be in condition to press them without delay The confederate leaders must employ their utmost efforts against this army in Virginia, and they will be supported by the whole body of their military officers, among whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as there is also very little among the higher class of citizens in the seceding States. "I have found no fighting men in this Peninsula-all are in the ranks of the opposing foe. "Even if more troops than I now have should prove unnecessary for purposes of military occupation, our greatest display of imposing force in the capital of the rebel government will have the best moral effect. I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your Excellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be reinforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the government. I ask for every man that the government can send me. Any commander of the reinforcements, whom your Excellency may designate, will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject. "I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have, and I firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our triumph should be made decisive and complete. The soldiers of this army love their government, and will fight well in its support: you may rely upon them. They have confidence in me as their general, and in you as their President. Strong reinforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force, the more perfect will be our combinations, and the less our loss. "For obvious reasons, I beg you to give immediate consideration to this communication, and to inform me fully at the earliest moment of your final determination. "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, “Major General Commanding. "His Excellency, ABRAHAM Lincoln, "President U. S." "It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey river. "In any event you will be able to prevent the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond, and falling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five (35) and forty thousand (40,000) men. "A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation. "At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is seut forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington, and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be necessary for sufficient cooperation. When General McDowell is in position on your right; his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be prepared to supply him by that route. "The President desires that General McDow ell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves forward. By order of the President, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. "Major General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, "Comd'g Army of Potomac before Richmond. "From Washington, May 18, 2 p. m." It will be observed, that this order rendered it impossible for me to use the James river as a base of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond from the north. I had advised, and preferred, that reinforcements should be sent by water, for the reasons that their arrival would be more safe and certain, and that I would be left free to rest the army on the James river, whenever the navigation of To which, on the 18th of May, I received this that stream should be opened. The land movereply: 'Headquarters, DEPARTMENT POTOMAC, "May 18th, 1862. "GENERAL: Your despatch to the President, asking reinforcements, has been received and carefully considered. "The President is not willing to uncover the "The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock, by the way of the Potomac and York river, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond. ment obliged me to expose my right in order to eral McDowell's march was soon countermanded, secure the junction; and as the order for GenI incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by the James, and thus avoided the delays and water, I could have approached Richmond by losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream. The following is a copy of the instructions to General McDowell: "WAR DEPARTMENT, "Washington, D. C., May 17, 1862. "GENERAL: Upon being joined by General Shield's division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, co-operating with the forces under General McClellan, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamankey and York rivers. "While seeking to establish, as soon as possi-¡ ble, a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such a position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces. "General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond, and throwing itself upon your column, before the junction of the two armies is effected. "A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your force is annexed. By order of the President. "EDWIN M. STANTON, "GENERAL MCDOWELL, "Com'g. Dep't. of Rappahannock.” Having some doubts from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority over the troops of General McDowell, and as to the time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this dispatch: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Camp near Tunstall's Station, Va., "May 21, 1862, Il p. m. "Your dispatch of yesterday respecting our situation and the batteries at Fort Darling, was received while I was absent with the advance, where I have been all this day. I have communicated personally with Capt. Goldsborough, and by letter with Capt. Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co-operation on land, which I will not be in condition to afford for several days; circumstances must determine the propriety of a land attack. action of the city government, the conduct of the citizens, and all other sources of informa tion accessible to me, give positive assurance that our approach to Richmond involves a desperate battle between the opposing armies. "All our divisions are moving towards the foe. I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack them according to my best judgment, and in such manner as to employ my greatest force. "I regret the state of things as to General McDowell's command. We must beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to this army for that effort would do more to protect Washington than his whole force can possibly do anywhere else in the field. The rebels are concentrating from all points for the two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I would still most respectfully suggest the policy of your concentrating here by movements on water. I have heard nothing as to the probabilities of the contemplated junction of McDowell's force with mine. I have no idea when he can start, what are his means of transportation, or when he may be expected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is little hope that he can join me overland in time for the coming battle; delays, on my part, will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoralization. This region is unhealthy for northern men, and unless kept moving I fear that our soldiers may become discouraged. At present our numbers are weakening from disease, but our men remain in good heart. "I regret, also, the configuration of the Department of the Rappahannock. It includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I think that my own department should embrace the entire field of military operations designed for the capture and occupation of that city. "Again I agree with your Excellency, that one bad general is better than two good ones. "I am not sure that I fully comprehend your "It rained again last night, and rain on this orders of the 17th inst., addressed to myself soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for and General McDowell. If a junction is effectarmy transportation. I personally crossed the ed before we occupy Richmond, it must necesChickahominy to-day, at Bottom's bridge ford, sarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg, and went a mile beyond, the enemy being about and within my department. This fact, my supehalf a mile in front. I have three regiments on rior rank, and the express language of the 62d the other bank, guarding the rebuilding of the article of war, will place his command under my bridge. Keyes's corps is on the New Kent road, orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed near Bottom's bridge. Heintzelman is on the by your Excellency, and I consider that he will same road, within supporting distance. Sumner be under my command, except that I am not to is on the railroad, connecting right with left. detach any portion of his forces, or give any Stoneman, with advanced guard, is within one orders which can put him out of position to cover mile of New bridge. Franklin, with two divi- Washington. If I err in my construction I desions, is about two miles this side of Stoneman. sire to be at once set right. Frankness compels Porter's division, with the reserves of infantry me to say-anxious as I am for an increase of and artillery, is within supporting distance. force-that the march of McDowell's force upon Head-quarters will probably be at Coal Harbor Richmond by the shortest route, will, in my to-morrow, one mile this side of Franklin. All opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interpothe bridges over the Chickahominy are destroy-sition by it, as completely as its movement by ed. The enemy are in force on every road water. The enemy cannot advance by Frederleading to Richmond, within a mile or two west icksburg on Washington. of the stream. Their main body is on the road from New bridge, excamped along it for four or five miles, spreading over the open ground on both sides. Johnson's head-quarters are about two miles beyond the bridge. "All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own. The position of the rebel forces, the declaration of the rebel authorities, the resolutions of the Virginia legislature, the "Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas I desire that the extent of my authority over McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious results which a divided command has so often caused. I would respectfully suggest that this danger can only be surely guarded At a later hour on the same day I received "MAY 24, 1862. “From Washington, 4 p. m., 24th. against by explicitly placing General McDowell | "In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend Gieneral WeDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force and part of General McDowell's in their rear. A. LINCOLN, President. “I believe that there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can, but in any event I shall fight it" Major General GEO. B. MCCLELLAN.” with all the skill, caution and determinatiou that I possess, and I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my government, or that it may close my career. “GEORGE B. McClellan, "His Excellency, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, • President of the United States." On the 24th I received the following reply: "MAY 24, 1862, From which it will be seen that I could not expect General McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate operations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening I replied to the President that I would make my calculations accordingly. It then only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail myself of all artificial auxiliaries, to compensate as much as possible for the inadequacy of men. I concurred fully with the President in the injunction contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was necessary with my limited From Washington, 24th. force to move cautiously and safely." In view "I left General McDowell's camp at dark last of the peculiar character of the Chickaliominy, evening, Shield's command is there, but is so and the liability of its bottom-lands to sudden worn that he cannot move before Monday morn- inundation, it became necessary to construct ing, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thin-between Bottom's bridge and Mechanicsville ned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two 2 companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril. "The enemy's forces under General Anderson, now opposing General McDowell's advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond. "If, in conjunction with McDowell's move ment against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely. "You will have command of