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ment thus entered to the General Term. The defendants attorney noticed the appeal for argument, and also gave notice of a motion that he would move for an order dismissing the appeal, and that the cause be stricken from the calendar, and his judgment be affirmed, with costs, on the ground that no case had been made and served. The motion was opposed upon affidavits of plaintiff's attorney, that the decision, consisting of findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the judge presiding at the Special Term, had been filed with the clerk, but that a copy thereof had never been served upon him, and that thus plaintiff's time to serve a case had not expired. The General Term granted the motion dismissing the appeal with costs of motion, and ordered that the judgment be offirmed, with costs of appeal, unless within twenty days thereafter the appellant should apply to the Special Term for leave to make and serve a case on appeal, and that if such application should be granted, the appeal should not be dismissed, but the cause should go over the term and be argued at the next General Term. We are of opinion that the learned General Term misapprehended the practice. The notice of the entry of judgment which the defendant's attorney served upon the plaintiff's attorney limited the right to appeal to thirty days, under section 1351 of the Code, which provides that an appeal to the General Term "must be taken within thirty days after service upon the attorney for the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from, and a written notice of the entry thereof," and it had no other effect; and within the time limited the appeal was brought. The plaintiff was not obliged to prepare a case to be settled, as required by section 997 of the Code, but he could file exceptions under section 994 of the Code to the findings of the trial judge upon questions of law, and could have his appeal heard upon those exceptions without any case, as provided by section 998 of the Code. At the time plaintiff's appeal was dismissed at the General Term, the time for filing exceptions to the findings of law had not expired. According to section 994, those exceptions could be taken and filed any time before the expiration of ten days after service upon plaintiff's attorney of a copy of the decision of the court, and a written notice of the entry of judg ment thereupon. A copy of the decision has never been served upon plaintiff's attorney, and hence his time for filing exceptions to the filings of the judge has not been limited, and has not expired. The court at General Term therefore had no right to dismiss his appeal, conditionally or otherwise. The defendant must serve upon the plaintiff's attorney a copy of the decision of the court, and then, unless plaintiff's attorney files and serves his exceptions within the time limited by law, his appeal may be dismissed. Nor has the plaintiff's time to make a case been limited as required by rule 32 of the Supreme Court. That rule provides that if the trial is before the court or a referee a case may be made and a copy thereof served upon the opposite party, "within ten days after the service of a copy of the decision or report, and written notice of the entry of judgment thereon." It would therefore appear that at the time plaintiff's appeal was dismissed he was not in default for not filing his exceptions or making a case. Oct. 26, 1886. Schwartz v. Weber. Opinion by Earl, J.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

EVIDENCE-LIFE AND ANNUITY TABLES IN ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURY MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-In an action for personal injuries, while standard life and

annuity tables, showing, at any age, the probable duration of life and present value of a life annuity, are competent evidence, the rules derived therefrom are not the absolute guides of the judgment and conscience of the jury; and an instruction directing the jury to ascertain the loss of income by the use of such rules, the charge nowhere suggesting that the jury are at liberty to ascertain such loss according to their own judgment, is erroneous. In Phillips v. London & S. W. Ry. above cited, the judges strongly approved the usual practice of instructing the jury in general terms to award a fair and reasonable compensation, taking into consideration what the plaintiff's income would probably have been, how long it would have lasted, and all the contingencies to which it was liable; and as strongly deprecated undertaking to bind them by precise mathematical rules in deciding a question involving so many contingencies incapable of exact estimate or proof. See especially the opinions of Lord Justice Brett and Lord Justice Cotton as reported in 49 Law J. (Q. B.) 237, 238, and less fully in 5 C. P. Div. 291, 293. The natural, if not the necessary, effect of the peremptory instructions at the beginning and end of dealing with this matter would be to lead the jury to understand that they must accept the tables as affording the rule for the principal elements of their computation, and to create an impression on their minds, which would not be removed by the incidental observation of the judge, when speaking of the possibility of the plaintiff's getting well. "This is only one mode of arriving at it; " especially, as it was nowhere, throughout the charge, suggested to the jury that they would be at liberty, if they found difficulty in following the mathematical rules prescribed to them, to estimate the loss of income according to their own judgment. Life and annuity tables are framed upon the basis of the average duration of the lives of a great number of persons. But what the jury in this case had to consider was the probable duration of this plaintiff's life, and of the injury to his capacity to earn his livelihood. Upon the evidence before them, it was a controverted question whether that injury would be temporary or permanent. The instruction excepted to, either taken by itself or in connection with the whole charge, tended to mislead the jury, by obliging them to ascertain the average injury to the plaintiff's capacity by the year, whether the extent of that injury would be constant or varying, and by giving them to understand that the tables were not merely competent evidence of the average duration of human life, and of the present value of life annuities, but furnished absolute rules which the law required them to apply in estimating the probable duration of the plaintiff's life, and the extent of the injury which he had suffered. Oct. 25, 1886. Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Putnam. Opinion by Gray, J.

