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ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE-
CISIONS.

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ver by the plaintiffs to show that an officer took them, unless it is shown that he had a legal right to have them by virtue of his writ. We think that upon reason and authority, the act of the defendant's servant in wrongfully delivering the property to a person not entitled thereto must be regarded as the act of the defendants, and one of conversion. Cooley Torts, 534; Edw. Bailm., § 162; Cooley Torts, 441, 448; Cooley Bl. Comm. 150, notes; Ang. Carr. 290, 292; Syeds v. Hay, 4 Term Rep. 260; Keyworth v. Hill, 3 Barn. & A. 685; Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich. 554; Bullard v. Young, 3 Stew. 46; Indiana & St. L. R. v. Herndon, 81 Ill. 143; Illinois Cent. R. v. Parks, 54 id. 294; Esmay v. Fanning, 5 How. Pr. 228; Coykendall v. Eaton, 55 Barb. 188; Bissell v. Starr, 32 Mich. 298; Edwards v. Frank, 10 id. 616; Hicks v. Lyle, 46 id. 488; Barnum v. Stone, 27 id. 335, 336. The intention with which the wrongful act is done by which a party is deprived of his property, except when malicious, is of little consequence, provided the act is done. It is the effect of the act which constitutes the conversion. Edw. Bailm., § 162; Cooley Torts, 534-538, 688; Griswold v. Haven, 25 N. Y. 595. The defendant was a carrier, and if the carrier of goods allow an officer to take the goods he is carrying, it is no defense against the plaintiff's action of trover for their value to show that an officer took them, unless it show that he had a legal right to take them by virtue of his writ. Ang. Carr. 223; Kiff v. Old Colony & N. Ry. Co., 117 Mass. 591. It is claimed that such a showing was made in this We think not. The evidence by which it is claimed such showing was made was, as we think, erroneously received against the objection thereto by the plaintiff's counsel, and cannot be regarded in this discussion. There was little evidence of the facts sought to be established, and when the defendant seeks to show a better right to the property, or to its control, and the plaintiff claims, the legal proceedings upon which the officer's writ or order is based should

case.

CONTRACT-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CONTRACT DIVIS-
IBLE AND REASONABLE.-A., by a contract, for a valu-
able consideration, agreed with B. that he would not
thereafter engage in the business of manufacturing
ochre "in the county of Lehigh or elsewhere." He
subsequently went into the business of manufacturing
ochre in Lehigh county, and upon a bill for injunction
to restrain him from continuing the same being filed
by B., he answered that his contract was in restraint
of trade, and therefore contrary to public policy.
Held, that the contract was divisible as to place; that
while it was void outside of Lehigh county, it was
good within the county; that it was competent for A.
to make the contract; and that it was reasonable and
not appressive. A contract restraining one of the
parties from the exercise of a trade within a limited
locality, when there is reasonable ground for the re-
striction is valid. Inquiry will not be made into the
adequacy of the consideration. Its value will not be
measured against the uncertain value of the right to
carry on the trade or business. If it be reasonable it
is enough. McClurg's Appeal, 58 Penn. St. 51. The
covenant as to place, "in the county of Lehigh or
elsewhere," is divisible and valid as to the county.
For the present it is conceded to be void elsewhere.
This point was decided in a case where the party
agreed not to engage in a particular business in Cin-
cinnati or elsewhere. Thomas v. Miles, 3 Ohio St.
274. Other cases are cited by the learned judge of the
Common Pleas sustaining the same doctrine. None
to the contrary was referred to at the argument.
Where a county or city or borough is named as a limit
and an unreasonable extent of territory in addition is
also named, the covenant is divisible, and may be
valid as to the particular place which "is a reasonable
limit. It has been said that all the cases, when they
come to be examined, seem to establish this principle
that all restraints upon trade are bad, as being
in violation of public policy, unless they are natural,
and not unreasonable for the protection of the parties
in dealing legally with some subject-matter of con-
tract. The principle is this: public policy requires
that every man shall not be at liberty to deprive him-
self or the State of his labor, skill or talent, by any
contract that he enters into. On the other hand, pub-in anger or not. In either case the persons bitten
lic policy requires that when a man has, by skill or by
any other means, obtained something which he wants
to sell, he should be at liberty to sell it in the most
advantagous way in the market; and in order to en-
able him to so sell it, it is necessary that he should be
able to preclude himself from entering into competi-
tion with the purchaser. In such case the same pub-
lic policy enables him to enter into any stipulation,
however restrictive it is, provided the restriction, in
the judgment of the court, is not unreasonable, having
regard to the subject-matter of the contract. Leather
Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, 9 Eq. Cas. 345. Peun. Sup. Ct.,
Oct. 4, 1886. Smith's Appeal. Opinion by Trun-
key, J.

