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KILPATRICK AND DAHLGREN'S RAID.

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having otherwise inflicted little loss an end. Kilpatrick had lost 150 men and incurred still less. on this raid, had taken 500 prisoners, a good many horses, and inflicted on the Rebels serious losses in burned bridges, stations, and stores.

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But Col. Ulric Dahlgren, who led a subordinate command of about 400 cavalry, had been far less fortunate. Crossing also at Ely's ferry, Dahlgren, after leaving Spottsylvania C. H., had gone farther to the right, through Louisa and Goochland counties, intending to cross the James and enter Richmond from the south when Kilpatrick assailed it from the north; but he found the river (at Dover mills) far too deep to be forded, and hanged his negro guide in the belief that he had purposely misled him away from Richmond rather than toward that city. Dahlgren now pushed down the north bank of the James to the fortifications of Richmond, which he charged at dark," passing the outer works; but was repulsed with loss

This raid, though directed against the enemy's dépôts, railroads, &c., was designed to distract attention from another, far more formidable, led by Gen. Kilpatrick; who, starting " from Stevensburg, crossed the Rapidan at Ely's ford, and moved rapidly down the opposite flank of Lee's army, by Spottsylvania C. H., to the Virginia Central Railroad at Beaverdam station, where he had his first collision and drove the enemy; thence across the South Anna to Kilby Station, on the Fredericksburg road; cutting both roads as he passed, and pushing on to within 3 miles of Richmond;" passing its first and second lines of defenses, and fighting several hours before the third, which he was of course unable to carry, and compelled to fall back, Kilpatrick camped for the night six miles from Richmond and two from the Chickahominy; where a two--of course, by far superior numbers— gun battery opened upon him, at 10 P. M., just as his weary men were dropping asleep. The charge which quickly followed was as quickly repulsed; but it was so manifest that the position was not adapted to quiet slumbers, that Kilpatrick moved on forthwith to the Pamunkey, which he could not find boats to pass; so he was obliged to move across the White House railroad and thence down the Peninsula; soon striking the track of a cavalry force sent up to his aid from Fortress Monroe by Gen. Butler, and encountering, when near New Kent C. H., a brigade of Black infantry, which had been likewise sent by Butler on the same errand. Pursuit by the enemy was of course at

10 Feb. 28.

at the inner lines. He then, with the remnant of his forces, made a circuit around the city by Hungary to Hanovertown ferry; and, finding that Kilpatrick had been driven off eastward, struck thence for King and Queen C. H.; but was stopped, just after crossing the Mattapony at Dabney's ferry, by a body of local militia, at whose first fire he fell dead, pierced by five balls. His command was here scattered, each seeking to reach our lines as he best might; and some of them made their way to Kilpatrick; but at least 100 of them were picked up as prisoners.

Col. Dahlgren's body was treated with ignominy; it being asserted that papers were found on it evidencing

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a plot to liberate our prisoners on | the Rapidan on his right, at Germa

Belle Isle, near Richmond, and, by their aid, burn that city, taking the lives of Davis and his Cabinet! That these papers were Rebel forgeries, and the meditated arson and murder a Rebel invention, intended to 'fire the Southern heart,' and justify murder by a pretense of retaliation, seems no longer doubtful; while that the Confederate authorities authorized the placing of several barrels of gunpowder under Libby prison, so as to blow some thousands of Union captives into fragments in case of a successful attack, is entirely beyond dispute.

It is not impossible that Richmond might have been taken at this time, had Kilpatrick kept his men together, and taken the hazards of a sudden, sanguinary, persistent assault; but it could not have been held two days; so that its capture would have been of small importance. Had he been directed simply to destroy the railroads as thoroughly as he could, while Butler, moving by steam, had rushed on Richmond with 20,000 men, well provided with artillery, the chances of durable success would have been far better. Butler had, in fact, attempted to surprise Richmond by a forced march, some weeks earlier; but the design had miscarried, through the escape by bribery of a culprit from prison, who gave the alarm to the enemy, and enabled them to obstruct the roads beyond Bottom's bridge. Butler's infantry, on this expedition, marched 80 miles within 56 hours; his cavalry 150 miles in 50 hours.

