of two calendar months, one calendar month, one calendar month, and two calendar months respectively. Upon the hearing, the justices found as facts, that the Cyprus Workman's Club and Institute was registered as a working man's club under the Friendly Societies Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 60; and it was admitted that the appellants were trustees of the club (one of them being also the treasurer), who according to the rules of the club were admitted to the meetings of the committee of management, and to take part in the proceedings thereof and vote on any question under discussion; that the appellants as such trustees held office permanently until death, resignation, or refusal; that they were removable only by threefourths of the members present at a special general meeting; that the secretary received all subscriptions and other moneys, and handed the same over to the treasurer; that the treasurer was responsible for such moneys as were paid to him by the secretary or by any person on account of the society; that he rendered his cash account quarterly; that Leach (one of the appellants) was the landlord of the premises, and that the treasurer paid rent to him; that the club was under the management of a committee, but there was no evidence, nor was it shown by the rules, how such committee was appointed; that the steward or manager of the club was employed by the committee and paid by the trustees, and that he had orders from the trustees and committee not to serve any one but members and affiliated members; that an affiliated member is an associate of the Working Men's Union Club, and that it was the common practice to allow affiliated members to introduce members; and that some kind of notice as to supply of liquor was posted up in the club, but there was no evidence of the contents of the notice. The justices found that on the 12th of March, 1885, John O'Connell, an excise officer, who was not a member or affiliated member, visited the club with an affiliated member (Musto), and ordered and was served with brandy, for which O'Connell paid 3d.; that on the same occasion O'Connell ordered port wine, beer, and brandy, which was served by the manager or steward, and for which he paid 18. 6d. ; that on the 17th of March, O'Connell again visited the club with Musto and one Jones (who was not a member), and paid a member of the club, and also a member who was acting in the absence of the steward, for port wine, whisky, beer, and cigars at different times; and that he also paid the member acting for the steward for whisky and cigars which he brought away from the club. It was contended for the appellants that they were not liable for the act of the steward or manager in selling the exciseable articles, inasmuch as he was not their servant, but the servant of the committee of management; and that even if he were the servant of the appellants, he was acting not in obedience to but in defiance of the orders he had received, the principle of law being that a master is not responsible for the criminal acts of his servant, unless he authorizes it or becomes an accessory after the fact. The case of Condy v. Le Cocq, 13 Q. B. Div. 207, was cited. The justices being of the opinion that the trustees, as legal owners of the property of the club, and as actual members of the committee, taking a part in the proceedings thereof, and voting on any question, were responsible for the acts of the steward or manager or any person acting for him, although such acts were in direct disobedience of the orders of the committee and of the trustees and were done without their knowledge or assent, and in direct violation of the rules of the club, gave their decision against the appellants. The question for the opinion of the court was, whether under the above circumstances the appellants as trustees of the club were liable for the acts of their servants and delegates in selling the exciseable articles. The case was argued on the 7th and 8th of April, 1886. The argument sufficiently appears in the judgment. Cur. adv. vult. Blackwell, for appellants. R. S. Wright, for respondent. A. L. SMITH, J. In this case, Thomas Jones, one of Her Majesty's officers of inland revenue, preferred against the appellants four informations, first, for having, as trustees of the Cyprus Workman's Club and Institute, on the 12th of March, 1885, retailed one gill of brandy without having a license, contrary to the provisions of 23 Vict., ch. 27, § 19; secondly, for having, as trustees as aforesaid, on the 17th of March, 1885, sold one pint of beer by retail, without having an excise license, contrary to the provisions of 4 & 5 Wm. 4, ch. 85, § 17; thirdly, for having, as trustees as aforesaid, sold a gill of port wine, contrary to the statute in that behalf; fourthly, for having, as trustees as aforesaid, sold two cigars without having a license, contrary to the provisions of 6 Geo. 4, ch. 81, § 26. The justices convicted the appellants in the several penalties of 251., 10l., 10l., and 251. and costs, and in default of payment adjudged distress for payment and in default of sufficient distress, imprisonment for the several terms of two months, one month, one month, and two mouths respectively. The material point raised by the justices in the case submitted to us is this: Even assuming (about which hereafter) that the relation of master and servant or principal and agent existed between the appellants and the steward of the club, who was the person who actually sold the articles in question to other than members or affiliated members of the club, can the appellants be convicted when they proved, as they did in the present case to the satisfaction