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can operate more than a hundred miles from its base, because the teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons, leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of the men and animals at the front, who are fully employed in fighting; hence the necessity to "forage liberally on the country," a measure which fed our men and animals chiefly on the very supplies which had been gathered near the railroads by the enemy for the maintenance of his own armies. "The march to the sea" in strategy was only a shift of base for ulterior and highly important purposes.

Meantime Hood, whom I had left at and near Florence, Alabama, three hundred and seventeen miles to my rear, having completely reorganized and re-supplied his army, advanced against Thomas at Nashville, who had also made every preparation. Hood first encountered Schofield at Franklin, November 30, 1864, attacked him boldly behind his intrenchments, and sustained a positive "check," losing 6252 of his best men, including Generals Cleburne and Adams, who were killed on the very parapets, to Schofield's loss of 2326. Nevertheless he pushed on to Nashville, which he invested. Thomas, one of the grand characters of our civil war, nothing dismayed by danger in front or rear, made all his preparations with cool and calm deliberation; and on the 15th of December sallied from his intrenchments, attacked Hood in his chosen and intrenched positions, and on the next day, December 16th, actually annihilated his army, eliminating it thenceforward from the problem of the war. Hood's losses were 15,000 men to Thomas's 305.

Therefore at the end of the year 1864 the war at the west was concluded, leaving nothing to be considered in the grand game of war but Lee's army, held by Grant in Richmond, and the Confederate detachments at Mobile and along the sea-board north of Savannah. Of course Charleston, ever arrogant, felt secure; but it was regarded by us as a "dead cock in the pit," and fell of itself when its inland communications were cut. Wilmington was captured by a detachment from the Army of the Potomac, aided by Admiral Porter's fleet and by Schofield, who had been brought by Grant from Nashville to Washington and sent down the Atlantic coast to prepare for Sherman's coming to Goldsboro', North Carolina, all "converging" on Richmond.

Preparatory to the next move, General Howard was sent from Savannah to secure Pocotaligo, in South Carolina, as a point of departure for the north, and General Slocum to Sister's Ferry, on the Savannah River, to secure a safe lodgment on the north bank for the same purpose. In due time-in February,

1865 - these detachments, operating by concentric lines, met on the South Carolina road at Midway and Blackville, swept northward through Orangeburg and Columbia to Winnsboro', where the direction was changed to Fayetteville and Goldsboro', a distance of 420 miles through a difficult and hostile country, making junction with Schofield at a safe base with two good railroads back to the sea-coast, of which we held absolute dominion. The resistance of Hampton, Butler, Beauregard, and even Joe Johnston was regarded as trivial. Our "objective" was Lee's army at Richmond. When I reached Goldsboro', made junction with Schofield, and moved forward to Raleigh, I was willing to encounter the entire Confederate army; but the Confederate armies Lee's in Richmond and Johnston's in my front -- held interior lines, and could choose the initiative.

Few military critics who have treated of the civil war in America have ever comprehended the importance of the movement of my army northward from Savannah to Goldsboro', or of the transfer of Schofield from Nashville to coöperate with me in North Carolina. This march was like the thrust of a sword towards the heart of the human body; each mile of advance swept aside all opposition, consumed the very food on which Lee's army depended for life, and demonstrated a power in the National Government which was irresistible.

Therefore in March, 1865, but one more move was left to Lee on the chess-board of war- to abandon Richmond; make junction with Johnston in North Carolina; fall on me and destroy me if possible, a fate I did not apprehend; then turn on Grant, sure to be in close pursuit, and defeat him. But no! Lee clung to his intrenchments for political reasons, and waited for the inevitable. At last, on the 1st day of April, General Sheridan, by his vehement and most successful attack on the Confederate lines at the "Five Forks" near Dinwiddie Court House, compelled Lee to begin his last race for life. He then attempted to reach Danville, to make junction with Johnston, but Grant in his rapid pursuit constantly interposed, and finally headed him off at Appomattox, and compelled the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, which for four long years had baffled the skill and courage of the Army of the Potomac and the power of our National Government. This substantially ended the war, leaving only the formal proceedings of accepting the surrender of Johnston's army in North Carolina and of the subordinate armies at the South-west.

All these movements were on a grand scale, strictly in conformity with the lessons of the great masters, and illustrate every branch of

the science of war as defined by Soady,-strategy, logistics, grand and minor tactics, and engineering.

