Having now called to your attention that it is conceded by Mexico that the principle of res adjudicata does apply to international arbitrations, I desire briefly to call to your attention the law and the history of the principle of res adjudicata as we understand them. To this end I desire to read a few quotations from Chand on Res Judicata, a work which has considerable circulation in America-one written by a British India judge. Sir EDWARD FRY. I did not catch the name. Mr. McENERNEY. Hukm Chand. Mr. Chand died a short time ago, after having written some other legal works. The work is dedicated to the Right Honorable Baron Herschell, lord high chancellor of England. Mr. McENERNEY (continuing). On page 1 of this work it is said: The doctrine of res adjudicata is of universal application, and in fact (quoting again the language which I have repeated so often) a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society. Justice requires that every cause should be once fairly tried, and public tranquillity demands that, having been tried once, all litigation about that cause should be concluded forever between those parties. The maintenance (quoting Judge Campbell, one of the early judges of the United States Supreme Court and a man of great distinction and learning) of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of families require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be received as irrefragable legal truth. If it were not for the conclusive effect of all such determinations there would be no end of litigation and no security for any person, the rights of parties would be involved in endless confusion, and great injustice often done under cover of law, while the courts, stripped of their most efficient powers, would become little more than advisory bodies, and thus the most important function of government, that of ascertaining and enforcing rights, would go unfulfilled. On page 2 the author says: The term "res adjudicata" is derived from the Roman law, and in its most obvious and general meaning it signified at Rome, as it signifies in England and in America, that a matter in dispute had been considered and settled by a competent court of justice. A judgment of the court among the Romans always operated as an novation of the original cause of action which was deemed to merge in it. This effect did not attach, however, to the judgments of the praetor's court, which were regarded as foreign judgments, but allowed to be pleaded by way of confession and avoidance. And it is said (p. 2), speaking of the rule according to Roman law: These maxims having stood the test of centuries, still retain their original place in the jurisprudence of every civilized country of to-day. It being established that res adjudicata does apply to the awards of international courts, the next question to be considered is whether the award of the arbitral court created under the convention of July 4, 1868, was within the limits of its jurisdiction. You will recall that it is urged by Mr. Mariscal that the award of the former arbitral court was not within the jurisdiction of that court. He therefore invokes in italics the limitation upon the doctrine, contained in the authority cited by Mr. McCreery, that the former award had not the force of res adjudicata unless the award was within the jurisdiction of the court which made it, the idea being that, if the court has no jurisdiction, its judgment is void and has not the force of res adjudicata nor any force whatever. It will be, therefore, necessary to consider the propositions advanced by Mr. Mariscal that the former arbitral court acted beyond its jurisdiction. We claim that the court had jurisdiction upon five different grounds. Our first ground is that the court decided that it had jurisdiction, and its decision that it had jurisdiction being an inherent function, is conclusive before all courts in all places. What is jurisdiction? It is the power to hear and determine a cause. The possession of jurisdiction does not involve, of necessity, its rightful exercise. Jurisdiction involves the power to commit error, because when you assert that a court has jurisdiction, you necessarily assert that it has the power in the exercise of that jurisdiction to correctly or incorrectly interpret the law, to correctly or incorrectly understand, appraise, and weight the facts. It has come to be axiomatic that the first thing that a court decides, that the fundamental decision of every court in every country, in every place, in every case, is that it has jurisdiction, because, when a court sits to hear a case, it necessarily affirms that it has the power to hear it, and when it determines it, it necessarily determines that it has the power to adjudge the case. There is, therefore, necessarily involved in the hearing and determination of every case a judicial determination (usually implied) by the court that it has power to hear and determine the cause. (A midi la séance est suspendue jusqu'à 2 heures.) SIXIÈME SÉANCE. 