The attack was made at 4 P. M.: the enemy of course posted in a wood, which concealed their strength, facing a level, open field, across which our men advanced with great spirit under a heavy fire, carrying a good part of the enemy's advanced line of rifletrenches and taking 600 prisoners. Their second line, however, was far stronger and more firmly held; and night fell with the Rebels still fully in its possession: our advance holding and bivouacking on the ground it had gained, at a cost of 2,000 killed and wounded. For Longstreet's corps, which had confronted our right the day before, had been moved rapidly to our left, parallel with Wright's movement, and was here facing us before the Chickahominy, as it had just been on the Tolopotomy, with a little less advantage of position but the same spirit and reso lution; so that (as Lincoln once remarked to McClellan) the chief obstacle had been shifted, not surmounted, by our movement to the left. Nevertheless, Hancock was now called down from our right to the left of Wright; Warren was directed to extend his left so as to connect with Smith; while Burnside was to withdraw entirely from the front and mass on the right and rear of Warren. These flank movements, in the presence of a vigilant and resolute enemy, may not often prove so disastrous as Rosecrans found them at the Chickamauga, but they are always critical. 41 Burnside, attempting to obey this order in broad daylight," his movement was of course detected by the foe in his front, who sharply followed up his skirmishers covering the operation, taking some of them 41 June 2, P. M. GRAND ASSAULT AT COLD HARBOR. 581 prisoners, and, striking Warren's left, | trebly so had our countrymen been 42 The two armies held much of the ground covered by McClellan's right, under Fitz-John Porter, prior to Lee's bold advance, nearly two years before: Gaines's mill being directly in the rear of the Confederate center; while Sheridan's cavalry patrolled the roads in our rear leading to our base at White House, covered our left and observed the Chickahominy eastward of Richmond. Wilson, with his cavalry division, watched our right flank. Burnside was still on Warren's right and rear; Smith, Wright, and Hancock stretched farther and farther to the left. In our front, Lee not only had a very good position naturally, but he knew how to make the most of its advantagesthe single point in which (but it is a vital one) his admirers can justify their claim for him of a rare military genius. No other American has ever so thoroughly appreciated and so readily seized the enormous advantage which the increased range, precision, and efficiency given to musketry by rifling, have insured to the defensive, when wielded by a commander who knows how speedily a trench may be dug and a slight breastwork thrown up which will stop ninetenths of the bullets that would otherwise draw blood. The lessons of Bunker Hill and New Orleans, impressive as they were, must have been 12 June 3. At sunrise, or a little before, the assault was made" along our whole front-bravely, firmly, swiftly made; and as swiftly repulsed with terrible slaughter. On our left, Barlow's division of Hancock's corps gained a transitory advantage; dislodging the enemy from their position in a sunken road, taking three guns and several hundred prisoners. But his second line failed to advance promptly to the support of the first, against which the enemy rallied in overwhelming force, retaking their defenses, hurling Barlow back, but not to the lines from which he started. He fell back a few yards only, and covered his front so quickly that the enemy could not dislodge him. Gibbon,charging on Barlow's right, was checked by a swamp, which separated his command: part of which gained the Rebel works nevertheless; Col. McMahon planting his colors on their intrenchments a moment before he fell mortally wounded. No part of the Rebel works was held; but part of Gibbon's men also covered themselves so close to the enemy's lines that, while the Rebels dared not come out to capture them, they could not get away, save by crawling off under cover of fog or thick darkness. Wright's and Smith's assaults were less determined at all events, less sanguinary-than Hancock's; and Warren, having a long line to hold, was content to hold it. Burnside swung two of his divisions around to flank the enemy's left, which he hotly engaged, and must have worsted had 43 June 3. the battle along our front been pro- | front advanced on several points and tracted. But that could not be. forced back on none; but Lee, overTwenty minutes after the first shot estimating the effects of our repulse was fired, fully 10,000 of our men on the morale of our men, and seeing were stretched writhing on the sod, that our hastily constructed intrenchor still and calm in death; while the ments directly before his lines were enemy's loss was probably little more but slight, hazarded a night attack" than 1,000. And when, some hours on our front, but was repulsed at later, orders were sent by Gen. Meade every point, and soon desisted. Next to each corps commander to renew day, a partial assault was made on the assault at once, without regard to our left; but this also was easily reany other, the men simply and unani- pulsed. Meantime, our army was mously refused to obey it. They gradually moving to its left, by the knew that success was hopeless, and successive withdrawals of Burnside the attempt to gain it murderous: and of Warren; when another night hence they refused to be sacrificed to attack was made" on our right, again no purpose. held by Burnside, but without success. And now an armistice of two hours was arranged, during which the wounded lying between the armies were removed and the dead buried. Our total loss at and around Cold Harbor was 13,153; of whom 1,705 were killed, 9,042 wounded, and 2,406 missing. Among the killed were acting Brigadiers P. A. Porter," Lewis O. Morris, and F. F. Wead; all of New York. Cols. Edward Pye, 95th N. Y., O. H. Morris, 66th N. Y., J. C. Drake, 112th N. Y., John McConihe, 169th N. Y., Edwin Schall, 51st Pa., and F. A. Haskell, 36th Wisc. Brig.Gen. R. O. Tyler was among the severely wounded. Brig.