intention of the favorers of the bill, but he believed its opponents possessed as pure a zeal for the protection and due encouragement of commerce as its advocates. It is not a question whether commerce is, or is not, to be protected; but whether the plan proposed be the most effectual and the least exceptionable that can be devised for that purpose? The difference of opinion does not consist in the end to be produced, but in the means proposed to effect the end. [MARCH, 1794. regardless of their enemy, and hardly recollecting that they are in a state of war. He thought it unsafe to calculate upon any peculiar invincibility in the armament now proposed, and, without such a quality, although he hoped their efficacy, yet he feared their inefficacy. He should fear the result, if the contest, in other respects, were to be upon equal terms. But that will not be the case. The armament will meet with peculiar embarrassment from the expected scene of action. They are to act three thousand miles from home, without the guarantee or even the prospect of a friendly port; they are to continue the whole year upon their station, and to be subject to attack whenever the enemy may think proper; they will also be continually exposed to a tempestuous ocean. Under these circumstances they must act upon the most disadvantageous terms, which will lessen extremely their prospect of success. The advocates of the bill have admitted the necessity of finding some friendly ports in the Mediterranean seas, and several have been mentioned-Carthagena, Gibraltar, &c.—but their hopes appeared to him to be wholly chimerical. The first objection he should make to the bill would be, the obvious inadequacy of the means contemplated to effect the end proposed by them. The object proposed is an effectual resistance, not only to the whole present naval force of Algiers, but to their whole naval ability. The bill contains, in itself, essentially a declaration of war. Our calculations, therefore, should be extended to the utmost limit of the naval ability of the hostile nation. The means to be employed consist of four frigates of forty-four guns each and two ships of thirty-six guns each. To decide with propriety upon the objection, this force should be compared with the naval ability of Algiers. He did not mean to go into a minute history of Algiers. He should only observe, in general, that it was a populous country; that it had furnished at one time one hundred thousand fighting men; that its power at this day was as great as at any preceding period; that they were a warlike people, accustomed to naval enterprises and desperate in naval engagements; that, for some time past, they had been subsidized for peace by almost every Euro-rected, is part of the system of the combination pean nation. He could not help concluding, from these circumstances, that the naval ability of the nation either was or might, without any uncommon exertions, be rendered superior to four fortyfour gun frigates and two thirty-six gun ships, the force contemplated by the bill, and, if the conclusions were just, the bill is unwise. He did not know how far it might be proper to have reference to confidential communications to present this part of the subject in its true light. He thought, however, he might be permitted to mention, in general, that it has been officially communicated to the House that the truce with Algiers, which has produced the injury to our commerce, against which the present remedy is di against France. The mildest apology from Great Britain for her interposition has been to enable Portugal to act more efficaciously in the common cause of despots. Other effects, equally important to that end, will result, and no doubt were taken into the estimate. They all may resolve themselves into the embarrassments produced to In the course of the debate, it has been replied our commerce. This information cannot be questo the argument of the ability of the nation, de- tioned. If, then, the Algerine truce be part of the duced from the number of men it has brought system of the combination against France, is it into the field, that the naval armament was not probable that the Combined Powers will afford intended to attack the invincible militia of Algiers. their ports for the protection of an armament inThis is true, but it is no refutation of the argu- tended to interrupt and destroy that part of the ment. The fact exhibits the ability of the nation system? May it not rather be inferred that they upon land, and the inference from it has been, will send their aid to their allies, the Algerines, that, if Algiers can exert such an ability upon to destroy the force sent against them? Have land, by changing the direction of her ability, she we hopes against this natural and obvious consewould certainly furnish a force at sea greatly su-quence from the good dispositions of the Comperior to the armament proposed. The history of bined Powers towards us? Have we any hopes her former naval exertions would also justify this from their inability to effect the object? For his conclusion. Providing this armament would na-part, he thought it was in vain to hope for a conturally turn the attention of Algiers