of the corporation is situated. Thus, under the constitution of California, "a corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases."1 1 Cal. State Const. 1879, art. 12, 16. This provision is regarded as permissive, and not mandatory. It does not prevent the bringing of suits in other counties, at the option of the plaintiff, and the right to change the venue, where this is done, is not absolute. It does not, for instance, prohibit the prosecution of an action against a national bank in San Joaquin County, upon a contract which was to be performed in Fresno County, where the contract did not name the county wherein payment was to be made by the bank. Fresno Nat. Bank v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. 491; s. c. 24 Pac. Rep. 157. Under this provision, where a railroad company was sued for damages resulting from its wrongful refusal to carry the plaintiff's lumber to market, and there was nothing in the body of the complaint to show where the breach of obligation occurred, it was held that the action was presumptively brought in the proper county, and that it devolved upon the railroad company to show that the breach did not occur in that county, in order to entitle it to a change of venue to the county where it had its principal place of business. Chase v. South Pac. Coast R. Co., 83 Cal. 468; 8. c. 23 Pac. Rep. 532. It is to be observed that the above constitutional provision reads a corporation or an association." It is held that an association of persons organized for a particular purpose may be sued for negligence in the county where the liability arose, although not formally incorporated. Kendrick v. Diamond Creek Consolidated Gold Min. Co., 94 Cal. 137; s. c. 29 Pac. Rep. 324. Where the action was brought against a corporation upon a contract made in the county of San Francisco, to be performed outside the State, and where the alleged breach of contract occurred outside the State, and the action was brought in the county of Los Angeles, the defendant was entitled to a change of venue to the county of San Francisco, because the action was not brought in the proper venue in the first instance,- not having been brought where the contract was to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arose, or the breach occurred, within the meaning of this constitutional provision. Cohn v. Central Pac. R. Co., 71 Cal. 488; s. c. 12 Pac. Rep. 498. This constitutional provision has been held to apply to cases of torts as well as to cases of contracts. Lewis v. South Pac. Coast R. Co., 66 Cal. 209; 8. c. 4 West Coast Rep. 615. A foreign corporation in California has no residence in any particular county, in such a sense that it can be sued alone in that county; but the plaintiff may select the county in which he will bring his action, provided he can get service of process there. Thomas v. Placerville &c. Min. Co., 65 Cal. 600; s. c. 3 West Coast Rep. 777. 8 7429. The Same Subject Continued. But in Montana the place of trial of an action against a railroad corporation, for personal injuries sustained by its employé, will not be changed from the county in which the accident occurred, on the ground that the defendant's principal place of business is in another county. So, in Louisiana, suits against railroad companies for damages may be brought in the parish where the damage was done, or the injury received.' So, in Texas where the cause of action is a fraud committed by the corporation through its agent, the action is properly brought within the county where the fraud was committed, and where the agent resides, although otherwise the corporation may have no residence in that county. So, under the Code of Civil Procedure of Kansas, an action against a foreign railroad company for personal injuries may be brought in the county within the State where the road is operated and where the injuries occurred, although the defendant is merely a lessee. So, in Georgia, a statute providing that railroad corporations shall be suable in the counties in which injuries shall be committed, is subject to no constitutional objection; and an action against a railroad company for refusal to issue a through bill of lading over its own line and a connecting road, must be brought in the county where the refusal occurred or the defendant resides. The provision of the Nebraska Code,' authorizing the bringing of an action against an insurance company in any county where the cause of action or some part thereof arose, is remedial, and not restrictive in its nature; and the action may be brought where the cause of action or some part thereof arose, although the company has no agent in that county. Under section. 1 Oels v. Helena &c. Co., 10 Mont. 524; s. c. 26 Pac. Rep. 1000. 'Houston v. Vicksburg &c. R. Co., 39 La. An. 796; s. c. 2 South. Rep. 562. 'First Nat. Bank v. Turner (Tex.), 15 S. W. Rep. 710. See 1 Sayles Tex. Civ. Stat., art. 1198, § 7. In this case the corporation was a co-defendant, and the action was brought in the county of the plaintiff's residence. Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Kanaley, 39 Kan. 1; s. c. 17 Pac. Rep. 324. • Davis v. Central Railroad &c. Co., 17 Ga. 323. So much of the Georgia Coles v. Central R. &c. Co., 82 Insurance Co. v. McLimans, 28 73 of the Civil Code of Kentucky,' an action against a common carrier for a personal injury cannot be brought in a county which is neither the residence of any of the parties, nor the place where the injury was done.' 87430. Where the Cause of Action Accrues. -The stat utes of several of the States permit an action to be brought against a corporation in the county where the cause of action accrued. Under such a statute, it has been held that a cause of action against a life insurance company, under a policy for the payment of indemnity in the event of death, accrues within the county where the assured died, although the contract of insurance may have been made in another county. § 7431. Validity of Statutes Making Corporations Suable in Any County.