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has paid the whole debt may still serve further to elucidate our conception of the true rule. He says very correctly that the liability inter sese does not depend upon any covenant or contract between themselves. Their sole expressed contract is to pay the obligee. But suppose that in the bond there was inserted an express covenant running not to the obligee but to each other to bear respectively one-half of the debt. In such a case their mutual liability would dependent-had done it to indulge in his own malevolence
against his directions. A master is liable for the acts of his servant, done within the scope of his authority, although the servant disobeyed instructions. The former is only shielded from liability when the latter steps outside his general duty, and does an act to subserve his own interest or gratify his passions. If the herder in this case had driven the sheep upon the respondent's land to vex, annoy and harass the respond
upon no equitable doctrine but be fixed by an express covenant, which would by itself sustain and support the right of action. The covenant here is of that character. It is not one running to the creditors, as is the covenant of the ordinary bond, but one running to each other, and establishing their rights and duties as between themselves. June 1, 1886. Dwinelle v. Edey. Opinion by Finch, J. [12 Daly, 253, affirmed.]
the appellant would not have been liable, unless he was privy to the act; but if he did it to advance the appellant's interest-did it to enable the sheep to thrive, and thereby gain an advantage to the appellaut-the latter would be liable, although the act was willful. It is said to be a universal rule that whether the act of the servant be of omission or commissionwhether his negligence, fraud, deceit or perhaps even willful misconduct, occasion the injury-so long as it be done in the course and scope of their employment, his master is responsible is damages to third persons. And it makes no difference that the master did not give special orders; that he did not authorize, or even know, of the servant's act or neglect; for even though he disapproved or forbade it, so long as the act was done in the course of the servant's employment he is none the less liable. Schouler Dom. Rel., § 637. And in Shearman & Redfield on Negligence it is said that "there is no such rule of law as that the master is not liable for the willful and wrongful acts of his servants, though such a doctrine has often been propounded in judicial opinions. There are many cases in which a master must be held liable for such acts, and there are numerous decisions holding him so liable, which commend themselves to every man's sense of justice. The true ground upon which a master avoids liability for most of the willful acts of his servants, when unauthorized by him, is that they are not done in the course of the servant's employment. When they are so done the master is liable for them." § 65. The herder in this case had charge of the sheep. It was his duty to keep them off the respondent's land, and whether he negligently or willfully violated it, cannot, it seems to me, shield the appellant from liability for the damages done the respondent, so long as the act was within the course of the herder's employment. If he was the appellant's servant while doing the act, the latter is responsible; but if he were a principal in the transaction-were his own master, were doing the act upon his own responsibility, and to accomplish private ends-he alone is liable. The question to be determined in such cases is whether the party committing the act was in fact a servant, or was a principal in the affair. The rule of respondeat superior is appli cable, and if the servant transcends the bounds of his authority he becomes pro hac vice the superior, and the only one that can be made to respond to the injured party. I distinguish between the willful doing of an act in such case and doing of it maliciously. The former may imply that it was done through stubbornness and obstinacy, but not necessarily for any ulterior purpose, while the latter implies that it was done with an intent to injure. The one exhibits a set purpose to do the thing itself; the other to do it in order to gratify hatred or ill-feeling. It was the appellant's duty to keep his sheep off the respondent's land. He was notified to do so, and if he employed ineffectual means to do it he should be responsible unless he were prevented by means over which he had no control. The herder may have acted willfully in the matter, but so long as he kept within the limit of his employment
the appellant was answerable for his acts. Whart. Neg., 171. Whether the herder was pursuing the course of his employment or not, when he permitted the sheep to eat off the respondent's grass, was a question for the jury. Their finding that he acted will
ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE-