to the increase of her naval strength; and he doubted the policy of measures which would produce that effect, without the United States were determined to enter into a competition for naval power with the nations of Europe. Naval exertions have been carried to such excess that there is scarcely any thing which furnishes more scope for comparison. Several nations, possessing a much greater naval strength than is contemplated by this bill, he believed, were at war with Algiers at this moment, yet her corsairs swim in the ocean, trary result. From these reflections, occurs another obvious objection to the measure-its direct tendency to war. Upon another occasion, it has been said, that Great Britain particularly is irritable towards us, and all measures ought to be avoided which might tend to increase the irritability. It really has become a question for this House, for all America, to determine, and particularly the lovers of peace, whether a naval armament calculated to resist part of the system of the combination against France, and destined to act in the very scene of war, or imposing high er duties upon some articles of imports, and making an act for the regulation of our own navigation, possess the greatest tendency to war? [H. of R. 1st. That the force to be provided is absolutely inadequate to the object. 2d. That, by proper management, a due attention to time and opportunity, a peace may be effected by money. In either case, the naval armament would be rendered unnecessary, and the expense ought not to be incurred. Mr. G. proceeded to consider the bill as the foundation of a permanent naval establishment. He said there was a clause in the bill authorizing the PRESIDENT to suspend all proceedings in the equipment of the armament, in case of a peace with Algiers, which gave him some consolation; but it did not altogether relieve his apprehensions from this operation of the measure, because he knew that a permanent naval establishment was a favorite policy with some gentlemen, and because the argument had been urged in favor of the present bill. He observed that a permanent naval establishment could be recommended to the United States but from one or both of the following considerations: Either upon the principle of entering into a competition for naval power with the Powers of Europe; or as affording security to the collection of our own revenue. For his part, if the proposed armament should be provided, he had but one consolation against this palpable effect of it. But that consolation furnished the strongest argument against the measure. The trees are now growing out of which the frigates are to be built. A considerable time must, of course, elapse before these trees can be put into the shape of frigates. From the present agitation and fluctuation of European affairs, great changes before that time may be effected, and the necessary delay in equipping the armament will be the only chance of avoiding a war by means of the measures. If the frigates were now afloat, and engaged in the expedition against Algiers, he should view the United States in a state of actual hostility against the whole Combined Powers. But the necessary delay, which may furnish the only security against war, as a result of the measure, proves the folly of an expensive armament, which, before it can be provided, the fluctuation of European affairs may render wholly unnecessary. Another objection to the measure consists of the certainty and enormity of the expense, with a total uncertainty of its efficacy; whereas, the plan of purchasing a peace regards economy, if its effi- He thought the question of a permanent naval cacy should be doubted. In this case, if the ob- establishment was one of the most important which ject be not effected, the money will not be ex- could be presented to the consideration of the pended. It is but a bad character of a measure, House, and that the most serious consequences to say it is neither certain in its object, nor eco- were necessarily connected with it. In the first nomical in its arrangement; yet these are the place, he viewed the establishment of a navy as a most striking traits in the present bill. When this complete dereliction of the policy of discharging measure was first brought into view, it was thought the principal of the public debt. History does not necessary that an estimate should accompany it. afford an instance of a nation which continued to This estimate, he knew not for what reason, was increase their navy and decreased their debt at kept out of view. It was, nevertheless, an esti- the same time. It is an operation exceeding the mate, and must again make its appearance in the ability of any nation. The naval competition of House. He expected, too, that it would appear the Powers in Europe has produced oppression to in a more formidable shape than when it was first their subjects and ruin to themselves. The ruin introduced. The pay of the seamen, the most im- of the French Monarchy, he believed, might be asportant item in the estimate, had varied its shape cribed very much to that cause. A navy is the materially. It is now calculated at double the most expensive of all means of defence, and the estimate first