McDowell after eleven (11) new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log-way approaches. The entire army could probably have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day's supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage, the army would have been paralyzed. It is true, I might have abandoned my communications and pushed forward towards Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy and the consequent fall of the city, for a renewal of supplies; but the approaches were fortified, and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchments requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have dispensed with rations, Under these circumstances, I decide to retain a portion of the army on the left bauk of the river until our bridges were completed. It will be remembered that the order for the co-operation of General McDowell was simply suspended, not revoked, and therefore I was not at liberty to abandon the northern approach. A very dashing and successful reconnoissance was made near New bridge on the 24th of May, by Lieutenant Bowen, topographical engineers, escorted by the 4th Michigan volunteers and a squadron of the 2d United States cavalry, commanded respectively by Colonel Woodbury and Captain Gordon. Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, and, with little loss, drove it back upon its brigade, kuling a large number and capturing several prisoners. Great credit is due to the staff officers, as well as to Colonel Woodbury. Capiam Gordon, and their commands, for their conduct on this occasion. The work upon the bridges was commenced at once, and pushed forward with great vigor; tt the rains which from day to day continued bo fail, flooded the valley, and raised the water to a greater height than had been known for twenty years. This demolished a great amount of our labor, and our trst bridges with their tapproaches, which were not made with reference to such extreme high wa er, were carried off or rendered impassable. We were obliged, with immense labor, to construc! others much lo age: more elevated. and is able. Our men worked in the water. exposed to the enemy's fire from the opposite bank On the 25th of May I received the following telegram. "Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have. "A. LINCOLN, President. "Major General MCCLELLAN." On the 25th the following was also received: "WASHINGTON, May 25, 186 -2 P. M. "The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him; precisely in what force we cannot tell. Ile is also threatening Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas Gap railroad, from both north and southin precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and a concerted one, such as could not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the ob, and come back to the defence of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly. "A. LINCOLN, President. "Major General MCCLELLAN." To which I replied as follows; mond. “Washington, May 25, 1862. "Your dispatch received. General Banks "COAL HARBOR, May 25, 1862. was a S rasburg with about (6,000) six thou-, Telegram received. Independently of it sand men. Shields having been taken from the time is very near when I shall attack Richhini to swell a column for McDowell to aid you The object of the movement is probably at Richmond, and the rest of his forces scalier to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. All ed a varrons places. On the twenty-third (23) the information obtained from balloons, deserta reber force of seven (7) to ten thousand (10,-ers, prisoners and contrabands agree in the Oub fell upon one regiment and two companies statement that the mass of the rebel troops are guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, it entirely-crossed the Shenandoah, and onready to defend it. 24) twenty-fourth, yesterday, pushed on "I have no knowledge of Banks's position and to get horta of Banks on the road to Winches-force, nor what there is at Manassas, therefore Chemeral Banks ran a race with them, cannot form a definite opinion as to the force beading them into Winchester yesterday even- against him. ings This morning a battle ensued between I have two corps across the Chickahominy, the wo forces. in which General Banks was within six miles of Richmond, the other on this beaca back into full retreat towards Martins-side, at other crossings, within same distance, burg, and probably is broken up into a total and ready to cross when the bridges are comTeary on the Manassas Gap railroad,pleted. jusi i ow reports that Jackson is now near Front G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General Comď'g. Royal with ten thousand 10,600 following up "His excellency, A. LINCOLN, President.” and sugg 5. ting, as I understand, the force now On the 26th, I received the following: pursui 12 Banks. Also that another force of "WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862-12.40 A. M. too and is near Orleans, following on in "We have General Bank's official report. the stine direction. Stripped bare as we are Lere. I will do all that we can to prevent them He has saved his army and baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and as probably crossing the Potomac iarper's Ferry or ú above McDowell Las about 20,000 of bis for-afe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at fifteen thousand (15,000.) ĉas moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Femont, who was a Fran lin. is moving to Harrisburg, both these movements inteudell o go in the enemy's rear. is not a sin de one at tha point This is now our situation. If MeDowell's force was ow beyond our reach we should be has A. LINCOLN, President. "Major General G. B. McCLELLAN." On the 26th I received the following: "WASHINGTOx. May 26, 1862. "Can you not cut the Acquia Cieek railroad; also what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond. Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city? "A. LINCOLN, President. Major General MCCLELLAN.' On the same day I sent the following: "COAL HARBOR, May 26, 1862. le Virginia Cenital read in "Have cut i el: less. Apprebesions of something three places be ween Hanover Court House and like this and no uwillingness to sus'aia you as the Chickal miny. Will try to cut the other. b eo my reason for withholding Mc-| I do not think Richmoud intrenchments formiDowell's forces from you. dable, but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance. Have railroad in | Quade, with Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters, operation from White House to Chickahominy. and three batteries, under Captain Charles Grif Hope to have Chickahominy bridge repaired to- tin, 5th United States artillery, followed on the night. Nothing of interest to-day. same road. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, At 10 A. M. I also sent the following dispatch: "Telegrams of last night received. I am glad to know affairs are not so bad as might have been. I would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to General Banks, of March 16th, to General Wadsworth, of same date, and to my letter of April 1st, to the adjutant general. I cannot but think that a prompt return to the principles there laid down wouid relieve all probability of danger. I will forward copies by mail. I beg to urge the importance of Manassas and Front Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General. "His excellency, A. LINCOLN, President." Late on the 26th, I sent the following: Colonel G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional brigade, composed of the 5th and 13th New York, the 1st Connecticut artillery acting as infantry; the 6th Pennsylvania cavalry and station at Old Church, by a road running to Weeden's Rhode Island battery moved from his Hanover Court House, parallel to the Pamunkey. After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles through the mud and rain, General Emory, at noon, reached a point about two miles from Hanover Court House, where the road forks to Ashland, and found a portion of the enemy formed in line across the Hanover Court House road. General Emory had, before this, been joined by the 25th New York (of Martindale's brigade) and Berdan's sharpshooters; these regiments were deployed with a section of Benson's battery, and advanced slowly towards the enemy until reinforced by General Butterfield, with four regiments of his brigade, when the enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of his guns being captured by the 17th New York, under Colonel Lansing, after having been disabled by the fire of Benson's battery. The firing here lasted about an hour. The cavalry and Benson's battery were immediately ordered in pur suit, followed by Morell's infantry and artillery, May 26, 1862-7.30 p. m. with the exception of Martindale's brigade. "Have arranged to carry out your last orders. Warren's brigade, having been delayed by reWe are quietly closing in upon the enemy, pre-pairing bridges, &c., now arrived, too late to paratory to the last struggle. Situated as I am anticipate in the affair; a portion of this comI feel forced to take every possible precaution mand was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy against disaster, and to secure my flanks against bridges, and captured quite a number of prisonthe probable superior force in front of me. Myers; the remainder followed Morell's division. arrangements for to-morrow are very important, and, if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached. us. CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, In the mean time General Martindale, with the few remaining regiments of his brigade and a section of artillery, advanced on the Ashland road, and found a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry and artillery in position near Peak's station, on the Virginia Central railroad; he soon forced them to retire towards Ashland. The 25th New York having been ordered to rejoin him. General Martindale was directed to form his brigade and move up the railroad to rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover Court “G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General. "His excellency, A. LINCOLN, President.” On the same day I received intelligence that a very considerable force of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court House, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our communications, and in a position either to reinforce Jackson, or to impede McDowell's junction, should be finally move to unite with | House. On the same day I also received informa- He sent one regiment up the railroad, but retion from General McDowell, through the Sec-mained with the 2d Maine, afterwards joined by retary of War, that the enemy had fallen back the 25th New York, to guard the rear of the from Fredericksburg towards Richmond, and main column. that General McDowell's advance was eight miles south of the Rappahannock. It was thus imperative to dislodge or defeat this force, independently even of the wishes of the President, as expressed in his telegram of the 26th. I intrusted this task to Brigadier General Fitz John Porter, commanding the fifth corps, with orders to move at daybreak on the 27th. Through a heavy rain, and over bad roads, that officer moved his command as follows: The enemy soon returned to attack General Martindale, who at once formed the 2 Maine, 25th New York, and a portion of the 44th New Jersey, with one section of Martin's battery, on the New bridge road, facing his own position of the morning, and then held his ground for an hour against large odds until reinforced. General Porter was at Hanover Court House, near the head of his column, when he learned that the rear had been attacked by a large force. He at once faced the whole column about, recalled the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ashland, moved the 13th and 14th New York and Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's assistance, pushed the 9th Massachusetts and 62d Pennsylvania, of McQuad's brigade, through the woods General Morell's division, composed of the on the right (our original left) and attacked the brigades of Martindale, Butterfield and Mc-flank of the enemy, while Butterfield, with the Brigadier General W. H. Emory led the advance with the 5th and 6th regiments United States cavalry, and Benson's horse battery of the 2d United States artillery, taking the road from New bridge via Mechanicsville, to Hanover Court House. i |
