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MERICA'S great experiment of trying by example to bring about general reduction of naval armaments and cessation of competitive naval building appears to have failed. Both at the Washington Conference and during the nine months since its adjournment we have set an eminently fine example in these respects, but there has been no commensurate response from the other naval Powers. America's naval strength has steadily declined relative to other Powers and continues to do so. The passing of the recent elections now permits a survey of the whole question and an estimate of necessary remedies for such an unsatisfactory condition, free from any color of political bias.

Consequently

Mr. Hughes's initial proposals for the scrapping of ships and the subsequent limitation of new construction was extraordinarily generous. It contained no element of selfishness. America offered to set the pace, to sacrifice relatively much more of her naval power than was suggested for any other nation.

At first the response to our unprece dented example was encouraging. All accepted the proposals "in principle." But when it came to detailed specifications, so many modifications were insisted upon by Great Britain, France, and Japan as to destroy the cardinal principle of mutual concession upon which Mr. Hughes's comprehensive plan chiefly depended. There was no appreciable tendency to follow America's lead in offering more than was asked. On the contrary, the foreign attitude appeared to be one of accepting advantages that had been offered and then of seeking to gain still more.

For several weeks Japan strove diligently to demonstrate that this status quo basis of limitation entitled her to a ratio of 7 to 10 instead of the proposed 3 to 5. It was finally proved to her satisfaction that by every method of calculation that could be devised her correct ratio was even less than 3 to 5. Japan then insisted upon a drastic limitation of naval bases in the western Pacific, the effect of which was greatly to enhance the strength of her navy relative to others in that region.

Great Britain strenuously sought the abolition of submarines or their limitation to small numbers and dimensions. The advantage which she would derive from such provisions, especially over France, caused the latter to interpose such vigorous objections, sustained by Italy, as to defeat the British proposals.

NAVAL EDITOR "ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL"

Thereupon Britain flatly refused to consider any limitation whatever upon cruisers, destroyers, and other auxiliary types of ships suitable for anti-submarine warfare.

Thus was America's example of unselfishness ignored. In spite of her demonstrated willingness to go even further against her own interests than the very generous initial proposals, still none would follow. The influence of a good example failed to bring about effective reduction of armaments.

It was one of the cardinal features of Mr. Hughes's original plan that the reduction and limitation was to include all naval types of ships. If this element of completeness had been retained, then, regardless of details, the final agreement would have been effective in its main purposes of reducing naval strength to a fixed limit and abolishing competitive building. The exclusion of the auxiliary types and the inclusion of only capital ships and airplane carriers in the final agreement opened the door to nullification of such purposes, which were then made dependent upon the individual future choice of the nations.

The nullifying effects of the omissions regarding auxiliary naval ships arise from the inherent possibility of substituting strength in auxiliaries for strength in capital ships. For example, a single battleship reinforced by a great number of light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mine-layers, etc., may be many times stronger than two or more battleships accompanied by only a small force of such auxiliaries. The inadequacy of partial limitation by agreement is manifest, unless the nations individually should freely choose to extend such limitation to include all types of ships.

Under these circumstances of partial failure of the Conference America again set a conspicuous example of sacrifice, in the hope of giving permanence to the spirit of the limitation, even though its letter was deficient. Such hope was translated into no uncertain terms. The naval enlisted personnel was reduced almost immediately to more than thirty per cent below the minimum peace requirement for a 5-5-3 navy of all types. Out of a total of 280 first-line destroyers more than 170 were laid up out of commission, with practically no naval personnel on board, and a risk of serious deterioration thus incurred. This notwithstanding a great deficiency relative to other Powers in light cruisers, for which destroyers may serve as a partial substitute. More than seventy other

ships of various types permitted by the Treaty to be retained were also placed out of commission. The letting of contracts was suspended for a number of additional destroyers and submarines whose construction was already authorized by Congress and was not prohibited by the treaty. In spite of a complete lack of modern light cruisers in the Navy compared with 41 of this type possessed by Great Britain, 11 by Japan, 4 by France, and 5 by Italy, we refrained from undertaking or projecting the construction of any new ones. It is true that work upon 10 already in an advanced state of completion was continued, but these had their counterparts in the new construction in hand in other navies. In general substance, the United States reduced her Navy as a whole to less than seventy per cent of that allowed her by the letter and spirit of the treaties.

