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Mr. Winchester Hall sends us his pamphlet The bar of this city are to be congratulated on review of Mr. Carter's paper on Codification. It is the accession of Mr. Esek Cowen to their number, a thoughtful, candid and courteous production, and Mr. Cowen on the 1st of January will form a partperhaps even at this late day not wholly superfluous, nership with Mr. Matthew Hale and Mr. Alpheus although possibly liable to the charge of slaying the T. Bulkley. Mr. Cowen does wisely in coming here, slain and jumping on the dead. Mr. Carter bimself and will probably fully supply the place which was is a living and lively force, but his pamphlet in our held by the late Samuel Hand. We have expressed judgment has been so thoroughly exposed and con- our opinion of his talents in connection with his futed that it is as dead as Julius Cæsar. On the caudidacy for the Court of Appeals. His brethren subject of definitions Mr. Hall observes:
of the bar and our citizens generally will find bim from the experience of an active practice for many a man of the most excellent and agreeable personal years, that the definitions of the Louisiana Code qualities. His coming here will do much to supply were found to be one of the greatest difficulties in the losses which our bar has recently experienced administering it.' I affirm definitions are no more by death and judicial promotion, and will give us : necessary under written than unwritten law; that resident counsellor worthy to succeed to the mantle while accurate definitions are good under any system of Hill, Reynolds and Hand. of law they are not absolutely essential to any system, written or unwritten; and that when cer
A strong effort has been made to induce Governor tain elements are necessary to constitute a transac
Hill to commute the sentence of Mrs. Druse, now tion to which the law is to be applied, that transac
under sentence of death for killing her husband. tion may be defined by its elements, as in a sale,
It is urged that hanging women is barbarous, and the elements are the thing sold — the price and
that only two have ever been hanged in this State. the consent of the parties — a sale therefore may be Ordinarily this plea should have great weight, but defined. In like manner a bill of exchange may be
although hanging is not a ladylike death, Mrs. Druse defined because certain elements constitute it. The
did not slay her husband in a ladylike manner. On difficulty about definition, I apprehend, is that the contrary, the history of crime hardly shows a many attempt to define, but omit some one or more
parallel for the deliberate and fierdlike manner in of the elements constituting the thing or transac
which she killed the partner of her bosom and the tion, and the definition of course is incomplete as father of her children. Druse was unquestionably a if in the definition of murder one should omit the
very unpleasant character,—"a shiftless farmer, a expression with malice aforethought, express or
poor provider, often abusive to his family,” say the implied.' I maintain that whether the law is writ
Court of Appeals, and frequently quarreling with his ten or unwritten there will be necessarily contro
wife for contracting debts. He was a good man to versies concerning words, and that unwritten law is
leave. But Mrs. Druse's method was different. She prolific in controversies of this character. Taking
procured a revolver, with which and a rope and the it for granted the author makes this assertion in
help of a nephew, 14 years old, she despatched the good faith, one is forced to the conclusion he has
wretched man, and then she cut his head off, and Adjudged Words and Phrases,' by
with an axe chopped his body into small pieces and Winfield of the New Jersey bar, an octavo volume burned them, and the unconsumed portions she of perhaps 500 pages in which controversies respect- dumped into a swamp.
She even compelled her ing words and phrases bave been settled by various
daughter, 19 years old, to assist her in chopping up courts, chiefly under the unwritten law; nor has he
and burning the husband and father. She hid the heard of Lawson's Concordance of Words and
axe and revolver and telegraphed an inquiry for Phrases Construed, in the decisions of English and “ William." This is the woman who asks for American courts. Nor has he even heard of a
It should be observed that she did not dictionary of American and English law by Rapalje
testify on her own behalf, and her defense was not and Lawrence, in which there are citations of over
insanity, but self-defense. The sentimentality that 40,000 reported cases in which words and phrases would save the life of such a fiend is puling and have been judicially defined and construed. It is
morbid. We hope the Governor will disregard it true a portion of these citations are from the decis
and execute the law. Aside from the peculiar cirions of courts in States where the law is codified, cumstances of this case, we see no reason why a but the bulk of them doubtless are under unwritten
governor should ever be asked to save a criminal law.” We may add that Mr. Carter (as well as Mr.
from the gallows on account of sex.
