If Franklin Pierce was willing to encounter a storm of opposition and obloquy by opposing the strong Abolition current of the North, as he did in putting down Atwood, merely to sustain the rights of a distant section of the Union, ought not you and I, and others, to be willing to make some sacrifices, if necessary, to maintain the great essential interests of our own section? When General Scott received the nomination, was it not the general feeling of our people that he ought not to be supported? That was an honest, patriotic impulse. Under pressing solicitations and the influence of party prejudice many have reluctantly yielded acquiescence. Is it not better, however, to consider the matter calmly and act solely for the interest of the country? If General Scott should be elected, under all existing oircumstances, it not only consigns to their political graves forever, Messrs. Fillmore and Webster, and other Compromise Whigs of the North; but the defeat of General Pierce will tend powerfully to deter any Northern Democrat from again standing up for our rights. This is what Seward and his followers are evidently seeking to accomplish. Ought we to aid them in such a movement, intended as it is solely to effect our political and social destruction? Is it not, under all the circumstances, better that Franklin Pierce should be elected rather than General Scott? By repudiating the nomination of the latter, by making it manifest that he was beaten, not merely because the Democratic party was the strongest, but because also the conservative men of the country generally refused to support him, we may prevent the recurrence of a similar nomination by any future convention, and greatly contribute to ensure the future quiet of the country.

I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

T. L. CLINGMAN.

To show more fully the circumstances and arguments which led to the disasastrous defeat incurred by General Scott, and which in fact terminated the existence as a national organization of the old Whig party, the following address to my constituents is republished. The first part of it is devoted to the summing up of the objections to General Scott, but there is in it a good deal of matter that is local or personal, which is omitted.

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1853.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: In the short interval which elapsed between the close of the last and the commencement of the present session of Congress, I did not, in consequence of my being unwell for some weeks, find time to visit all the counties of our district; I determined, therefore, to avail myself of the first leisure time to address you in explanation of my views, and to defend myself against attacks. This I regarded as alike due to myself, whether I should or should not again be a candidate before you. That is a question which can be decided with more propriety at the close of my present term of service, than it could at an earlier day. Valuing as I do my character as a man, and reputation as a statesman, more than mere political success, I shall leave all considerations only connected with the latter to a future day.

For several years past old party topics have been lost sight of, and overridden entirely by questions connected with the institution of slavery. Though for a great while abolition societies have been active in the Northern States, yet the agitation did not assume a formidable shape until within the last half-dozen years. During the Mexican war, there being a prospect that territory would be acquired, the Wilmot proviso was brought forward. The effect of that movement was to provide that in whatever territory we might acquire, no slaveholder should settle with his property. By this means the territory would be carved into free States, and by its political affinities strengthen the North. This was the main object of Northern politicians. They intended that while no more slave States should be admitted into the Union, a number of free States might come in, so as to give them the entire control, in a few years, of the government. It was their purpose not only to secure thus all the political power of the Union, but in the end to effect the abolition of slavery, or the passage of measures destructive to our interests. On our part we resisted this state of things, not only because of its mischievous tendency, but also on account of its gross injustice. The Southern States besides paying a liberal proportion of the taxes necessary to sustain the war, actually furnished twice as many soldiers as the North. As our population was in fact but little more than half theirs, we thus contributed, proportionally, four times as much as their section. Feeling indignant at the attempt to exclude us entirely, we struggled to effect either such a settlement as might leave the territory open to every citizen of the Republic, so that he could go into it with such property as he could hold at home, or at least to get some equitable division. Most Southern men were willing to take the Missouri line as a compromise, though it would have given us only one third of the territory acquired.