In thus summarizing these controlling events, extending through four years of time and embracing a continent, I have endeavored to confine myself to the chief campaigns and battles which illustrate military principles. The first year of the war was necessarily one of preparation, but in the last three I contend that every principle of the science of war was illustrated and demonstrated by examples in our war. "Divergent" operations were generally use less or failures; "convergent" operations, with good "bases," though far apart, when persevered in resulted in success and victory. All I aim to establish is that the civil war brought forth, on both sides, out of the mass of the American people, the knowledge, talents, and qualities which were necessary to the occasion; that success resulted from the same qualities, the same knowledge and adherence to the rules of war, which have achieved military success in other ages and in other lands; and that military knowledge acquired beforehand was most valuable, though not conclusive. The same knowledge might have been and was acquired in actual war, though often at a terrible expense in human life and misery. There is an old familiar maxim, "In peace prepare for war," so that I would deem it the part of wisdom for our Government to accumulate in our arsenals a large supply of the best cannon, small arms, ammunition, and military equipments, ready for instant use; to encourage military education, and to foster a national militia.

I will quote here an expression of a personal friend who was a good soldier of the civil war, now a senator in Congress, contained in an address which he recently delivered to the graduating class of a college in Michigan:

Of course knowledge is power, we all know that: but mere knowledge is not power, it is simply possibility. Action is power, and its highest manifestation is action with knowledge.

How true this is, is felt by every soldier who has been in battle. 'Tis not the man who knows most, but the one who does best, that wins. Grant, and Meade, and Sheridan at the close of the war could have been taught many lessons by our learned professors, but none of these could have guided the forces to victory as Grant did at Chattanooga, defended his position as Meade did at Gettysburg, or hurled his masses as Sheridan did at Winchester. Action guided by knowledge is what is demanded of the modern general. He must know as much of the school of the soldier as any man in the ranks; he must know what

VOL. XXXV.— 81.

men can do, and what they cannot do; he must foresee and forereach to provide in advance the food, clothing, ammunition, and supplies of every nature and kind necessary for the maintenance of his command; and, moreover, he must gain the confidence and affections of all the men committed to his charge. Above all, he must act according to the best knowledge and information he can obtain, preferably coupled with experience acquired long in advance. If we demand of the engineer of a locomotive, composed of bits of iron, both knowledge and experience, how much more should we demand these qualities of the commander of an army, composed of living men, of flesh and blood, with immortal souls! There may be such men as born generals, but I have never encountered them, and doubt the wisdom of trusting to their turning up in an emergency.

The aggressive demands a great moral force, the defensive less. A man who has not experienced the feeling cannot comprehend the sensation of hurling masses of men against an intrenched enemy, almost sure to result in the death of thousands, and, worse still, the mangling of more, followed by the lamentations of families at the loss of fathers, brothers, and sons. We in America, with a free press behind us, which sympathized with their neighbors and rarely comprehended the necessities of battle, felt this moral force far more than would any European general with his well-organized corps and battalions which he could move with little more feeling than he would the ivory figures on a chess-board.

In 1872 I visited Europe in the frigate Wabash, and was landed at Gibraltar, held by England with a full war garrison, composed of all arms of service, commanded by Sir Fenwick Williams of Kars, a general of great renown, whose officers were thoroughly educated and of marked intelligence. They naturally questioned me as to the conduct of our civil war; they could comprehend how we might, out of our intelligent citizens, create battalions of infantry, but were incredulous when I explained that we had been equally successful with artillery, engineers, ordnance and staff, the scientific branches of the military service; and when I further claimed that most of our campaigns had been conducted according to the highest military principles, as taught by their General Hamley in the staff school at Aldershot, I could read in their faces signs of more than doubt. The same or similar experiences occurred afterwards at Malta, and in the clubs of London.

In Russia I found the army officers specially well informed about American affairs. At Vladi Kavkas, a city at the north base of the

Caucasian range of mountains, Mr. Curtin and I, with our party, were entertained by a brigadier-general and the officers of his command, who welcomed us in a speech referring to Grant and Sheridan, Farragut and Porter, with as much precision as could have been expected at Denver. In Italy also there prevailed a similar public feeling, and there I encountered several who had been to America, and had shared in some of our campaigns.

In Germany the army officers seemed so well satisfied with themselves, by reason of their then recent victories over the French, that they gave little heed to our affairs on this side of the Atlantic. In all their garrisoned towns they were drilling morning, noon, and night, at the squad drill, at the company drill, and in the school of the battalion; and if industry and attention to details are ruling elements in the science of war, then will the German battalions maintain the cohesion and strength they displayed in the war of 1870-71. With such battalions as units, there can be no scarcity of skilled officers and generals.

In like manner the French had not yet recovered from their defeats at Woerth, Metz, Gravelotte, Sédan, and Paris. With them the separation of the officer from the soldier was much more marked than in any other of the military establishments I witnessed in Europe, and one of their most renowned generals attributed to this cause their defeat and national humiliation; specifying that when their armies were hastily assembled on the Rhine, the soldiers did not personally know their captains and company officers, and these in turn could not distinguish their own commanders. I infer, however, from recent accounts, that General Boulanger, who attended our

NEW YORK, May 1, 1887.

centennial celebration at Yorktown in 1881, has corrected much of this, and has infused into the French army somewhat of his own youthful ardor and spirit, so that if a new war should arise in Europe we may expect different results.