of the justices, that the steward, in selling the articles as and where he did, acted in direct contravention of the bona fide orders given by the appellants, and in direct violation of the rules of the club, and without the knowledge or assent direct or indirect of the appellants thereto. Such however was the contention of the Crown. It certainly sounded to us as novel; but it was insisted that such was the effect of the statutes, and it was said that there were authorities in favor of the contention. It becomes therefore necessary for us to examine them. It was very frankly admitted by Mr. Wright, on behalf of the Crown, that if the proceeding in hand had been a prosecution for a crime, the prosecution could not be maintained; but he said that the statutes in question did not constitute the selling of the articles a crime, but only prohibited their sale by a penalty enforceable by distress and subsequent imprisonment in default of distress; and that the conviction could be upheld. He said that the statute above mentioned enacted that "every person who should sell liquors or cigars without a license was liable to the penalties therein prescribed." So far he is correct. He then said that it was immaterial whether the appellants knew or did not know whether the articles were being sold, if sold they were by one who stood in the relation of servant or agent to the appellants; and he said that the authorities covered that proposition. That however is not the question now to be determined. The question is, whether a master or principal is liable when the servant or agent sells in direct contravention of the bona fide orders given, and without the knowledge or assent direct or indirect of the master or principal. The following were the cases eited. In the first place he gave us the case in 1824, of Rex v. Marsh, 2 B. & C. 717, where it was held that in an information under the 5 Aune, ch. 14, § 2, against a carrier for having game in his possession as carrier, it was not necessary to prove that the carrier had the game in his possession knowingly; and therefore he argued, it was not necessary to establish in the present case that the appellants knew that the steward was making the sales. In our judgment all that was decided in that case was, that upon proof given that the carrier had the game in his possession, a prima facie case was made out, and that it lay upon him to rebut that case, which he could do by establishing that the game was not put into his wagon with his assent or was put in contrary to his orders. This case, as it appears to us, instead of establishing that for which it was cited, shows how a prima facie case may be rebutted, as rebutted it was in the case in hand. The next case cited was that of Atty.-Gen. v. Sid-| don, 1 C. R. & J. 220; 1 Tyrwh. 41, in the year 1830, in which it was held that a master was liable for penalties under the Smuggling Act, 58 Geo. 3, ch. 123, § 13, for the illegal act of his servant in concealing smuggled goods, the master being absent at the time when the act was done. The judgment of the court proceeded upon the ground, as stated by Alexander, C. B., "that whatever a servant does in the course of the employment with which he is intrusted, and as part of it, is the master's act." "The legal presumption is so," says the Chief Baron, "unless the contrary be shown." In the present case it was shown that the appellants did not authorize the acts of the steward, and the case therefore is no authority for the proposition put forward, but is a cogent authority against it. The next case was that of Davies v. Harvey, L. R., 9 Q. B. 433, where it had been held that a guardian of the poor was properly convicted for furnishing for his profit goods to be given in parochial relief, although he had no knowledge that the goods were to be given in parochial relief. This case was decided upon the ground, that although the defendant did not know for what purpose the goods were required, yet that his partner did, and that the goods were supplied by the partner within the scope of the partnership authority, for the profit of both partners. This case does not help the Crown; for in the present case the articles were manifestly sold beyond and without the scope of the authority given. The case of Mullins v. Collins, L. R., 9 Q. B. 292, was next cited. In that case it was held that a licensed victualler was liable to be convicted under 35 & 36 Vict., ch. 94, § 16, for the act of his servant knowingly supplying liquor to a corstable on duty. All that this case decided was that a licensed victualler was liable for the act of his servant within the scope of his employment; but it is no authority whatever for the liability of the master for the act of his servant outside the authority given. It was then urged that the case of Condy v. Le Cocq, 13 Q. B. Div. 207, having held that the master under the same statute was liable even though neither master nor servant knew that the constable was on duty, that therefore it was an authority on behalf of the Crown. It was upon this case, as we are informed, that the justices to a great extent relied when they convicted the appellants. We cannot follow their ratio decidendi. Even assuming that the case was not decided upon the special wording of § 16 of 35 & 36 Vict., ch. 94, which it was, how does the fact of neither master nor servant knowing that the constable was on duty establish that the master is liable where a servant acts in direct contravention of the orders given? It does nothing of the kind. The above were the authorities alleged to cover the Crown's contention in this case. It is manifest that they do not. As to the point urged, that the money taken