that where the statute provides that railroad commissioners shall make and fix reasonable and just rates of freight and passenger tariffs, to be observed by all railroad companies doing business within the State, and shall, as soon as practicable, furnish each company with a schedule of such charges, -a suit to enjoin such commissioners from enforcing such charges, on the ground that they are unreasonable and unjust, is not, in itself, a suit against the State; but the court further reasoned, with reference to the case before them, that as the statute provides a penalty for the violation of such rates as fixed, and directs the commissioners to sue in the name of the State to recover the penalty, if the bill for an injunction also prays that they be enjoined from instituting such suit, it becomes, in effect, an action against the State, and cannot be maintained.1 § 7781. At the Suit of Private Persons to Compel Corporations to Perform their Public Duties.—In the absence of a special injury done to him, or of a special right of action conferred by statute, the general rule is that a private person. cannot maintain a suit in equity, the purpose of which is to compel a corporation to perform its public duties. The reason is that if one individual may interpose, any other may, and 9 'McWhorter v. Pensacola &c. R. Co., 24 Fla. 417; 8. c. 5 South. Rep. 129; 12 Am. St. Rep. 220; 2 L. R. A. 504. It was at one time held in the Supreme Court of the United States that the court would look only to the record to determine whether or not the action was an action against the State: Osborn v. Bank of U. S., Wheat. (U. S.) 738; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 203. But in subsequent cases the court discovered that this test was too narrow: Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711; Cunningham . Macon &c. R. Co., 109 U. S. 446; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52; Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269. See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76; State v. Burke, 33 La. An. 498; Weston v. Dane, 51 Me. 461; Marshall v. Clark, 22 Tex. 23; Houston &c. R. Co. v. Randolph, 24 Tex. 317; Printup v. Cherokee R. Co., 45 Ga. 365; Hosner v. De Young, 1 Tex. 764. In round terms, the rule is that a sovereign State cannot be sued without its own consent, and then only in the mode and in the tribunal pointed out by that consent, which must be unequivocally expressed; and that what cannot be done di rectly, cannot be done indirectly in the form of actions against its officers: Moore v. Tate, 87 Tenn. 725; 8. c. 10 Am. St. Rep. 712, 724, note. as the decision in one individual case would be no bar to any other, there would be no end to litigation and strife.1 The doctrine is analogous to that relating to bills in equity by private persons for injunctions against public nuisances, the rule being that such actions cannot be maintained unless the complainant shows a particular injury to himself distinct from that which he suffers in common with the rest of the public. When, therefore, the slack-water navigation of the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company maintained, by means of pumps, locks, and other devices, was destroyed by a flood, it was held that a bill in equity could not be maintained by another corporation, to enjoin the former corporation from neglecting to repair and put in operation their navigation; and that the complainants had no right to a decree compensating them for any damages suffered as an incident to the non-repairing. 1 Buck Mountain Coal Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 50 Pa. St. 91, 99; s. c. 88 Am. Dec. 534. Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565; s. c. 36 Am. Dec. 502. Buck Mountain Coal Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 50 Pa. St. 91, 99; s. c. 88 Am. Dec. 534. On analogous grounds, a mandamus was denied by Lord Ellenborough, in the Court of King's Bench, to a brewery company, to assess damages against a dock company for polluting the waters of a public navigable river, from which the brewery company had been accustomed to draw water by pumps, wherewith to brew their beer. Lord Ellenborough was of opinion that a private proprietor cannot have such a right in the waters of a public navigable river as would give him a right to compensation for the deterioration of the same by a company proceeding under an act of Parliament. The injury, if any, was to all the king's subjects, and that was the subject-matter of indictment, and not of action. Otherwise, every person who had before used the water of the river might equally claim compensation, for which there was no pretense. And by the same rule, if the salubrity of the air in Bristol were impaired in consequence of the docks, every inhabitant of the place might as well claim compensation. For general injuries, common to all the subjects, the remedy is by indictment; and suppose that is taken away by the act (which was admitted), then the act has taken away the only remedy which the law would have given for this general injury. Rex v. Bristol Dock Co., 12 East, 429, 432. Analogous decisions denying private right of action for the redress of injuries common to the whole public-many of them so unjust that their doctrines have been measurably discarded in modern times, - are: Rose v. Miles, 4 Maule & S. 101; Ivison v. Moor, 1 Lord Raym. 486; Earle's Case, Carth. 173; Wilkes v. Hungerford Market Co., 2 Bing. N. C. 281; Greasly v. Codling, 2 Bing. 263. § 7782. Injunctions against Strikes, Boycots, and Other Combinations among Workmen. Within the last few years the powers of courts of equity have been called into play to an extent hitherto unprecedented, at the suits of employers of labor, individual and corporate, to restrain strikes, boycots, and other combinations and conspiracies among their employés, injurious to the property and business of the complainants. The use of the injunction in such cases is vindicated upon the ground that equity exercises this species of jurisdiction for the protection of property and business against irreparable injury, threatened by persons who are insolvent, and who, by reason of their numbers, cannot be impleaded in proceedings at law, without a multiplicity of actions. An extended discussion of this subject cannot be regarded as germane to a work on corporations; but, briefly stated, it may be said that injunctions have been granted to restrain striking employés from intimidating other employés, so as to induce them to quit their employment, or to prevent persons from engaging in the employment of the plaintiffs; to restrain 1 Cœur d'Alene Consolidated Mining Co. v. Miners' Union of Wardner, 51 Fed. Rep. 260; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 382; Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135; 8. c. 12 L. R. A. 193 (where there is an extensive note on the subject); State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46; 8. c. 3 Am. St. Rep. 23; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212; 8. C. 9 Am. St. Rep. 689; Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595; s. c. 34 Am. St. Rep. 678; Barr v. Essex Trades' Council (N. J. Eq.), 30 Atl. Rep. 881; Continental Ins. Co. v. Board of Underwriters, 67 Fed. Rep. 310; Longshore Printing &c. Co. v. Howell, 26 Or. 527; s. c. 38 Pac. Rep. 547 (where the injunction was refused on the ground that the injury did not appear to be irreparable); Wick China Co. v. Brown, 164 Pa. St. 449; s. c. 35 W. N. C. 330; 25 Pitts. L. J. (N. 8.) 