22 septembre 1902 (après-midi). La séance est ouverte à 2 h. 20 sous la présidence de M. Matzen. M. le PRÉSIDENT. La parole est à l'agent des Etats-Unis de l'Amérique du Nord. Mr. RALSTON. I want to say just one word in reply to the observation of Mr. Beernaert of this morning, a word which perhaps is entirely unnecessary, but as an observation of the same general tenor has been several times submitted, it seems to me that our ground should be made absolutely and entirely clear. The protocol under which we are acting provides that— all pleadings, testimony, proofs, arguments of counsel, and findings or awards of commissioners or umpire filed before or arrived at by the mixed commission above referred to, are to be placed in evidence before the court hereinbefore provided for, together with all correspondence between the two countries relating to the subjectmatter involved in this arbitration, originals or copies thereof, duly certified by the departments of state of the high contracting parties being presented to said new tribunal. The record of the old case, what we term in English the record, and which is termed on the continent "dossier," happened to be entirely in the possession of the Department of State of the United States, and for that reason, and for that reason alone, and not because there was any special understanding between the parties, the United States printed that dossier, that record, and it is before you. The United States also had printed a complete copy of the diplomatic correspondence between the parties, contained in the same volume; but I desire to state, and to make entirely clear, that that was not printed because any special duty so to do rested on the United States more than upon Mexico, for, as is stated, "originals or copies thereof, duly certified by the departments of state of the high contracting parties, being presented to said new tribunal," it therefore became equally the duty of Mexico to present certified copies of that diplomatic correspondence. The United States chose to perform that duty, and Mexico did not, but that has not involved any hardship or inconvenience to the court, one copy having been presented. Perhaps what I am saying is entirely unnecessary, but I want to make clear the situation of the United States. I think there has been a confusion between us in the application of the word "dossier." When we have said that it was our duty to present it, we have referred to the "dossier" of the old case, and it was our duty to present that, because it rested entirely within our control. The special duty rested on us to present that, but so far as what you may term the "dossier" of the present case is concerned, it is our clear and manifest understanding that each party, Mexico as well as the United States, shall present to this court such documents and such pleadings, allegations, as it may see fit, and as it may think incumbent upon it to present or advantageous to present. I want to make this absolutely and entirely clear to my friends upon the other side, so that they may not think that we regard any duty resting upon us which in fact does not rest upon us under the protocol. We have stood ready to perform our whole duty under the protocol. We hold ourselves ready still to do it, but we do not wish our willingness to be made the foundation of any claim of right. M. LE PRÉSIDENT. L'agent des Etats-Unis Mexicains a la parole. M. EMILIO PARDO. Je crois que l'incident qui vient d'être provoqué par M. l'agent des Etats-Unis n'a qu'une importance tout-à-fait secondaire, parceque nous pouvons dire que l'incident est vidé une fois que la réclamation des Etats-Unis et la réponse du Gouvernement Mexicain avec les pièces à l'appui ont été présentés à la Cour. Cependant, comme il y a, plus ou moins caché, une espèce de reproche contre la conduite du Gouvernement Mexicain dans cette affaire, je dois appeler l'attention de la Cour sur un point qui me paraît tout-à-fait bien établi par le protocole du 22 mai dernier. D'après ce protocole, article 7: Dans les 30 jours suivant le dépôt du mémorial à l'ambassade mexicaine, l'agent ou l'avocat de la République du Mexique déposera au Département d'Etat de la République des Etats-Unis de la même façon et avec la même référence un mémorial de son opposition à ladite réclamation. D'accord avec cet article, mon Gouvernement, dans le délai fixé par le protocole a déposé au Département d'Etat des Etats-Unis la réponse de la République Mexicaine. Il a déposé cette response, et il l'a accompagnée d'un livre imprimé qui se trouve à la disposition de la Cour. Quand nous nous sommes aperçus que la réponse du Gouvernement mexicain n'avait pas été envoyée par le Départment d'Etat des EtatsUnis, nous avons eu de très justes motifs pour nous étonner, d'autant plus que cette réponse n'ayant pas été remise le livre imprimé se trouvait cependant dans les mains de l'agent américain et était présenté devant la cour, sans prendre soin de faire remarquer que cette pièce appartenait à la réponse du Gouvernement mexicain, et que si l'annexe était présente le mémorial, qui contient la réponse de mon Gouvernement, devait aussi être présent. Peut-être n'avons-nous pas bien compris les termes du protocole, mais nous pouvons citer à l'appui de la conduite du Gouvernement Mexicain le texte sur lequel je viens d'appeler l'attention de la cour. Nous avions entendu et compris que toutes les pièces présentées à la cour formaient le dossier commun, et c'est justement la remarque que M. Beernaert, notre conseil, a eu l'occasion de faire devant la cour dans l'audience d'aujourd'hui, c'est-à-dire que ce dossier ne peut pas être considéré comme appartenant exclusivement aux Etats-Unis, mais qu'il contient les pièces et documents que le Mexique a l'honneur de présenter à la cour, avec sa réponse et les annexes présentées avec cette réponse. Je crois que l'incident, comme je le disais tout à l'heure, n'a aucune importance et qu'il peut être considéré entièrement vidé; mais je me suis considéré comme obligé de justifier devant cette Cour la conduite de mon Gouvernement, invoquant le texte si précis et si clair de l'article dont lecture vient d'être faite. Mr. RALSTON. Mr. President and honorable arbitrators, just to add one word. I quite agree with the honorable agent for Mexico that the matter is of entirely secondary importance, and I would not have thought of troubling you with the slightest reference to it to-day had it not been on several different occasions made the subject of apparent