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myself to be a real existence--a limit- structed with this simple idea would ed, relative substance, no doubt; but be the veriest abstraction, and in the still a substance capable of supporting last analysis identical with no universe accidents or phenomena ; and, there at all. The faculties of the particular fore, not myself a phenomenon, nor a being in question must always be collection of phenomena, whether of learned empirically, and be taken as matter or of spirit.
facts of experience, and not as facts of
reasoning. It would not be difficult to The substantiality of the me affirms conceive of beings created with the its UNITY. If I am substantial, I am simple FORCE or power of acting without one substance; for two substances thinking or feeling. But such a being is would be two mes, instead of one. not man. We may add to force intelliMoreover, I am always revealed to gence, and conceive of a being capable myself as one. My phenomena may of acting and knowing, and yet incavary, but I do not vary with them. pable of feeling. Such a being is very They may pass away, but I survive. conceivable; there may be, for aught We never confound ourselves with our we know, many such beings; but man phenomena. We think, but are not is not one of them. He is capable of the thought; are pleased, but are not feeling. The sentiments, love, joy, the pleasure; are pained, but are not grief, hope, pleasure, pain, are among the pain; nor do we become it when those phenomena which nobody quespained. There is always unity of con- tions, for they are facts of every one's sciousness. The me that wills, knows, experience. Man, then, is not only a feels, is always one and the same me. substance, but an intelligent and senThe me, then, is a unity; that is, a tient substance,-a being that ACTS, simple substance, being, cause, or KNOWS, and FEELS. force.
From this it follows that man has But I am not a mere naked sub- three faculties, which may be named, stance; that is, a mere abstraction. I 1. Activity, am a living substance, clothed with 2. Intelligence, attributes. I find myself in the act of 3. Sensibility. thinking. But to think is to perceive, no less than to act. An unintelligent Activity is the power of acting ; inactor would not be a thinking actor. telligence the power of knowing ; senNo being but an intelligent being can sibility the power of feeling. There think. The ne, then, since it thinks, may, for aught we know, be beings must be INTELLIGENT.
endowed with more than these three
faculties; but these are all that we I am also capable of feeling. The have found ourselves to possess, and naked conception of substance does not all that we can conceive it possible for necessarily involve the power to feel; us or for any other being to possess. nor does it imply that of intelligence. The fact that I am intelligent is learn- But the me has already been shown ed by experience, not deduced from the to be a UNITY,--one and indivisible. nature of being or substance, considered This distinction of faculties, then, im. apart from its manifestations. There plies no division in its essence. There is no particular substance or being is not one part of it that acts, another whose attributes or properties can be part that knows, and still another part known, à priori. The naked idea of that feels. It is all and entire in each being--the reine Seyn of Hegel-is one of its faculties,-a simple subsimply the idea of something which is, stance, with the threefold power of actand does not necessarily suppose the ing, knowing, and feeling. It must being to possess any other quality, pro- then act in knowing and feeling; know perty, or attribute, than that of being in feeling and acting; feel in acting and able simply to be. From this idea, some knowing. This follows inevitably philosophers have, indeed, attempted from the fact that I am in myself a to deduce, logically, the universe, with cause. I find myself always as a all its infinite variety of phenomena. cause, and never under any other charBut from being, nothing but being can acter. I find myself in all my phenobe obtained ; and the universe con- mena, in those of intelligence and sen
VOL. XI.-NO. LIV, 73
sibility, no less than in those of acti- of these facts, activity will be found to vity. Then I find myself in them all give us actions, intelligence cognitions, as a cause. Then I am active in them. and sensibility sentiments or feelings. Since I am a unity, and therefore must We may distribute them, then, into act ever as a whole, in all my integrity, actions or volitions, cognitions or ideas, I must act in them all with my three- and sentiments or feelings. But this fold power of acting, knowing, and distribution, however true it may be to feeling.
me as studied in the products of my
past life, will not be true to the me of According to the Formula now ob- actual life. In actual life all go togetained, man is a being that acts, knows, ther. There is no action which is not and feels, and ALL THESE IN THE SAME at the same time a cognition and a PHENOMENON, AND IN ALL HIS PHENO- sentiment; no cognition not at the MENA. He is then a TRINITY, a living same time a sentiment and an action; type of that sublime doctrine which no sentiment not at the same time an lies at the bottom of all Christian theoaction and a cognition. logy, and not only the type, but in some sort the origin and basis.