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-PART OF GOODS NOT KNOWN. Where a party feloniously took a coat which contained a watch in the pocket, of which he claimed not to be aware at the time of the taking, but which he appropriated, held, that he was liable for all the property taken by him. Neb. Sup. Ct., May 17. 1886. Stevens v. State. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-CHANGES IN BUILDING BY TENANT-WASTE.-The contention of the plaintiff is that a tenant, whether rightfully in possession or not, cannot, without the consent of the landlord, make material changes or alterations in a building to suit his taste or convenience, and if he does it is waste. The law is undoubtedly so settled. "Any material change in the nature and character of the buildings, made by the tenant, is waste, although the value of the property should be enhanced by the alteration." Kidd v. Dennison, 6 Barb. 13; Douglass v. Wiggins, 1 Johns. Ch. 435; Story Eq. Jur., § 913; Will. Eq. Jur. 373. In Jackson v. Andrew, 18 Johns. 434, the court say "that a tenant cannot, under the pretense of advantage to the reversioner, change the nature of the buildings; and many cases show that such changes, though beneficial, would be waste." "The ground on which alterations in demised premises, not prejudicial to the value of the property, have been declared waste, is that they change the identity of the estate." Will. Eq. Jur., supra. "If a tenant makes any essential change in a dwelling he is liable in waste. Thus if he takes down a partition and makes two rooms into one, or if he sets up a permanent partition, and makes one room into two, it is waste." Wood Landl. & Ten. 704 "A landlord need not wait until waste is actually committed; for if he ascertains that the tenant is about to commit any act which would operate as a permanent injury to the estate the court will interfere and restrain him from doing such act; and whether he begins or threatens or shows an intention to commit waste, an injunction will be granted." Tayl. Landl. & Ten., § 691; Poertner v. Russel, 33 Wis. 193. Wis. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886. Brock v. Dole. Opinion by Cole, C. J.
MASTER AND SERVANT-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.The master is liable for the act of his herder in allowing sheep to trespass upon the lands of another land-owner, even though the herder has been expressly directed to keep the sheep off such lands. We do not agree with the counsel that the appellant was not liable for his sheep having trespassed upon the respondent's land, if his herder willfully allowed it
fully in regard to the matter would not have been sufficient unless they should also find that he was acting to subserve a private end. Rounds v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129; Whart. Neg., supra. Oreg. Sup. Ct., May 17, 1886. French v. Creswell. Opinion by Thayer, J.
-An employee who engages in the service of a railway company in the running of its trains is presumed to do so with a knowledge of the dangers incident to such service, and he assumes the risks of its ordinary hazards. An employer is not bound to furnish for his workmen the safest machinery, nor to provide the best methods for its operation in order to save himself from responsibility from accidents resulting from its use. If the machinery be of an ordinary character and in sound repair, and such as can with reasonable care be used without danger to the employee, this is all that is required. When the court instructed the jury for the plaintiff that the law requires a railroad company to use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in providing and maintaining reasonably safe structures, tracks, side tracks, switches, turnouts, etc., and if it fails to do so, and an injury happen in consequence thereof to an employee in the exercise of due and reasonable care, then the railroad company would be liable, the jury must have understood from the instruction that the railroad company was absolutely required to use blocks in its switches aud turn-outs. There was no other negligence charged in the declaration to which this instruction could refer. Had it been proven that an unblocked switch or turnout was unsuitable or unsafe, or that defendant had not used proper care and skill in constructing its turnout or switch at Bureau Junction, a different question might be presented; but such was not the case. It is apparent from the evidence that unblocked switches have been in use on the various railroads all over the country for years, and it is a fair inference from the evidence that the blocking of switches is yet but an experiment. The invention is yet in its infancy. At al! events the utmost that can be claimed for the new appliance is that where blocks are used it may be safer for the employee than where the switch is constructed according to the old plan. Conceding this to be true, as we have seen from the authorities cited, the failure to use the new device does not render the company liable. It must appear before the defendant can be held liable that the switch or turn-out, as constructed and used, was not reasonably safe, or that it was not constructed with the usual care and skill. An employer is not required to change his machinery in order to apply or adopt any new invention. Whart. Neg. 213. The fact that a few of the railroads of the country have adopted the new device, or that the defendent has used it on a part of its road, is not enough to establish its utility, and establish negligence in every other road that adheres to the old system. The old system of constructing switches must be condemned; it must appear that unblocked switches are unfit for the purpose for which they are constructed. It is not enough to prove that in the opinion of witnesses blocked switches are safer for the employee, as the law does not require the lawyer to furnish absolutely safe machinery, or the most approved pattern; he is only required to furnish that which is shown to be reasonably safe and proper for the purpose for which it is constructed. Ill. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Londergan. Opinion by Craig, J.; Mulkey, C. J., Shope and Magruder, JJ., dissenting.
