crush it, but had failed. Slocum manifested a signal ability in meeting the onset, and prompt reinforcements defeated the purpose of the foe. Slocum's wing deserves the credit of having alone borne and resisted the burst of the rebel assault.

Leaving his commanders to bury the dead, Sherman went to Coxe's Bridge, met General Terry, and on the 22d rode into Goldsboro, where Schofield and his army received him with enthusiastic greetings.

The left wing went in the same day and the following morning, and the right on the 24th. The veterans who separated at Atlanta were again together. The third grand station on Sherman's march was attained. Atlanta-Savannah-Goldsboro.

Says Major Nichols: "When our columns pushed up from the sea coast, Beauregard's strongest line of defence was the Salkahatchie; but his earliest steps were fatal to his cause, and insured the success of our movement toward our first objective-Columbia— if not the final triumph of our campaign. Beauregard committed the gross error of attempting to defend cities which possessed no strategic value, neglecting, or having been ignorant of the truth, that the surest road to a successful system of defense was the concentration of all his forces upon the line of the Salkahatchie, and the abandonment of Charleston, Augusta and all other garrisoned places. Although it would have been no easy task, we will suppose that Sherman had out-flanked and forced this line. By moving upon converging lines the rebel leader could always have had the choice of a central position, which he could have occupied sooner than our army, obliged as it was, to cross the river encumbered with trains. Such a point was Branchville on our right, another was Augusta on our left. The advantage of either of these positions would have been, that if our objective had been Charleston, with the rebel army at Branchville, even though we had succeeded subsequently in crossing the Edisto, the enemy would have been in our front or flank. Had Augusta been our objective, the enemy could have thrown a dangerous force in our rear. Again if Beauregard had fallen back to Augusta, and our objective had been either that place or Charleston, the same logic would have held good. The rebel army would have been as near Columbia as ours with greater facilities for reaching the capital before us, had we marched in that direction."

Colonel Bowman says, "The failure to defend Columbia was the turning-point of the campaign, and necessarily involved its loss, since it enabled Sherman to move either upon Charlotte or Fayetteville, at his pleasure, and compelled Johnston to sacrifice one of these lines to the defence of the other. In like manner, the inability to cripple Sherman's army in detail, and thus prevent his occupation of Goldsboro, carried with it the impossibility of preventing his juncture with the Army of the Potomac. For should Johnston attempt to oppose Sherman in his progress to the Roanoke, on the Weldon road, he must necessarily expose himself to the danger of having his right turned, and being compelled to fight a battle between the Neuse and the Roanoke, with his back to the sea. Should he`retire behind the Roanoke, to dispute its passage, his rear would be at the mercy of Grant, and with a large river and a powerful enemy in his front, he must then choose whether to abandon the uttempt, or submit to be hemmed in without supplies. Again, if Johnston should decide to refuse his left, and retire on Raleigh or the south bank of the Neuse, he would, by that very act, abandon all hope of being able to restrain the accomplishment of his adversary's purpose. The last alternative, though ineffectual to oppose Sherman, was the best of the three, being the only one that did not point to immediate destruction, and it was the one which General Johnston promptly and very properly adopted."

General Sherman consulted briefly with Schofield and Terry, and went by railway to Morehead City, and thence by steamer to City Point, where he met the President of the United States, with Generals Grant and Meade. There were men whose fame was spreading throughout the world, and the two first in rank were from the single state of Illinois! There was much for these men to say, but it was speedily said, and Sherman was again in Goldsboro on the 30th.

On the 24th, he issued the orders for re-organizing his grand army, and furnishing it suitable supplies, as follows:

I. Major-General Schofield was to organize an army equivalent to two corps, or five divisions, to be called the Center, to be posted to hold Goldsboro, and cover the railway back to Wilmington and Morehead City, and aid the railroad department, with details to finish and equip in the shortest time, the two roads, so as to be fitted for the service.

II. Colonel W. W. Wright, of the Railway Department, was to use extraordinary efforts night and day, for the completion of the two roads, “and to equip them to the capacity of three hundred tons per day of freight." Various directions were given as to the amount and kinds of stores to be shipped, and the work was portioned among several specified corps.