But, losing sight of this fact, psycho
logists not unfrequently transfer to Two facts here must never be lost actual life the classifications they obsight of, the UNITY and TRIPLICITY oftain by studying our past life, and there the me. Man acts always as a unity, fore destroy the me, by resolving it but with a threefold power of activity, into its attributes. In the facts of meor rather with a capacity of giving to mory there is no living unity. That his activity a threefold direction. We living unity has left them behind, has can discover in his nature the distinc- passed on, and is now merely looking tion of faculties, but no division of es back upon them. That living unity is sence. There is a broad distinction the ME itself, and being no longer in between an action and a cognition, be- them, but merely contemplating them, tween a cognition and a feeling, and as it were, at a distance, cannot, of between a feeling and an action; but course, find itself in them. They are in actual life there is no separation. to it what the dead body is to the liv. The faculties designated are essentially ing. There being, in fact, no unity in the me, and the activity displayed in them, reflection cannot find it, any them is the activity of the one invariable niore than anatomy finds in dissecting and indivisible subject. We cannot say the dead body the one vital principle that activity acts, intelligence knows, which controlled all the functions and and sensibility feels; for this would be gave a common direction to all the actito separate the faculties from the me, vities of the living body. The me ob and to give them in some sort an inde- tained by studying these facts exclupendent existence. The intellectual sively is necessarily multiple and not phenomenon is always the product of simple. Taken, then, for the ME of the NE displaying itself in its unity actual life, it gives to the me of actual and triplicity; therefore of the simul- life no upity, separates it into parts, taneous and joint action-so to speak into independent beings, and, instead of ---of all the faculties.
a me that at once, by virtue of its own
nature, acts, knows, and feels, gives us This fact is important. Neglect of three separate, and in some sort indeit has generated much confusion, and pendent mes,-a me that acts, another no little false philosophy. Psycholo- me that knows, and still another that gists have mistaken the facts of MEMO- feels, displaying themselves sometimes RY for the facts of CONSCIOUSNESS. The in concert, sometimes one after anofacts of memory may be dissected, de- ther, and sometimes, as it were, one in composed, and distributed into sepa- opposition to another. But the facul. rate classes. As the soul has three fa- ties do not exist independent of the culties, and each of these faculties per- me. There is not a me and by its forms an office in generating the phe- side a power to act, a power to know, nomena, we may detect ihe part of or a power to feel. The threefold each, and distribute the phenomena power is the me, and the me is it. into classes corresponding to the dis- Activity does not act, I act because tinction of faculties. In the analysis I am in my essence active; intelligence
does not know, I know because I am then covers the whole phenomenon of by my nature intelligent; sensibility actual life, and instead of being the does not feel, I feel because I am in product of pure intelligence, it is simulmyself sentient.
taneously and vitally action-cognition
sentiment. In consequence of transferring to the living subject the classifications we The various distinctions introduced have obtained by studying the dead into the phenomena of actual life by subject, or facts of memory, we have psychologists, or rather psycho-anatosupposed that we could perform actions mists, of facts of activity, facts of inor generate phenomena which should telligence, facts of sensibility, facts of not necessarily imply all our faculties. reason, facts of understanding, of a
Thought, which expresses the highest higher nature and a lower, of a moral activity of the soul, has been regarded nature and a religious, however conveas a purely intellectual act, and intel- nient they may be for certain purposes, lect has been defined to be the thinking are really inadmissible, and while they faculty, as distinct from activity or sen- recognize the multiplicity of the me, sibility. Thought is looked upon as tend to make us lose sight of its unity. something dry and cold; and a “man It is always the self-same me thatacis, of thought" would designate a man whatever the sphere of its activity, or without soul, without heart, destitute tendency of its action. It has but one of love or sentiment, living only in ab- nature, and it is always by virtue of stractions. But there are no abstrac- that one nature it does whatever it tions in actual life. A purely intellec- does. If a man be base and grovelling tual being may, as has been said, be in his propensities, worthless or vicious conceived of, but such a being man is in his life, it is not a lower nature that not. Such a being might indeed think, is at work within him, that is at fault, that is, know, but thinking and know- but the man himself misdirecting his ing in such a being could not and activity ; if he aspire to the generous would not be what they are in us. and the heroic, to the pure and upright, Man is in his essence sentient. He it is not a higher nature, nor a nobler cannot divest himself of his sensibility, faculty of his nature displaying itself, for he cannot divest himself of himself. but the man himself conducting with Always and everywhere, then, must he greater propriety and in stricter confeel. When he acts, act where or to formity to the will of his Maker. what end he will, he must feel. He can perform no dry, cold, intellectual All these distinctions go to destroy act. Even the metaphysician, poring the unity of the soul, to perplex and over his abstractions, withered and dry mislead our judgments. The distincas he may seem, is still a man, and has tion which has larterly been contended a heart; and when, after days, weeks, for between the moral nature and the months, and years of painful watchreligious is unfounded. Man is not ing and laborious study, truth at last moral by virtue of one set of faculties, dawns on his soul, and he grasps the and religious by virtue of another set of solution of the problem which had tor- faculties. The same faculties are ac. tured his heart, he too is moved, and in tive in both cases, and the only differa sort of rapture exclaims, “I have ence there is or can be between religion found it, I have found it !"
