rights belonging to mankind, independent of all human grant; and not derived from any compact; that of all the rights inherent in human nature, that of thinking for ourselves, and following the conviction of our own judgments in relation to the object of our faith, worship, and religious obedience, is the moft facred and inconteftable; and is, in every view of it, entitled to the moft careful protection. He fhews that the prefervation of the great natural and abfolute rights of men is one of the chief ends, or rather the very firft intention, for which civil focieties were inftituted, and the rulers of it invefted with power. What, fays he, is the confequence from thefe premises? Maft st not be this, that in all governments, the rights of confcience hould have a principal place affigned them in the care of those, to whom the protection of their fellow-creatures is committed? If the fecuring of equal, impartial liberty in all thofe inftances of it in which it is not injurious to others, be fo much the object of every equitable, wife, and well conftituted fyftem of laws, that all needlefs encroachments upon it are deviations from the fpirit, which ought to be diffused through all laws, and impair the very benefit which they ought to confirm; can it be fuppofed that the rights of confcience ought not to be guarded from violation? To take for granted a re nunciation of thefe rights, when men enter into fociety, is, of all prefumptions, the moft groundless. They are the laft rights, which men can ever be imagined to give up to be modelled at the pleafure of others; nor is there any one principle connected with their fubmiffion to governors in other refpects, from which fuch an inference can be deduced. Does it follow, that because the magiftrate is entrusted with authority to decide difputes between us and our fellow-citizens concerning property, that he is to determine points, which lie only between God and our own confciences? Because it is allowed to be his office to guard the peace of his fubjects, and to inflict punishments for this purpofe on thofe, who unjustly disturb it; is it to be taken for granted, that he is to dictate to them what rule of faith they fhall adopt, and in what manner they are to worship the Deity, when it is allowed on all hands, that of these things the will of God is the only rule, and that no worship can be acceptable to him, but what is accompanied with the fincere conviction of him who offers it? Nay, there is no prefumption in advancing a step further, and afferting, that fuch is the nature of this right; and in this refpect, it ftands upon a foundation peculiar to itself, and is diftinguished from every other right, that it CANNOT be given up. Property may be refigned, transferred, or fubmitted to the regula tion of others.-A man may in many inftances relinquith his cafe, and fubject himself to inconveniences, and in fo doing, at not only an innocent but a laudable part.-Cafes may occur, in which a man may facrifice life itfelf, and the facrifice may merit the higheft applaufe. But his CONSCIENCE, he cannot refign. To prove all things and hold faft that which is good, is not only a privilege but a duty; an obligation laid upon him, by the very nature of religion and and virtue, and from which he cannot difcharge himself, without departing from the principles of both. It must always remain entire to him; nor, while the principles of the most reasonable liberty are allowed to fubfift in their due extent, can any attempt be confiftently made to take it from him. me. There is no difficulty in difcerning, that while I am speaking in this manner, an objection will offer itfelf to the reader; and that it will be fuppofed, that my own reasoning may be retorted against The more important confcience is reprefented, the more it will be faid, it falls under the infpection of the magiftrate. To exempt it thus from his jurifdiction, will be thought laying a foundation for excluding him by degrees, from taking that care of the fafety of his fubjects which is confeffed to be a part of his office. Religion, it will be urged, may be made a plea for any thing; and if governors must never interpofe to reftrain it, there is no enormity but what will pafs unpunished. But thefe objections arife entirely from imperfect views of the principle, which is here afferted. To contend for a right to think for themselves in fome, and deny it to others, might indeed be chargeable with thefe confequences. But to contend for this as a right, to which EVERY INDIVIDUAL has a claim equally valid and clear, never can be justly liable to fuch an imputation. For a man firft to own, that not only he, but all around him have an indifputable right, the very fame right with himself, to be guided by their own confciences in religion (and let it be remembered, it is thus the matter has all along been stated) for a man to allow this, I fay, and yet make his perfuafion a pretence for taking that liberty from them, is a contradiction fo grofs and palpable, that it is fcarcely conceivable, a perfon in poffeffion of his underRanding, can fall into it. Were a perfon to be fuppofed capable of this extravagance, every one would inftantly difcern that the very principle upon which he pretends to act condemns him. Were it again