If it is ordiHall) seems not to have heard of a little book of
narily barbarous to hang women let the legislature our own, entitled “The Judicial Interpretation of
interfere, nevertheless so long as we have a law Common Words and Phrases," made up from these
making no such distinctions, let us have it executed. columus. In the present number of this journal The bane of our institutions is unexecuted laws. may be found a solemn adjudication of the English court of appeal, reversing the decision below, that rats are not a “danger of the sea. And in
NOTES OF CASES. Mr. Carr's article on Wills may be found a review of decisions as to what is "the end of a N Horde v. Welch, New York City Court, General will."
Term, April, 1886, it was held that in deter
mining whether the conditional promise to pay, of and separate offenses, viz.: (1) Keeping open a a debtor residing in another State, is such shop, warehouse or work-house on the Lord's day; acknowledgment of the debt ay will remove the (2) doing any manner of labor, business, or work on bar of the statute of limitations of that note, the that day, except works of necessity or charity. construction of the statute by the courts of that Com. v. Has, 122 Mass. 40. Section 2, in that part State controls, rather than a contrary interpretation of it which is quoted, is in substance the same as by our courts of a similar statute in this State. those previously enacted under the province, and The court said: “This seems to us to be the since the acceptance of the Constitution. The exproper test to be applied and the fair interpretation ception in each statute, save that of 1760–61, folto be placed on the statute under examination, and lows the words, doing any manner of labor, busithe only one which can prevent an unseemly con- ness, or work,' and qualifies them. The phrase flict of construction between the courts of the two 'except works of necessity or charity,' has no States, a clash which every principle of State reference to the first offense of keeping open a comity seems to require us to avoid. The trial shop, warehouse or work-house, and qualifies only judge therefore properly directed a verdict in the second offense of doing any manner of labor, favor of the plaintiff, but he erred in setting it aside business, or work. Com. v. Nagle, 117 Mass. 142. and in directing judgment for the defendant. The The object of this statute, and of each of the preerror was caused by ignoring the construction ceding statutes, was to prohibit the opening of applied by the Iowa courts to their local statutes, shops and warehouses on the Lord's day, for the in Penley v. Waterhouse, 3 Iowa, 418; Bayliss v. purpose of the transaction of the ordinary business Street, 51 id. 627; Ayres v. Bane, 39 id. 518; and carried on during the week. Com. v. Collins, 2 by applying to that statute a different mode of Cush. 556. Keeping open a slop or work-house on interpretation which has been adopted in this the Lord's day, for the purpose of doing business State in reference to its own local statute of an with the public indiscriminately, is an offense in almost similar nature. The true rule to follow, in itself. The legislature intended by this statute to cases depending on the laws of a particular State, keep the ordinary places of traffic, business, and is to adopt the construction which the courts of work closed on this day, so that persons who dethat State have given to those laws. Angell Lim.
sired to relax from labor and business, and attend (6th ed.) 24; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152; to private and public worship, might not be disBell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 360; Leffingwell v. War- turbed by those who chose to pursue their worldly ren, 2 Black, 599. The reason for the rule is that business and vocations in open shop. This statthe courts of every State and country must be ute is substantially the same as that enacted in the presumed to be the best expositors of their own Statutes of 1791, chapter 58. The preamble to that laws and of the terms of contracts made with refer- statute sets forth at length the reasons of its pasence to them; and, as Judge Story observes: "No sage, and is applicable to the statute now in force, court professing to be governed by principle would as well as to the several laws enacted upon this assume the power to declare that a foreign court subject since that time. The complaint alleges that misunderstood the laws of their own country.' the defendant kept open his shop on the Lord's Story Conti. Law., § 277. Judge Swayne, in Lef- day, 'for the purpose of doing business therein, finguell v. Warren, supra, said: “The courts of the namely, cutting hair and shaving beards, the same United States
recognize the statutes of not being works of necessity or charity.' The oflimitations of the several States, and give them the fense is fully set out by omitting the words, the same construction and effect which are given by same not being works of necessity or charity.' the local tribunals.