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WHAT AMOUNTS TO -SEIZURE OF

be introduced. Beach v. Botsford, 1 Doug. 199; Gidday v. Witherspoon, 35 Mich. 367. Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct. 28, 1886. Gibbons v. Farwell. Opinion by Sherwood, J.

DAMAGES LIABILITY OF OWNER OF DOG.-A person bitten by a dog may recover damages from the owner, upon evidence that the dog, with the knowledge of the owner, had a mischievous propensity to bite, whether

would suffer injury. A mischievous propensity from which injury is the natural result. In the case of Hudson v. Roberts, 6 Exch. 699, it appears that the plaintiff was walking in the street wearing a red handkerchief. The bull of defendant, ordinarily gentle and quiet, and not known to have gored any person previously, was being driven along the street, when he attacked and gored the plaintiff. The defendant said that the red handkerchief caused it, and that he knew the bull would run at any thing red. The plaintiff recovered. The bull had no hostile feeling against the man he injured, and no disposition to gore mankind, yet because of his mischievous propensity to rush at a red object, of which his owner knew, it was held that when he caused injury to the plaintiff, through that propensity, his owner should pay damages. A domesticated bear may hug a man until his ribs be broken. This may be the mode adopted by the animal to manifest his affection; yet if he had on other occasions previously shown his affection in that way, causing injury, and his owner knew of such propensity, the owner would have to pay damages caused by breaking the man's ribs. It is true that the bear is classed with animals feræ naturæ, and the presumption, in such case, would be that although domesticated, the animal had relapsed into his wild habits, yet although the presump

CONVERSION
GOODS BY OFFICER.-The plaintiff and his partner
owned certain hop-poles at Schenaux islands, in Lake
Huron. The defendant undertook to carry these poles,
by water, to Detroit, and deliver them to the plain-
tiff. Defendant carried the poles, but on reaching
Detroit, made no attempt to deliver the poles to their
owner, and the master of the boat, who was a United
States marshal, delivered the property, without the
owner's consent, to a third party. Held, to be wrong-
ful conversion, for which trover would lie. If the
carrier of goods allow an officer to take the goods he
is carrying, it is no defense against an action of tro-

boundaries. Daggett v. Shaw, 5 Meto. 223; Davis v. Sherman, 7 Gray, 291; Wood v. Foster, 8 Allen, 24; Long v. Colton, 116 Mass. 414; Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333, 334. So far as these cases stand on the ground that such declarations are acts qualifying the party's possession (Niles v. Patch, 13 Gray, 254, 257) they do not apply to the identification of an easement. For unless it be assumed that the easement identified and claimed is the one in fact attached to the dominant estate, the party making the declaration has no possession of it. And the assumption thus made to justify the admission of the evidence, would be an assumption of the very fact which the evidence was admitted to prove. But it is more satisfactory per haps to say that the admission of such declarations has generally been regarded as an exception to the general rule against hearsay, and that we cannot extend the principle further than it has been carried by au thority. We are not aware that it has been applied to a case like this. Where, in an action for interference with a right to a spring of water, it appears that the plaintiff has not appropriated the water, he cannot sue the defendant for doing transitory acts, such as drawing water in pails, or watering his cattle; but when the defendant puts in an aqueduct, which diverts the water continuously, and which interferes with the exercise of the plaintiff's rights, whenever thereafter defendant seeks to exercise them, he does an overt act of permanent effect, which amounts to an open denial of the plaintiff's right, and will extinguish it in twenty years to the extent of the water withdrawn. Nominal damages may always be recovered for such an act. Mass. Sup.Jud. Ct., Oct. 21, 1886. Peck v. Clerk. Opiuion by Holmes, J.