made, and he apprehended that the tyranny of Governments consists in the expensivesame fate would attend other parts of the estimate. ness of their machinery. The expensiveness of He admitted that the sum mentioned in the bill the French Monarchy is the true cause of its dedid not positively fix the wages of the seamen, but struction. The navy of France furnished the was intended as a limit to the PRESIDENT's dis-principal item of that expense. The navy procretion. He was inclined to think, however, from the nature of the service, that the whole sum would be found necessary; for all the other perquisites which the seamen will expect must consist of toil and danger. He observed, that the intelligence lately received, in his opinion, served to confirm all those objections, although he supposed it had affected the minds of other gentlemen very differently; because he had observed more votes in favor of the bill since the receipt of the intelligence than before that period. The intelligence being communicated in confidence, he supposed it would be improper to particularize those parts of it which affected his opinion. He should, therefore, only remark, in general, that the intelligence had led his mind to these two conclusions: 3d CoN.-17 duced expense, the expense exceeded the revenue, new contributions became necessary, the people saw the tyranny, and destroyed the tyrant. The same effect, by the same policy, will probably be produced in great Great Britain. The Government is not yet destroyed, but the people are oppressed, liberty is banished. The extensiveness of the Government is the true ground of the oppression of the people. The King, the Nobility, the Priesthood, the Army, and, above all, the Navy. All this machinery lessens the number of the productive and increases the number of unproductive hands of the nation in Great Britain. The operation has been extended so far that the poor rates alone probably afforded a greater tax per capita than the whole taxes paid in the United H. OF R.] Naval Armament. [MARCH, 1794. curred, therefore, will exceed the security afforded, and of course ought not to be incurred. Upon the whole, if these considerations were not sufficient to induce the House to negative the bill, he conceived the impressions produced upon his own mind by them would furnish a justification for his opposition. He said, if the bill should pass, he should, however, find a consolation in a consciousness of his own fallibility, and a respect for the opinions of the majority who advocated it; but, impressed as he was with the subject, he felt it a duty, as far as he could, to give a veto to the measure. States. He was astonished, with these fatal examples before our eyes, that there should be any gentlemen who would wish to enter into this fashionable system of politics. He said the United States had already progressed full far enough into this system; for, exclusively of the ordinary expense of the Civil List, a debt had been funded upon principles of duration. An Army had been raised, at an immense expense, and now there was a proposition for a Navy. He observed that, for several years past, the appropriations for the support of the Military Establishment had exceeded a million of dollars per annum-from one million to one million and a half annually. He believed Mr. W. SMITH remarked, that though it was not that, if the expense had been foreseen, there would probable any proselytes were to be expected at have been more active efforts to have avoided it. this late period of the business, and after so ample It was a policy, at this day, very generally con- a discussion as the question had received in its demned; yet we are now to exhibit a counterpart different stages, yet he considered it necessary to of this policy upon the ocean, with this aggrava-make a reply to some of the various objections tion: that it will commence with greater certain which had just been made to the passing of the expense, and with a more uncertain object. The bill. Many of those objections appeared to him system of governing by debts he conceived the totally inapplicable to the subject, which he should most refined system of tyranny. It seems to have pass over in silence. If it were the design of the been a contrivance devised by politicians to suc- House to incur a vast expense in the establishceed the old system of feudal tenures. Both sys- ment of a Navy, merely for the idle purposes of tems were tyrannical, but the objects of their ty- vain parade, there would be force in some of the ranny were different. The system of feuds ope- objections; but, as this was not the case, and as rated upon the person of the individual-the sys- the measure was a measure not of choice, but of tem of debts operates upon the pockets of the indi- necessity, extorted by the pressure of unavoidable vidual. In the feudal system, the tenant often events, he did not feel their force in any respect. received some indulgence and lenity from the The question was, simply whether our commerce martial generosity which generally characterized required protection against the Algerine corsairs, the Lord. The Lord was gratified with the ac- and whether this was the best mode