-Gen. Doles was the only Rebel officer of note reported as killed. Col. Lawrence M. Keitt, formerly a conspicuous M. C. from South Carolina, had fallen the day before. Our army had suffered terribly in this battle; but it had lost blood only. The fighting closed with our * Col. Peter A. Porter, of Niagara Falls, son of Gen. Peter B. Porter, who served with honor in the War of 1812, and was Secretary of War under J. Q. Adams. Col. Porter, in the prime of life, and in the enjoyment of every thing calculated to make life desirable, volunteered from a sense of duty; saying his country had done so much for him that he could not hesitate to do all in his power for her in her hour of peril. When nomi 47 Next day, our left was extended to the Chickahominy, finding the enemy in force opposite Sumner's and Bottom's bridges; while Sheridan was dispatched with two divisions of cavalry around Lee's left, to tear up the Virginia Central railroad in his rear, which he did: crossing the Pamunkey at Aylett's, breaking the Fredericksburg road at Chesterfield station, and thence pushing over the North Anna by Chilesburg and Mount Pleasant, over the upper branches of the North Anna," striking the Central railroad at Trevilian's, routing a body of Rebel horse, under Wade Hampton, that interfered with his operations, and breaking up the nated in 1863 as Union candidate for Secretary of State, he responded that his neighbors had intrusted him with the lives of their sons, and he could not leave them while the War lasted. He was but one among thousands animated by like motives; but none ever volunteered from purer impulses, or served with more unselfish devotion, than Peter A. Porter. 48 June 10. 45 June 4. 46 June 6. 47 June 7. GRANT CROSSES THE JAMES. 583 52 road nearly down" to Louisa C. H.; | struck the James at Wilcox's wharf, This is not a military history, and its author makes no shadow of pretension to other military knowledge, than that which is necessarily gained by all students of history; while no one who carefully reads this volume will accuse him of partiality or special admiration for Gen. Grant. Yet the criticisms which have been leveled at that commander's advance to Richmond seem so unjust as to demand exposure. Gen. Grant now decided to pass the Chickahominy far to Lee's right, and thence move across the James to attack Richmond from the south. It was a bold resolve, especially as the "Why not embark his army at authorities at Washington had a set- once for City Point?" has been tritled and reasonable repugnance to a umphantly asked, "and establish it movement which seemed to place there at a cost of a few hundred men, the Federal City at the mercy of Lee. instead of fifty or sixty thousand?" Taking up the rails from the Chick- The question not only ignores the ahominy to White House, and ship- Rebel losses in the course of this ping_them around for use south of movement-losses which were at least the James, Smith's corps was like- as large in proportion to their resourwise embarked" and returned to But- ces as ours-but ignores also the obler; while the Army of the Potomac vious fact that Lee's army around was put in motion" for the passage Richmond, hard pressed by a superiof the James: Wilson's cavalry, in or force, was no peril to Washington advance, crossing the Chickahominy and the loyal States; whereas, to leave at Long bridge, followed by War-it on the Rapidan and take ship for ren's corps; which was passed at the James was either to make the Long bridge by Hancock's, which enemy a present of our capital, with 49 June 12. 50 June 12-13. $1 June 12. 62 June 14-15. its immense stores of every warlike material, or compel that division and dispersion of our forces whereof McClellan had so persistently, and with some justice, complained. Lee at Richmond, with the country northward to the Potomac thoroughly exhausted and devastated, could not reach Washington at all without abandoning Richmond to its fate; and corps after corps of our army could be transferred to the Potomac in less than half the time required for a march of the Rebel forces to Centerville. Of course, Grant set out expect ing to defeat Lee decisively between the Rapidan and the Chickahominy, and was disappointed; but it is difficult to see how he could have evaded obstacles at least as serious as those he encountered. As he pertinently observed, the Rebel army was his true objective; and this must be encountered, whichever route he might take. Had he attempted, as Lee evidently anticipated, to advance by Gordonsville or Louisa C. H., flanking Lee's left instead of his right, he would have been starved into a retreat before he came in sight of the James. Petersburg, at the head of sloop navigation on the Appomattox, 22 miles south of Richmond, is the focus of all the railroads but the Danville which connected the Confederate capital with the South and South-west. Petersburg taken and firmly held by our forces, the stay of the Rebel Government and Army at Richmond must be of short duration. But merely to take it, without the ability to hold it against the force which Lee, near at hand, could easily send against it, would be worse than useless. The moment it was decided that Meade's army must cross the James below Richmond and threaten that city from the south, Grant hastened to Butler's headquarters to impel against Petersburg whatever force might there be disposable, so soon as it should be certain that that attempt could be seasonably supported by the legions of Meade. Butler, after the dispatch of the best part of his force, under W. F. Smith, to Meade, had been inclined to keep quiet within his intrenchments; but that was not permitted. His northern outpost at Wilson's wharf, north of the James, held by Gen. Wild with two Black regiments, had already been summoned and charged " by Fitz-Hugh Lee's cavalry, who, after a fight of some hours, were beaten off with loss: and now Gen. Gillmore, with 3,500 men, was thrown across the Appomattox, to approach Petersburg by the turnpike on the north, while Gen. Kautz, with 1,500 cavalry, should charge into it from the south or south-west. Two gunboats and a battery were simultaneously to bombard Fort Clinton, defending the approach up the river. 54 The combination failed, though it should have succeeded. Gillmore advanced" unresisted to within two miles of the city, where he drove in the enemy's skirmishers and halted— or rather, recoiled-deeming his force altogether too weak for the task before him, and understanding that he was free to exercise his discretion in the premises. Kautz, on the other hand, made his way not only up to but into the city-the Confederates' attention having been concentrated on Gillmore-but, now that they |