-Stated generally, there can be no doubt that a statute making a corporation, having a residence within the State for the purposes of jurisdiction, suable in any county in the State, does not deprive the corporation of any rights guaranteed by the Federal or by any State constitution,though there may be contrary provisions in recent State constitutions. It has been held that a constitutional provision declaring that corporations "shall have the right to sue, and shall be subject to be sued in all courts in all cases as natural persons," has no reference to the subject of venue in civil actions, which belongs only to the remedy or form of procedure; and that it does not inhibit the passage of a general law authorizing a corporation to be sued in any county in which 1 Which reads as follows: "An action against such carrier for an injury to a passenger, or to other person or his property, must be brought in the county in which the defendant, or either of several defendants, resides, or in which the plaintiff or his property is injured; or in which he resides, if he resides in a county into which the carrier passes." Sherrill v. Chesapeake &c. R. Co., 89 Ky. 302; s. c. 12 S. W. Rep. 465. Similarly, see Harper v. Newport News &c. Co., 90 Ky. 359; s. c. 14 S. W. Rep. 346. • Such was Wagn. Mo. Stat. 294, § 28. Rippstein v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 Mo. 86. • Davis v. Central R. &c. Co., 17 Ga. 323; Home Protection v. Richards, 74 Ala. 466. Const. Ala., art. 14, § 12. it transacts business through its agents, though an individual citizen can only be sued in the county of his residence. On the contrary, according to the reasoning of the court, such a law is based upon sound reasons, growing out of the difference between natural and artificial persons, and does not violate the essential principles of justice, nor establish an unjust or unreasonable discrimination against corporations." § 7432. Local Actions. By the principles of the common law, any action founded upon a local thing must be brought in the county where the cause of action arises. Actions which are local by the principles of the common law, are not rendered transitory by permissive statutes, enacting that when one of the parties to an action is a corporation other than a county, town, school district, or parish, "the action may be brought in any county in which such corporation shall have any established or usual place of business,” etc., "or if the other party to such action is a natural person, the action may be brought in the county where such party lives."" 1 Home Protection v. Richards, 74 Ala. 466; Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Pruett, 74 Ala. 487. 'Metcalf, J., in Vermont &c. R. Co. v. Orcutt, 16 Gray (Mass.), 116, 117; citing Com. Dig., Action, N. 5; 5 Dane Abr. 653. The learned judge proceeds to state the difference at common law between local and transitory actions thus: "In other books it is said that the venue is local when the cause of action could have happened in one county only. Smith on Actions at Law (3d ed.), 79, 102; (7th ed.) 75, 96; 15 Petersd. Ab. (Amer. ed.) 241; 1 Chit. Pl. (6th Amer. ed.) 298; Steph. Pl. 289; Gould Pl., ch. 3, § 107. Thus, an action on the case upon the custom of England, against an innkeeper for not safely keeping the goods of his guest, is local, Clench, J., saying: 'If it be an action upon the case upon a contract, or for words, and the like transitory thing, it may be brought in any country, but in this case it ought to be brought where the inn is.' Anon., Godb. 42, and 1 Nels. Ab. 33. See also Williams v. Land, 4 Taunt. 729. So of an action for a nuisance by obstructing the navigation of a river. Mersey & Irwell Navigation Co. v. Douglas, 2 East, 502." Gen. Stats. Mass., ch. 123, § 5; Vermont &c. R. Co. v. Orcutt, 16 Gray (Mass.), 116. Therefore, an action by a railroad company for an injury to its culvert must be brought in the county where the culvert is situated. Ibid. So, a statute providing that actions must be brought and tried in the county in which the defendants, or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 395), has no proper application to an action affect - § 7433. Transitory Actions. On the contrary, transitory actions against corporations follow the corporation in its de facto migrations, and may be brought wherever the corporation has a residence, for the purposes of jurisdiction.1 87434. Changing the Venue. Under some statutory systems, if the action is brought in the wrong county, the venue may be changed to the right county." Where the statute requires an affidavit by the party in support of the grounds upon which a change of venue is demanded, judicial construction has adopted the conclusion that in the case of a corpora ing land, such as a proceeding by a railroad corporation to condemn land for its purposes; but the strongest reasons favor the conclusion that such an action is to be brought in the county where the land lies. "The compensation for the land sought to be taken is to be determined upon testimony, and the witnesses most competent to speak upon this subject will usually be found in the county referred to." California Southern R. Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 65 Cal. 394. A drainage district in Illinois is a quasi-municipal corporation, and where it includes within its boundaries a portion of the territory of two counties, it is deemed to have a residence, for jurisdictional purposes, in every part of its territory, and its corporate authorities are presumed to reside throughout its territory. It follows that its commissioners may maintain a proceeding in the Circuit Court of a county other than that in which it was originally organized, and in which its records are kept, for the purpose of enlarging its boundaries, under the provisions of an enabling statute. If the action is local, either by reason of the locality of the drainage dis trict, or of the lands sought to be annexed thereto, the jurisdiction may as well be in the one county as in the other. Mason &c. Special Drainage District v. Griffin, 134 Ill. 330, 338; 8. c. 25 N. E. Rep. 995. 1 New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. Wallace, 50 Miss. 244. Thus, an action to recover an indemnity stipulated for in a policy of fire insurance, may be brought wherever service can be had upon the corporation, and the jurisdiction is not restricted to the State within which the property was situated, or the contract made, although there may be a statute in that State designating the county in which such an action shall be brought. Insurance Co. v. McLimans, 28 Neb. 653; s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 991; 19 Ins. L. J. 542. So, it has been held that a railroad company, created under the laws of another State, may be sued in Mississippi for a personal injury inflicted within the territory of another State. New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. Wallace, 50 Miss. 244. 2 See Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 396. Construction of this section and practice under it: Jenkins v. California Stage Co., 22 Cal. 537; Edwards v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 48 Cal. 460. |