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State v. Berning, 74 Mo. 88, the executor pledged certain notes of the estate with a bank to secure his personal debt. After that he gave a second bond, and the notes were with the bank, and not paid until long after the bond was given. The sureties on the first bond were held liable, though the bank took no title to the notes, and though there was a breach of the second bond also for a failure on the part of the exocutor to reclaim and recover the notes as he might and ought to have done. Now in the case at bar the commissions allowed before the execution of the second bond were claimed and allowed in the previous settlements. That was an open declaration of the guardian that the money was his own, and an appropriation thereof to his own use. These allowed commissions were never carried into any subsequent settlement. To hold these second sureties liable therefor under the circumstances is to wholly disregard the rule that sureties are not liable for a past default. Prima facie the allowances were correct, and the sureties had a right to assume that they were correct. If it should be found that these commissions set apart in

the settlements before the execution of the second bond are excessive, still these sureties should not be held liable therefor. Mo. Sup. Ct., June 21, 1886. State v. Jones. Opinion by Black, J.

party who sues for the consequential injury. And while it is true that the person who receives a direct personal injury is alone entitled to an action, and the damages recovered thereby, this does not bar the action of one whose right of recovery rests upon loss of service, or expense incurred, as a result of direct injury. Woodward v. Washburn, 3 Denio, 369. As a consequence of the foregoing, the contract entered into by the wife having nothing to do with the present action, the case stands here just as if the plaintiff were suing for loss of service, etc., arising by reason of an ordinary tort done the wife. Mo. Sup. Ct., June 21, 1881. Blair v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. Opinion by Sherwood, J.

MASTER AND SERVANT-RIGHT OF DISCHARGED EMPLOYEE TO SUE FOR WAGES.-A railroad employee upon being discharged, from service, is entitled to immediate payment of the wages due, and may maintain an action for the recovery of the same; the evidence failing to show a general custom among railroads to defer payment, or notice to the plaintiff of a regulation or usage of his employer to do so. The question before us is whether, upon plaintiff being discharged from the defentant's service, on the 31st day of July, after five days' service, a right of action at once arose for the recovery of his wages, or whether, MARRIAGE-HUSBAND'S ACTION FOR INJURIES TO by force of an alleged usage, or from the inconvenience to which the obligation of immediate payment WIFE-LOSS OF SERVICE.-Where a married woman is personally injured by a common carrier to such an exwould subject the defendant, the right of action was tent as to disable and prevent her from the discharge deferred, so as to enable the defendant to make payof her ordinary duties, her husband can maintain an ment in the manner shown in the latter part of the action predicated solely on the loss of her services, twelfth finding of the court. The obligation to make even though she alone made the contract of common payment arose at once upon the termination of the carriage, without the consent or joinder of her husband. contract of service, and the right of action became I do not find any case which goes the length of holding perfect (Ganser v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 25 N. W. that a husband, in such circumstances, cannot main-Rep. 943) unless the case is to be deemed to be exceptain a separate action in his own name for the loss of tional, upon the grounds above referred to. The the services of his wife, and for any expense or loss usage of the defendant as to the manner of paying consequent upon the injury thus received by the wife. employees not on the monthly pay-roll is not found to The rule is the other way. This position is abundantly have been brought to the notice of the plaintiff. Unsustained by the authorities. 2 Rorer R. 1093-1095; less this was done it would not be, by implication, a Fuller v. Railroad Co., 21 Conn. 557; McKinney v. part of the contract, nor would it affect the plaintiff; and he would be entitled to payment at once, upon Stage Co., 4 Iowa, 420; Cregin v. Railroad Co., 75 N.Y. 192; McDonald v. Railroad Co., 26 Iowa, 124; Hop- the termination of the service by the discharge of the kins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9; 2 Thomp. Neg. 1240, servant. No regulation or usage of the employer of 15: Filer v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 47; Cooley Torts, which the servant is not chargeable with notice could 226, 227, and cases cited. And in such cases it matters affect the legal obligations arising from the contract. not that the injury arose as an incident or conseCollins v. New England Iron Co., 115 Mass. 23; Stevens v. Reeves, 9 Pick. 198. The fact that the same usquence of a breach of contract made with the wife when the injury extends further, and invades rights age was observed by four other railroad corporations which are personal to the husband, depriving him of does not show the existence of a custom with regard her services, and compelling him to the expenditure to which the contract in question is to be deemed to have been made. Pevey v. Schulenburg & Boeckler of money on account of her injuries. The gravamen of such an action by the husband being a breach of Lumber Co., 33 Minn. 45; Janney v. Boyd, 30 id. 319; duty by the common carrier, privity of contract is not Taylor v. Mueller, id. 343. Minn. Sup. Ct., July 13, 1886. essential. Any one sustaining damage by reason of Thompson v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. Opinion by Dickinson, J. such breach of duty may maintain his action therefor. In such case the tort does not spring from or arise out of a breach of contract, but the action lies "against the carrier on the custom of the realm"" Marshall v. York, etc., Ry. Co., 7 Eng. Law & Eq. 519; Max v. Roberts, 12 East, 80; Ansell v. Waterhouse, 18 E. C. J. Rep. 469; Bliss Code Pl., § 14; Ames v. Railway Co., 117 Mass. 541. The action is bottomed on a violation of a public duty-a duty which the law imposes independent of contract. Stanley v. Bircher, 78 Mo. 245. It is a principle of the common law that where a person sustains loss or damage by the wrong of another, be may have an action on the case to be remunerated in damages. 1 Com. Dig. 168, tit. "Action on the Case, A." And it is also a general principle that an action lies for an injury done to one who stands in such relation to the party injured that the injury of the latter causes loss of service or expense, etc., to the