tled to recover it must be shown that the defendants knew, or ought to have known, of the dangerous condition of the oven, and that the plaintiff did not know or could not reasonably be held to have known of the defect, if such it was, which led to the injury. Knowledge on the part of the defendants, or such lack of it as would render them culpably liable, and ignorance on the part of the plaintiff of the alleged danger of defect, are essential prerequisites to the maintenance of this action. Beach Contrib. Neg., § 123; Shearm. & Redf. Neg., § 99. Thus in the recent case of Griffiths v. London & St. Katharine Docks Co., 12 Q. B. Div. 495, afterward affirmed in the High Court of Appeal, 13 id. 259, the plaintiff at the time of the accident was in the employment of the defendant company, when one of the large iron doors upon the defendant's premises, where the plaintiff was at work, suddenly gave way and fell upon the plaintiff; the court here say: "If the master employs a servant to do work for him, not knowing of any special or latent danger in the work, the servant takes the consequences of any danger there may be in it. The master does not mislead the servant, but only avails himself of his voluntary service. On the other hand, if the master knows of danger which the servant does not, it is clearly the duty of the master to communicate his knowledge of the danger to the servant. If the master requires the servant to do something out of the ordinary course of his employment, and dangerous, the servant may disobey him. It is clearly the duty of the master to communicate a danger which he knows and which the servant does not. It is necessary to allege that the servant does not know of the danger, because if the servant knows of the danger, and does the act which may and does cause injury to him, he has nothing to complain of, and cannot bring an action for the damage sustained." Welfare v. Brighton Ry. Co., L. R., 4 Q. B. Div. 696; Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1; Indianapolis R. Co. v. Love, 10 Ind. 554; Wright v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 566; Hayden v. Smithville Manuf. Co., 29 Conn. 548; Buzzell v. Laconia Manuf. Co., 48 Me. 113; Hull v. Hall, 78 id.; S. C., 4 East. Rep. 395. Me. Sup. Ct., May 17, 1886. Nason v. West. Opinion by Foster, J.
NEGLIGENCE-NOTICE OF INJURY-CONDITION PRECEDENT.--A horse railroad company was required by its charter to grade and keep in repair the surface of the street for a space not less than two feet in width on each side of each rail. Held, that where an injury was caused by the defective condition of such part of the street the company was entitled, before being liable to a suit, to written notice of the injury under the statute (Session Laws of 1883, p. 283), which provides that no action for an injury from a defective highway shall be maintained against any town, city, corporation or borough unless written notice of such injury and of its nature and the place of its occurrence shall be given within sixty days. The complaint we must treat as a complaint founded upon the statutory liability of the defendant, and before the plaintiff can enforce its provisions against the defendant he must perform his own duty under it; he must give the written notice prescribed; and the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to his right to maintain the action. This has been so often and so recently decided that it needs no further consideration. Hoyle v. Town of Putnam, 46 Conn. 61; Shaw v. City of Waterbury, id. 266; Cloughnessey v. City of Waterbury, 51 id. 405; Wall v. Toomey, 52 id. 35. Conn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 12, 1886. Fields v. Hartford, etc., Horse R. Co. Opinion by Granger, J.
