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der the State law, because the provision therefor was void. The rule of 1872 now comes into effect. But in the absence of all words indicating an intention that the rule shall apply to the cases of supplies, etc., furnished before the rule took effect, it must be held, on familiar principles of interpretation, to apply only to cases of supplies, etc., furnished after it takes effect. The same principle which always applies to the interpretation of a statute must be applied to the construing of this rule. All statutes are to be considered prospective, unless the language is expressed to the contrary, or there is a necessary implication to that effect. United States v. Heth, 3 Cr., 399; Harvey v. Tyler, 3 Wall., 328, 347. There is nothing in the rule of 1872 to indicate an intention to give a remedy in rem against a domestic vessel, where the supplies, etc., were furnished before the rule took effect.
“Another consideration is of force. The Supreme Court, on the sixth day of May, 1872, expressly state that they amend the 12th rule of 1859 so as to read thus and so. They do not repeal the 12th rule of 1859. By their order of May 2, 1859, they repealed the 12th rule of December term, 1844, and prescribed a new 12th rule. The 12th rule of 1859 is amended, from and after May 6, 1872, so as to read in the new form, thereafter, in respect to suits to be brought thereafter for supplies, etc., to be furnished thereafter. In respect to suits brought before May 6, 1872, and on and after May 1, 1859, for supplies, etc., furnished between those dates, and in respect to suits brought on and after May 6, 1872, for supplies, etc., furnished before May 6, 1872, and after the 12th rule of 1859 went into operation, that rule is to govern, for it is still left in force in respect to cases not covered by the amendment of 1872. That rule expressly forbids process in rem in the present case. It results that the libel must be dismissed with costs."
This case decides, first, that the 12th rule of May 6, 1872, was intended to, and did, provide that in every case of a contract for supplies, repairs, etc., to a vessel, domestic as well as foreign, being a maritime contract, process in rem against the vessel, or in personam against the master or owner, may at the option of the party be resorted to to enforce the contract. Second, that the rule is prospective and does not give these remedies in cases where the supplies, etc., were furnished prior to the taking effect of the rule.
In Estate of Kirkland, Chase & Co., bankrupts, reported in 12 Am. L. Reg., 300, it is held that the amendment of rule 12, providing that material men furnishing supplies or repairs may proceed against the ship and freight in rem is applicable to all suits instituted since May 6, 1872, for supplies or repairs, no matter whether they were furnished before or since the adoption of the amendment, and that ship carpenters have a lien for repairs made to a domestic vessel which may be enforced in rem.
The rules of practice in admiralty proceedings are merely intended to reg. ulate the remedy and have no relation to the question of jurisdiction. Id.
A note taken for the amount of the supplies furnished for a vessel will not waive a maritime lien on a vessel unless so understood at the time. The note, however, must be returned or surrendered in court at the hearing. The Eclipse, Id., 99.
Maritime liens are not allowed to those furnishing a vessel with her usual supplies on her regular trips, and at her usual ports of entry and discharge. To sustain such a lien a case of maritime necessity upon the vessel must be established. The Lady Franklin, 1 Biss., C. C., 557.
There is a maritime lien upon a domestic vessel for wharfage which is enforceable in the admiralty. The Kate Tremaine, 5 Ben., 60.
The rule in the case of The General Smith, 4 Wh., is not to be extended.
A person who advances money upon the credit of a foreign ship for the purpose of repairing her, or for furnishing her with necessary supplies, and which is actually employed for that purpose, has a lien on the ship for such advances. The Bark J. F. Spencer, 4 Ben., D. C., 151.
In the absence of any express application by the ship owner, freight money received by a consignee of a ship is to be deemed to be applied to the discharge of the liens on the ship. Id.
Rule No. 13. Suits for mariners' wages.-In all suits for mariners' wages the libelant may proceed against the ship, freight and master, or against the ship and freight, or against the owner or the master alone in personam.
The claims of seamen, for wages, and of material men, for supplies, where they are innocent of all knowledge of, or participation in the illegal voyage of a ship, are preferred to the claims of forfeiture on the part of the government. The St. Jago De Cuba, 9 Wh., 409. See, further, as to the rights of seamen where the vessel is engaged in unlawful trade, The United States v. Robertson, 5 Pet., 675; The Brig Langdon Cheves, 2 Mason, C. C., 58.