HENRY STANBERY

THE September number of the American Law Record contains an article on Henry Stanbery, a great advocate and admirable man, accompanied by an excellent portrait. We make some extracts: "Henry Stanbery was born in New York city, and came to Zanesville, Ohio, in 1814. He graduated at Washington College, Pennsylvania; studied law in the office of Goddard & Granger; was admitted to the bar at Gallipolis, in 1824, and the same year commenced practice with Thomas Ewing, at Lancaster, Ohio.

"He was the first attorney-general of the State, having filled the office soon after its creation, and he was a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1850,

In 1853 he removed to Cincinnati, where he kept his law office up to the date of his death, in 1881, and had his residence at the Cedars,' a lovely spot on the summit of one of the Kentucky hills, overlooking the river and the suburbs of our city. In 1866 he was appointed by President Johnson attorney-general of the United States, and filled the position with rare ability and distinction until 1868, when he resigned in order to defend Johnson in the celebrated impeachment of the president for 'high crimes and misdemeanors.' He was also nominated for associate justice of the United States Supreme Court, but was not confirmed by the Senate, on the alleged ground that the number of judges composing that tribunal were to be permanently reduced. This is the only political episode which interrupted the course of the distinguished advocate in a brilliant career which lasted over half a century, and this occurred at a time when the great battle was raging, upon which hung the answer to the momentous question whether the Union should be broken or preserved. Mr. Stanbery had no doubt as to the result of the contest, as those will bear witness who heard his vigorous and inspiring address at Pike's Opera House, in the darkest days and most doubtful period of the war. When the best and the bravest were leaving their daily avocations for the field of honor, it is not to be wondered that Mr. Stanbery should find his place in the national council, for as of old, amid the clash of arms, the laws are silent.'

"The defense of Johnson by Mr. Stanbery and Mr. Groesbeck, also of the counsel, in the impeachment proceedings, was said to be able, thorough and successful; but owing to the failing health of Mr. Stanbery his speech had to be read to the Senate by one of his assistants, and was thus probably deprived of much of its force and vivacity by this second-hand delivery. His duties as cabinet minister over, Mr. Stanbery returned to the practice of the law at Cincinnati, and remained faithful to the profession he loved, and the duties he so skillfully and ably fulfilled, until the final order of release came in his seventy-ninth year."