WATER AND WATER-COURSE-RIPARIAN OWNERGRANT FROM UNITED STATES -TITLE TO BED OF STREAM-PRESUMPTION.-The owner of the bank of a
navigable stream by purchase from the Uuited States is presumed to be the owner of the bed of the stream in front of his purchase to the middle or thread thereof, and the same presumption arises in favor of the owner of such bank in all cases, however such owner acquires his title; but the presumption in the case of owners not deriving their title directly from the government is not conclusive. The owner of lands bordering upon a navigable stream, and of the bed of the stream in frout of the lands, may separate the ownership of the lands upon the bank of such stream from the ownership of the bed of the stream, and convey the shore and bank to one grantee and the bed of the stream to another. When the owner of lands bordering upon a navigable stream makes a deed as to such lands, the boundaries mentioned in which include the whole of the bank and shore along the stream for the whole length of the lot conveyed, there arises a presumption that the grantor intended to convey, aud did convey, all his rights to the bed of the stream in front of the lands described in the deed to the middle of such stream; and that presumption can only be rebutted by an actual reservation in the deed, or by the production of such facts and circumstances in evidence attending the making of the conveyance as clearly show an intention to limit the grant to the exact boundaries fixed by the description in the deed. Wis. Sup. Ct., Apri 6, 1886. Norcross v. Griffiths. Opinion by Taylor, J. [27 N. W. Rep. 606.]
WILL-CERTAINTY AS TO DEVISEES.-A bequest "for the special benefit of the worthy, deserving, poor, white, American, Protestant, Democratic widows and orphans residing in the town of Bridgeport, Connecticut," is not void for uncertainty as to the persons in the class named. It is a matter of common knowledge that there is a political party known as the Democratic party, to which a large portion of the voters in every one of the States adhere; which they support by speech and act, by advocating its principles and voting for its candidates for office; and that the determination of the question as to what persons and principles shall be in the ascendant in government for the time being depends upon the belief of the voter that the speech and the act of the candidate are true indexes of his opinion. The trustees are to inquire and decide concerning a given man, whether they believe that he adhered to and supported the principles of the Democratic party; and they may
well rest upon reasons which are sufficient to control the general mind of voters in a matter of the highest importance. They may be "orphans." This word describes a child who has lost one or both of its parents. He may be extremely young, and so of course without character, religious belief or political principles; and as by law neither women nor children vote, so in the common speech neither are said to have Democratic or other political principles. Therefore it must be determined to have been the intent of the testator as to an orphan not of sufficient age to have acquired a character, that he should have been born of white, American and Protestant parents, of a Democratic father, and be destitute; and as to a widow, that she should be worthy, deserving, poor, white, American, Protestant, and have had a Democratic husband. Conn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 13, 1886. Beardsley v. Selectmen of Bridgeport. Opinion by Pardee, J. [3 Atl. Rep. 557.]
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY-REVOCATION.When it appears to have been the intention of a testator that all after-acquired property should pass by his will, a conveyance of all the estate previously devised by a trust deed containing a power of revocation which is subsequently exercised and the title revested
in the testator, does not operate as a revocation of the will; and upon the revesting of the title in the testator the estate is subject to the will, and the interest of the devisee exists if no conveyance had been made. It was formerly essential to the validity of a devise of freehold lands that the testator should be seised thereof at the making of the will, and that he should continue so seised, without interruption, until his decease. If therefore the testator subsequent to his will by deed aliened the lands which he had disposed of by his will, and afterward acquired a new freehold estate in the same lands, such newly-acquired estate did not pass by the devise, which was necessarily void. 1 Jarm. Wills, 147. The will was regarded in law in the nature of a conveyance of the land devised. It could operate only upon land in which the testator had an interest at the time of the execution of his will, and consequently after-acquired real estate could not pass by it. George v. Green, 13 N. H. 521. When the conveyance subsequent to the devise, though made for a partial purpose, embraced the entire fee-simple or the whole estate of freehold which was the subject of the devise, the rule under the old law was that the conveyance, though limited in its purpose, and though it instantly revested the estate in the testator, produced a total revocation of the devise. 