JURISDICTION-DISTRICT COURT UNITED STATESLIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF SHIP-OWNERS-PROHIBITION.-(1) The District Court of the United States cannot take jurisdiction in admiralty of a petition for limitation of liability under the Revised Statutes of the United States, where it would not have had cognizance in admiralty, originally of the cause of action involved. Nothing is clearer than that, by the express adjudication of this court, the District Court, as a court of admiralty, would have no jurisdiction of a suit, either in rem or in personam, by any one of the sufferers by the fire, to recover damages from the vessel or her owner. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20. As there is no foundation in the general admiralty jurisdiction of the District Court for its assumption of jurisdiction in this case, and uone in the special provisions of the statute for the limitation of liability, it is sought to uphold the jurisdiction under the rules in admiralty

promulgated by this court in reference to the limita tion of liability. The provisions of the Revised Statutes on the subject of the limitation of liability were taken from the act of March 3, 1851. 9 St. 635. There is nothing in that act, nor in the corresponding enactments in the Revised Statutes, in regard to the promulgation of any rules by this court for procedure in the matter. The rules it has made (Rules 54-57) are rules in admiralty, promulgated May 6, 1872. 13 Wall. xiii. They were announced as "supplementary rules of practice in admiralty under the act of March 3, 1851, entitled 'An act to limit the liability of ship-owners, aud for other purposes." " They are authoritatively embodied in, and numbered as part of the rules of practice for the courts of the United States in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, on the instance side of the court, in pursuance of the act of the twenty-third of August. 1842, chapter 188." The authority given to this court by the act of 1842 was in section 6 (5 St. 518). In view of the decision made by this court at December Term, 1865, in the case of The Plymouth, it is not to be presumed that the six of the judges upon the bench when it was made who were also upon the bench when the Rules of May 6, 1872, were promulgated, intended that those rules should contain any thing in conflict with the decision in the case of The Plymouth: nor are those rules capable of any such construction. There is nothing in any of these rules which purports to enlarge the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States as to subject-matter. On the contrary, they exclude any such construction, and leave that jurisdiction in admiralty within the bounds set for it by the Constitution and statutes, and the judicial decisions under them. There is nothing in these rules which sanctions the taking of jurisdiction by a District Court on a petition under the rules, where that court could not have had original cognizance in admiralty of a suit in rem or in per