The construction They can therefore be stricken out as surplusage, given to a statute of a State by the highest judicial and the complaint will be complete. We are not tribunal of such State is regarded as a part of the called upon to pass on the question whether it is a statute, and is as binding upon the courts of the work of necessity to cut hair and shave beards on United States as the text.''
the Lord's day. This question does not arise in the present case. We construe the statute to mean that
the law prohibits the keeping open a shop, wareIn Commonwealth v. Dexter, Massachusetts Su
house, or work-house, for the purpose of doing preme Judicial Court, Nov. 12, 1886, it was held
business therein, on the Lord's day; and that it is that under the statute it is an indictable offense to
immaterial what the business may be." keep open a shop on the Lord's day, for public business, without regard to the necessity of the business, and the conviction of a barber accordingly In Curtis V. Dinneen, Dakota Supreme Court, was affirmed. The court said: “The statute un- Oct. 4, 1886, it was held that a wife who keeps a der which this complaint was drawn is as follows: tavern is not responsible for an assault by her hus'Whoever, on the Lord's day, keeps open his shop, band upon a guest, without her approval, although warehouse or work-house, or does any manner of the husband was the servant of the wife in conductlabor, business, or work, except works of necessity ing the tavern. The court said: “It is claimed and charity.' Pub. Stat. 98, $ 2. This portion of the that the said defendant is liable because of her negsection provides for the punishment of two distinct ligence in having in her employ“ a rough, brutal,
passionate and ferocious servant,' 'to whom she in- husband, or liable to respond in damages therefor; trusted largely the care and conduct of her hotel or but on the other hand, there is much in such relainn," well knowing his disposition, and negli- tion opposed and repugnant to responsibility of gently suffered said rough, brutal, passionate and liability. The liability of the defendant must arise, ferocious servant to go at large in and about her if at all, from the relation of master and servant, or hotel or inn, intrusted by the defendant with the employer and employee, under the well-established care of said hotel, and of the guests, without being legal principles governing such relation with respect properly guarded or confined, well knowing his to the liability of the master. Section 1157 (Cir. vicious, ferocious and brutal propensities to strike Code), defines the terms master and servant,' and and beat mankind, and the guests of her house, says: 'A servant is one who is employed to render without provocation'; the complaint in this regard personal service to his employer otherwise than in being very much like one for keeping and allowing the pursuit of an independent calling, and who in to run at large a vicious and ferocious dog or other
such service remains entirely under the control and animal. The complaint charges the said defendant direction of the latter who is called his master.' with negligence in having and keeping in her em- It is doubtless good legal doctrine that a master is ploy a brutal, passionate and ferocious servant, and liable to answer in a civil action for the tortious or on the ground of this negligence, it is claimed that wrongful act of his servant if done in the course of the defendant is liable for the tort of such servant. his employment in his master's service, even though This allegation and charge in the complaint, and the master did not know of or authorize such act, claim of liability, necessarily implies the possession or may have disapproved of or forbidden it. The by the defendant of the right and power to employ act must be done in the execution of the authority the servant complained of, and also to control and given by the master, and in the pursuit of the confine him, as well as the right and power to dis- master's business, and must be within the scope of charge him; the real insistment being that she was the servant's employment, or unless it be ratified by guilty of negligence in keep!og said servant in her
the master, he (the master) will not be liable there. employ, knowing his disposition and propensity, for. Outside of the scope of bis employment the and that having kept him, and not discharged him, servant is a stranger to the master, and the master and having suffered him to run loose about the to the servant, so far as the liability of the one for premises, she is bound to respond in damages for the tort of the other is concerned. It is the relation his assault upon the plaintiff. But can the defend- of master and servant, and servant and master, that ant be made liable on this ground, which rests creates the liability, or from which it arises; and upon the relation of master and servant, and is sub- within the limits of that relation, the liability, by ject to the legal principles governing the said rela
reason of the very relation itself, has its birth, and tion, when we regard the admitted fact that the outside of those limits it can neither arise nor exist. relation of husband and wife existed between her The application of this principle is alike just to the and the person for whose tort as her servant it is | master, to the servant, and to third persons. It claimed she is responsible? It will not be con- must be admitted that not only in the cases cited by tended that the existence of the relation of master counsel for the respondent, but in all well-considand servant is all that is required to fix upon the ered cases determining the liability of a master for master liability for the wrongful act of his servant.