1 Jarm. Wills, 148. A conveyance by the devisor subsequent to the devise -except in mortgage or for the purpose of partition -of the estate devised, removes it from the operation of the will, and of necessity operates as an ademption of the subject of the devise, and in effect as a revocation of the will pro tanto. If the alienation is partial the revocation is partial, and if the alienation is of the entire estate, it is in effect a total revocation of the testamentary disposition of the estate; not because of any infirmity or want of operative force in the will, but by reason of the withdrawal of the entire estate from its operation. Marston v. Marston, 17 N. H. 503, 506. And as formerly, no after-acquired real estate could pass by a will, a conveyance of the entire estate was regarded as an absolute revocation of the testamentary disposition of property. In England since 1837, by the statute of 1 Vict., ch. 26, no will is revoked by any presumption of an intention on the ground of a change of circumstances, and every will is construed to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears by the will. So in this State many of the conditions upon which the doctrine of implied revocation was formerly based in England no longer exist. Under this alteration of the common law (Loveren v. Lamprey, 22 N. H. 434) any form of words showing the intent of the testator to devise all the estate which he should own at the time of his decease, passes all his property, real and personal, whether owned at the time of making the will or acquired afterward. If a testator, after executing his will, makes a conveyance of land specifically devised, and subsequently becoming re-vested with the title, is the owner of the same land at his decease, it passes by the will as if there had been no alienation. But at common law such conveyance operated as an absolute revocation of the will as to the estate conveyed, although the testator died seised of the identical estate which he possessed at the making of the will. N. H. Sup. Ct., March 12, 1886. Morey v. Sohier. Opinion by Clark, J. [5 East. Rep. 203 ]
——— DEVISE-LIFE ESTATE-INTENTION-Where a will devised to A. the "north end of the house, the north kitchen, and what she needs of the smoke-house and lumber-house, and as much land as she can work her hands on," and the same will devised the same land to B., it was held, that A. only took a line estate, B. the remainder in fee. Unquestionably if this de
vise in the defendant had stood alone in the will, by virtue of the act of 1784, Code, § 2180, she would have taken the fee simple therein. For the act provides: "When real estate shall be devised to any person, the same shall be held and construed to be a devise in fee simple, unless such devise shall, in plain and express words, show, or it shall be plainly intended by the will, or some part thereof, that the testator intended to convey an estate of less dignity." But the statute, while prescribing a rule of construction, still leaves the question open as to the intention of the testator, to be collected from the whole provisions of the instrument. The main and leading intention of the testator, to be gathered from the will, is to give the fee simple to his son John in the home place, which included the dwelling-house, and the devise of one end of the house, etc., and as much land as she can employ her hands on, and what she needs of the barn and stable," was secondary, and must be construed to be in subordination to the general devise of the whole-a different construction would derogate from what was the manifest intention of the testator, that is, that John shall have the fee simple of the home place. This interpretation is in accordance with the doctrine announced by the court in Ross v. Toms, 4 Dev. 376, where it is held "when there is a particular and a general paramount interest apparent in the same will, and they clash, the general interest must prevail." N. C. Sup. Ct., Feb. Term., 1886. Leeper v. Ñeagle. Opinion by Ashe, J. [93 N. C. Rep. 338.]
LAW CODE OF GORTYNA IN KRETE. Text Translation, Comment, by Augustus C. Merriam. Baltimore, 1886.
In 1884 came to light one of the most interesting of all the monuments of antiquity and one promising much to our correct understanding of early institutions. It seems the occupier of a mill stream at Hagioi Deka, in Crete, turned off the water and discovered in the bed some stone blocks, bearing an inscription. The attention of several savants, Doctors Halbherr and Fabricius was called to these,and they were found to be the fragments of a very ancient Cretan Code, perhaps the very one familiar to Lykurgos, Solon and others of the νομοθεται.
Ever since this discovery many minds have been directed to deciphering the archaic contents of these fragments. The most celebrated editions are those of Professor Comparetti of Florence, of Dr Fabricius, of Lewy, of Bernhöft, of Bücheler and Zittelmann, the Baunaks and perhaps several others. These are all foreign editions.