fuppofed, that the magi@rate was to guard a part of his fubjects only in the rights of confcience, it might be poffible for that favourite part to make it a cover for violating the peace and fafety of others with impunity: but let this protection be granted impartially to all of them, and no fuch confequences can take place. For protection confifts in the prevention or fuppreffion of injuries, and while this is allowed to be the office and duty of the magistrate, the duty which he is to difcharge to all his fubjects, he will always have an unquestionable right, as the guardian of the whole community, whenever they are committed, to animadvert upon the authors of them. Nor is maintaining this at all repugnant to the general principles bere afferted. For it is not in a religious but political view, that fuch diforders come under his cognizance. It is not as offences against God, but as hurtful to the community and breaches of the peace, that he punishes them. Where this is not violated, the right of fellowing their own convictions in religion without being molefted for it, continues: the more facred, important, and valuable it is, and valuable it must be allowed to be to the advancement of truth, the real intereft of society, and the cause of pure and undefled religion, the more effectually it fhould be guarded from every encroachment Rev. Nov. 1772. Bb upon upon it and by this general rule, the real genuine principles of Toleration are to be determined. • Let what has been observed then be applied to this purpofe.And we may collect from it, in what light Toleration in general ought to be confidered. It is, there is room to think (more room than was till of late apprehended) confidered by many as a matter of mere grace or favour, which government has a right to with-hold, grant, abridge, or refume at pleasure. But if the arguments which have been advanced are conclufive, it stands on a totally different foundation. It is the acknowledgment and confirmation of a right; not one of thofe adventitious rights, which are fubfequent to the eftablishment of civil focieties, and arife out of the peculiar forms and conftitutions of it; but of thofe higher rights which belong to men as fuch, and which ought to be preferved under all ftates and go. vernments whatsoever. It is a branch of protection, which ought to be as effectually univerfally and impartially fecured, as protection in the enjoyment and exercife of any other right which can be named.The extent of it again, or, to speak more precifely, what is comprehended in the juft idea of it, flows from the fame principles with equal evidence. If liberty of confcience be a right essential to human nature, all penalties in cafes merely of a religious nature, muit be an infringement of a right, and a DEGREE of OPPRESSION, though inflicted by a law: nor can the expreflion be justly thought improper. Every law is oppreffive which is unjuft; every law is unjuk which fubverts the effential rights of mankind; and if to judge for ourfelves in religion, be one of the first and most inviolable of all those which have ever been dignified with this title: it is evident, that every hardship laid upon men for ufing it is a degree of oppreffion, which the complete and perfect idea of Toleration excludes. And from the fame principles it can furely be no difficult matter to determine, who are entitled to this protection. For this does not depend on the supposed truth or error of the fentiments which men may adopt, but upon the common right, which all men have, to -be led in these points by the light of their own minds, and to enjoy all the fecurities and benefits of fociety, while they fulfil the obligations of it. All, who can give good fecurity to the government under which they live, and to the community to which they belong, for the performance of the duties of good fubjects and good citizens, have an undoubted claim to it, and cannot with any juft reafon be deprived of it. If, indeed, there are any, whofe religious principles put it out of their power to give fuch affurances of this as may be fafely trufted, their cafe may be thought an excepted one; though in ftrictness of fpeech fuch cafes are not fo properly exceptions from the rule laid down, as cafes, which can never with reafon be supposed to be included in it; for to fay, that all, who give proper fatisfaction for their being faithful fubjects, have a right to Toleration, can never give thofe the fame right to it, who are incapable of giving fuch fatisfaction. But whatever fuch cafes may at any time appear, or be fuppofed now to exist, the principle upon which this argument is conducted ftands untouched. It is not on account of their mistakes in religion, but their incapacity to be steady friends to the state, ghat that they are laid under reftraints. To fix these reftraints upon any other footing, would be rendering them utterly indefenfible. It is not error, but injury to the ftate, or the individuals which are under the care of it, which juftifies the animadverfion of the magiftrate; and all to whom this cannot be justly imputed, are the objects of his protection: nor ought it to make any difference, in this refpect, what are the comparative numbers of those different bodies of men, which compofe the fociety. As the