"His ready knowledge of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence, and of the leading cases upon vital points of the common law, arose in part from the conditions and circumstances surrounding his early practice of the law, as well as from his strong and retentive memory and clear insight. Regular as the terms of court, he rode the circuit from county to county, and in the absence of railroads, did his travelling upon horseback. The period of consultation with his clients and associate counsel was short-while the jury was being impanelled, or at farthest, while the preceding case was being tried. Judge, jurors, clients, witnesses, lawyers and spectators all arived at the court-house about the same moment; and the plaintiff or defendant picked out his lawyer and commenced to instruct while the latter was tying up his horse in front of the court-house door. There was no library at hand, or law clerk to fish up decisions bearing directly upon the point in issue, and the only vade mecum was a good memory and the ability to build up an organism from its imprint in the sand. The terms were short, for the judge was desirous of getting through his docket, and hurrying away to the next county-seat; and his cavalcade of lawyers found themselves on one side or another of every suit. Murders, larceny, forgery, alternated with actions quare clausem fregit, bills in equity, suits to foreclose mortgages, and applications for writs of injunction and habeas corpus. And as the English common law form of pleading prevailed, and special pleas were the mode, with all their delightful ambiguities and prolixities

one can well imagine the strain and test of counsels' knowledge and readiness, upon being called to conduct such legal contests with no brief and only five minutes' consultation or preparation. If this was excellent mental training, and thoroughly conducive to self-confidence, readiness, and familiarity with the axioms of law and equity, it had a bad effect physically, as the hot biscuit, pie and coru cakes of the various inns, with the limited time of digestion, laid the ground-work of a dyspepsia which troubled Mr. Staubery for the balance of his days. His exact knowledge and reliance upon principles always prevented him from quoting many cases in support of his position; it was very rarely that he appealed to over three or four books. This is strikingly illustrated by the series of cases argued by Mr. Stanbery, while attorney-general of the United States, in the Supreme Court at Washington, and reported in volumes 4,5 and 6 of Wallace. A reference to these reports will show how few were the precedents relied on, and yet how clear and convincing are the arguments.

"When the war closed a series of important cases arose, and were presented in the United States Supreme Court, in which the separate powers and func tions of the executive and judicial branches of the government were closely criticised and defined. For instance, in State of Mississippi v. Johnson, an application was made for a writ of injunction, to restrain the president of the United States from executing the provisions of certain acts of Congress, which provided that this State should form a part of a military district, and be placed under the control of a military commander. Mr. Stanbery, as attorney-general, objected to the bill in limine, and the question presented was as to the leave to file the bill for the purpose indicated. In the discussion that followed, the ministerial and executive duties of the chief magistrate, as well as the jurisdictional powers of the Supreme Court, were examined and defined. So also in State of Georgia v. Stanton, a bill was filed asking for a writ to enjoin the secretary of War and Generals Grant and Pope from carrying out and putting into force the provisions of similar acts of Congress. Mr. Stanbery, in his argument against the issue of the writ, claimed that this attempt to fetter the executive branches of the government from the performance of duties devolved upon them by law, was an at tempt to imitate the veto of the Roman Tribunes, who although they had no seat in the Senate, and no voice in the enactment of its statutes, could nevertheless, by a single word, check one of the most important functions of government. His arguments are singularly vigorous and eloquent, the style lucid and direct, with scarcely more than a couple of precedents to illustrate and enforce his view.

"The fact is, that Mr. Stanbery had very great literary ability, and his study of the classics, ancient and modern, gave him a style as rich as it was simple and direct.

"Next to a catalogue of bugs, or a State geological report, the ordinary lawyer's brief is the dryest, most incoherent and fragmentary of written compositions. It glitters with italics and underscored points, like the bliud door of a jail with imitation knobs and bolts, and to the uninitiated must be as meaningless as the symbols on an Egyptian obelisk. On the contrary, the briefs of Mr. Stanbery were not only readable but instructive even to laymen. If they were dry, it was from the dry light so highly extolled by Ba

con.