Nevertheless, for service in our wooded country, where battles must be fought chiefly by skirmishers and "thin lines," I prefer our own people. They possess more individuality, more self-reliance, learn more quickly the necessity for organization and discipline, and will follow where they have skilled leaders in whom they have confidence. Any one of the corps of the Army of the Potomac, or of the West, would not have hesitated to meet after 1863, in open ground, an equal number of the best drilled German troops. This, of course, may seem an idle boast; it is only meant to convey my opinion that the American people need not fear a just comparison in warlike qualities with those of any other nation. We are more likely to err in the other direction, in over-confidence, by compelling inferior numbers and undisciplined men to encounter superior troops, exposing them to certain defeat a "cruel and inhuman" act on the part of any government. Strength in war results from organization, 'cohesion, and discipline, which require time and experience; but war is an expensive luxury, too costly to maintain even to secure these important results: therefore the greater necessity for fostering a national militia, and supporting military schools like that at West Point, which has proven its inestimable value to the nation as General Washington predicted, and as every war in America during this century has demonstrated.

W. T. Sherman.

VALUES.

I

MAKE apprisal of the maiden moon
For what she is to me:

Not a great globe of cheerless stone

That hangs in awful space alone,
And ever so to be;

But just the rarest orb,
The very fairest orb,
The star most lovely-wise
In all the dear night-skies!

So thou to me, O jestful girl of June! I have no will to hear

Cold calculations of thy worth

Summed up in beauty, brain, and birth: Such coldly strike mine ear.

Thou art the rarest one,

The very fairest one,

The soul most lovely-wise

That ever looked through eyes!

Richard E. Burton.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

PREMIER OR PRESIDENT?

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE REBEL GAME.

HE rebel conspirators were not unmindful of the great advantages they had hitherto derived from their complaints, their intrigues, their assumptions, their arrogant demands. No sooner was the provisional government organized at Montgomery than they appointed a new embassy of three commissioners to proceed to Washington and make the fourth effort to assist, protect, and if possible to establish the rebellion through a negotiation. They not only desired to avert a war, but, reasoning from the past, had a well-grounded faith that they would secure a peaceful acquiescence in their schemes. The commissioners were instructed to solicit a reception in their official character, and if that were refused, to accept an unofficial interview; to insist on the de facto and de jure independence of the Confederate States; but nevertheless to accede to a proposition to refer the subject of their mission to the United States Senate, or to withhold an answer until the Congress of the United States should assemble and pronounce a decision in the premises, provided the existing peaceful status were rigidly maintained. This modest programme was made necessary by the half-fledged condition of the rebellion: its personal jealousies were not yet hushed; its notions of State rights were not yet swallowed up in an imperious military dictatorship; above all, its military preparation consisted mainly of a self-sacrificing enthusiasm. Notwithstanding the two months' drill and batterybuilding at Charleston, Davis did not agree with Governor Pickens that the moment had come to storm Sumter. "Fort Sumter should be in our possession at the earliest moment possible," wrote the rebel war secretary, but "thorough preparation must be made before an attack is attempted. . . . A failure would demoralize our people and injuriously affect us in the opinion of the world as reckless and pre

Toombs to commissioners, Feb. 27, 1861. Unpublished MS.

Walker to Pickens. War Records. § Beauregard to Walker. War Records.

cipitate." Therefore they made Beauregard a brigadier-general and sent him to command in the harbor of Charleston. Beauregard's professional inspection justified this prudence.

[wrote he (March 6th)], it would be a perfect GibralIf Sumter was properly garrisoned and armed tar to anything but constant shelling night and day from the four points of the compass. As it is, the weakness of the garrison constitutes our greatest advantage, and we must for the present turn our attention to preventing it from being reenforced. This idea I am gradually and cautiously infusing into the minds of all here; but should we have to open our batteries upon it, I hope to be able to do so with all the advantages the condition of things here will permit. All that I ask is time for completing my batteries and preparing and organizing properly my command.§

The first of the three commissioners, Martin J. Crawford, arrived in Washington the day before Lincoln's inauguration. He would have nothing more to do with Buchanan, he

wrote.

His fears for his personal safety, the apprehensions for the security of his property, together with the cares of state and his advanced age, render him wholly disqualified for his present position. He is as incapable now of purpose as a child.

With the arrival of the second commissioner, John Forsyth, they prepared to begin operations upon the new Administration. It was comparatively easy to call into caucus the active or disguised secessionists who yet remained in the city. Wigfall, Mason, Hunter, and Breckinridge were still in the Senate; Virginia and the other border States had a number of sympathizing Congressmen in the House; Bell, Crittenden, and Douglas, though loyal, had no love for Lincoln, and could be approached with professions of peace; Seward, in order to gain information, had kept himself during the whole winter in relation with all parties, and had openly proclaimed that his policy was one of peace and conciliation. ¶

The prospect of beginning negotiations seemed flattering; nevertheless, their first caucus over the inaugural agreed that "it was Lincoln's purpose at once to attempt the col

Crawford to Toombs, March 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

Senate speech, Jan. 12, 1861. "Globe."