The hope that this impressive postConference example might influence other nations to extend the principle of limitation to all classes of ships, and to reduce their aggregate forces substantially below the strength fixed by the Treaty, seems to have been vain. resumption of competition has already begun.

The

Five months after the Conference ad

journed Japan announced a revision of her pre-Conference building programme for auxiliary naval types. To the 10 or 11 light cruisers already under construction were added 8 or 9 more. Similarly, about 24 destroyers and 24 large submarines were projected to augment nearly the same number then on the stocks. It was not made clear that the above is the maximum in these types which Japan intended to complete before 1927.

The eminent British naval authority, Mr. H. C. Bywater, states that this building programme revision was made by the Japanese with the object of rectifying the deficiency in battleships as represented by the 5-3 ratio. He states further that the characteristics of the newly projected Japanese ships preclude the assumption of purely defensive objects; that "no reasonable doubt exists as to the purpose for which all these swift Japanese cruisers and huge underwater boats are being built; ... they are designed for attacking an enemy's communications and merchant shipping, for carrying out oversea raids, and generally for offensive operations at a great distance from their home ports." The same authority estimates that, considering

Japan's new programme, the ratio of strength in light cruisers is: Japan, 3; United States, 1; and in submarines Japan 7, compared with about 5% for

us.

Four months after Japan's decision for new construction was published Great Britain announced a programme for two new great battleships. There is absolutely no need for such additional vessels to maintain Britain's overwhelming ⚫ preponderance against any possible combination of European navies, or against any other navy except that of the United States. Even against us the building of these ships means much more than an endeavor merely to preserve an equality. The naval status under the treaties gave England a substantial superiority over us by reason of her surplus of auxiliary naval vessels, her luxury of overseas bases, her great merchant marine, her superabundance of seafaring population, and other important elements of naval strength. Yet, in spite of all this, and in addition, notwithstanding our drastic reductions of naval strength below Treaty limits, Britain now decides to maintain her full treaty quota of battle ships. Like Japan, she fails to respond to our example of cutting armaments below the allowances and ceasing competitive building.

It is not alone in new construction that Britain and Japan have failed to follow our lead of downward competition. Their last naval budget, which would exclude the projected construction, was in each case roughly forty per cent greater than ours on a 5-5-3 basis. Yet, relatively speaking, they are paupers and we are rolling in wealth. The personnel question furnishes another example. Our cut to less than seventy per cent of the peace requirements of personnel for the "Treaty Navy" has not been met even approximately. Both Britain and Japan have kept practically full peace complements. The significance of this cannot be appreciated without considering that Britain's Naval Reserve is three times greater than curs, and Japan's more than twice as great. Moreover, the reservoir of maritime population of both these Powers is very much greater.

From time to time misleading headlines and statements in our press have given the impression that Japan and Britain are anticipating ratification of the Treaty in the execution of their scrapping programme. It is true that they have scrapped some obsolete vessels of no practical value, and have taken a few steps preliminary to scrapping other somewhat antiquated ships of

very doubtful value. But the United States has done likewise. None of us have substantially altered our battleship strength. Most of the preliminary work can be easily restored at small cost in case the Treaty ratifications fail to be exchanged. The evidence afforded by the scrapping situation is inconclusive as to the influence of the spirit of the treaties upon the nations that are concerned.

Now that the election is past, there is opportunity for America to review her naval situation exclusive of any political element. The question is properly National, and not partisan. Persistence in the effort towards progressive disarmament by example appears certain to result in an early reduction of our naval power out of all proportion to our National interests and welfare. Already the true ratio of naval strength, disregarding any consideration of strategic theaters of operation, stands at about United States 4, Great Britain 5, Japan 3. For operations in the western Pacific, where an effort to defend the Philippines would necessarily take our fleet, the existing ratio is about Japan 3, United States 2. Moreover, we are steadily losing aggregate strength while the others are gaining. The deterioration of our ships is much more rapid than theirs,

page of certain exports would throw thousands of men out of work, with ensuing disarrangement of the industrial fabric. Suppose that the export of manufactured steel were stopped for three months. We export over three hundred million dollars' worth in that time. Not only would steel plants be shut down but all other industries would be affected, shares of other stocks would go down, there would be much selling on the exchanges, less money to be put into productive enterprise, and so much consequent loss in wages. It is imperative for the preservation of industrial contentment that markets be found.