"One of his constant admonitions was the absolute necessity of careful preparation before trial. If asked what were the three principal factors in his own suc

cessful advocacy, he would paraphrase the answer of Demosthenes, and reply: 'Preparation, preparation, and stil preparation.' He used to say, that after a close and careful scrutiny of the pleadings, a personal interrogation of his witnesses, and thorough familiarity with the law bearing upon his case, he was prepared and fully armed against all opponents; otherwise he felt handicapped (if I may use the expression), and coutending against unknown odds.

"He seldom took notes of the testimony on a trial, having a quick and very retentive memory, which he claimed was apt to be weakened for want of use, by relying on the written record rather than upon the vivid and ever ready source in his own mind. Nor do I ever remember his marking out the various heads of his discourse to the jury; he had thoroughly thought out the arrangement, and each part came spontaneously to his lips. He was an interesting and delightful speaker, his address being always a model of clearness and epigrammatic simplicity. The nervus argumentationis was always delivered in a bare, plain and direct manner, without any side-bar excursions, and the worse than useless ornamentation of vain and pedantic lore or rhetoric. He constantly advised a full, thorough and exhaustive argument to court and jury; seeming to think that the necessity of modifying the decisions of the last Courts of Appeal, as well as the making of bad laws, arose from the want of competent argument and examination in the first instance. knew the supreme value of facts, and possessed the art of presenting them in an irresistible array. For this reason also he was a very effective cross-examiner of witnesses. He knew precisely what he desired to draw out of the witness, and also which is equally important, how to hide the cogency and significance of the question or expected answer. He never indulged in the futile process of treating the witness like a partner in a country dance, and waltzing with him up the sides and down the middle of every circumstance, nor try to bully him into spitting out the truth, nor probably what is more tedious still, turn his memory inside out, in the vain hope that in an unguarded moment, something might drop out, useful to one side, or at least damaging to his opponeuts; but like a guide in a maze, carefully concealed the approaches to the center, until the witness stood fairly in front of it.

He

"To Mr. Stanbery the trial at nisi prius was like a game of chess, in which more depended upon the skill of the player than upon the intrinsic value and number of the pieces employed; and he never losing sight of the fact that the capture or loss of a pawn often determines the victory. His vigilance was unceasing; nay, it rather increased than diminished if the result looked doubtful."

"He knew so well how to keep the equipoise between the respect due to the court, and the equally important factor in the proper administration of justice, the respect due to himself as a member of the bar. He loved the law, and brought into the practice of it the natural dignity and reverence which formerly prevailed between the Roman patron and his client. It was an old saying, 'that all roads lead to Rome,' and with Mr. Stanbery, all branches of learning and science were useful and necessary to the advocate; as in the manifold diversity of suits, there was no line of study or thought-music, chemistry, physiology, anatomy, mathematics, poetry, painting but would, time or another, be called upon in the legal forum to aid in judicial examination and judgment. And the knowledge of science and art furnished the most convincing illustrations and examples to the zealous ad

vocate.

some

"He thought that any good, clear head was worth

three weak ones, and doubted if multiplicity of counsel in a law-suit insured safety. I drew his attention once to the fact that he was opposed by five advocates, and that the contest was at least unequal in numbers, but he replied: So many lawyers, so many opinions. In law multiplicity of counsel generally means confusion.'

"For over half a century he was counsel on one side or the other of nearly all the important trials in the State and Federal courts of Ohio, as well as representing the same in the United States Supreme Court, and pitted against, or associated with, the eminent and distinguished jurists of other States and of the Union. In his long and successful career the bench of the United States Supreme Court had been three times entirely renewed, since he first appeared before it as an advocate, and his elevation to the bench would have been the natural and fitting tribute to his pre-eminent merits and worth."