of protection. knowledgment of the tenant that he was a slave, The first part of the question was admitted on all and the rendition of a pepper-corn as an evidence sides. For himself, he had always considered the of it. The product of the tenant's labor was left second equally clear. But in the course of the for his own support. The system of debts affords discussion, various difficulties had been started no such indulgences. Its true policy is to devise against the mode of protection, and various subobjects of expense, and to draw the greatest pos- stitutes had been proposed, as offering a remedy sible sum from the people in the least visible mode. more prompt, more effectual, and less expensive. It boasts not of economizing in calls upon the peo- He would first consider the proposed substitutes ple for contributions. It boasts not of economizing for a naval armament, and then answer the obin the objects of expenditure. It consults the obe-jections to it. The substitutes were: 1st. To pur dience, and not the happiness of the people. There chase a peace of the Algerines. 2d. To depend is no device which facilitates the system of ex- on Portugal breaking her truce with Algiers, and pense and debts so much as a Navy. And he de- shutting up their cruisers within the Straits. 3d. clared, from that consideration, he should value To pass commercial regulations against Great his liberty at a lower price than he now did, if the Britain. 4th. To subsidize other nations to propolicy of a permanent Naval Establishment should tect our commerce. obtain in the United States. He saw another strong objection to the establishment of a Navy. He deemed it a hostage to its full value for our good behaviour to the great naval Powers, until it should be able to contend with them for the ocean. It will increase rather than lessen our dependence upon them. To these several substitutes, he might, in a few words, object that the first was impracticable, the second precarious, the third inoperative, and the fourth dishonorable. But he would, more in detail, evince their futility by a few observations: 1st. With respect to the purchase of a peace. The late communications must satisfy every one With respect to the other considerations, their who had attended to them, that all hope on that utility in affording an additional security for the score must be abandoned, unless there was a macollection of the revenue, he should make but one nifestation of some force on the part of this counobservation. When revenue is laid, the expense try, which might give effect to pacific negotiaof the machinery employed in the collection is tions. As long as our vessels were so easy and so the primary consideration. These vessels may, tempting a prey to the cupidity of those rovers, it therefore, be considered as aquatic sheriffs, but of would be vain to expect that they would sell a the most expensive order. They will be an ad-peace for any thing like the price which the Goditional cost of at least twenty per centum upon the whole revenue collected. The expense in vernment would be willing to give, or that a peace, even if effected, would be of any duration. If the Executive formerly experienced such difficulties when the Algerines had captured only one or two of our vessels, and their cruisers were confined to the Mediterranean by the Portuguese squadron, how much less prospect was there of success after they had captured a considerable number of our ships, were likely to capture many more, and were at liberty to cruise in the Atlantic, even to our very coasts? And that little prospect of success would be diminished, when the Dey of Algiers should understand that we took no measures to protect our trade, and were afraid of the expense of a small armament. Even should a peace be purchased, the temptation to break it would be so great, that we ought not to expect it would be long observed. But if the Dey knew that we had some naval strength, and were resolved to protect our trade, he would find his account not only in making peace with us, but in maintaining it. 2d. To rely on the chance of Portugal breaking her truce, was putting our commerce and the liberty of our seamen on a very precarious footing indeed. It was impossible to say how long Portugal might continue at peace with Algiers; and it had been remarked, that the truce had been accomplished by the intervention of the British and Spanish Courts, without the knowledge or assent of Portugal; but Mr. S. was persuaded the latter part of this allegation was without foundation. Portugal must have consented to it, and it was therefore probable she would maintain peace with Algiers as long as the policy of the British Court, with whom she was clearly connected, should dictate. 3d. It was proposed to put a stop to the depredations of the Algerines by certain commercial restrictions aimed at Great Britain. Admitting, for a moment, the ultimate efficacy of these restrictions, which, like a panacea, were to cure all our ills, the remedy must be very remote. These regulations could not pass into a law till the close of the session, allowing a moderate time for their discussion in both Houses. A distant period must then be assigned for their operation, in order not to create too sudden and violent a disturbance to the course of trade, and to allow a reasonable time to merchants to make their arrangements. A certain time must, then, elapse before their effect would be felt by Great Britain, and a still further time before it could be felt, by a kind of re-action, by Algiers. In the interim, the Algerines would seize our vessels, and carry hundreds of our fellow-citizens into captivity. 