tion on the question of scienter would be against the owner, he might be able to prove that the habit of embracing persons did not proceed from the savage nature of the bear, but under the influence of civilization, from a cultivated affection. But this proof would not avail the owner in a suit by a party embraced. Such a propensity would be held to be mischievous, because hurtful to those who were the object of the bear's affection. In the case of Oaks v. Spaulding, 40 Vr. 347, it appeared that Mrs. Oaks was driving cows home from pasture, when the ram of Spaulding attacked and injured her. It was shown that the ram had a propensity to butt mankind and that the defendant knew it, but it did not appear whether the previous buttings by the ram proceeded from an ugly disposition, or from the exuberance of a playful spirit; yet it was held that the defendant was liable. It did not cure the hurt nor assuage the pain of the woman to be told that the ram, when he butted her, was only in one of his accustomed sportive moods. It might have been fun for the ram, but it was hurtful to Mrs. Oaks. It was a mischievous propensity, whether proceeding from ugliness of temper or from good nature, which if known to the owner of the ram, made him liable for damages resulting from such propensity. There is no doubt, that in cases of animals not naturally inclined to do mischief, a previous mischievous propensity must be shown and the scienter clearly established. The gist of the action is, not the keeping of the animal, but the keeping with knowledge of the mischievous propensity, whether proceeding from a savage disposition or not. The conclusion is, that the plaintiff below having shown by his proof that on several previous occasions the dog in question had bitten various persons on the hand, with knowledge of the defendant, he was entitled to recover, even if the habit did not proceed from a ferocious nature, but was the result of a mischievous propensity. N. J. Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 1886. State v. McDermott. Opinion by Parker, J.

DEED-RESERVATION OF "SPRING "-DECLARATION OF DECEASED GRANTOR OF FORMER GRANTEE. A

deed contained the following clause: "Excepting and reserving to myself, my heirs and assigns, the spring of water on said premises, and the right to lay down, repair, and rebuild aqueduct and pipe, and convey said water off from said premises, together with the right to fix said spring, and do any other act or thing necessary for taking off said water." It was proved that there was no water on the premises, except that a small stream of water, having its rise in a spring on adjoining land, and flowed on to the premises and was finally lost in the ground. Held (1), that the word "spring" referred to this stream; and (2), that evidence that this water was called a "spring" in the neighborhood was superfluous. Declarations of a grantor, since deceased, that he called it a "spring," is inadmissible. Her subsequent statement that she understood at the time that this stream was the water reserved, was merely a statement of the conclusion, from what she had already testified and did not add to it. Whether, standing alone, it would have been admissible, if the suit had been against her, as an interpretation made by her against her own interest, and whether, if admissible against her, it would have been admissible against a purchaser from her, without notice, are questions not fairly raised, we think, in this case. The evidence of a former owner, that at the time of her purchase and ownership there was no other water or spring on the lot, is admissible as tending to show that the words must have referred to this water. The declaration of the deceased grantor was admitted, we presume, as being in effect an identification of the spring attached to the land conveyed and as falling within the principle of declarations as to

CORRESPONDENCE.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

An opportunity is presented to the citizens of the State of New York to take a long step to the front in the matter of popular government.

We are to have a Constitutional Convention next summer, and if it can be brought to formulate a very short Constitution, as nearly as may be establishing veritable popular government, good may come of if.

The nearest approach to what is recognized as popular government has been attained under constitutional forms. The limitations thereby secured have been productive of the profitable restraints directed against monarchical institutions, the line between ruler and subject having been settled.

This was all good enough in its time. But now that the awful menace of the throne has been removed from the State, is it necessary to maintain the ancient barriers?