The admiralty has no jurisdiction of matters of account between part owners; nor over a vessel not engaged in maritime trade. The Steamboat Orleans, 11 Pet., 175.
By the maritime law the master of a ship has no lien thereon even for maritime wages. Id.
A master may maintain a suit in personam in the admiralty for wages or for compensation in the nature of wages. Hammond v. The Essex Fire Ins. Co., 4 Mason, C. C., 196.
The lien of seaman's wages attaches to the ship and freight, and their proceeds, into whosoever hands they may come, and takes priority of all other claims. Therefore, the ship owners are liable, though they have received certain installments only of the sums awarded under the treaty, and not in full payment; and though a proportion of this has been paid to the underwriters, who had insured the vessel at the time of her loss. Brown et al. v. Hull, 2 Sum., C. C., 443.
The claim of seaman's wages takes precedence of bottomry bonds and all other claims, whether the entirety of the fund, out of which they are to be paid, remains, or a part of it is lost by accident or otherwise. Pitman v. Hooper, 3 Id., 50.
The rights of seamen to their wages accrue to the full extent of the freight earned, and their wages are “nailed to the last plank of the ship"; so, also, to the last fragment of the freight. Id.
The right of seamen to their wages is not affected, either for good or for evil, by any private contract between the ship owner and the shippers with regard to freight. Id.
Where a portion of a vessel, which has been wrecked, is saved by the exertions of the seamen, brought to the United States and sold, they have a lien on the proceeds for their wages. Brackett et al. v. The Hercules, Gilp., 184. Seamen have a tripple security for their wages, the vessel, the owner, and the master. Bronde 3. Haren, Id., 592.
The owner of a vessel, although his name is not mentioned in the shipping articles, is liable for the wages of the seamen. And the sale of the vessel subsequent to the making of the shipping articles does not discharge his liability for the wages of seamen, even though the voyage was not terminated, or the wages were not demanded previous to the sale. Id.
Where a vessel which arrives at a foreign port, discharges her cargo, and remains there some time after the discharge, is lost on the homeward voyage, the seamen are entitled to their wages up to the time of the discharge, but not for one-balf the time she afterwards remained in the foreign port. Id.
The wreck of a ship is pledged for the seamen's wages, and the seamen's privilege is preferred to all other claims. But if they abandon the wreck their contract with the owner is dissolved, and they lose their privilege against the ship and their claim for wages, and they are not restored by the jus post-liminii, on the salvage of the property by other persons. Lewis et al. v. The Elizabeth and Jane, 1 Ware, 33.
A person hired for a particular purpose, as nominal captain, is entitled to wages agreed upon with the real captain, and so far the vessel and owners are bound. But not for a further sum in case of discharge. L'Arina v. Brig Exchange, Bee's Adm., 198; Same v. Manwaring, Id., 199.
So an agreement by the captain to pay such person, in case the voyage should be altered or discontinued, must be enforced at common law. L'Arina v. Manwaring, Id., 199.
No rule has ever been adopted by the maritine law, either in England or America, prescribing the time within which seamen should proceed to enforce their liens for wages. The Ship Mary, 1 Paine, 180.
The lien of mariners has no analogy to common law liens, as regards the possession of the subject of the lien. Id.
The seaman does not lose his* lien on the vessel for his wages by taking an order on the charterer for the balance due at the close of the voyage. The Eastern Star, 1 Ware, 184.
The seamen have a paramount lien upon the freight money earned by the vessel, and such lien is administered by a court of admiralty by the service of its attachment upon the freight money in the hands of the parties where it is found. The Sailor Prince et al., 1 Ben., 234.
Where seamen shipped at Hamburg for a voyage to New York and back, in New York the vessel was sold by a decree of the court of admiralty for advances and the purchaser discharged the seamen, who, thereupon, petitioned to have their wages with two months' extra pay paid first out of the fund, held, that the Hamburg law was a part of the contract of these seamen, and by that law, where a vessel is prevented by a higher power
from completing the voyage, and the crew are discharged, they are entitled to a free passage home, or two month's extra pay; that the sale of the vessel was a “preventing by higher power," and that as no free passage home was provided them, they were entitled to the two months' extra pay and had a lien on the proceeds therefor. The Brig Blohm, Id., 228.