by the steward for the articles sold went into the coffers of the club, and not into the steward's pocket, we say that that would have been an ingredient for the justices to take into their consideration, when determining whether the steward, when he sold, was acting in reality in contravention of the orders given. But inasmuch as the justices have determined, upon the facts proved before them, that the steward had orders from the appellants not to serve any one but members and affiliated members of the club, and that they were bona fide orders, and that he transgressed them, and as they convicted the appellants because they were legal owners of the property of the club and members of the committee, this point is of no avail to the Crown. We give no judgment upon the point as to whether the steward was servant or agent of the appellants; for it is not material now to do so. We give judgment for the appellants with costs; and the conviction must be quashed. Conviction quashed. Solicitor for appellants, E. Newman. WAREHOUSEMAN- FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO SECURITY OF BUILDING. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, JUNE 1, 1886. HICKEY V MORRELL. Where a warehouseman, in a circular soliciting patrons, states that the exterior of his building is "fire-proof," and that "no expense has been spared in supplying protection against the spread of fire," etc., and part of the portion described as fire-proof is of wood, it is a false statement, if made by him with knowledge of the component parts of his building, and with intent to deceive, and he will be liable to one who was induced by the statement to deliver property to be stored in the building, and thereby incurred loss. Mr. Hale, for appellant. Mr. Bowers, for respondent. DANFORTH, J. As to the character of this action the parties are agreed. It was for "falsely and fraud ulently," and "with an intent to deceive and defraud the plaintiff," representing among other things, that the defendant's warehouse was "fire-proof on the exterior," whereby the plaintiff was induced to deliver to him, to be stored therein, certain property of value, which while there was destroyed by fire communicated from the outside "to the wooden cornice and wooden window-frames" of the warehouse, and thence to the property in question. The answer admitted that defendant was proprietor of the warehouse; that it and the articles described in the complaint were destroyed by fire; but denied the other matters above referred to as making out a cause of action, and set up that "the property was received and stored by him as a warehouseman, and in no other capacity, and under the special contract that the goods were stored at the owner's risk of fire." There was uo controversy as to the evidence. The question was determined upon that introduced by the plaintiff, and in view of the law as it stood at the time of the bailment. The appellant refers to the statute (Laws 1871, ch. 742, § 8) "in relation to storage, and other purposes: " imposing liabilities upon persons for any fire resulting from their willful and culpable negligence, and among other things, requires the closing of iron shutters "at the completion of the business of each day, by the occupant of the building having use or control of the same; " but the complaint contains no allegation of negligence, and so the action could not stand on that ground either at common law or by statute. Another statute, also referred to, relating to buildings in the city of New York (Laws 1871, ch. 625, 18), is of some importance in its bearing upon the point chiefly pressed upon us, and as likely to have been in contemplation of both parties. It is there provided that buildings of a certain description-proof buildings. To say of a certain portion of a within which the storehouse in question comes-shall have doors and blinds and shutters made of fireproof metal on every window and opening above the first story. tion and affirmation, no misstatement of any material fact can be permitted, except at the risk of making compensation to whoever, in reliance upon it, suffers injury. Here the allegation is that the exterior of the building is fire-proof. It necessarily refers to the quality of the material out of which it is constructed. or which forms its exposed surface. To say of any article it is fire-proof conveys no other idea than that the material out of which it is formed is incombustible. That statement, as regards certain well-known substances usually employed in the construction of buildings, while it might in some final sense be deemed the expression of an opinion, could in practical affairs be properly regarded only as a representation of a fact. To say of a building that it is fire-proof excludes the idea that it is of wood, and necessarily implies that it is of some substance fitted for the erection of fire The plaintiff's testimony went to show that she was induced to store her goods with the defendant by representations contained in a circular issued by him, the object of which was to call "the special attention of persons having valuable articles, merchandise, or other property for storage to his new first-class storage warehouse, in the erection of which," it is said, among other things, "no expense has been spared in supplying light, ventilation, aud protection against the spread of fire; the exterior being fire-proof, and the interior being divided off by heavy brick walls, iron doors, and railings, appropriate and convenient in every way for the various kinds of articles to be stored." The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the only statements of facts in the paragraph quoted are those