it is estimated that the submarines and many of them of I mention this because the Russian submarine menace is far greater today than that of the Germans in World War II. mans had a submarine fleet of 290 vessels. Russians have a fleet of between 500 and 600 the most modern variety. As chairman of a subcommittee of armed services, I have been making inquiries into the strength of the Russian submarine fleet. Increasingly, it is pushing out farther into the Atlantic and the Pacific to hold maneuvers. It. of course, is composed of the most modern variety of the snorkel-type submarine perfected by the Germans; and we now have reason to believe that the Russians are perfecting a nuclear submarine with the ability to remain under water indefinitely, with unlimited range, and even with ability to fire rockets and torpedoes while still submerged. In the face of this new Russian menace, let me point out that the proper development of our intracoastal waters becomes increasingly important to our national defense. These waterways offer a vital link in our transportation system-a link that is sheltered from the submarine menace and is largely protected from the air. Modern submarines are now capable of launching, when under water, missiles with atomic warheads. If, however, our vital war cargo is moving along the intracoastal canal system on the gulf coast or along the eastern seabord, it is highly unlikely that these vessels will be molested. Vessels carrying these cargoes so vital to our people and to the continuance of our war effort, would move along these inland water routes in sheltered security from all efforts of the undersea craft. Even though, now and then, one of the ships or barges carrying the burden of the war effort of our people may be bombed from the air, the loss will be relatively small, and the waterway obstruction can be easily removed. CROSS-FLORIDA BARGE CANAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1942: Report of the Chief of Engineers (H. Doc. 109, 79th Cong., 1st sess.). The essential findings of this favorable report were: (a) Benefit-cost ratio of 0.19 to 1. (b) The Board (the Chief of Engineers concurring) concluded that "the value of the barge canal in time of war, together with the prospective benefits to be anticipated in normal times, is sufficient to warrant its construction." (c) The Board (the Chief of Engineers concurring) recommended that although construction of the project would have to await until such time as the then existing war effort would permit, it should be authorized and that construction be undertaken when practicable, i. e., "at the earliest date on which work can be started without interferring with other construction directly connected with the war effort." 1942: Congress authorized the project by Public Law 675, 74th Congress, approved July 23, 1942, "in order to promote the national defense." 1942-46: During this period the Chief of Engineers developed working plans for the project. In the hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations for War Department civil functions for the fiscal year 1946, the project is listed by the Chief of Engineers among those for which funds are required and which are "of immediate value to navigation." Thereafter, the committee heard and disapproved a request for a large appropriation for the project. 1956: The committee approved an item of $8,000 (later increased to $11.000) to enable the Chief of Engineers to review and bring up to date the economies of the project. Present status The review of the economic status of the project, mentioned above, is believed to be so nearly complete as to permit the Chief of Engineers to advise the committee as to its general tenor. It is known that the economic worth of the project has increased many times since the original survey, and that the defense value has also greatly increased. In other words, the justification upon which Congress authorized the proiect, i. e., a benefit-cost ratio of 0.19 to 1 plus its defense values is very much greater today than it was then. Proponents are requesting the committee to allow whatever sum the Chief of Engineers may be willing to approve for initiating construction during the fiscal year 1959. HOL. CLARENCE CANNON, MAY 5, 1958. Chairman, Subcommittee on Public Works, House Committee on Appropriations, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Florida delegation in Congress respectfully requests approval by your committee of the 1959 budget recommendation of $1,100,000 for continuing work on the authorized Intracoastal Waterway, Jacksonville to Miami, Fla. Appropriations heretofore made for this project total $5,988,000 and the work has now progressed to a point considerably more than halfway from Jacksonville to Miami. The ever-increasing economic importance of this waterway is evidenced by the following data which has been collected during recent months: When the survey by the Corps of Engineers, which led to the authorization of the 12-foot project, was made in 1942, the data available at that time showed that the annual commerce on the waterway was approximately 453,000 tons and 17 million ton-miles. The report estimated an ultimate increase in traffic upon provision of a channel improved to 12 feet by 125 feet of 257,000 tons and approximately 2 million ton-miles. The savings to result from the improved waterway were then estimated at $208,300 based on the level of commerce referred to above. The project is only partly complete and the actual increase has been nearly 1 million tons, or five times as much as the estimate by the Corps of Engineers, and an increase of 40 million ton-miles. In addition to the above, we submit the attached exhibit which develops, in detail, the defense justification of this waterway. Respectfully, WILLIAM C. CRAMER, First District. ALBERT SYDNEY HERLONG, Fifth District, PAUL G. ROGERS, Siath District. Seventh District. DONALD RAY (BILLY) MATTHEWS, Eighth District. NATIONAL DEFENSE ASPECTS OF EAST COAST INTRACOASTAL WATERWAY, JACKSONVILLE TO MIAMI, FLA. WARTIME ECONOMIC SAVINGS TO NORTHBOUND OCEAN COMMERCE 1. This project was authorized by Congress in the Rivers and Harbors Act, approved March 2, 1945, pursuant to a favorable report by the Chief of EngiDeers (H. Doc. 740, 79th Cong., 2d sess.). 