the tort of his servant, including also the cases havIn order to make one person liable for the act of ing reference to the liability of hotel proprietors or another as his servant the relation of master and innkeepers for the acts or torts of their servants or servant must exist between them, and the master employees, the liability has been based upon the must have control over the servant, and the right actual or implied existence of the relation of master and power to hire, direct and discharge him, and and servant, employer and employee, and the nature certainly, when the liability is claimed for negli and extent of such relation, and of the possession gence in keeping said servant in his employ, the by the master or employer of the control and direcright and power to order or compel the servant to tion of the servant or employee, including the right leave his employment and premises. Has a wife, and power not only to hire, but also to discharge under our Code, such control, direction, right or said servant or employee. And the extent of the power over her husband? I think not. And this liability of the master or employer is generally view is strengthened, in the case at bar, since so determined by the nature and limit of his control far as the evidence shows, the entire premises were over the servant or employee, and the calling or the homestead or dwelling of the husband and wife business of the master, in the prosecution of which (the defendant and her husband, the alleged ser- the servant is employed, and in the course of which vant); it not appearing that any particular rooms he acts for his master, and out of the course of or portions of the inn, hotel or boarding-house of which, unless by order of his master, he acts for the defendant were used as the dwelling or home | himself. However interesting then it would be of the defendant and her husband in contradistinc- to discuss the question whether or not the relation tion to the whole of said inn, hotel or boarding- of master and servant can actually or in law exist house. There is nothing in the relation of the hus- between husband and wife, or wife and husband, band and wife that would make the defendant in or whether or not the two relations of husband and this action responsible for the alleged act of her wife and master and servant can, at the same time,
exist between the same persons, and if they can
In the earlier ages this form of a last will, which was exist, the extent, nature, effect and qualifications of
almost uuiversally used, was made by a solemu deola
ration in the presence of witnesses, under prescribed their existence, such discussion is unnecessary in this
formalities, of the testator's intention, aud was called case; since even admitting that the relation of noncupative from the Latin verb noncupare, meaning master and servant existed between the said defend- to solemnly declare. However as civilization adant and her said husband, and that the husband was
vanced the art of writing became more widely posthe servant, and his wife the master, the remaining sessed, and owing to this fact, and the facility with
which spurious nonoupative wills bad been proved, essential element or requisite which must exist
the right to make the same was almost completely before the liability of the defendant could arise
abolished by the statute of frauds of 29 Charles II, ch. would be wanting, in that it does not appear, from 3, and still further limited by subsequent legislation, a careful and discriminating inspection of the testi- so that to-day noncupative wills can be made only by mony and the surroundings of the case, that the
soldiers in actual military service and marines wbile husband, M. J. Dinneen, when he committed the
at sea, and in every other case the “justa sententia "
of the civilian must be expressed in writing and in acassault and battery upon the plaintiff, was doing cordance with the various formalities by law prehis master's business, or executing his master's soribed. The terms “soldier in actual military serorder, or acting within the scope of his duty or vice” has been held to mean soldiers ou a military ex. authority as the servant of such master; but on the pedition, and to exclude those housed in barracks (3 contrary, it is plainly manifest, that granting that at
Curt. 522, 818), and the term “mariner wbile at sea
to mean superior officers and common senmen while the time he committed the act complained of, he was
absent from home on a voyage, even while the vessel in the employ, as her servant, of his wife as his master, is lying at a wbart or at anchor in a harbor (Hubthe assault and battery committed by him was neither bard v. Hubbard, 8 N. Y. 199; Ex parte Thompson, his wife's business, nor done by her order or consent,
4 Bradi. 154), in which cases many authorities on this nor ratified by her after its occurrence, nor was it subject will be found collated. No precise number of
witnesses are required (Ex parte Thompson, ut supra), within the actual or apparent scope of his duty or au
and no express declaration of the testator's intention thority as her servant. The injury inflicted by the said to make a will (Hubbard v. Hubbard, ut supra), though M. J. Dinneen upon the eye of the plaintiff was a part it seems that the testator must be in extremis, at least and the result of a personal altercation or quarrel | in fear of death. Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Jobns. 602; between said M. J. Dinneen and the plaintiff whom opinion by Chancellor Kent. Unwritten or noncupa
tive wills being restricted to the classes before menhe assaulted; and to hold his wife responsible in
tioned, the vast majority of people are obliged by law damages for his tort, as his master, under the cir
to make a written will, if any they make. Whether cumstances, would not be in accord with any prin- the right to make a will is a natural right or a mere ciple of law or equity, but a violation of well- political privilege, it is unnecessary to discuss at pressettled principles of both.”
ent. The various States have surrounded the execution of a last will with prescribed formalities, and their courts will not give effect to instruments in the
making or the execution of which the statutory reTHE FORMALITIES OF A LAST WILL.
quirements have been iguored.