The edition now before us for notice is wholly American. It is reprinted from Vol. I, No. 4, and Vol. II, No. 1, of the American Journal of Archaeology, and was evidently made prior to the first English edition.
The London Law Quarterly for April last had a very complete historical notice of what it calls "The Twelve Tables of Gortyn" and the text of the first English translation, from no less a pen than Professor Roby's. It may be well for the inquiring reader to turn there. In Mr. Merriam's American edition these laws are more properly called the Law Code of the Kretan Gortyna. Gortyna was a town mentioned by Homer, and its laws, from the very dawn of our civilization, played an important part in Greek legislation. The date of the Gortyna laws is placed about 400 B. C. or midway between the Roman XII Tables (B. C.
451) and Plato's Laws. Mr. Merriam would seem to incline to an earlier date for the fragments.
Professor Roby states that in their character and extent, these tables take the lead of all legal inscriptions, either of Greece or Italy. Certainly they are the most complete. The fragmentary character of the Roman Decemviral Code has long been a subject of great regret to scholars. Now after all it seems as if the early Greek laws, once almost wholly disregarded because of their incompleteness, were destined to spring into notice after a lapse of almost the whole period of Roman law, and actually to point the way to the solution of the most interesting and profound problems of comparative jurisprudence. What a vindication of the almost inexhaustible resources of the Hellenic race!
The London Quarterly translation does not give the Greek text as does the American edition, but it is interesting to compare the several translations, English and American. In some points they greatly differ, but this is not strange, the original dialect being wholly archaic and the alphabet of only eighteen letters. It is written Bovorpoßndov, (ox-turning-wise) i. e. from right to left and the succeeding line from left to right and so on continuously. Mr. Merriam, with the modesty of a true scholar, disclaims infallibility for his excellent and sonorous translation, conceding that the ultimate solution of the text demands much exegetical work. He has given the subject more critical attention however than has even Professor Roby.
DEWEY ON CONTRACTS FOR FUTURE DELIVERY.
A Treatise on Contracts for Future Delivery and Commercial Wagers, including "Options, Futures and Short Sales." By T. Henry Dewey, of the New Yoak Bar. Baker, Voorhis & Co., publishers, 66 Nassau street, N.Y. 1886. Pp. xvi, 385.
The object of this work is to make clear "the distinction between open board of trade transactions for future delivery" and "bucket shop" business. To this end the author has classified the cases involving the subject-matter as follows: Chapter 1, Wagers; chapter 2, Wagers between principals; chapter 3, Fact and circumstances which have been considered by the courts as indicating an intention to wager; chapter 4, Evidence divided into three rules and considered in reference to subjects treated of in chapter 3; chapter 5, Wagers considered in reference to brokers and commission merchants, reduced to five rules, and under each rule the English and American cases are considered. It will no doubt be found useful as a
compendium of the law relating to the particular class of contracts treated of, but we cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that it is written in their defense. In our opinion gambling, whether done on the "Exchanges" or in "bucket shops," is equally illegal and should be dealt with accordingly. The author contends that in a case where the contract is in writing, and the understanding that no delivery is to be made is not expressed, parol evidence is inadmissible to establish that fact. We do not so understand the rule. The evidence is admissible, not for the purpose of contradicting the agreement in writing, but for the purpose of showing that the intent of the parties was merely to gamble; notwithstanding it may have the effect to vary the terms of the writing; see pp. 54-7. Again it has been held that evidence to establish any defect of this character (illegality) in the alleged contract does not come within the spirit or the letter of the rule excluding parol evidence. Jones on Construction of Contracts, § 191, citing authorities. See also Kreigh v. Sherman, 105 Ill. 49, and the very recent case of Stewart v. Garrett, Md. Ct. App, 4 Atl. Rep. 399.
The Albany Law Journal.
ALBANY, JULY 17, 1886.