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to recover for the loss or damage involved. Nor do we find any thing in any of the decisions of this court on the subject of the limitation of liability which supports the view that a District Court can take jurisdiction in admiralty of a petition for a limitation of liability where it would not have had cognizance in admiralty originally of the cause of action involved. In Norwich Co v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, the case which furnished the occasion for the making of the rules, and which came before this court again in The City of Norwich. 118 U. S. 468; S. C., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1150, the damage was occasioned by a collision on navigable water between two vessels, and a fire resulting from it on board of one of them. In all the other cases in which this court has upheld proceedings for limitation in a District Court. there was original admiralty jurisdiction of the cause of action Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239, the cause of damage was a collision on the high seas, and the petition for limitation was filed in the same District Court in which the offending vessel was libeled. In The Scotland. 105 U S. 25: S C., 118 U. S. 507. and 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1174, there was a like cause of action, and the limitation was claimed by an answer to a libel in personam in a District Court. In Ex parte Slayton, 105 U. S. 451, the petition for limitation was filed in a District Court. by the owner of a vessel which had foundered, to limit his liability for the loss of goods carried, and for damage to another vessel by a prior collision, he not having been first sued. He transferred to a trustee appointed by the court his interest in the vessel, and in the freight pending. See The Alpena, 10 Biss. 436. This court, being applied to for a writ of prohibition, refused to grant it. It held that the owner of a vessel may, before he is sued, institute appropriate proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain a limitation of liability; that the words "any court," in

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section 4284, mean any court of competent jurisdic tion;" and that as the transfer had been made, and the freight money paid over to the trustee, the District Court had jurisdiction to apportion the fund. But it is to be noted that the causes of action were in fact of admiralty jurisdiction. In Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Manuf'g Co., 109 U. S. 578; S. C., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379, 617, the cause of action was a loss, by the burning of a vessel, of goods carried by her. and the petition for limitation was filed in the District Court of the district where the fire occurred. and where the remnants of the vessel remained, and the contract of affreightment was of admiralty cognizance. In The Great Western. 118 U. S. 520, the cause of damage was a collision on the high seas, and the claim of limitation was made in the answer in a suit in person. am in a District Court in admiralty to recover for the damage. (2) It is contended that the mistake of the District Court must be corrected by appeal, and that the case is not one for a writ of prohibition. Where the case is within admiralty cognizance, the District Court may decide whether the party is entitled to the benefit of the statute, and a writ of prohibition will not lie. But where, as here, the tort is not a maritime tort, there can be no jurisdiction in the admiralty to determine the issue of liability, or that of limitation of liability. This court refused a writ of prohibition where a suit in rem was brought against a vessel, in admiralty, in a District Court, to enforce an alleged lien for wharfage, on the ground that a contract for the use of a wharf by a vessel was a maritime contract, and cognizable in the admiralty, and that as a lien arose in certain cases, the admiralty court was competent to decide in the given case whether there was a lien. Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68. So also a writ of prohibition was refused where a suit in admiralty was brought in a District Court to recover damages for the loss of life by a collision between two vessels, on the ground that damages from collision were within admiralty jurisdiction, and the admiralty court could therefore lawfully decide whether such damages embraced damages for the loss of life. Ex parte Gordon, 104 U. S. 515. But in the present case the District Court is called upon by the petition of the owner of the vessel, to first determine the question of any liability when it has no jurisdiction of the cause of action, and then to determine whether the statute cov. ers the case. The case is clearly one for a writ of prohibition. as the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings. U. S. v. Peters, 3 Dall. 121. Nov. 1, 1886. Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, N. I. Opinion by Bradley, J.

REMOVAL OF CAUSE-CONSPIRATORS TO DEFRAUDCOLLUSION - ESTOPPELSTIPULATION.-(1) The bill charged the defendants as co-conspirators in a scheme to raise a cloud on the title of the complainants, and to defraud them of their property. According to the allegations of the bill, the deed to Giles was a link in the chain of fraudulent acts charged. We have re peatedly held that a suit brought against several defendants, some of whom are citizens of the same State with the plaintiff, charging them all as joint contractors or joint trespassers, cannot be removed into the United States court by those who are citizens of another State. although they allege in their petition for removal that they are not jointly interested or liable with the other defendants, and that their controversy with the plaintiff is a separate one. We think that the present case is one of that kind. The bill, as we have said, charges the defendants jointly. Giles could not, by merely making contrary averments in his petition for removal, and setting up a case inconsistent with the allegations of the bill, segregate himself from the other defendants, and thus entitle himself to remove the