"And now comes the principal question, what was Mr. Stanbery as a man among his fellowmen? What was the value and significance of the ethical and moral side of his character? For, after all, this is the kernel and the one fact of value in a man's existence. Brain is but froth unless supported and stimulated by courage, uprightness, honesty and charity. If you are simply looking for brainy men, you will find them more plentiful among the vulgar crowd of nouveauxriches, which like the watered stock of insolvent corporations have only a nominal or commercial value, than you will among the unknown respectable, and simply virtuous people. Large heads and small hearts generally go together; they are the rule, the common plan of life. But Henry Stanbery was as much distinguished for his courtesy, probity, courage and charity as for his legal knowledge and forensic skill. As he was the first week of my contact with him as a law student, so he continued the nineteen years in which I remained in his office; the first day was a correct sample of the whole. Always courteous, gentle in speech, easy of approach, and eager to help by advice or discussion; and always a gentleman."

To the article is subjoined the following from Mr. Justice Matthews' address to our State Bar Association in 1882:

"If there, in fact, has been any decline in the influence and power of the legal profession during the present generation, it certainly cannot be said to be due to any failure on its part to realize, from time to time, as in times past, in its foremost men its highest ideal. Doubtless there will arise to the memory or imagination of every one present, the figure of one, at least, that answers to the call for the exemplar of his prófession. I have in my mind's eye-for he has passed from corporeal sight, though but recently-one that might have sat, even to such a painter as Bacon, for his portrait as a model lawyer. Nature had done much for him. She endowed him with many graces, both of body and spirit. He was a picture of manly beauty and dignity; his presence was benign, but majestic; his address was winning, insinuating, persuasive, impressive; his posture firm, collected, self-possessed, self-respecting, full of respect to others; his movements gracious and inspiring; his voice musical and various; an eye beaming with sympathy and intelligence. He had every physical quality to fit him for grave and serious oratory. His intellect was keen, incisive, rapid and unhesitating; his logic inexorable. He had a rare faculty of language, which pictured in vivid and striking colors all the images of his mind. A moral and intellectual energy that was tireless answered every call of enthusiasm that was born of a union of a lofty sense of duty with a strikingly sincere love of his profession. Unremitting and systematic

study had filled a retentive memory with the stores of learning that yielded treasures for every emergency, and made the habitual and diligent preparation of every case and argument the instinctive delight which all living activities have in natural exercise. In judicial tribunals he recognized the authority and majesty of the law, which he felt that both they and he were appointed to administer, and he respected as well his own function as counsel and advocate as the person of the magistrate. He recognized no man as master, but respected all men, each in his own place and degree, and stood for his cause, like a knight, answerable only to his own honor. He was, indeed, the very prince and paragon of lawyers. Doubtless there are those who survive him entitled to be numbered with him, whom living, it were invidious to dis. criminate; but him, dead, it is no offense to praise no shame to name; he lives still in the love of those who will always take pride in recalling the name and person of Henry Stanbery."

INCONSISTENCIES IN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

State of New York vests in Courts of Special Sessions
Section 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the
exclusive jurisdiction of the trial of certain specified
misdemeanors, subject however by section 57 to trial
on indictment by obtaining proper certificate. And it
has been held that the Legislature possesses the power
thus to deprive, for minor offenses, of the supposed
law jury of twelve.
constitutional right of trial by and before the common

section 56, inasmuch as it is by section 211 left to the
Section 211 of the same Code seems to conflict with
option of its defendant whether to be tried in the
Court of Special Sessions, or "held to answer to a
court having authority to inquire by the intervention
of a grand jury into offenses triable in the county."
Section 211 should be repealed if it has not been,
which after a somewhat cursory examination I cannot
find to be the case.

Respectfully,

PRATTSVILLE, N. Y., Oct. 5, 1886.

J. B. DALY.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CONTRACTS TO SATISFACTION.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

It seems to me very clear that there exists perfect consistency in the decisions of Justice Pratt in Brassford v. Oelrichs and Cross v. Belknap, both reported in 24 Week. Dig. The difference is that in the latter case the artist agreed as part of the contract to perform the work to the satisfaction of the other party, and it is well settled that under such a contract, when the subject involved is a matter of taste, the person for whom the work is done is the sole arbiter. Brassford v. Oelrichs does not conflict with this doctrine. There the contract was simply to do the work, but with no stipulation that it should be done to the satisfaction of the other party, and the court held, that as matter of law under such contract the artist is required only to do the work in a skillful and artistic manner, and it is for a jury to say whether it was so done.