which relate to the interior as divided by heavy brick walls, iron doors, and railings; that as to those the defendant had knowledge, and concedes that their non-existence would make him guilty of a misrepresentation. This is a very narrow view of the subject, and could prevail, if at all, only by conceding that the defendant purposely avoided mention of those things, which if stated would make his solicitations less attractive, and display him as the owner of a building combustible on the outside, and so of little security to its contents if they happened to be of the same character. building it is fire-proof, suggests a comparison between that portion and other parts of the building not so characterized, and warrants the conclusion that it is of a different material. In regard to such a matter of common knowledge, the statement is more than the expression of opinion. No one would have any reason to suspect that any two persons could differ in regard to it. But when we look at the words accompanying this statement, viz.: "No expense has been spared in supplying protection against the spread of fire," all possibility of doubt seems removed. This danger is pointed out as the one thing, which more than another, the owner had in view and guarded against; and the rest of the sentence shows with what result, viz., "the exterior being fire-proof," and the interior divided off by heavy brick walls, iron doors, and railings. Thus the expenditure of money is said to have been limited only by the accomplishment of the desired object. and the statement of the material used is connected with the representation as to the quality of the exterior. No one reading of inside walls and railings of incombustible material, and of an exterior fire-proof, could suppose that a precaution against fire made necessary by statute had been omitted, or that a builder who called attention to such matters as an inducement to patronage could have regarded wooden window-frames as in any sense fireproof. The language of the circular is very emphatic. In effect, it says the buildings, as a whole, have been erected at an immense cost, from which assertion alone, in view of the business to which they were de voted, one would expect strength and adaptation of We think the appellant's ground of complaint a just materials, and skill in construction, affording security, one. It was proven that in fact the window-frames in at least, against all the ordinary dangers to which the warehouse were of wood; that at the outside of property might be exposed when put in store. But the windows there were no shutters; that the cornices this general statement is followed by the declaration were of wood, covered with tin. The fire occurred in that no expense has been spared in supplying "protecthe evening. It originated in other buildings across tion against the spread of fire;" and this assurance is the street, and from them communicated to the made prominent by the display of capital letters, and wooden window-frames on the defendant's building. justified by the explanation which relates to an exAn architect and a builder, examined as experts, tes-isting state of things, viz., "the exterior being firetified that a building constructed, as was the one in question, "with wooden window-frames and sashes, and no outside shutters," could not be deemed fireproof, and that in October, 1881, it was practical to erect a storage warehouse which would be fireproof on the exterior. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence she was nonsuited, upon the ground that the statement in the circular, as to the character of the exterior of the building, was a mere expression of au opinion, and not the statement of a fact. Upon the same ground the judgment was affirmed at the General Term. In such a circular, obviously intended as an advertisement, high coloring and exaggeration as to the advantages offered must be expected and allowed for; but when the author descends to matters of descrip proof," and still further emphasized by the more moderate and qualified statement as to the interior. That is not said to be fire-proof, but only "divided off by heavy brick walls and iron doors and railings;" describing at the same time its arrangement, and the substance of its walls and partitions. As to this therefore the statement would be true, although the floors, lintels, stairs, landings, ties, joists, ceilings, and other parts were of wood, but no such discrimination is suggested as to the exterior. The strength of the walls might, indeed be impaired by the necessary openings for doors and windows, but for the purpose of preventing mischief by fire, or as the defendant put it, "the spread of fire," the exterior is pronounced fire-proof. Had he only said of the exterior, as he did of the interior, “the wall is of brick," the intending customer would have been put to an inquiry as to the window-frames and doors. He said much more. We think therefore that the defendant must be regarded as stating a fact, and not as expressing a mere opinion, when he described the exterior, that is, the whole exterior of his buildings as fireproof. Such statement is not to be classed with those relating to value, or prospective profits, or prospects of business, or assertions in regard to a speculative matter, concerning any of which men may differ. It relates to something accomplished; to an existing fact, as distinguished from one yet to come into existence. It was made after calling to mind the use to which the buildings were to be put, the fact that the attention of the builder had been especially directed to "protection against the spread of fire," which could be effected only by the use of proper