Are we so prone to self-injury that we must be protected against ourselves? If the anchor has saved us in some old-time storm, now that the skies are clear and the winds fair, must we look more to anchor than sail?

The truth is, any Constitution, which goes further than outline the form ot government, is more of a disability than help. Popular government means the right of the people to govern themselves. There is a growing belief that many of the ills which oppress mankind may be removed or mitigated by law without exceeding the legitimate functions of govern

ment.

Constitutional restraints have grown to such proportions of late that the ship of State can hardly be navigated, because of such like obstructions, and what in limited doses was found a safe medicine, we cannot hope to make a healthful article of diet.

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A good Constitution for actual service would be one that by its first article would lodge the government in the hands of the Legislature.

Then go on and state the number of senators and assemblymen and their districts, with authority to the ladies to enact such laws as the safety and good government of the Commonwealth required. Provide for a governor and lieutenant governor and other State officers, to hold by act of Legislature.

The judiciary article might provide for a Supreme Court and General Term thereof, with as many judges as the due administration of justice may require, to hold office during good behavior, and the calendar of all the courts to be cleared annually.

A Court of Appeals of fourteen judges, or as many more as may be required, to hold office during good behavior, said court to consist of a chief justice and thirteen associates, to be divided into two parts, No. 1 to be presided over by the chief justice, and to consist of six associate to be selected by the governor, and No. 2 to consist of the remaining seven justices to be presided over by one of their number, to be selected by the governor, and who shall be known as the presiding justice. All questions arising where the two branches of the court are at variance shall be decided by the full bench of all the judges called together by the chief justice for that purpose.

Also power for the Legislature to provide for additional judges and parts of the court.

A Constitutional Convention that would give us a Constitution placing the government in the hands of the people absolutely would stimulate renewed activity by and give a value to citizenship, that could only result in progress for us.

If the answer to this proposition is that the people could not be safely trusted with such powers, then we must admit that popular government is a failure.

There never were conditions more favorable to broad departures in the line of government than are

in all cases a decision with findings upon the issue of law must be made and filed. If the demurrer be to a whole pleading, and be sustained or overruled without leave to amend, a decision should be drawn, and let the decision direct final judgment to be entered, and enter it accordingly. But if leave to amend or plead over is given, draw your decision just the same, aud let it direct that an interlocutory judgment be entered adjudging the demurrer to be sustained or overruled, and that final judgment be entered unless the party amends or pleads within days, and pays $ costs, and enter your interlocutory judgment accordingly. This judgment is appealable. 15 Hun, 220. If the amendment or pleading be not made, enter your final judgment, on application to the court, and an affidavit of default.

This is respectfully submitted to the profession as a correct practice, and one entirely free from difficulty, and in accordance with the ideas of the framers of the Code. Yours truly,

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BAYLIES' NEW TRIALS AND APPEALS. New Trials and Appeals; or the Rules of Practice, applicable to the review of judicial determination in civil actions and in special proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure, with an appendix of forms. By Edwin Baylies, Counsellor-at-law Rochester, N. Y.: Williamson & Higbie, 1886.

This is a companion volume of "Baylies' Trial Practice, and whoever has the one will need the other.

The book will be found of great assistance in the preparation of cases for the appellate courts, and the authorities pertinent to the practice therein have been carefully digested and arranged in convenient and ac

permitted the separate States. The general provis-cessible form. There is an appendix of eighty-one

ions of the Constitution of the United States presents all necessary safeguards, and it seems high time for us to exhibit to the world the truth of our claim, that one hundred years of education has prepared us for self government.

I submit these remarks for what they are worth. Very respectfully,

EDW. GEBHARD.

PRACTICE ON DEMURRER.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal: I think that a practice founded upon an intelligent reading of the sections of the Code relating thereto ought to avoid any "friction," such as a correspondent in your last issue supposes necessarily exists, regarding appeals, when a demurrer is sustained or overruled. It strikes me that the trouble arises from a misapprehension of the provisions of the Code as to the form of decision and judgment in such cases, and that having settled that question, the other, as to appeal, fades entirely away.