4th. The last substitute was, to subsidize other nations. Besides the national dishonor of depending upon others for that protection which was in our own power, Mr. S. said there were several objections to this project. Either the nations in contemplation were at peace with the Regency of Algiers, or they were not: if the former, it was not to be expected that they would relinquish that peace for any indemnification the United States could make them. If they were at war, they had sufficient inducement to check the depredations of their enemies without our subsidies. In addition to these objections, such a protection [H. or R. would be hazardous, as it would be at any time in the power of the nation we should employ, when engaged thereto by any Power envious of our prosperity, to conclude a truce with Algiers, and leave us at the mercy of her corsairs. Having a navy of our own, we might co-operate to advantage with any of the Powers at present at war with the Algerines, but it would be risking too much to depend altogether on any of them. Mr. S. next reviewed the principal objections to the bill. These were, he said, Îst. That the force contemplated was incompetent. 2d. That sending an armed force on the ocean would be the means of involving us in a war with some of the maritime Powers. 3d. That we had no friendly ports in Europe, which our frigates_could resort to for supplies or refitment. 4th. That the expense would exceed the object to be protected. 5th. That our trade would be deprived of the seamen required to man the frigates. 6th. That it was now so late in the season we could not protect our vessels the ensuing Summer, and that some favorable events might occur before the frigates could be equipped, which would render them unnecessary. 7th. That this was the beginning of a Naval Establishment, which would hereafter involve this country in immense debts and maritime wars. 1st. To the first objection, Mr. S. replied that he was surprised those gentlemen who deemed the number of frigates inadequate to the object, had never proposed to increase the quantum of force; though this objection had been re-echoed by several gentlemen, none of them had thought proper to move an augmentation of the strength. The only motion of that nature had proceeded from a quarter which had been always friendly to the measure. From the documents on the table, and from the diligent inquiries of a large com mittee, the force contemplated by the bill did, however, appear inadequate. The number and strength of the Algerine corsairs had been pretty nearly ascertained; it had been stated, from good authority, that these vessels were slight, and that they did not cruise in fleets, but scattered, for the purpose of plunder. It also appeared that a smaller force than ours had been successfully employed by Portugal in blocking up the Straits. 2d. The second objection arose from the danger of being involved in a war. It had been said that some of the maritime Powers, whose interest it was that our commerce should suffer from these piratical depredations, would see with displeasure our armed vessels on the ocean, and would insult them; and that our officers would resent such insults, and thus draw us into a war. If there were any nation so anxious to go to war with us, as this objection supposes, they would be at no loss for pretexts without this. If, while we were exercising so just, lawful, and necessary a right as that of using the only means in our power of protecting our commerce from ruin, and our fellowcitizens from a most dreadful captivity, any nation should wickedly and wantonly interfere, and molest our frigates, it would show such a disposition to quarrel with us, and be such an act of hostility, as would justify war on our part. Whatever nation it might be, he should view such an aggression as the effect of a predetermined hostility, and should not hesitate a moment to consider them as much our enemies as the Algerines themselves. But this armament would furnish so little pretence for any danger of this kind, that he viewed all such terrors as chimerical. Indeed, it was somewhat strange, that these apprehensions should have been suggested by gentlemen who considered commercial restrictions particularly directed at Great Britain as of a most pacific tendency. If irritating measures, pointedly directed at Great Britain, were not likely to excite a hostile spirit in her, much less was it to be expected that measures of unavoidable necessity against the Algerine pirates, would excite that spirit. [MARCH, 1794. tracted it to the present period. Late as it is, however, it is still necessary, and the best expedient which has been suggested. The very circumstance of preparation for naval defence, would facilitate our negotiation for peace, and would encourage our seamen to remain in our service. He wished it always to be understood, that he did not rely solely on the efficacy of this armament. He still looked forward to a negotiation, and was ready to provide the most ample means for that purpose; but he was at the same time satisfied that the first measure must accompany the latter, as the one would be nugatory without the other. 