2. In that report, the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, the Chief of Engineers concurring, cites the district engineer's conclusion that "the deepening of the waterway is justified as war insurance." In paragraph 8 (p. 5) of the report, the Board states-"The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors concurs in general with the views of the reporting officers that provision of a more suitable improvement is advisable. War conditions have had a major effect upon the importance of this section of the Intracoastal Waterway. The need for a more adequate channel for use in the conduct of the war is attested by the active interest and cited recommendation of the War Production Board. Ocean shipping facilities available to deep draft ports have been severely curtailed. While the degree of future need for the waterway as a carrier of freight depends somewhat upon events which are not predictable at this time, the Board concludes that its usefulness during normal times in addition to its prospective value during the war period clearly justifies immediate deepening to 12 feet." 8. The Board, the Chief of Engineers concurring, recommended modification the existing Intracoastal Waterway from Jacksonville to Miami to provide for a channel generally 125 feet wide and 12 féet deep which would conform to the dimensions of the waterway north from Jacksonville to Trenton, N. J. The Board's recommendation provided that if construction were delayed until after the war, the Secretary of War, "upon determination of the peacetime commercial needs of the waterway," might in his discretion limits the dimensions to a general width of 100 feet and a depth of 10 feet. 4. Congress authorized the project on this basis, and under date of March 29, 1945, the Chief of Engineers addressed a communication to the Secretary of War in which he states-"I am firmly convinced that there will be an ultimate requirement for a project of 12-foot depth and suitable width to accommodate commercial needs of the waterway from Miami to Jacksonville." In the same communication the Chief of Engineers recommended this determination of these needs and these dimensions by the Secretary at that time, pursuant to the discretionary authority vested in the Secretary by the authorizing act. This was approved by the Secretary under date of April 19, 1945, and the project is at present under construction in accordance with that determination. 5. The validity of the purely economic benefits of the war insurance features of a project were reaffirmed by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors in 1946 in its evaluation of the authorized Cross-Florida Barge Canal. In a communication to the Director of Civil Works in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, under date of August 30, 1946, the Board states: "During the actual conduct of hostilities, comparative means of placing essential supplies in sufficient quantities at the proper points are measured, not in dollars but in units of time, materials, and manpower, against the available national reserves of these vital elements. The primary necessity for gaining the final military decision in war at the least possible cost in the lives of our nationals renders monetary yardsticks a secondary consideration. But there is, nevertheless, a definite value apart from purely military considerations in the avoidance of ships and cargo loss through enemy action. This Nation, since its birth in 1776, has been involved in foreign wars on an average of 1 year in 10. Despite the obviously peaceful objectives of national diplomacy, the pattern of the past half century indicates a recurrence of hostilities every 20 to 25 years, and the present turbulence of international relations does not furnish any assurance of a lengthening of this interval. The economic analysis of a long-lived project could not be considered complete if it covered merely the intervals of peacetime years and ignored the recurrent war periods. The insurance value of the avoidance of war losses is, therefore, distributable on an annual basis and can be at least roughly approximated in dollars and cents for measurement against the monetary annual charges of providing and maintaining the facilities." 6. It is generally agreed that in maritime warfare the impact of the submarine on merchant shipping will be roughly proportionate to (a) the density of ship traffic, (b) the concentration of submarines, and (c) the length of the period of exposure. Technology and convoying can modify this, but not sufficiently to upset the rule as it governs the whole picture. Factors (a) and (b) will undoubtedly be greater in a future major war than they were in World War II. However, the values given here are computed on the assumption that in a future major war the losses to our shipping in the eastern coastal lanes will be no greater than they were in World War II. 7. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that the existing potential submarine hazard to our merchant shipping is really far greater than it ever was in World War II, nor that our requirements for oceanborne commodities, both overseas and coastwise, will be far greater. For these reasons, it must be assumed that advantage would be taken by us of the opportunity the subject waterway would afford for reducing the submarine hazard on our eastern seaboard by transshipping northbound ocean cargoes at Miami and barging them north to the areas of destination via the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway. 8. The war-insurance value of the avoidance of war losses and excess tankerfleet tonnage yielded by the subject project in a future war and distributable on an annual basis is developed in the following pages of this memorandum. This value is based upon the testimony of the Army Engineers before the House and Senate Subcommittees on Public Works Appropriations. The values arrived at represent purely economic savings to commerce (entirely aside from military values) and may be prudently credited to the subject project. They are computed from official World War II experience data and present-day price, wage. and tonnage movements levels and trends projected to 1965. |