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case into the United States court. This matter has been fully considered in the following cases. Louisville & N. R Co. v. Ide, 114 U. S. 52; Farmington v. Pillsbury, id. 138; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 id. 41; Crump v. Thurber, id. 56; Starin v. New York, id. 248; Sloane v. Anderson, 117 id. 278; Ins. Co. v. Huntington, id. 280; Core v Vinal, id. 347; Mining Co. v. Canal Co., 118 d. 264. (2) But we are also satisfied that the other ground is well taken, that the deed to Giles was collusively made for the mere purpose of giving jurisdiction to the courts of the United States, and that for this reason the case should have been remanded to the State court. Of course where the interest of the nominal party is real, the fact that others are interested who are not necessary parties, and are not made parties, will not affect the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court; but when it is simulated and collusive, and created for the very purpose of giving jurisdiction, the court should not hesitate to apply the wholesome provisions of the law. Farmington v. Pittsburg, 114 U. S. 138. (3) It is contended by the appellees however that the decision of the judge in the case at law of Giles v. Owens, upon the plea in abatement in that case, in which the issue was whether the deed to Giles was collusively made for the purpose of bringing suit in the United States Court, concludes the appellants on that point. A stipulation was entered into between the parties in this case that the issue on said plea in abatement should be tried and that the decision thereon should be taken and entered of record as the decision upon the pleas filed in four other actions at law against other parties, and also of the issues in this suit as far as they are the same. All that this stipulation amounts to, so far as it affects this case, is that the trial and decision in the law case should be regarded as the decision in this. It is the same as if an issue had been directed by the Circuit Court, and a verdict had been rendered. The decision of the judge was adverse to the appellants and in favor of Giles; and so far as this case is concerned, that decision, by virtue of the stipulation, is to be considered as the decision of the Circuit Court, and nothing more. But all the evidence taken on that trial is incorporated into this case, and is now before us. If we are satisfied that the whole evidence in the case, taken together, including that before the judge, does not support the decision, we are not bound by it. Nov. 1, 1886. Little v. Giles. Opinion by Bradley, J.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-CHATTEL MORTGAGE ASSIGNING BOOK-ACCOUNTS - PREFERENCES AND ASSIGNMENT NOT ONE TRANSACTION.-(1) Executing chattel mortgages, and making an assignment of book-accounts by an insolvent firm, with the bona fide intention of securing particular creditors, does not operate as a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, but is a valid transaction for the purposes intended. (2) The execution of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors within an hour after executing instruments to secure particular creditors cannot be considered a part of the same transaction so as to make the whole operate as a general assignment, where it is shown that the general assignment was made because of the fear that the recording of the instruments first executed would cause the unsecured creditors to institute attachment suits. (3) An assignment of the book-accounts of a firm to a creditor at the suggestion of a third party having no authority from the creditor to act for him, and the delivery to such third party of the

assignment, and the books assigned, does not operate as an executed assignment, and will be defeated by a general assignment executed before the particular assignment comes into the hands of the creditor for whose benefit it was made. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 20, 1886. Gage v. Parry. Opinion by Reed, J.