* Copyright by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, 1886-7. All rights reserved.

lection of the revenue, to reënforce and hold Forts Sumter and Pickens, and to retake the other places."* A day or two later, on comparing the fragmentary gossip they had raked together, in which the difficulties of reënforcing Sumter were dimly reflected, with a general conversation alleged to have been held by one of their informants with Seward, they framed and reported to Montgomery a theory of probable success.

Seward, they thought, was to be the ruling power of the new Administration. Seward and Cameron were publicly committed to a peace policy. They would establish an understanding with the Secretary of State.

This gentleman [they wrote] is urgent for delay. The tenor of his language is to this effect: I have built up the Republican party; I have brought it to triumph; but its advent to power is accompanied by great difficulties and perils. I must save the party and save the Government in its hands. To do this, war must be averted; the negro question must be dropped; the "irrepressible" conflict ignored; and a Union party to embrace the border slave-States inaugurated. I have already whipped Mason and Hunter in their own State. I must crush out Davis, Toombs, and their colleagues in sedition in their respective States. Saving the border States to the Union by moderation and justice, the people of the cotton-States, unwillingly led into secession, will rebel against their leaders and reconstruction will follow.

The commissioners therefore deemed it their duty to support Mr. Seward's policy. "Until we reach the point of pacific negotiations, it is unimportant what may be his subsequent hopes and plans. It is well that he should indulge in dreams which we know are not to be realized." They of course make no mention of the arguments, agencies, and influences which we may infer they employed in their deceitful intent to foster these dreams; unless, indeed, they were instrumental in provoking the Senate debate of March 6th and 7th, in which Clingman attacked the inaugural as an announcement of war, while Douglas defended it as a manifesto of peace, "for the purpose," as Mr. Forsyth wrote that Douglas told him, "of fixing that construction on it and of tomahawking it afterwards if it [the Administration] departed from it."†

Acting upon this assumed anxiety of Seward for delay and for peace, the commissioners now agreed upon what they elaborately described in a long dispatch to Montgomery as a most ingenious plan. They would force the Administration to accept or reject their mission, and thereby confront the immediate issue of peace or war, unless Seward would consent to

*L. Q. Washington to Walker. War Records. Forsyth to Toombs, March 8, 1861. Unpub. lished MS.

Commissioners to Toombs, March 9, 1861. Unpublished MS.

maintain the present military status. Having reached this conclusion, they laboriously drew up a memorandum which they purposed to ask Seward to sign, and sent it to the State Department by an "agent," but Mr. Seward was at home ill, and could not be seen.

Their long dispatches home, and their mysterious allusions to conversations, to agents, and intermediaries, convey the impression that they were "in relation " with the Secretary of State; but whether they were duped by others, or whether they were themselves duping the Montgomery cabinet, indisputable indications in these documents contradict their assertions. At last, however, their vigilance was rewarded with what they considered an item of important news, and they hurried off several telegrams to Montgomery: "Things look better here than was believed." "The impression prevails in Administration circles that Fort Sumter will be evacuated within ten days." was on Saturday night, March 9th, and so far from being exclusive or advance information, it was substantially printed in next morning's newspapers. § After four days' consideration by the Lincoln government, and extended discussion in a Cabinet meeting, the loss of Sumter seemed unavoidable; and the rumor was purposely given out to prepare the public mind, if the need should finally come for the great sacrifice.

This

The Jefferson Davis cabinet at Montgomery clutched at the report with avidity. Under this hope they were no longer satisfied with the "existing peaceful status" specified in their instructions of February 27th, and repeated in the prepared memorandum of the commissioners. "Can't bind our hands a day without evacuation of Sumter and Pickens," replied Toombs imperatively by telegraph on Monday, March 11th. || Until Sumter should be evacuated it was idle to talk of peaceful negotiation, he added in his written dispatch to the commissioners, while they were further instructed to "pertinaciously demand" the withdrawal of the troops and vessels from Pickens and Pensacola. ¶

Thus spurred into activity, the commissioners now deemed it incumbent on them to make an effort. The whole tenor of their previous dispatches was calculated to convey the impression that they were twisting the Secretary of State at pleasure between their diplomatic thumb and finger. On Monday, March 11th, they sent him their first message - not the demand of Toombs that day received by tel

"New York Herald," March 10, 1861.

Toombs to commissioners, March 11, 1861. Unpublished MS.

Toombs to commissioners, March 14, 1861. Unpublished MS.

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