magiftrate is not to attempt to diftrefs any of them, because they differ from him in judgment; fo neither is he at liberty to facrifice one part to the clamour and bigotry of the other; but, as the common defender of justice, equity, and peace, impartially to preferve the freedom of them all. And here this part of the subject might be difmiffed, were it not that the intervention of establishments of religion, makes, in the opinion of many, a great alteration in the extent of this religious liberty; for which reafon there feems to be a neceffity of confidering the grounds and confequences of them a little diftinctly.' What our Author fays concerning religious establishments appears to be very fenfible, pertinent, and liberal; the subject is treated with candour and decency; and we are perfuaded that no judicious friend of establishments can be displeased with what is advanced upon it, or think it bears any unfriendly afpect toward the usefulness and honour of fuch inftitutions. He fhews clearly, that liberty in matters of religion is the right of all men; that a right to protection from the magiftrate is the just confequence of their claim to this liberty; and that no difference of opinion, refpecting modes of worship, or, in a word, any thing which does not interfere with the rights of others, can juftify his laying any reftraints upon it. He proceeds to apply the principles advanced on the subject of Toleration to our laws, and confiders how far they are fa vourable to religious liberty; but we must not accompany him any farther, and fhall therefore content ourselves with referring our Readers to the Enquiry itself, where they will find several important topics difcuffed in a very folid and fatisfactory manner. ART. III. The Hiftory of Hindoftan, from the Death of Akbar, to the complete Settlement of the Empire under Aurangzebe. To which are prefixed, 1. A Differtation on the Origin and Nature of Despotism in Hindoftan, . An Enquiry into the State of Bengal; with a Plan for reftoring that Kingdom to its former Profperity and Splendor. By Alexander Dow, Efq; Lieutenant-Colonel in the Company's Service. 4to. 1. s. Boards. Becket and De Hondt. 1772. F ROM the account which hath formerly been given of the two preceding volumes of this Hiftory, our Readers cannot be ignorant of its general character. We then endeavoured to do juftice to its merit; but at the fame time we were fenfible that it had feveral inaccuracies of ftyle, which fhewed that the Au Bb 2 thor thor had not been early habituated to regular grammatical com pofition. Every defect of this kind is now totally removed, not only with refpect to the prefent continuation of the work, but with regard to the two former volumes; the fecond edition of which hath likewife received a variety of other alterations and improvements. The number of proper names, which rendered fome parts of it harsh and uncouth, is very much reduced. Ferifhta's account of the ancient Indians, and the invasions of the Mohammedans before the commencement of the Ghiznian empire, is omitted, and an introduction fubftituted in its place, more fatisfactory, fuccinct and agreeable. To throw greater light on the affairs of India, there is given, at the conclufion of the different reigns, a fummary review of the affairs of the reft of Afia; and in fhort, it appears to us, that nothing has been neglected that could contribute to render the work a complete hiftory of Hindoftan, down to the death of the Emperor Akbar, the third of the Mogul race. The fame folicitude to make the performance deferving of the public notice, and the fame attention to compofition, are The diction is indeed difplayed in the volume now before us. fo greatly fuperior to that of the first edition of the two preceding volumes, in regard to perfpicuity, elegance and harmony, that we are perfuaded Mr. Dow must have received no fmail degree of affiftance from fome ingenious and learned friend. If we may be allowed to mention a conjecture arising from the conformity of ftyle, we fhould fay that this friend feems to be the Author of the Introduction to the Hiftory of Great Britain and Ireland. In the first differtation prefixed to the prefent work, Mr. Dow points out a variety of circumftances which may ferve to explain the origin and nature of defpotifm in Hindoftan. Government, he obferves, derives its form from accident, its fpirit and genius from the inherent manners of the people. The languor occafioned by the hot climate of India, inclines the native to indolence and cafe, and he thinks the evils of defpotifm lefs fevere than the labour of being free. Tranquillity is the chief object of his defires: his happinefs confifts in a mere absence of mifery; and oppreffion muft degenerate into a folly which defeats its own ends, before he calls it by the name of injuftice. Thefe phlegmatic fentiments the Indian carries into his future ftate. He thinks it a mode of being in which paffion is loft, and every faculty of the foul fufpended, except the confcioufnefs of exift ence. Other motives of paffive obedience join iffue with the love of eafe. The fun, which enervates the body, produces for him, in a manner fpontaneously, the various fruits of the earth. He finds fubfiftence without much toil; he requires little covering but |