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All being at length in readiness, Gen. Meade's army, masking its intention by a feint on Lee's left, crossed"

19 Feb. 6-9.

nia and Ely's fords: Warren leading at Germania, followed by Sedgwick, and pushing straight into 'THE WILDERNESS; Hancock crossing at Ely's ford, and moving on Chancellorsville, followed by the trains of the whole army. Burnside followed next day.

The Wilderness is a considerable tract of broken table-land, stretching southward from the Rapidan nearly to Spottsylvania Court House, seamed with ravines and densely covered with dwarfish timber and bushes, diversified by very few clearings, but crossed by three or four good roads, the best of them centering on Fredericksburg, and by a multiplicity of narrow cart-tracks, used in peace only by wood-cutters. (It is a mineral region, and its timber has been repeatedly swept off as fuel for miners.) In this tangled labyrinth, numbers, artillery and cavalry, are of small account; local knowledge, advantage of position, and command of roads, everything.

Lee's army, alert and vigilant, was just west of it; the roads diverged, fan-like, on that side: it was Grant's obvious interest to get through this chapparal as quickly and with as little fighting as possible: it was Lee's business not to let him. Hence, the moment our movement was developed, the Rebel army, which had been looking north across the Rapidan, was faced to the right and moved rapidly down parallel with our advance, forming line of battle some six miles east of its strong defenses on Mine run, which proffered a safe refuge in case of disaster. Lee, like Meade, had reorganized his army in three corps; May 4.

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infantry advance, rested for the night at the Old Wilderness tavern,' five miles from the ford, where Grant and Meade crossed and made their headquarters next morning; Gen. Sedgwick's corps was between them and the ford; -Gen. Hancock, with his corps, halted at or near Chancellorsville, in the rear of Warren. Our cavalry, under Sheridan and his lieutenants, Wil

whereof Ewell's (late the right), on its change of front, held the left, next the Rapidan; A. P. Hill coming into line on the right; while Longstreet (recently returned from his East Tennessee campaign) was posted near Charlottesville, two marches off, but was rapidly brought up, and came into action the second day. The ground was as unfavorable for us as could be; yet Grant, being unexpect-son and Gregg, covered the front and edly assailed-for he had confidently flanks of the infantry. expected to get through unmolested -had no choice but to fight: neither Burnside nor our trains being yet fairly over the river; so that any attempt to evade Lee's unlooked-for blow would have compromised, not merely the campaign, but the army.

Warren had orders to move, supported by Sedgwick, early next morning," to Parker's store, five miles S. W. of his camping-ground; following the road leading to Orange Court House: Hancock was to press southward, at considerable distance on his left, making for Shady Grove church; while Sheridan's cavalry swept still farther south-west, making a reconnoissance in force. But these move ments were met in their inception by an unlooked-for advance of the Rebel "Thursday, May 5.

Hardly a shot had been fired on the first day of our movement; the Rebel pickets retreating precipitately before our imposing advance, to speed the great news to their leaders. Gen. Warren, with his corps, forming our

infantry under Hill against Warren, | tle after 1 P. M.; but Ewell was not and under Ewell against Sedgwick: at first in so great force as Hill was; the former driving in the 5th N. Y. and the advantage here was on our cavalry with loss, and striking War- side: the enemy being obliged, at 31 ren heavily and full in front, long P. M., to give ground, after a most before he had reached Parker's store, determined effort: Maj.-Gen. J. M. and before Hancock had orders to Jones and Brig.-Gen. Stafford havarrest his southward march and, ing been killed. Rhodes's division, led facing westward, swing in on War- by Gordon, next charged vigorously, ren's left. In short, the battle com- and pushed back our advance with menced before our army was in posi- loss, taking some prisoners. In a tion, and while our Generals still return charge from our side, Gen. supposed that there was no considera- Pegram fell severely wounded. Hereble Rebel force at hand-as Lee evi- upon a general advance on our side dently intended to have it. And was ordered, but arrested by the Hill, having, by an early advance, coming of night. The Rebels claimed secured a strong and sheltered posi- 1,000 prisoners to our 300 as the net tion on a ridge crossing the road, product of the day's work; otherrepelled with loss the brigades of wise, the losses were nearly equal.. Bartlett and Ayres, of Griffin's division, that were first sent up against him; not pressing far his advantage until about 3 P. M.; when, perceiving the approach of Hancock, he attempted the favorite Rebel maneuver of interposing a strong force between our usually loosely joined commands, but was checked by Hancock's arresting his direct advance and pushing rapidly to the right, to close on Warren. This was effected, not a moment too soon; the enemy's charging column being already on Warren's left flank; but Hancock, with his division Generals, Birney, Barlow, and Gibbon, struck heavily on their right, and two hours' stubborn and bloody conflict, with musketry alone, resulted in great loss to both sides, and little advantage to either: Hancock's corps, which had, ere this, been strengthened by Getty's division of Sedgwick's, saving itself from rout by the most obstinate fighting.