In a word, instead of a mere matter of taste, it is a mere matter of contract.

BUFFALO, Oct. 2, 1886.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

WEST END.

If the readers whose attention was called to the decisions of Mr. Justice Pratt in Cross v. Belknap and Brassford v. Oelrichs, in 24 Week. Dig. 233, 256, will give these cases attention, they will find no difficulty in reconciling them. In the first case plaintiff agreed to build a house "in a good, workmanlike and substantial manner, to the satisfaction of defendant," and on the trial it was proved "that the contract was not performed to a very material degree, and many defects in workmanship and materials were shown." In the second case the contract was pure and simple, for the painting of a picture, and it was only claimed by the defendant that the painting was to be done to his satisfaction, and that it was not so done.

It seems only fair to Judge Pratt that your readers should not be misled, for the cases are very plain, and the comments made on them show the advantage of

reading more than the head-notes.

Respectfully,

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THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, Oct. 12, 1886.

Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Arthur V. Briesen, appellant, v. Long Island R. Co., respondent; Louis Bajus, respondent, v. Syracuse, Binghamton & New York R. Co., appel

lant; Anna N. Dwight et al., executors, respondents, v. Germania Life Ins. Co., appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs-James S. Morton, respondent, v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. et al., appellants; Robert W. Gleason, respondent, v. James W. Smith.--Judg. ment of General Term reversed, and judgment of ion; that judgment be settled before the judge who Special Term modified in accordance with the opinwrites in the case. Neither party to have costs of appeal to the General Term of the Supreme Court or to this court as against the other-Margaret I. Wilmerding, appellant, v. John McKesson, respondent.Motion for reargument denied with costs-Henry Wehle, appellant, v. Albert Karutz, respondent.Denied with costs-Isabella R. Clute, respondent, v. Jacob Knies et al., appellants.-Motion to amend remittitur granted without costs-People, ex rel. Augustus N. Weller, respondent, v. Charles DeKay Townsend, appellant.-Motion to correct calendar granted without costs-Bessie J. Cuming, an infant, respondent, v. Brooklyn City R. Co., appellant.-Motion for leave to withdraw appeal denied without costs-Erastus S. Prosser, respondent, v. First National Bank of Buffalo, appellant.-Motion to advance cause denied without costs-Syracuse Water Co., appellant, v. City of Syracuse, respondent; Syracuse Water Co., appellant, v. Central City Water Works, respondent.-Motion to dismiss appeal granted under section 191 of the Code of Civil Procedure with costs--Bridget Mulcahy, respondent, v. Francis C. Devlin, appellant.-Motion to dismiss appeal denied without costs-Mary v. Weidmer, respondent, v. New York Elevated R. Co., appellant. Motion to dismiss appeal granted with costs of appeals, but without costs of motions-J. Daniel Ackerman et al., appellants, v. Marcus Braunstein, respondent; Julius M. Wile et al., appellants, v. Same; David A. Sahliem v. Same. -Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with costs to one appeal and $10 costs of motion-In re Application of City of Rochester, appellant, to acquire water rights of George R. Smith et al.

The Albany
Albany Law
Law Journal.