IN

ATTORNEY-LIABILITY TO THIRD-OBEYING STRUCTIONS.-An attorney who simply obeys instructions of his client, and in obedience thereto communicates directions for the seizure of property, is not liable therefor. He need have neither belief nor suspicion that the defendant owns the property, nor need he seek information that would warrant a belief. He is simply a medium for the communication of his client's directions, and is required by his duty to make no inquiry in such a case as to the ownership of the property. The client assumes the responsibility of determining such question. The party injured by the levy suffers nothing from the individual act of the attorney. His act was done in the capacity of an agent, and amounted to nothing more than the communication of the client's direction to the officer serving the process. We answer the fourth question negatively. In support of these views, see the following cases: Lyon v. Tevis, 8 Iowa, 79; Paton v. Lancaster, 38 id. 494; Hardy v. Keeler, 56 Ill. 152; Cook v. Hopper, 23 Mich. 511; Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535; Schalk v. Kingsley, 42 N. J. L. 32; Hunter v. Burtis, 10 Wend. 358: Ford v. Williams, 13 N. Y. 577; S. C., 24 id. 359. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 29, 1886. Dawson v. Buford. Opinion by Beck, J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EX POST FACTO LAWSCHANGE OF PROCEDURE.—-Where the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense provided that juries should be the judges of the law, but which law was repealed before the trial, held, that it was competent for the Legislature to make such change, and no error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury in the language of the prior law. The procedure only has been changed. The degree of punishment, the character of the offense, and the rules of evidence, remain as under the former law. It may be observed.that the only change in the law is to provide another tribunal to pass upon the law of the case. Prior to the change, if the words in the former Code are to be taken at their full meaning and import, the jury were the judges as to the law of the case on trial. After the change the court sits in that capacity, and is the judge of the law. No vested right of plaintiff in error is affected. A new tribunal may be erected, or a new jurisdiction given to try him, and no right is abridged. Com. v. Phillips, 11 Pick. 28. In People v. Mortimer, 46 Cal. 114, it is said: "It is clear therefore that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered in requiring past offenses to be tried under new forms of procedure; and it is equally clear that if such of fenses are to be tried only under the old forms, and later offenses under the new, it would or might 'create endless confusion in legal proceedings.'' Cooley, in Constitutional Limitations (4th ed.), at page 331, says: "But so far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party has no more right in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies must always be under the control of the Legislature, and it would create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to be conducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and heard only by the courts in existence when its facts arose. The Legislature may abolish courts and create new ones, and it may prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its discretion, though it cannot lawfully, we think,

tween the parties to this controversy. Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1886. Seive v. Steinreide. Opinion by Pryor, C. J.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

THE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, Dec. 7, 1886:

Decision of board of claims reversed and a new

in so doing, dispense with any of those substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime." In 1 Bish. Crim. Proc., § 115, it is said: "It is a doctrine, extending through every department of the law, that rights, when vested in individuals, are unchangeable, while the remedies by which those rights are enforced may be varied from time to time at the pleasure of the Legislature. Now within this principle, the absolute rights of prisoners, especially the constitutional ones, in respect to their defense, cannot be taken away. But they can be modi-hearing ordered, costs to abide the event-J. Smith fied as to time, place and manner of their enforcement. Only the substance of them must be preserved. We therefore conclude that the law is not ex post facto and within the inhibition of the Constitution of the United States, or of this State, and that plaintiff in error has been deprived of no substantial right by the refusal of the trial court to instruct as requested. Neb. Sup. Ct., Oct. 27, 1886. Marion v. State. Opinion by Reese, J.

CONTRACT-COMPROMISE

AGREEMENT BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WIFE AS TO PROPERTY JOINTLY ACQUIRED CLAIM OF NEXT-OF-KIN.-Where husband and wife,natives ofGermany, by their equal labor and thrift, accumulate property in real estate, and the husband deeds it to the wife, and on her death, never having had children, her lands to go to her next-of-kin, who lives in Germany, and who upon demanding the lands of the husband, are met by his statement that there was an agreement between him and his wife that the property should go to the survivor of them, to be by said survivor devised equally among the relatives of each, and the parties finally settled by deeding a moiety to each other, this settlement, in the absence, of any overreaching by the husband, will be upheld. It is manifest that the appellants knew their rights, and had prepared to enforce them when the compromise was effected. The appellee was claiming that the wife held this property in trust, to pass to him as the survivor, and whether this fact existed, or could have been established, it is not necessary to inquire. It is sufficient that this was the character of his claim to property-the results of the labor of a life-time on his part-that he may have inadvertently conveyed to his wife without securing to himself any interest, in the event he survived her. The execution of the deed under the circumstances must strike the mind of the chancellor as remarkable, in the absence of some understanding between the husband and the wife as to the nature of the husband's title. in the event the latter should survive her. If he made this deed without some such agreement, the presumption is much stronger that he did it in ignorance of his rights than that these appellants, from the facts before us, entered into this compromise with the nature of their interest concealed from them by the appellee. There was certainly a high moral obligation on these appellants to make some provision for the appellee. The result of the thrift, labor and economy on the part of the appellee, that enabled him to accumulate this estate, had all gone into the pockets of the appellants without any valuable consideration whatever, and there the conveyance of the one-half of his property to him was but an act of justice, and we might add duty, on the part of the appellants, excluding from the controversy any consideration of the impending litigation between the parties. Here however was a fair and just compromise of the right of property asserted by the one party and denied by the other, with no certainty as to what would have been the final result of a law-suit; and a court of equity, being always ready to aid in enforcing family settlements based upon a just and fair compromise, will not hesitate to further consummate, by its judgment, this just settlement be