The Congress in which this measure was introduced, passed by without any final action. When the next Congress assembled in December, 1847, the subject was renewed. I found that every single Whig from the free States, and a large portion of the Democrats likewise, steadily supported, on every division, the principle of the Wilmot proviso. When, feeling indignant at such palpable injustice, we remonstrated with Northern Whigs, we were often told not to be alarmed, that they only intended to use this question as a means of stopping the Mexican war, and of splitting into two the Democratic party in New York, who were divided on the question. They declared, from time to time, that they did not intend to push the matter to a practical issue, and that we need feel no alarm whatever. They assured us, most emphatically, that they intended to take no ground in the end that would oblige Southern Whigs to abandon them. On the side of the Democrats there were many against us likewise, and General Cass, the head of the party, occupied in his Nicholson letter, a position unsatisfactory to us, and which, subsequently was repudiated also by the bulk of his party in the South. General Taylor, our candidate, took no position whatever on this subject, but we preferred risking the chances with him, to one whose doctrine was objectionable. The first attempt at settlement which came near succeeding was that known as the Clayton Compromise. This measure was bitterly opposed by every Northern Whig in the House of Representatives. They declared that it was, in its tendency merely calculated to elect Cass, and that if it were defeated, they would afterwards give us a better settlement, &c. I do not suppose that any Southern Whig was induced to take ground against the bill on the strength of these assurances alone, though it is probable that such promises operated in aid of other objections. In fact, it is due to the eight gentlemen from the South who assisted in defeating the measure, that I should say that though I did not act with them, yet I concurred in the opinion that this bill fell far short of doing the South justice. These gentlemen, and all of us from that section, in fact, had a right to look for a better adjustment. I am sorry to be obliged to say, however, that after the termination of the Presidential contest, there were no more favorable indications on the part of our Northern political allies. At the following session, commencing in December, 1848, they not only voted regularly for the Wilmot proviso, to exclude us from all share in the conquered territory, but when Mr. Gott's resolution was passed for the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia, they were found voting for it. There was, as you well know, fellow-citizens, a meeting of the Southern members of Congress to devise means to protect their section. We were then met by the same sort of solicitation on the part of Northern men, and such Southern Whigs as sympathized with them. They declared that this movement was all a scheme of certain Democrats to break down General Taylor's administration before it came into power, and implored us to take no rash steps, but to trust to their good conduct at the proper time. Though I attached, myself, no weight to these declarations, yet I am satisfied that they served to sooth and quiet many Southern members. At the close of the session there was another vigorous effort to settle the territorial question. I allude to Walker's amendment, a proposition of a Democratic Senator, which came to us from the other wing of the Capitol, where it had been adopted by a handsome vote. This was, in my judgment, a better settlement for the South than the Clayton Compromise, and all the Southern members made an honest effort to pass it. It met, however, the same kind of opposition from the body of the Northern Whigs, and a portion of the Deniocrats, and was defeated, as all similar movements had been. General Taylor's administration then came into power, and for myself, I felt that we had a right to require of the Northern Whigs some national and liberal line of policy as the price of any further co-operation in party movements. In the autumn of 1849, before the assembling of the new Congress, while traveling in the Northern States, I had opportunities for ascertaining something of the sentiment in that section. I found, as was admitted in our first caucus during the discussion of Mr. Toombs' resolution, that every Whig member of Congress from the free States had, prior to his election, during the canvass, been pledged to the support of the Wilmot proviso, and to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. This had been done generally in the nominating conventions to enable them to beat the Cass men in some localities, who stood on his non-intervention platform, and also to win over the Abolition voters from the support of Van Buren or Hale. They were thus all pledged to a line of policy, in fact unconstitutional and destructive to the government. A portion of the Democratic members elect, also, stood upon the same principles, while many even of the non-intervention men, irritated by their defeat, had determined, with a view of punishing the South, to offer no resistance to these measures, but to oblige General Taylor to sign or veto the bills. Seeing that almost the entire North was hostileon my reaching the city early in November, I made such inquiries as were necessary to ascertain what were the views of the administration, and whether it was likely to make any affective resistence to this hostile line of policy. A majority of the cabinet were Wilmot proviso men, while part of the minority were indifferent. I came soon to the conclusion, from all the information that I could obtain, that if the proviso were passed, it would not be vetoed; while, with respect to the abolition of slavery in the District, I could not learn that anything was determined on except to avoid the issue if possible. Seeing the dangers that threatened my section, I expressed my apprehensions to my colleague, Mr. Mangum, and to General Foote, of Mississippi, both of whom happened to be here at that time. Our letters then published were intended to put our countrymen on their guard, and prepare them for the struggle. When Congress assembled, it is wellknown that the manifestations were such as to excite alarm in the country. Several weeks elapsed before the organization of the House was completed. Though some little impression had been made by our efforts, yet it appeared that a majority of about twenty votes were still for the Wilmot proviso, as indicated by the division on a proposition introduced by Mr. Root, of Ohio. Happening to obtain the floor at the opening of the debate on the President's Message, I, in my speech of the twenty-second of January, 1850, after surveying the ground which the Northern Whigs had occupied to a man in the preceding Congress, declared, most emphatically, that the time for a change in their line of policy had come, if they looked for further co-operation from our section. The first favorable indication occurred a few days afterwards, when the proposition of Mr. Root, coming up for final action, was defeated by a vote of the House. The incidents of that memorable session are too well known to require a review of them. After General Taylor's death, and the accession of Mr. Fillmore, the bills commonly called the Compromise Measures became laws. Being unwilling that the South should lose all the territory acquired from Mexico, I refused to vote for the bills disposing of it. The Fugitive Slave Law being the compensation offered us for the other measures, I supported, because right in itself. As the Constitution had already provided that fugitives should be delivered to their owners, I was not willing for the sake of getting a new law on that subject, to consent to surrender to the North the whole of that territory, it being sufficient to make ten States as large as North Carolina. When, however, those measures had passed irrevocably, though the bargain had in my opinion been an unwise one for us, yet I resolved to insist upon the North carrying out the Fugitive Slave Law which they had offered us in exchange for the territory given up to them, and which could not of course be gotten back.