Section 990 of the Code was amended by chapter 542 of the Laws of 1879, and the word "order" was stricken out, so that no provision is now made in the Code for any thing except, first, a decision; second, a judgment.

Then comes section 1621, which expressly declares that the decision must direct final or interlocutory judgment to be entered.

From all which (and from the decisions cited by your correspondent, and also from 74 N. Y. 80, and 76 id. 515) it would appear that a demurrer is an issue of law, to be tried on fourteen days' notiee; that in no case is any order either proper or necessary, but that

forms.

FREEMAN'S VOID JUDICIAL SALES.

Void Execution, Judicial and Probate Sales, and the legal and equitable rights of purchasers thereat, and the constitutionality of special legislation validating void sales, and involuntary sales in the absence of judicial proceedings. Second edition. By A. C. Freeman. St. Louis, Mo.: Wm. H. Stevenson, 1886.

This is a very complete and convenient manual by the learned author of the works on "Judgments" and "Executions," who is also the editor of the "American Decisions." There is no person more competent to treat of this topic than Mr. Freeman, and he has unquestionably done a good service in producing this special treatise, the law of which has hitherto been scattered and somewhat inaccessible.

RANDOLPH ON COMMERCIAL PAPER, The second volume of this treatise, which is now published, confirms the favorable impression which the first made upon us. A third volume will complete the work, and as a whole the treatise will have a marked and permanent value. F. D. Linn & Co., Jersey City, publishers.

JACOB'S FISHER'S DIGEST, SUPPLEMENT. This large volume, the eleventh of the series, comprises all decisions from the year 1883 to 1886, and is of course indispensable to the possessors of the preceding volumes. It is in every point well executed. Published by George S. Diossy, New York.

CATALOGUE OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE LIBRARY. The catalogue of the law department of the library, prepared by Talbot H. Wallis, State librarian, is a handsome volume of 650 pages, and is in every way a creditable performance. It is indexed under States, authors and subjects.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Tues-
day, Dec. 14, 1886:

Judgment affirmed- Nathaniel R. Denton et al., appellants, v. George W. Sanford et al., executors, respondents.- Motion for reargument denied. Remittitur amended by substituting for order of judgment an order granting a new trial, with costs to abide the event-Brackett v. Griswold.-Motion for reargument denied, with costs-Blake v. Griswold. -Motion to dismiss granted, with costs-Derleth v. De Graaf.-Motion to advance cause denied, without costs-City of Brooklyn v. Copeland.-Motions to advance cause denied, without costs-Berndheimer v. Rundskopf; Seymour v. Mack.--Motion to withdraw granted, with $30 costs and $10 costs of motionPorteous v. Williams.

NOTES.

Judge Bleckley on Egotism: "No matter how well introduced by others, I always bring myself before my audience, if I have any. Very often I have none, and then I don't speak, except to myself. I take myself along all the time, and my habit is to talk about myself as freely as about other people, and quite as favorably; if any difference, more so. an egotist. I consider it a great blessing to be myself, In short, I am a blessing which I appreciate the more, the more I think of the great risk I must have run of being somebody else. Of the fifty-five millions of other people in the United States I might have been any one. deed the possibilities were much wider; I might have Inbeen any one of the fifteen hundred millions that inhabit the earth. Nor does this even begin to exhaust the contingencies to which I was subject; I might have been any one of the countless myriads that ever did or ever will live. I might perchance have been one of the unimaginable number of animals, or plants or minerals-a grain of sand or a mote in the atmosphere. I might have been one of the units, any one of the atoms, of derivative existence, with my place at any point in the immensities, my time at any moment of the eternities. On the other hand, I might not have been at all."

on

The conclusion of the Coleridge trial is what was expected at a very early stage. Our only interest in it is from a professional point of view. Sympathy is decidedly with the chief justice, and he will resume his judicial duties under decidedly improved impressions. The scene in the court Tuesday afternoon was as painful as any thing that can be conceived. The venerable chief justice spent the larger part of the day in being literally "badgered" by an unprofessional cross-examiner, who in his opening statement had magniloquently professed his intention of keeping closely to the issue. The result was that the latitude given to a party in person was stretched too far. Painful questions of a totally irrelevant character were pressed home until both judge and jury remonstrated; yet the judge beyond question strained his forbearance to the utmost in order that there might not be a symptom of a suspicion of unfairness. For ourselves however we believe that the pitiable trial may bring forth good fruit. It may

teach judges that parties who sue in person do not de serve an indulgeuce which they almost invariably abuse.-London Law Times.