and morality is in the direction
man gives to his activity. Nor is The me never acts as naked cause, there any distinction between the faculas pure intelligence, nor as pure feel ty by which man knows what some ing. It acts as it is, and for what it is. call the truths of the reason, and what Thought, then, since it implies the ac- are termed truths of the understandtivity of the me, implies the me with ing. There is not a reason taking cog. all its essential attributes. It implies nizance of one class of objects, and an sentiment as well as cognition. The understanding taking cognizance of me, it has been shown, enters into another. To know may indeed have every thought as subject. It enters various conditions, but it is always one then as a whole, for it cannot leave and the same phenomenon, and by one half of itself behind, and go forth virtue of one and the same intellectual and act with the other half. Thought power. The whole me acts in knowing, let it know wherever it will. In without sensibility, we never do, if knowing material objects it uses mate. we ever could know, even spiritual rial organs, but the faculty by virtue of truths. To raise men to a perception which I know through these organs is, of what are called the higher truths, as will hereafter be shown, the same as it is always necessary to purify and that by virtue of which I know in the exalt sentiment. Beethoven carries bosom of consciousness itself. The us nearer to God, than Kant or Hegel. pretence that sensibility is the faculty Without love man cannot soar; and by which we know material objects, without that exaltation, that enthuand reason the faculty by virtue of siasm which goes by the name of Inwhich we know spiritual objects, is ar- spiration, there are few truths of an bitrary and without any just foundation elevated nature that are discoverable. in actual life. Without reason, our Man acts ever with all his faculties, in senses would be as the telescope with the least as well as in the greatest of out a seeing eye to look through it; his actions.
I SHALL not soon forget that sight:
The glow of Autumn's westering day,
On Raphael's picture lay.
The fair face of a musing boy ;
Was mingling with my joy.
Of boyhood's soft and wavy hair,
Unmarked and clear, were there.
I saw the inward spirit shine;
The white veil of a shrine.
The hidden life, the man within,
By mortal eye were seen.
The waving of that pictured hand ?
I saw the walls expand.
Broad, luminous, remained alone,
And beauty looked or shone.
* Suggested by a portrait of Raphael at the age of fifteen, in the possession of Thomas Tracy, of Newburyport.
Around the mighty master came
The marvels which his pencil wrought, Those miracles of power whose fame
Is wide as human thought.
There drooped thy more than mortal face,
Oh Mother, beautiful and mild ! Enfolding in one dear embrace
Thy Saviour and thy Child !
The rapt brow of the Desert John;
The awful glory of that day
Through manhood's veil of clay.
And, midst grey prophet forms, and wild
Dark visions of the days of old, How sweetly woman's beauty smiled
Through locks of brown and gold!
There Fornarina's fair young face
Once more upon her lover shone, Whose model of an angel's grace
He borrowed from her own.
Slow passed that vision from my view,
But not the lesson which it laught; The soft, calm shadows which it threw
Still rested on my thought.
The truth, that painter, bard and sage,
Even in Earth's cold and changeful clime, Plant for their deathless heritage
The fruits and flowers of time.
We shape ourselves the joy or fear
Of which the coming life is made, And fill our Future's atmosphere
With sunshine or with shade.
The tissue of the Life to be
We weave with colors all our own, And in the field of Destiny
We reap as we have sowp.
Still shall the soul around it call
The shadows which it gathered here, And painted on the eternal wall
The Past shall reäppear. Think ye the notes of holy song
On Milton's tuneful ear have died ? Think ye that Raphael's angel throng
Has vanished from his side ?
Oh no!We live our life again;
Or warmly touched or coldly dim The pictures of the Past remain,Man's works shall follow him!