McMaster, applt., v. State of New York, respt.Judgment affirmed with costs-Leopold Wise et. al. applts., v. Andrew W. Morgan, respt; In re Will of James Dennin, deceased. Mary Renihan, applt., v. Martha A. Dennin et al. respt.: Stephen Brown, exr.. respt., v. George M. Crippen, applt.; Lewis Roberts, respt., v. Edward B. Cobb,exr.,applt.; Bridget Cooper, admrx., respt., v. Central Stock Yard, etc., Co., applt.

-Judgment affirmed-People, respt., v. Helen McCallam, applt.-Order of General Term affirmed, with costs-Charles Schwartz et al. applts., v. William K. Soutter, et al. respts.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event Eugene A. Brewster, exr.. applt.. v. Spencer Carnes, impld.. respt.; Agnes E. Abel, exrx., applt., v. D. & H. Canal Co., respt.; George W. Conselyea, et al. respts., v. Francis Swift, applt.-Order of General Term reversed; judgment of Special Term affirmed without Hoisch, respt.costs-Isaac L. Kip et al. admr.. applts. v. Edward ple ex rel. Mary R. Brush, et al.. respts., v. John R. -Appeal dismissed with costs-PeoBrown, applt.- -Motion for reargument. Ordered. lows: Judgment modified by declaring that the same that the remittitur be amended so as to read as fol founded on the contract of August, 13, 1875, and as so is without prejudice to any action or proceeding modified, judgment affirmed with costs-Munson v. Syracuse and Corning R. Co. (Magee).-Motion for reargument denied-Sweet v. Morrison.

NOTES.

Lawyers in trouble-the "Coke operators" in Pittsburgh.

The Boston Advertiser man says. "Judge Holmes' oration was punctuated with hearty applause.' He means the applause stopped it.

We ought to have had the following to append to our recent remarks on Mr. Conkling s defense of betting: The leading lawyers of Nashville have subscribed $1,000 for a stake to be run at the Nashville spring meeting. It will be known as the lawyers stake for three-year-olds, one mile and a sixteenth.

་་

Some ten years ago a young lawyer made his debut at the Troy bar. in the defense of a criminal, at a session presided over by the late Judge H. The writer sald to the judge: "I understand young So-and-So produced a very good impression." Why, y-e-s," drawled the judge, who was a great stickler for forensic etiquette, "but he had one habit that annoyed me very much. He had a lemon, and was continually sucking it. I didn't like the looks of it, but I didn't want to hurt the young man's feelings by a public reprimand, and so I addressed him a little note, intimating that unless the lemon was essential to his health, it would be more in accordance with the received etiquette of courts to desist from the exercise, or postpone it until recess. The lemon disappeared; but they told me afterward, " continued the judge with a grin and an indescribable squeal, "that it contained w-h-i-s-k-e-y.”

The Albany Law Journal.