complaint against the United States. For that reason and for that reason alone I mention it, not because it is of any importance. I should be very sorry, however, if any words which I have said should be construed in any manner as a reproach on the Mexican Government, for anything of that kind is as far removed from my thought as can possibly be. I assume that the agent of Mexico performs his duty and his whole duty according to his understanding of the requirements of the case. trespass upon your time for a moment more. The protocol does not, in our opinion, require that Mexico should have served upon us the written document to which allusion has been made, the Pleito de Rada. It was so served before I left Washington, although the protocol only provided that it be deposited with the Mexican embassy, and that we have an opportunity to examine it; but having been delivered to us, we have felt it our duty to bring it here at the earliest possible moment, and to safeguard ourselves to deposit it with the secretary-general of this court. It is entirely open to both parties; everything that we have placed before the court is open to the court and to our friends on the other side. M. LE PRÉSIDENT. La première question c'est que tous les documents sont à la disposition des deux parties; l'autre question est sans importance; nous donnerons seulement acte au protocole des déclarations de MM. les agents. M. EMILIO PARDO. Puisque nous sommes en train de faire des rectifications, je me permettrai d'appeler, un peu tardivement, l'attention de la Cour sur un point qui peut avoir une certaine importance. Je dois commencer par avouer que j'aurais dû faire cette observation avant, mais il est toujours temps de réparer une erreur, et je me hâte de faire la rectification suivante: Dans les procès-verbaux qui ont été lus à l'audience de ce matin on a fait constater que j'avais l'honneur de comparaître devant la Cour en qualité de ministre plénipotentiaire et d'envoyé extraordinaire de la République mexicaine auprès de la Cour des Pays-Bas. Le fait n'est pas tout-à-fait exact: bien que j'ai reçu de mon Gouvernement ma nomination de ministre plénipotentiaire je ne suis pas encore accrédité; par conséquent en ce moment je ne comparais devant la Cour qu'en ma qualité d'agent du Gouvernement mexicain et non en qualité d'envoyé extraordinaire de la République du Mexique que je n'ai pas encore parce que je n'ai pas eu l'occasion de presenter mes lettres de créance. La remarque a son importance, parce qu'une fois mon caractère diplomatique établi et mes lettres de créance remises, je ne pourrai pas continuer la représentation de mon gouvernement comme agent de la République mexicaine. Je prie la Cour de faire constater dans le procès-verbal cette rectification parce que j'y tiens absolument comme ayant une importance spéciale. M. DE MARTENS. Mais, Monsieur PARDO, vous avez signé le procèsverbal. M. EMILIO PARDO. On y fait plusieurs fois mention de ma qualité de ministre plénipotentiaire et d'envoyé extraordinaire et on m'attribue un appointement que je n'ai pas encore devant la Cour. M. DE MARTENS. Alors, vous désirez que ce soit supprimé? M. LE PRÉSIDENT. Maintenant l'incident est clos, et le conseil des Mr. McENERNEY. Mr. President and honorable arbitrators: At the hour when the tribunal rose this forenoon I was addressing myself to the first of the five grounds upon which we claim that the arbitral court of 1868 had jurisdiction to make the award that it did make in favor of the archbishop and the bishop of California against the Republic of Mexico. You will recall that the argument in support of this proposition was that the former arbitral court did decide and had inherent power to decide that it had jurisdiction of the particular case. The decision of a court that it has jurisdiction of a cause is often not final. It is often not final in the sense that its decision that it does possess jurisdiction is open to review in a higher court. This can not be true of an international court, because in the very nature of things, there is no tribunal to which the decision of an international court holding that it has jurisdiction of a particular case can be appealed. This proposition is reasoned out to completion and sustained by ample precedent in the statement and brief of the United States, written by the learned agent of the United States. I shall not stop to dwell upon the argument which he makes, nor refer to the authorities with which he sustains his proposition. There is, however, one precedent to which I desire to call the attention of the tribunal, not to be found in the brief of the learned agent of the United States. It is to be found in 2 Moore's International Arbitrations, page 1242. It refers to the convention between the United States and Mexico created under the treaty of 1839. Sir EDWARD FRY. What volume? Mr. McENERNEY. 2 Moore's International Arbitrations, page 1242. From 1821 down to this time there have been five treaties between Mexico and the United States. Four of them were ratified; one not ratified; these were the treaties of April 11, 1839, January 30, 1843, November 20, 1843 (not concluded), February 2, 1848, July 4, 1868, and May 22, 1902. A history of all these treaties and the proceedings under them will be found in Mr. Moore's work on International Arbitrations (pp. 1209-1286). During the session of the joint commission created by the treaty of 1839 claims were presented against Mexico for damages which were said to have been sustained on account of the seizure of an American schooner called the "Topaz." This seizure had been made the subject of diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Mexico for the settlement of some claims asserted by the United States as a Sov |