The result of the tedious case of Adams v. Coleridge is to show that Mr. Adams has been unreasonable, and a chief justice may be indiscreet. Mr. Adams had good ground for bringing his previous action against Mr. Bernard Coleridge, but he had been sufficiently compensated by the 500l. awarded him by Lord Monkswell, who no doubt also took a just view of the first action against Lord Coleridge in awarding Adams had been sufficiently provided for by Lord forty shillings damages and costs. Moreover Mrs. Coleridge, and the interests of her husband fully con with a power of appointment to the husband. There sidered by the settlement of 600l. a year on the wife, was no necessity therefore for Mr. Adams to take adLord Coleridge's solicitor to the arbitrator for the vantage of the accident by which letters were sent by purpose of a second time placing his grievance before lish to the world letters in which there are expressions the public. All he has succeeded in doing is to pubwhich it were better that a chief justice should not have written, and that is all. Little difficulty need be felt about the law of the case. If a man puts letters into the hands of a third person with express instructions not to publish them, he is not responsible for any publication which may take place through that agent. If however he leaves his agent a discretion he is responsible for the agenc's act in publishing. The latter seems to have been the case of Lord Coleridge and Mr. Bernard Coleridge. Then arises the question whether the act of the clerk of the solicitor in sending the letters to the arbitrator was, so far as it can be attributed to Lord Coleridge and his son, a privileged shown, and Mr. Adams failed to bring malice home publication. Honestly to convey evidence to an arbitrator is no doubt privileged unless malice can be either to Lord Coleridge or Mr. Bernard Coleridge. Practically the question which the jury had to decide was whether Lord Coleridge or his son was a party to the communication of the letters to the arbitrator, happily for the honor of the bench the jury have fully with the intention of unduly influencing his mind, and That part of the case which concerns the slip made in cleared the chief justice from this grave imputation. the office of Mr. Harrison is of much professional intending Marie Louise, "Treat her as if she were a poor terest. Napoleon said to the accoucheur who was atgirl in the Faubourg St. Antoine." have a chief justice for a client are apt perhaps to be Solicitors who What happened in this case shows that a loss of nerve or want of care in such circumstances is tolerably sure to meet a perhaps undue punishment. The lowest drawer in the most secret safe accessible to the principal only is not too well guarded a place for the letters of a chief justice, especially one apt when he writes fully to lay bare his heart. Great lawyers are seldom good witnesses. stepped into the witness box in Adams v. Coleridge he When Lord Selborne acting for Miss Coleridge?" And he answered, “I was asked, "Did you know that your solicitor was should prefer to state what passed." The statement was so little what the plaintiff wanted to know, that at last Lord Selborne confessed, "Perhaps I had bet witness would have done at first. Sir Charles Ruster answer the question put to me," which a good sell's lapse of memory in regard to John Baptist's Day was perhaps precipitated by the discomfort of having so accomplished a man and subtle an advocate by his side as a client. If so, the disturbing influence was defendant himself who brought back the court to the its own remedy, as no doubt it was the distinguished consciousness that the day was identical with a famil iar quarter-day.-London Law Journal.