THE

ALBANY, DECEMBER 18, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HE Ohio Weekly Law Bulletin says of the first trial in the boodle aldermen cases: "The jury that sat upon his case in the first trial threw out the testimony of Fullgraff and Duffy, because they were self-confessed accomplices in the crime. This is the dangerous process advocated by the defense in the Columbus trials for the tally-sheet forgery. It strikes deeply at the very foundations of the administration of justice, and if it were once to be recognized by the courts, would put an end to all subsequent trials for bribery, election frauds and other similar crimes. These crimes are never committed in the presence of honorable men who are opposed to them. If brought to light at all it must be through the evidence of one or more of the participants, and the rule is that such evidence, if sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of others or by circumstances, is as strong as any upon which justice ever relies. If crime of this kind is only to be established on the testimony of nonparticipants who saw it perpetrated, then it might as well be understood at once that crimes against the public safety and in violation of official duty may be committed with impunity, and a large proportion of the most atrocious crimes against life or property would have to go unpunished where conviction cannot be brought about except on the confession of accomplices." This is very sound sense. There is nothing inherently improbable in the story of Duffy and Fullgraff. On the contrary almost everybody believes it to be true. McQuade himself does not take the stand to deny it. Why then should a jury refuse to give it credit? It is true that the accomplice witnesses confess their own guilt and their own repeated perjuries, but a court would not hesitate to convict them on their own plea of guilty, and we see no reason why their accomplices should not be convicted on their uncontradicted testimony. If these scoundrels are not punished the city of New York may as well go to the dogs.

The mental back of "our own and only Sherwood, J.," of Missouri, seems to have assumed the form of a permanent water-shed. Here is one of his last deliverances, in 87 Missouri Reports: "Regarding the majority opinion in respect of the inadmissibility of the deposition of Mrs. Way, as radically wrong, at war with reason, precedent and one of the plainest and most fundamental rules of evidence, I dissent." This is all superfluous except the last two words. If a man cannot convince his fellows by reasoning he cannot by denunciation. Such language simply hardens the eleven obstinate jurymen.

VOL. 34-No. 25.

Mr. Banks has been awarded the contract for publishing the reports of the New York Court of Appeals by virtue of not being the lowest responsible bidder. His bid was for volumes over the counter, 98 cents; for volumes otherwise delivered, $1.10. The bid of Weed, Parsons & Co. for the same was $1 and $1.05 respectively, or three cents cheaper in the aggregate. Inasmuch as the bulk of the volumes are not delivered over the counter the latter bid must be esteemed much the lower. Perhaps Mr. Sickels will now arise and explain the mystery which seemed to him and others so great when the contract was last awarded. Now that Mr. Banks has got the contract at a living price, it is to be hoped that he will conform to its requirements in spirit as well as in letter, and generously throw in paper and twine when he sells a single volume, and not exact the precise change, etc., and thus confirm the intense love and respect in which he is held by the legal profession of this State.

The industry and ingenuity of counsel are strikPresident, etc., of D. & H. Canal Co., recently deingly illustrated in Mr. Moak's brief in Abel v. cided in our Court of Appeals, where he succeeded in establishing the proposition that railroad companies are bound to establish reasonable rules for Mr. Moak fortifies and illustrates this position by the action of their employees toward co-employees. some six pages of extracts from Dredge's History of Pennsylvania Railroads, Kirkman's Railway Service, and Huntington's Road Master's Assistant.

We were pained to see in the columns of the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle some very intemperate and unfounded abuse of the Lord Chief Justice of England in connection with his recent family difficulties. The editor is a person for whom we have the highest esteem, but when he essays to write on a subject with which he cannot possibly have the slightest acquaintance he naturally makes mistakes. It will be seen from the extracts in our columns that the jury have absolved Lord Coleridge from blame, and that the influential law journals of London approve the verdict. We long since formed our own opinion in the matter-partly from direct information

that the Lord Chief Justice is quite incapable of wronging his child, and that he has an eccentric and erratic daughter and an adventurous and scheming son-in-law. Lord Coleridge deserves the respect and admiration of all Americans not only for his personal conduct when he was here, but for his long and unswerving friendship for our country in times of trial as well as in times of peace. There is nothing to be gained among fair-minded republicans by railing at him as an unnatural father and hard-hearted aristocrat. Such abuse is very cheap and vulgar, and utterly unworthy the scholarly and accomplished editor of the Democrat and Chronicle. Probably it was the work of some indiscreet and hot-headed young writer who will know better when he knows more.

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