Now, the American workingman demands, and justly demands, a standard of living that not only must be kept high, but one that must be bettering itself continually. So long as domestic demand increases sufficiently fast there is no great necessity for foreign markets in order to insure an increasing wage, but eventually a population saturation point will be reached, and just as the population must then overflow (or the increase must be stopped), so likewise must the distribution of goods overflow or else the condition of the worker becomes static.

These great forces of economics are only just beginning to be felt in their strength, owing to the comparative past sparseness of the population of the world.

The Conference did not, and probably could not, really help this situation much. The principle of the Open Door in China has been reaffirmed and other agreements have been made, but the struggle for markets in the undeveloped regions will continue.

Of the countless causes that tend to create misunderstanding and conflict, three rather important ones have been mentioned:

The pressure of population.

The artificial impediments in the way of free flow of goods.

The struggle for markets.

These causes will apply with particular force to America, fast becoming settled, apparently rooted in the habit of erecting trade barriers, and rightly jealous of the standard of living that prevails.

What does all this mean?

It means that the likelihood of war in the world is great in the rather near future.

It means that America as the greatest nation of the earth cannot escape the chance of involvement, indeed the certainty of it indirectly and the probability of it directly.

By virtue of possessing the next most powerful navy in the world, and financial and industrial strength far surpassing that of any other nation in the world, America was able to call such a conference as was held with a practical certainty that such a call would be well received, and was able to dominate this conference. We still retain numerical equality with the most powerful nation in capital ships, but have given up the possibility of such numerical superiority as would in itself have insured success in future war, which superiority could have been retained only at great expense. This was done by the expressed will of the American people and under the direction of four of the ablest statesmen in the country. It was well done, and well it is that it was done, but the voluntary reduction of our Navy was evidently made with the understanding that the agreement would be lived up to and that, in view of the dangers that confront us as set forth above, such reduction was the maximum consistent with our National safety.

Are we living up to the terms of this agreement?

The capital ship strength of our Navy was specifically defined, but that is only a part of the Navy, for "Men fight, not ships."

If we are to have a Navy, it must be clearly borne in mind that it exists for one purpose, and but for one, and that is to win war. Anybody can fight, but the best man wins. The Navy of the United States must be able to win in any war that we may become involved in, and, being restricted as to numbers, it can win only by superiority in efficiency.

How are we to obtain that efficiency? It can be obtained only by sending the ships to sea. Ships laid up deteriorate rapidly, while at sea they have to be kept up to the mark. At sea any defects in construction will develop and are corrected, while in port they may exist unknown. It is only by keeping all

of our ships manned and at sea much of the time that we can be assured of that degree of efficiency in machinery, gunnery, and communications which is essential to victory.

And the officers and men, how are they to learn to make war while the ships are tied up to a dock or lying at anchor? True, much can be accomplished by study on the part of those in high command, but all the study in the world is useless without actual practice as nearly like that which will be encountered in war as is possible to obtain. Ships newly manned are practically useless for fighting until their crews have lived and worked together for some time. We have many examples of that in history. Vivid in the memory of Americans is the case of brave Lawrence, who went to his death in the Chesapeake. The French fleet blockaded for twenty-two months in Toulon by Nelson, who kept the sea during that whole period, is another. When the French ships went to sea they lost their topmasts in a gale and had to put back into port for repairs, while Nelson's ships, manned by experienced sailors, suffered not at all.

It needs salt spray to make a sailor; it needs target practice to make a gunner; it needs maneuvers to make a tactician; and these can be had only by sending our ships to sea.

The American people are heavily burdened by debt and are sorely taxed to pay it, but they have the right to have the situation put before them clearly before making a final decision.

It has been determined that we need a Navy to use in war.

This Navy is of no use unless it can win.

The only way to insure its winning is to enable it to keep the ships in commission and send them to sea and pay the price.

If after hearing the facts the American people are content to have a moderately good Navy instead of the best Navy, that is their undoubted privilege. When war comes, the Navy, whatever there is of it, will do its level best, but if inadequately trained many a mother's son will meet his death who would have been living but for lack of a fighting chance.