What then does the law require of a last will in orN a former article on “Testamentary Capacity," an der to give it effect? The New York statute of wills,
inquiry was had into the circumstances attending and in this respect the statutes of many of our States, the right to make a last will and testament.
require, first, as has been said before, that such last How one, possessing such right, must proceed to will should be in writing. What kind or form of give it valid expression shall now be discussed. A “writing” the statuto does not declare. The word great civilian, Modestinus, bas defined a will thus: "writing" however is broad enough to include print“ Testamentum est voluntatis nostrae justa sententia de ing, type-writing, eto., and is used in contradistinceo, quod quis, post mortem suam, fieri velit,' which tion to “speaking." It was not the intention of the Blackstone translates as follows: "The legal declara- statute to require any thing further than a fixed, intion of a man's intentions which he wills to be per
delible and immutable form of testamentary expresformed after his death," and upon which definition ho
sion. Nor sball the phraseology of this “ ' writing" comments thus: “It is called sententia to denote the take any particular form. It will be enough if the ciroumspection and prudence with which it is sup
maker intends it as a will, it it furnishes evidences posed to be made; it is voluntatis nostrae sententia from which such intentiou may be inferred, and if its because its eficacy depends on its declaring the testa- provisions are of a testamentary character. Under tor's intentions, whence in England it is emphatically the earlier statutes, when the requisite formalities styled his will; it is justa sententia, that is drawn, at- were fewer, instruments assuming the form of a letter, tested and published with all due solemnities and or a deed, were held and construed to be a will, beforms of law; it is de eo quod quis post mortem suam cause a testamentary intention was juferred from fieri velit, because a testament is of no force till after their terms. Now however when the formalities are the death of the testator."
increased and the maker of an instrument required to One may express his ideas by either of two means, declare it as a will, the court reste upon his declaration orally or by writing, and so the law directs that a man
and considers the instrument, however expressed, as may declare his last will either by writing or by spoken
the intended will of the testator. words alone. When our modern civilization was in its The statute next requires that this instrument in infancy the art of writing was possessed but by few,
writing shall be signed by the testator at the "end" and consequently the law did not demand a written thereof. The testator's “mark" is a sufficient signainstrument where the same was either an impossibil
ture, and if the signing be done by a second person at ity or obtainable only at great expense and inconven
the testator's request, such aot will be held to be the ience. Hence we bave iuberited from medieval law signature of the testator on the principle of " qui facit what is known as an unwritten or noncupative will. per alium facit per se."
The words “end of the will” seem sufficiently clear, contended that as the whole instrument was read to and apparently could give rise to no doubt about the the testator in manner as if the completed clause premeaning. Yet what coustitutes the "end" of a will ceded this signature, and as the phraseology of both has given rise to much discussion. While the testator parts of the clause connected them both together, has a right to make a will in such form as he deems showing one to be but the continuation of the other, it proper, and may make it as ehort or as long, as simple should be held on the strength of Tonnele v. Hall
, the or as complex, as bis fancy dictates, yet the mere fact supra, that the remainder of the clause was to be of his signing it at any particular place, intending that deemed constructively inserted in the will at the point place to be the end of the will, does not make it so, for of connection, and that therefore the instrument was in determining the "end" of the will, not the testa. properly signed. The court however, refused to take tor's intention, but the intention of the statute, is to this view, in the following words: “It is not believed be considered, as is held by the decisions on this mat- that any paper or document containing testamentary ter.