THE

ALBANY, OCTOBER 23, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HE autumnal legal campaign opens with several encouraging or interesting events. Foremost among these in our State is the affirmance of the conviction of Jaehne. It is fortunate that the appellate court were able to come to this conclusion, for it would have been disheartening to see the prisoner gaining another chance on a vexatious technicality. We regret however that the rest of the "boodle" aldermen are likely to have an unmolested journey to Canada at the expense of their bail. The denial of a new trial for the Chicago anarchists is also a good step toward justice, although we regret to say not the final one. We take no pleasure in hangings, but really these wretches deserve the immortality of infamy which they seem to court. It will be a sorry day for our country if they do not hang. In the celebrated Dwight insurance case the Court of Appeals have granted a new trial, which may be pronounced an interesting if not an encouraging fact. Certainly the insolvent Colonel Dwight was a fortunate man to be able to

get such a vast amount of life insurance, pay only one premium, and then so easily walk himself to death. Against these items must be set off the pardon of the boycotters by Governor Hill. The governor certainly states some plausible reasons for his action, the most convincing of which is that the district attorney advised it. We have confidence in his discretion. The ignorance of the offenders is a much less cogent reason, for they must have known that they were doing a grossly unjust, if not an illegal act. But they were probably the tools of bad and designing men. At all events the community are now warned that such conspiracies are crimes, and must not expect to be rescued by the executive arm in future. Meantime the boycotters are out of durance in ample time to vote for judge of the Court of Appeals! Then there is Governor Tilden's will with a probable contest. Certainly the trust in the will is very loose and indefinite, and if held invalid will afford another proof of the value of advice.

It is probable that next to the bureau for the protection of the interests of workingmen, which organizes strikes and dictates boycotts, the "Salvation Army" business is the most successful fraud of the present time, which thrives by appealing to ignorance, bigotry and prejudice. The officers of these two precious organizations undoubtedly make a fat living. The "Salvation Army" people have a rule, it seems, which prohibits marriage among their officers. This order, as given in the daily papers, provides: "That in future no sanction will be given to courting or any engagement of any male lieutenant. He must get promoted to the rank of VOL. 34-No. 17.

captain before any thing of the kind can be recognized. No captain is to expect head-quarters consent to his marriage, either, after two years' service or more, unless he has proved himself an efficient and successful officer, and is backed by his divisional officer, who, in consenting to his marriage, must agree to give him three stations. In future no marriage will be agreed to by head-quarters unless we have consented to the engagement at least twelve months before." The Solicitors' Journal says of this: "The 'staff-council' can hardly have been aware that according to English law any contract in general restraint of marriage is absolutely void; and that any engagement by a 'male lieutenant' or 'captain' not to 'court' or marry, will not be worth the paper on which it is written. But if a solicitor had been at hand before the order was promulgated he could probably have indicated a less objectionable mode of wording the order, and also a mode in which a valid contract, sufficient for the purposes of the 'staff-council,' might be constructed. Contracts in partial restraint of marriage are valid, however large may be the class alliance with any of whom is prohibited. Thus the Court of King's Bench, eighty years ago, held that a condition against marriage with a Scotchman was valid. Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East, 170. Vice-Chancellor Hall held that a condition against marriage with any person who did not profess the Jewish religion was good. Hodgson v. Halford, L. R., 11 Ch. D. 959. And the last of the vice-chancellors has recently decided that a condition against marriage with any person 'being, or ever having been a domestic sermarked, it was competent for the person indicated vant,' was valid, for, as he characteristically re

in the condition to choose a wife from the whole female world except only that portion of it which comprises domestic servants.' Jenner v. Turner, 29 W. R. 99. It would seem easy therefore to frame an agreement, to be entered into by 'male lieutenants' and 'captains,' which should bind them not to marry any of the various classes of persons mentioned in the schedule thereunder written; and by including in such schedule 'the whole female world,' except daughters, sisters, aunts or cousins lujah lasses,' the object in view would probably be of any member of the 'staff-council,' being 'Halleaccomplished. We may add that any undertakings by amorous 'male lieutenants' or 'captains' to render services to the 'staff-council'in consideration of facilities for marriage, will apparently convert that sublime body into proxenetæ or match-makers. The civil law looked with some favor on persons who stipulated for reward in promoting marriages, but our courts from a very early period have treated such contracts as utterly void."

We are advised, by Gibson's Law Notes, of a new organization for the collection of debts, which rivals the well-known "black-list" scheme which is much used in this country, and which has been denounced by the law journals. The new scheme is described as follows: "The old-fashioned system

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