III. The Chief Quartermaster and Commissary were ordered to Goldsboro to superintend forwarding supplies.

IV. The right wing of the army will group to the front and right of Goldsboro, looking north; the left wing in front and left of Goldsboro; the center to Goldsboro, with detachments to cover the railroads, to the rear. The cavalry will be posted at or near Mount Olive Station. All will send foraging parties into the country, being careful to have them strong enough and well guarded.

The left wing, under Slocum, assumed the title of "The Army of Georgia," and Major-General Mower succeeded Williams in command of the 20th. Howard's retained its glorious and historic name, "The Army of the Tennessee," and was still composed of the proven 15th, under Logan, and 17th, under Blair.

Sherman reported to Grant that the 10th of April would be the earliest date at which he could advance. The railroads were put in order, but, as usual, somebody must blunder, and some one sent rolling-stock of the wrong gauge, restricting transportation to such as had been picked up in North Carolina, at Wilmington and Goldsboro. However, the best use was made of it, the men were supplied with clothing and sufficient forage collected, to justify the movement at the time specified.

On the 5th the General issued orders as follows:

"The next grand objective is to place this army, with its full equipment, north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base of supplies at Norfolk, and at Wynton or Murfreesboro, on the Chowan, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac, about Petersburg, and also to do the enemy as much harm as possible en

route.

"I. To accomplish this result, the following general plan will be followed, or modified only by written orders from these headquar ters, should events require a change:

"1. On Monday, the 10th of April, all preparations are presumed to be completed, and the outlaying detachments will be called in, or given directions to meet on the next march. All preparations will also be completed to place the railway stock back of Kinston on the one road, and below the northeast branch on the other.

"2. On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their lines of march, say about seven miles, and close up.

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"3. On Wednesday, the march will begin in earnest, and will be kept up at the rate of, say, about twelve miles a day, or according to the amount of resistance. All the columns will dress to the left, which is the exposed flank, and commanders will study always to find roads, by which they can, if necessary, perform a general left wheel, the wagons to be escorted on to some place of security on the direct line of march.

"Foraging and other details, may continue as heretofore, only more caution and prudence should be observed, and foragers should not go in advance of the advance guard, but look more to our right rear for corn, bacon and meal.

"II. The left wing, Major-General Slocum commanding, will aim straight for the railway bridge near Smithfield, thence along up the Neuse River to the railway bridge over Neuse River, northeast of Raleigh (Powell's), thence to Warrenton, the general point of concentration. The center, Major-General Schofield commanding, will move to Whitley's Mill, ready to support the left, until it is past Smithfield, when it will follow up, substantially, Little River to Rolesville, ready at all times to march to the support of the left, after passing Tar River, en route to Warrenton.

"The right wing, Major-General Howard commanding, preceded by the cavalry, will move rapidly over Pikeville and Folk's bridge ready to make a junction with the other armies in case the enemy offers battle this side of Neuse River about Smithfield, thence, in case of no serious opposition on the left, will work up towards Earpsboro Andrew's Bridge and Warrenton.

"The cavalry, General Kilpatrick, commanding, leaving its incumbrances with the right wing, will push, as though straight for Weldon, until the enemy is across Tar River and that bridge burned, then it will deflect towards Nashville and Warrenton, keeping up a general communication with general headquarters.

"III. As soon as the army starts the chief quartermaster and commissary will prepare a supply of stores at some point in Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, ready to be conveyed to Kinston, or Wynton and Murfreesboro, according to developments. As soon as they have satisfactory information that the army is north of the Roanoke they will forthwith establish a depot at Wynton with a sub-depot at Murfreesboro.

"Major-General Schofield will hold, as heretofore, Wilmington, with the bridge across Northeast Branch as an outpost, Newbern and Kinston as its outpost, and will be prepared to hold Wynton and Murfreesboro as soon as the time arrives for that move. The navy

has instructions from Admiral Porter to co-operate, and any commanding officer is authorized to call on the navy for assistance and co-operation, always in writing, setting forth the reasons, of which, of necessity, the naval commander is the judge.

"IV. The General-in-chief will be with the center, habitually, but may in person shift to either when his presence may be needed, leaving a staff-officer to receive reports. He requires absolutely a report of each army or grand detachment each night, whether anything material has occurred or not: often the absence of an enemy is a very important fact in military prognostication."