It ought not be forgotten, too, that even after they obtained the admission of California, and the passage of the other territorial measures, out of more than eighty Whig members of Congress from the North, only three were willing to vote for the Fugitive Slave law, its enactment being mainly due to the support of the Northern Democracy and Southern members generally. The great body of the Northern Whigs still stood upon their anti-slavery ground. They still constituted a formidable band, hostile to our section, determined to use all the powers within their reach for our injury, anxious to convert a government formed for our protection into an engine of oppression, and to substitute for the limited Constitution of the United States a political system, that, in all time was to be our great enemy. Though repulsed and foiled in their efforts, they did not feel discomfitted, and were intent on recovering the vantage ground, which they had for a time lost. For myself, having already met trouble and difficulty enough from their efforts, I determined not to give them aid, but, on the contrary, to use my best exertions to prevent their getting into power again, until they abandoned those principles. Their first movement was the opening of a fierce war on those Northern men who had shown a disposition to do us justice, and had aided in the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act. It was their purpose to render such persons odious throughout the entire North, and build up, on their destruction, a controlling political party. A part of their plan consisted in superseding such men as Fillmore and Webster with a presidential candidate of hostile views. Their thoughts were at once turned to General Scott, who, in accordance with their wishes, avoided committing himself, publicly, in relation to any of the so-called compromise measures. Though urged again and again by Southern men to take a position, by letter or speech, he steadily refused to do it. It is known to you fellow citizens, that, in 1848, I advocated his claims rather than General Taylor's. I need not recapitulate my reasons for so doing it this time. Though neither he nor General Taylor had taken any distinct ground upon the slavery question as then pending, yet for party reasons I preferred General Scott to General Taylor, who had not been connected in any way with the action of the Whig party.

Soon after that contest, however, viz: in the summer of 1849, General Scott published his Canada letter, in which, while expressing his wish for the annexation of the British provinces, he went out of his way to declare his hostility to the acquisition of Mexican territory. This occurred in the height of the controversy about the territory already acquired. It was, in substance, saying to the North, I am for strengthening you, but against the South. It must not be forgotten that the British possessions are larger than the whole United States, and yet while in favor of obtaining them he was against Southern acquisition, lest we might likewise be strengthened so as to be able to resist the North. If he had in express terms declared for the Wilmot proviso, he could not have exhibited himself as more sectional or more hostile