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The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, DECEMBER 25, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

"PENOLOGY " is the rather ambiguous title of

Mr. Warner, "is about the only thoroughly clean family newspaper I know of; certainly there are few journals published outside that are fit to circulate inside this prison; it needs a good world to stand some of our newspapers; a prison cannot." We are interested to notice that Mr. Warner does not believe in mercy to habitual criminals. He says: "If professional and confirmed criminals, men who declare by undergoing second conviction for a felony that they have made preying upon society their business, who belong, in short, to a pretty well-defined criminal class, cannot be removed altogether from troubling this world, they ought to be locked up permanently and made to earn their living. They are of no sort of use in the world, and are an expense and a danger to society." This institution certainly seems to be well worth the $30,000 a year which it costs the State. It is an outgrowth of civilization easily distinguishable from that "mawkish sympathy" with degraded and hardened criminals which exhibits itself in sending flowers to murderers and running up and down to procure commutations and pardons for those who have shown no mercy and who deserve nothing but justice.

Mr. Max Fast contributes an interesting account of the land-transfer system of Prussia to the Record and Guide. The basis of the system is the record. There can be no unrecorded holding, and property passes by recording. The kingdom is divided into districts, each of which is presided over by a single judge, and every town, village or manor within each district has its "ground-book." This book is divided into three parts; the first sets forth the owner's name, the mode of acquiring the history of the title, the time when acquired, the purchase price or value; the second states the permanent incumbrances or easement; the third, the mortgages. Land cannot pass without the allowance of the judge, who examines into the identity, competency and capacity of the parties. Nobody but the recorded owner may convey the land. If any prohibition or limitation of his rights has been ad

a little pamphlet sent to us. On inspection it turns out not to be a treatise on penmanship, but one on the proper treatment of those who are penned in prisons-a reprint of several papers from the North American Review and Harpers' Magazine, by Charles Dudley Warner, with the addition of one by Charles A. Collin and several not signed, issued by the State Reformatory at Elmira. The series has considerable interest as showing the result of an intelligent and persistent attempt at reformation rather than mere punishment of convicts. The Reformatory is a school of morals and learning rather than a prison, and the inmates, although subjected to strict discipline and to eight hours' daily labor, are less worked and better fed, better housed, and better instructed than they probably would have been if they had led virtuous lives. At first this course of treatment would seem rather a premium on vice, but let us free our minds from prejudice, and judge the tree by its fruits. If the convicts are turned out reformed and likely to make and continue good citizens, it is certainly a great deal better and cheaper than to keep them pent in ordinary prisons without any such prospects. The Reformatory has been in operation eight years, and its present population is seven hundred and thirtythree. "The reports show that eighty per cent of the men going out are reformed. That is to say, they do not again fall under the law; it is not supposed that they become saints, but they are fairly law-abiding, do not commit felonies." On the other hand, of those ordinarily discharged from State prisons sixty per cent have to be caught and imprisoned again." This is certainly a convincing showing. As to the course of education, it "runs from the rudiments - reading, writing and arith-judged in other courts (of bankruptcy), it is notified metic - up through grammar, higher mathematics, and geography, to history, specially American and English history, politics, English literature, such knowledge of law and the government of society as is necessary to make one an intelligent citizen, and political economy. None of these things are superficially taught; they are drilled in and in." "The education of the institution is intended to be industrial as well as scholastic. A few of those best fitted are taught telegraphy, and others stenography. Lessons in drawing and design are given; and I saw some very creditable designs for tile and mantel-pieces, done by the pupils. Teaching specific industries is to be carried out more generally in future, the object being to fit the discharged to earn a living honestly, as carpenters, workers in metals, etc. The class in carpentry was very successful." Printing is also taught, and the convicts edit and print a weekly newspaper, which, says VOL. 34 No. 26.

to the land court and properly entered. Two kinds of mortgages are recognized, hypothek and grounddebt. Both originate in and depend upon entry in the books. The former is an accessory security for a personal debt and the creditor has both an action in personam and an action in rem. The ground debt has no personal character and carries only the right to an action in rem, the liability to which adheres to the land. The most curious characteristic of the scheme however is the "Grundschuldbrief," or certificate issued by the court on the recording of a title, which mobilizes the estate and enables the owner to carry it around in his pocket and sell or pledge it in whole or in part. This is described by Mr. Fast as follows: "It may be indorsed in blank and is indeed a veritable lettre au porteur.' The assignment needs no recording in the Grundbuch, in order not to hinder the easy mercantile movement of the paper, and if an assignee should

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