EFORE we again address our readers, Albany will have celebrated the two hundredth anniversary of the founding of the city. This will be done with a magnificence and an expense never paralleled at the north. One procession alone will cost above ten thousand dollars. In our opinion, it would be much better to bestow this large sum in some lasting memorial a bronze statue of Philip Schuyler for our park, for example. But the very manner of the celebration is a survival of the ancient Dutch love of civic display, with its allegorical ships and fountains of wine the latter on this occasion being faintly but efficiently indicated by a thousand saloons where lager-beer is dispensed. Few cities of this country have been so influential in its general affairs, and few have so distinctly preserved the characteristics of its founders, as Albany. Albany is to this day distinctly Dutch, although surrounded by Yankees and Puritanism Hudson, settled by the Nantucket whalers, and Troy, founded by men from the east, both within a century. Not to speak of such a trifling matter as the habit of going to bed early, and of digging a canal as soon as the State was rich enough, our city, we believe, cherishes and exemplifies the love of liberty and of country, the thrift, the peaceableness and the integrity which were the predominant characteristics of the sturdy men who planted the infant colony. Old Albany physically is nearly passed away. A few weeks ago the second oldest house of the seventeenth century was demol
ished to make way for a superb new building, and this very week our city's most ancient and peculiar
characteristic the customary out-door market in State street, answering in modern times no purpose but to litter up that magnificent avenue with horse dung, sheep's pelts and rotting vegetables, and to play into the hands of hucksters pretending to be farmers has wisely been abolished by our mayor, John Boyd Thacher. Our old capitol disappeared some five years ago, and marked the growth of the State in a surprising manner. The old building, erected in the early part of the present century, cost only about one hundred and ten thousand dollars, and yet the State was so small and poor that it had to resort to a lottery to raise the money to complete it nominally for the "improvement of Hudson's river;" while we have already spent some seventeen millions on the new capitoi, and no one has felt it. The old North Dutch Church remains, of which Halleck sings in "The Croakers:"
Long has proud Albany, elate,
Reared her two steeples high in air,
Its sway however is divided with the spire of a neighboring Presbyterian Church, surmounted by a gilt codfish weather-vane, supported by a gilt pumpkin, emblems respectively of Massachusetts and Connecticut, whose people established the church; with the tower of St. Peter's Episcopal Church, unrivalled for beauty; the growing walls of the Episcopal Cathedral, and the lofty spire of a grand Roman Catholic Cathedral. Our new capitol is a conglomeration of nearly every conceivable order of architecture, but in the new City Hall we have a building appropriate to the traditions of the spot where it stands, with steep roofs to shed the snow that seldom falls. Albany has produced many men of mark in politics, in religion, in medicine, in the fine arts, in literature, in education, and in trade, of whom it is not within our province or space to speak, but we may point with especial pride to the pre-eminence of her lawyers. Her bar has always been the most distinguished of the State after the city of New York, and has only yielded to that because of her smaller
population. Not to speak of the living, nor to go beyond our own recollection, what bar can parallel the names of Nicholas Hill, Ira Harris, Rufus W. Peckham, Lyman Tremain, Peter Cagger, John H. Reynolds, Henry Smith, Grenville Tremain, William J. Hadley and Samuel Hand. They have some worthy successors among the living, and we have faith to believe that there are among the younger members of the bar some who will prove fit to carry forward the banner of our progression with credit and distinction. Of legal journalism, it may be permitted us to plume ourselves a little on the fact that the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL was the pioneer of its class. We ourselves may possibly not be here on the next bi-centennial celebration, but the JourNAL will be, no doubt. As "Coco," says in "The Mikado," we shall not be there to see the fireworks, but they will be there all the same." This is too grand an occasion to be allowed to pass in cold prose, and so "we drop into poetry," and attest our enthusiasm by the following, recently published in the Albany Evening Journal:
Quaint and sturdy burgomasters,
Left their chilling northern clime-
Listening to the forest's roar,