Grant had decided to open next morning " by an advance along our whole front; Burnside's corps having arrived during the night by a forced march, and been distributed to the points where it seemed to be most needed. Sedgwick was ordered to move at 5 A. M.; but the enemy were upon him a quarter before; attempting to turn our right flank, which was held by Gen. Wright's division, with Gen. Seymour's provisional division still nearer the Rapidan. This attack, twice repeated during the forenoon, but not resolutely (being a feint to mask the real attack on Hancock), was repulsed, and our line advanced a few hundred yards to a more favorable position.

At 8 A. M., our whole front was assailed, and again two hours later, as if the enemy were feeling for a weak point. Then, efforts were made, as before, to push in between our several corps and their divisions; and at length to strike with crushing force 16 Friday, May 6.

Sedgwick had been attacked a lit

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GEN. WADSWORTH KILLED-SEYMOUR CAPTURED. 569

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on one wing and then the other; | striking heavily on Stevenson's divi-
sion of Burnside's corps, drove it back
and rushed through the
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cock promptly sent Col. Carroll, with
the 3d brigade of his 2d division, to
strike the advancing foe in flank,
which was admirably done: the ene-
my being driven back with heavy
loss, and our troops regaining their
former position.

and this proved the more successful maneuver. It was evident that the Rebels, in their perfect knowledge of the country, and in the facility of moving their forces from left to right and back again in the rear of their defenses and fighting line, thus thoroughly screened from observation on our part, possessed advantages fully counterbalancing their deficiency in numbers.

On our left, Gen. Hancock had moved out, at 5 A. M., and had pushed forward, fighting, crowding back Hill and taking many prisoners, nearly two miles, across the Brock road, on his way to Parker's store. Here he was stopped by the arrival of Longstreet; who, after a brief full, charged in turn, throwing our front into confusion, and requiring the presence of part of Burnside's men to restore and steady it; when Longstreet in turn was pressed back, falling severely wounded--it was said by a fire from his own men. Again a desperate attack by the enemy bore back the front of the 2d corps to its intrenched line and abatis along the Brock road; near which, but farther to the right, Gen. James S. Wadsworth, gallantly struggling to stem the adverse tide, was shot through the head and mortally wounded; as Gen. Alex. Hays had been the day before.

But, another lull now occurring, our front was straightened and strengthened; Gen. Burnside's corps having been thrown in between Hancock and Warren, so as to give our line the full strength of our infantry. Hardly had this been done when the now united corps of Hill and Longstreet fell furiously upon our left and left center, pushing them back, and,

Thus ended the battle on our left; but, the enemy, massing swiftly and heavily on our right,after our Generals supposed the day's fighting over,struck again, under Gordon, just before dark, at that flank; surprising and routing Truman Seymour's and then Shaler's brigade, taking nearly 4,000 prisoners, including Seymour himself. For a moment, it seemed that our army, or at least its right wing, was exposed to rout; but Gen. Sedgwick exerted himself to restore his lines, and succeeded: the enemy making off with most of their prisoners in triumph. In fact, this charge had been made at so late an hour that no farther success than was achieved could wisely have been aimed at. Our army rested, after the second day's bloody struggle, substantially on the ground held by it at the beginning.

Early next morning, some guns (which had just been posted on our right) opened; but there was no reply; then our skirmishers advanced, but were met by skirmishers only; and it was soon evident that Lee had intrenched his whole front, and was willing to receive an attack behind his works, but not inclined to advance again and make one. And, as fighting in this labyrinth was nowise Grant's choice, but Lee's wholly, and as the latter did not invite a persistence in it, Grant resolved to resume

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