provisions not authenticated according to the prorisIn the case of Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. ions of the statute of wills has yet been beld to be a 409, the question arose on the following facts: “The part of a valid testamentary disposition of property, testator, Kelly, drew up the will himself and signed it simply because it was referred to in the body of the in two places, once in the body of the will, in the will. It was held in Tounele v. Hall that a map appearmiddle of the last clause appointing his executors, and ing after the signature upon a will, *** and wbicb again at the beginuing of the attestation clause, as was referred to in the body of the will, did not require follows: "Subscribed by John Kelly." these words the signature of the testator and witnesses to follow it being written in his handwriting. The signatures of in order to make it a part of the will. It is to be obthe attesting witnesses however preceded, and did not served that the paper there in question was referred follow, the attestation clause. The will was drawii up to merely to identify the subject devised, and code by the testator himself, and though embodying his tained no testamentary provisions. It is further to be testamentary wishes, was awkwardly executed. Pro- observed, tho will in the case cited was complete with. bate was denied the instrument ou two grounds, viz., out such additions, and that the map could probably that it was not sigued at the “end thereof," and that have been used as evidence to identify the property it was not properly attested. The Court of Appeals, devised, even if no reference had been made thereto wbile sustaining the second objection, was called upon in the will." to decide on the first ground, it being claimed in sup- It will be observed that in the language tbus quoted port of the will that the first signature should be held the hitherto generally accepted doctrine in relation to a sufficient signing (and if this were so, the second ob- | incorporating extrinisio documents in the body of a jection would be baseless). It was urged that wher- will is repudiated, or at least doubted. As this docever the testator affixed his siguature, he intended to
trine did not come squarely before the court, the words make that place the end of his will, and his intention on the fourth page of the instrument not having been should govern. As there was no doubt that the in- explicitly referred to in the body of the will as a part of strument was the will of a competent and free testa. the instrument, it may be theu stated that Judge Ruger's tor, and as the law favored wills, his signature at that remarks are merely dicta - dicta however coucurred placo should be considered a substantial observance of in by the remainder of the court, and which may be the statute, even if all the matter following it were to taken as evidence of the light in which this doctrine be considered invalid. The court however did not in- is viewed by that body. Considering the rigid rules of cline to this view. It took a ground that may be execution hitherto held by the court, it may not be termed extremely techuical. Folger, J., in the opin- amiss to say that there is great probability that the ion reasons thus: “ Call we say that the end of a will doctrine referred to will be repudiated whenever tbe has been found until the last word of all the provis- same is fairly presented to the court as it is at present ious of it has been reached? To say that where the constituted. naine is, there is the end of the will, is not to observe
Younger v. Duffie, 95 N. Y. 535, is the latest case on the statute. That requires that where the end of the the question before considered. There the will was will is there shall be the name. It is to make a new executed in Spain, in accordance with the formalities law to say that where we find the name, there is the of that country. After all the testamentary clauses end of the will. The instrument offered is to be were completed an attestation clause followed, inter. scanned to learn where is the end of it as a completed vening between the body of the will and the signa• whole; at the end thus found, must the pame of the tures of the testator and the attesting witnesses. To testator be subscribed." Probate was refused.
the claim that the will was vot signed at the end The question arose again in the Matter of O'Neil, 91
thereof, the court, through Eurl, J., answered as folN. Y. 516, upon a state of facts as follows: The will was lows: “The purpose of the law which requires the drawn up and executed on a “printed blank,” and subscription to be at the end of the will is to prevent the blank space customary in such instruments being fraudulent additions to a will before or after its exenot large enough to coutain all the clauses of the will, rution, and the statute should be so construed as to which was almost completed, the remaining half of accomplish this purpose. What shall form part of the the last clause, conferring a power of sale, was contin- instrument which the testator intends as his will must ued over on the top of the fourth page. The testator be determined by him. It is true
that a however signed his name in the usual blank space left proper definition of a will is an instrument by which a for that purpose. The incomplete clause couferring persou makes a disposition of his property, to take power of sale on the executors was a suffoient expres- effect after his decease. But erery word contained in sion of such power and its continuation over on the the instrument may not relate to or bear uponi other page modified it but slightly, and in no material the disposition of property. It is not uncommon for respect. There was no doubt about the instrument the testator to recite in the will his religious faith and being the last will of a competent testator, and probate | hopes, etc., and to give directions concerning his bods. was refused on the sole ground that it was not signed and to make many declarations which bare no bearat the end thereof. Ruger, C. J., in his opinion, en- ing whatever upon the disposition of his property: ters into a son ewhat elaborate consideration of the and yet they are all part of the instrument which he question, citing many English authorities, and decid- intends as his will. Such matters and declarationis ing the point on the strength of Sisters of Charity v. are usually inserted at the commencement of the will, Kelly, ut supra. In support of the will however it was but they may as well bo placed after the disposing