materials, and the statement was made with knowledge that such materials had not been used. Nor is it like the safe case cited by the respondent, Walker v. Milner, 4 Fost. & F. 745. There the action was upon a warranty that "the safe in question was thief-proof;" "that nothing can break into it." It was broken into. There was no suggestion of fraud or doceit, and the jury were required to discriminate between what was represented and what was warranted, and unless satisfied there was a warranty, to find for the defendant. The safe-maker's prospectus was put in evidence. It stated that the safes would insure the safety of valuable property contained in them. The court said: "The words cited from the circular could hardly be understood in the sense of a warranty or assurance of perfect safety, but only as importing a representation of a high degree of strength." They were promissory merely. Then plaintiff's counsel referred to a later prospectus, in which the safes in question were only spoken of "as of the strongest security," and relied on this as implying a withdrawal of the previous warranty. But Cockburn, J., observed that, "assuming later prospectuses to have been issued after the burglary, it was only dictated by common honesty; for after it had been found by actual experience that the safe was not absolutely secure against all possible attempts, it would have been fraudulent to continue previous description." In the case at bar the plaintiff alleges fraud. A jury might find that an exterior of a city building, partly of wood, although to no greater extent than the one in question was not fireproof within the meaning and intent of the circular. They might also find that when the circular was issued this fact was known to the defendant; and then the doctrine suggested by Cockburn, J., in the case cited, would have some application. Nor do the other cases referred to seem to support respondent's contention. They exclude the idea of fraud, and relate to matters of mere opinion; as whether a certain valve will consume smoke and save fuel (Prideaux v. Bunnett, 1 C. B. [N. S.] 613, whether certain pictures were the work of the old masters, or copies (Jendwine v. Slade, 2 Esp. 571), whether land was of the value certified to. Gordon v. Butler, 105 U. S. 554. But in none of them is it denied, that if the person making the statement or expressing the opinion had at the time knowledge of its falsity, the action would lie. It is certainly well settled upon principles of natural justice, that for every fraud or deceit which results in consequential damage to a party, he may have an action. Here the complaint states, not only a false representation, with a fraudulent intent, but that the falsehood was conscious and willful; that by it the plaintiff was induced to deliver her property to be stored in the building, and thereby incurred loss. The evidence may be so viewed as to sustain these allegations. The learned counsel for the respondent has stated, in the broadest and most unqualified terms, as a proposition not to be disputed, "that no man is liable for the expression of his opinion or judgment." But this is true only when the opinion stands by itself and is intended to be taken as distinct from any thing else; and where the proposition is found in the books, it is so restricted. Thus it is said: "Matters of opinion, stated merely as such, will not in general form the ground to a legal charge of fraud." Leake Cont. 355; giving many instances, and also exceptions to the rule. Statements of value have been held insufficient to sustain an action, where, as it is said, there were "mere matters of opinion" (Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 306), but at the same time it is shown that under certain circumstances they are to be regarded as affirmations of fact, and then if false, an action can be maintained upon them. The same rule applies where A. desiring credit for B. for a certain amount, the latter asks C. as to the solvency of A., and he replies, "He is good; as good as any man in the country for that sum." No doubt this involves opinion; but it is held that if the recommendation was made in bad faith, and with knowledge that A. was insolvent, C. would be liable. Upton v. Vail, 6 Johns. 181. And so as to every representation concerning a matter of fact, by which one man is induced to change his position, to his injury, or the benefit of another, it may be so expressed as to bind the person making it to its truth, whether it take the form of an opinion or not, or it may appear that it was not intended to be acted upon. In the latter case no obligation is incurred. In the circular issued by the defendant there are many words of commendation, which however strong, could not be relied upon as the basis of contract. The ones at first referred to are of that character. They relate to the present, and describe a portion of the building in its existing state as "being fire-proof." This is not a matter of opinion, for it defines a state or condition, and if part of that portion was of wood, may properly be regarded as a "false statement of a fact." Whether the defendant knew the conponent parts of his own buildings, and if so, whether the statement was made with intent to deceive, and whether it was an inducement to the contract, the learned counsel for the respondent has fully argued. At present it is unnecessary to discuss those questions, for it seems to us they are, as the case stands, properly for the jury, and upon the only point which appears to have been considered by the court below we are obliged to differ from them. That the issues may be more fully tried the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. All concur, except Andrews and Miller, JJ., not voting, and Earl, J., dissenting. CONTRACT OF FIDUCIARY FOR BONUS TO HIMSELF-PUBLIC POLICY. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT. LANDIS V. SAXTON. Defendant, an executor, lent to plaintiff out of the funds of the estate $16.000, and took plaintiff's note for that amount. Plaintiff actually received only $15,000, defendant by agreement retaining the other $1,000 as a bonus to himself for making the loan Defendant afterward became the owner of the note in his own right, and in this suit sought to enforce it for the full amount. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to a deduction for the $1,000. BLACK, J. This was a suit to enjoin the sale of certain real estate under a deed of trust given to secure a promissory note made by the plaintiff, Israel Landis, and two other persons as his securities, for $16,000 due in two years after the date thereof with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, interest payable annually. The note is payable to the defendant, Albe H. Saxton, executor of the estate of John Patee, deceased. The defendant filed answer, in which he set up the note and deed of trust and prayed for a foreclos ure. Various payments were conceded to have been made on the note from time to time, and as the issues over the credit of date January 20, 1874, were ruled for the appellant, they need not be further considered. The contest in this court grows out of a claim of the plaintiff for a deduction of $1,000 from the face of the note, which was refused by the Circuit Court, and hence there was a decree of foreclosure, from which the plaintiff appealed. The facts as to the $1,000 are as follows. In 1863, and at the date of the note, Landis was embarrassed and went to Saxton to borrow $15,000. He offered to pay Saxton a bonus of $1,000 for a loan of that amount of money, or for negotiating a loan. Saxton, who was then executor of the Patee estate and president of a bank, agreed to let him have the money from the Patee estate on the proposed terms, and thereupon the note and deed of trust were executed. The funds of the estate were then in gold coin, then at a premium. Saxton converted the same into currency, and on the 2d of April, 1863, made a memorandum on the note to the effect that interest should commence from that date. At the same time Saxton deposited to the credit of Landis $15,000 and took a credit for himself of $1,000, thus reducing, we infer, the Patee estate account $16,000. Plaintiff, in his testimony, says he did not agree to give defendant a bonus of $1,000, but the other evidence and the attending circumstances show conclusively that he did, and that the transaction was as before stated. The plaintiff drew out and used the $15,000 placed to his credit. Nothing more was said of the matter until in 1880 or 1881, when the plaintiff's son discovered from the father's pass-book that only $15,000 had been received on the note, and then for the first time followed the demand for a deduction of $1,000. An agent for loaning money may take a reasonable term of the statute relating to usury. Here the executor, not as such, but Saxton individually, is the owner of the note, and in point of fact only $15,000 was paid to Landis. Whether the note should be held to be tainted with usury in the hands of the Patee estate or assignees, other than Saxton, presents a question which we do not determine. Saxton having become the owner of the note, seeks to foreclose the mortgage, and in the case of Fellows v. Longyor it was an assignee from the estate who sought to foreclose the mortgage. This difference in the parties is material, and opens the way for the application of other rules of law. Saxton, as executor, was a trustee. He had no right to speculate with the trust property or to make gains therefrom individually beyond his allowed compensation, and the law fixed the amount of his compensation. It is against public policy to allow an executor or administrator to make commissions over and above that allowed by law by speculating or loaning the trust funds. Saxton's contract for the bonus was illegal, a contract which a court would not enforce. Story Agency, § 330. A trustee cannot hold on to money thus illegally made by the use of the trust property or by the use of his position as trustee, and he might be required to ac. count therefor to the beneficiary in the trust. Bent, receiver, v. Priest, not yet reported. It is equally clear that the court will not enforce the performance of the illegal contract. Story Eq., § 298. If the defendant is not here literally seeking to enforce the verbal bargain by which he received the bonus, he is seeking to enforce the contract, by the enforcement of which he is enabled to hold on to the bonus, and without which he cannot retain it. In short, having accounted to the estate for the note, he must now collect the note to the full amount or lose the bonus. It is but an indirect way of recovering back that which was received by an illegal and prohibited contract. We cannot see that in contemplation of law Saxton occupies any other or better position than that of suing Landis directly for the bonus. In such a suit he would not receive the aid of the courts. It follows that the deduction of $1,000 must be made from the face of the note. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, to be proceded with according to the principles before stated. All concur except Henry, C. J., who dissents. commission from the borrower, even with the knowl- STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-CERTIFICATE OF edge of the lender, and still the transaction will not be DEPOSIT |