7th. The dangers resulting from a large Navy Establishment, and the immense debts they have created in other countries, had been depicted, and the House had been warned against such evils. How a bill providing six frigates, which were to 3d. It had been clearly shown that there were many convenient friendly ports to which our ves-exist only during the war with Algiers, could exsels of war should have access. Spain, Portugal, and France, had been mentioned. It was not probable we should be at war with all those Powers at the same time. Being at peace with them all, we had a right to expect a friendly admission into their ports. A state of war would undoubtedly present many difficulties, but even in that event, the proposed measure did not appear less indispensable. 4th. The expense had been strongly urged as a weighty objection. Mr. S. observed, that the saving in insurance, the value of our ships and cargoes, the ransom of our captive seamen, was more than an offset against this item. But was not the slavery of our fellow-citizens, the national disgrace resulting from it, to be taken into the account? These were, in his mind, considerations beyond all calculation. Who could, after reading the affecting narratives of Captain Penrose and the other unfortunates, sit down contented with cold calculations and dry syllogisms? These narratives ought to excite every possible exertion, not only to procure the release of the captured, but to prevent an increase of the number of these unhappy victims. This could only be effected by the proposed measure; it was the only practicable mode of obtaining a peace, which would insure the release of the captives, and of preventing the capture of others. Were the expense, therefore, double the sum proposed, he, for one, would not hesitate to vote for it. 5th. It had been alleged, that depriving our merchant vessels of the seamen requisite to man the frigates, would be a serious injury to our trade. No further answer was necessary to this objection, than barely to remark, that the injury was not to be put in competition with the loss of seamen by slavery in Algiers, or by desertion from merchant ships, so unprotected and exposed. 6th. The lateness of the season had furnished another objection. Mr. S. asked whose fault it was, that this measure had not been adopted sooner? The members whose opinions coincided with his, and himself had urged the necessity of it near three months ago, but the persevering opposition it had encountered, and the intervention and discussion of the commercial regulations had pro cite an apprehension of a large and permanent navy, and an enormous debt, Mr. S. said he was at a loss to discover. The clause which authorized the PRESIDENT, in the event of a peace with the Regency of Algiers, to discontinue the armament, was a complete answer to all the reasoning which had been indulged on the subject of navies and debts. Admitting there had been no such clause, he did not feel the weight or applicability of the reasoning. This country is peculiarly fitted for a navy: abounding in all kinds of naval resources, we have within ourselves those means which other maritime nations were obliged to obtain from abroad. The nature of our situation, and the navigating disposition of a considerable proportion of our citizens, evince still more the propriety of some Naval Establishment. Perhaps the country is not yet mature for such an establishment, to any great extent; but he believed the period was not far distant, when it would. Sweden, with a population not greater than that of the United States, and with more slender resources, maintained a large navy. He saw no reason why the United States, with an increasing population, much individual wealth, and considerable national resources, might not, without ruin, do as much, or why the equipment of a squadron, inferior to that of any of the petty nations of Italy, should involve us in an insupportable expense. Having replied to the principal objections against the bill, Mr. S. said, though he did not suppose that any arguments of that day would change a single vote, yet, as a formal and lengthy opposition had been made, he wished to show that he did not rely upon a majority, and that he would never give his assent to a measure which did not, in his opinion, rest on the basis of good policy and propriety. He viewed this measure as resting on that basis; he trusted it would produce the good effects which its friends anticipated, and that, as he was confident it would be supported by a majority of that House, he had little doubt that it would be sanctioned by the approbation of their constituents; but that, even were he persuaded it would be attended with some of the mischiefs which its opponents had predicted, he should still |