Under the act of Feb. 16, 1875, entitled "an act to facilitate the disposition of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States and for other purposes," the finding of facts by the circyit court in admiralty cases is conclusive; and only rulings on questions of law can be reviewed on bill of exceptions. The Abbotsford, 98 U. S., 440.
Seamen engaged in good faith to serve on a ship which is intended to make one or more coasting voyages, have a lien on the ship for their wages while the ship is getting ready, though she should never leave the port. The Island City, Lowell's Dec., 375.
A seaman who is at the time a part owner of the vessel in which he serves, is not thereby precluded from libeling in admiralty for his wages. Foster et al. v. Steamboat Pilot No. 2, Newb. Adm., 215.
The wages of seamen are not discharged by the sale of the vessel on an execution against the owners. Id.
Rule No. 14. Suits for pilotage.-In all suits for pilotage the libelant may proceed against the ship and master, or against the ship, or against the owner alone, or the master alone in personam.
The admiralty has jurisdiction in personam as well as in rem for pilotage earned in piloting ships to, from, or on the sea. The Schooner Annie et al., 1 Mason, C. C., 507.
To make pilotage a lien on the ship, the contract must have been made by some person in the employment of the owner, duly authorized to make the contract, such as the master or the quasi master. But mere wrong-doers or mutineers have no authority to bind the ship. Id.
See, also, The Wave, 7 Leg. Obs., 97; Logan v. The Eolian, 1 Bond, 267,
Rule No. 15. Collisions, suits for.-In all suits for damage by collision the libelant may proceed against the ship and master, or against the ship alone, or against the master or the owner alone in personam.
Where a collision of vessels occurs in an English port, the rights of the parties depend upon the provisions of the English statutes then in force, and if doubt exist as to their true construction, the Supreme Court of the United States will adopt that which is sanctioned by the English courts. Smith et al. v. Cowdry, 1 How., 28.
In cases of tort, or collision happening upon the high seas, or within the ebb and flow of the tide as far up a river as the tide ebbs and flows, though it may be infra corpus comitatus, courts of admiralty of the United States have jurisdiction. Warring et al. v. Clarke, 5 How., 441.
A libel in rem against the vessel and personally against the master, may properly, under the present practice of the court, be joined; and if the libelant have originally proceeded against vessel, master, owners and pilot, the libel may, with leave of the court, be amended so as to apply to the vessel and master only in the way mentioned. Newell v. Norton and Ship, 3 Wall., 257.
Under rule 15, the libelant may proceed: First. Against the ship and master. Second. Against the ship alone. Third. Against the owner alone. Fourth. Against the master alone. A proceeding in rem against the ship, and in personam against the owner, not being authorized by the rule, is prohibited. The Atlantic and Ogdensburgh, 1 Newb., Adm., 139; Ward et al. v. The Ogdensburgh, 5 McLean, 622.
Where a loss by collision arises from the negligence of the master and crew, the master is personally responsible; but the ship also is primarily, although not exclusively, liable for the compensation. Hale et al. v. Wash. Ins. Co., 2 Story, 176.
The colliding vessel is not exonerated from full damages, because after the wreck a portion of the cargo was injured or lost through the efforts of a third vessel to save it. The Steamboat Narragansett, Olc. Adm., 246.
Rule No. 16. Assault and battery, suits for.-In all suits for an assault or beating on the high seas, or elsewhere within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the suit shall be in personam only.
The law which governs the deportment of men to each other on shore, cannot be applied to their habits and intercourse on board of a ship. Generally speaking, however, a seaman is entitled to recover damages for an assault and battery from an officer of a ship, first, where personal violence is inflicted, wantonly and without probable cause, though not excessively; seco ond, where there was provocation or cause, but the punishment was cruel or excessive; third, usually when the punishment is inflicted with a deadly or dangerous weapon. Forbes v. Parsons, Crabbe, 283.
The master of a vessel is liable for an unjustifiable assault and battery by one of his officers upon one of the crew where the same is done by his connivance, consent or authority. And this consent and authority will be presumed when it appears that he knew of the trespass or had reason to know it, and did not interfere to prevent it. Hanson 0. Fowle et al., 1 Saw., C. C., 539.
In a libel for a maritime trespass, assault and battery, against two respondents if there is a joint decree for damages, either of the respondents may appeal without joining the other where they have severed in their pleadings or answers, or jointly pleaded a negative plea in the nature of the gen