151; 30 Atl. Rep. 261; Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189; s. c. 63 N. Y. St. Rep. 89; 39 N. E. Rep. 72 (where a permanent injunction was refused because the strike had ceased, and the injury did not appear to be irreparable); Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 803; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310 (appeal in the preceding case); California R. Co. v. Rutherford, 62 Fed. Rep. 796; United States v. Elliott, 64 Fed. Rep. 27; United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724; Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564. See also Davis v. Foreman [1894], 3 Ch. 654 (where an injunction was refused to restrain an employé from quitting his employment). 2 Coeur d'Alene &c. Min. Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. Rep. 260; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 382; Wick China Co. v. Brown, 164 Pa. St. 449. persons from gathering in crowds at the plaintiff's place of business and interfering with his workmen;' to restrain the continuation of a so-called "boycot" against a newspaper;2 in courts of the United States, under the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, to restrain striking railway employés from interrupting the operations of interstate commerce; to restrain railway employés, while continuing in their employment, from refusing to perform their duties, when such refusal interferes with the transmission of the mails and with the operations of commerce between the States;5 to restrain the employés of the receivers of a railway, appointed by a court of the United States, from entering into combinations or conspiracies for the purpose of crippling the property in the hands of the receivers, and embarrassing the operation of the rail. roads under their management, either by disabling the engines, cars, etc., or by interfering with their possession; or by actually obstructing their control and management of the property; or by using force, threats, or other wrongful methods against the receivers, their agents, or employés remaining in their service; or by using like methods to cause their employés to quit their service; or by preventing or deterring others from entering their service in the place of those leaving it; but not to enjoin them from merely quitting the service singly or in a body, for the purpose of securing better wages or better terms of employment. 1 Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595; 8. c. 34 Am. St. Rep. 678; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212; s. c. 9 Am. St. Rep. 689. 2 Barr v. Essex Trades' Council, (N. J. Eq.) 30 Atl. Rep. 881. 826 U. S. Stat. 209. United States v. Elliott, 62 Fed. Rep. 801; and 64 Fed. Rep. 27; United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724; s. c. 27 Chicago Leg. News, 139. See also Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730, 746; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 387, 395; United States v. Workmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. Rep. The Federal doctrine 994; . c. 26 L. R. A. 158; Thomas v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 803; United States v. Debs, 63 Fed. Rep. 436; Re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 Fed. Rep. 828; Re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. Rep. 834; Re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. Rep. 840; United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. Rep. 698. Compare United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed. Rep. 605, where this use of the injunction is disapproved by Mr. Circuit Judge Putnam. Southern California R. Co. v. Rutherford, 62 Fed. Rep. 796. 6 Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310; s. c. 25 L. R. A. 414; modifying on this subject may be said to have culminated in a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which must remain for all time the leading Federal case on this subject, in which the court unanimously affirmed the proposition that the United States may, by a bill in equity in its own courts, restrain the striking employés of railway companies from interfering with the operations of interstate commerce, and with the transportation of the United States mails, and may punish them for contempt, without trial by jury, for disobeying such restraining orders. The court proceeds upon the view that the United States has jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and that it is entitled to exert its authority directly upon each citizen, a principle unquestionably sound and of the very greatest importance. The jurisdiction to grant an injunction in such cases is upheld upon the settled doctrine of the English Court of Chancery, that an injunction would be granted at the suit of the Attorney-General to restrain purprestures of public highways and navigations. The opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer, is a very learned and conclusive presentation of the subject, and is, throughout, clear and strong.1 § 7783. Other Decisions Illustrating the Use of Injunctions in the Case of Corporations.- Injunctions have been granted in England to restrain the prosecution of corporate work, at the suit of 8. c. sub nom. Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 803. 1 The leading Federal case, so far decided, relating to the extent of the power to enjoin striking employés, is Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310; 8. c. 25 L. R. A. 414, decided by the United States Court of Appeals, in a very learned and well-considered. opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan in 1894; modifying an injunctive order previously granted by Mr. Circuit Judge Jenkins, in the same case, reported under the name of Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., a 60 Fed. Rep. 803. The opinion of |