lacy of the Defendant's argument consists in treating this suit as a suit for a legacy. Now, the fund ceased to bear the character of a legacy, as soon as it assumed the character of a trust fund. Suppose the fund had been given by the will to any body else, as a trustee, and not to the executor; it would then be clearly the case of a breach of trust. In this case, the executor, when he severed the legacy from the general personal estate, could not pay it over to any other person; he was bound by the direction of the testator to hold it upon certain trusts until the legatee attained twenty-four. What he would have done by paying it to a trustee, he has done, by severing it from the testator's property, and appropriating it to the particular purpose pointed out by the will. It is impossible to consider that the executor, so acting, is acting as an executor: he has all this while been acting as a trustee. This suit must be considered, not as a suit for a legacy, but as a suit to compel a party to account for a breach of trust; and it is clear, therefore, that it is not within the terms of the act in question. (a) There is room, perhaps, for considerable doubt, whether the act above referred to extends to any legacies which are not charged upon land. The title of the act relates solely to land; and so, apparently, do all its provisions, except the words in the fortieth section above cited, with respect to the recovery of legacies, and similar words in the forty-second section, with respect to the re Motion refused with costs. (a) covery of interest upon legacies, the See some observations upon scope of the act, in Paget v. Foley, 2 Bing. N. S. 679. 1837. PHILLIPO v. MUNNINGS A Barrister, IN this case, two petitions had been presented to the Lord Chancellor, under the seventy-first section of who was also a Member of Parliament, appeared before a Mas a petition himself and the act 5 & 6 W. 4. c. 76, for the regulation of municipal corporations, praying that proper persons might ter, as counsel be appointed trustees of certain charities at Ludlow: in support of and by an order made by the Lord Chancellor upon presented by both petitions, and bearing date the 20th of August 1836, others; and it was referred to the Master in attendance during the he afterwards addressed a vacation, to appoint proper persons to be trustees of letter to the the charity estates and property, late vested in or under Master, which was expressed the administration of the corporation of Ludlow, or any in threatening of the members thereof in that character, which were affected by the seventy-first section of the act of parliament. terms, and the tendency of which was to induce the Master to alter the opinion he was supposed to have formed upon the case; and he subsequently wrote a letter to the Lord Edmund Lechmere Charlton, Esquire, one of the Members of Parliament for the borough of Ludlow, and a barrister, was one of the petitioners by whom one of the petitions was presented; and in the prosecution of the order, he attended as counsel, on behalf of his co-petitioners Chancellor, in and himself, before Master Brougham, who sat for the vacation Master. After some proceedings had been taken, both Master Brougham and Mr. Charlton left town, and Mr. Charlton subsequently addressed to Master Brougham the following letter: — which he avowed the authorship of the letter to the Master. The Lord Chancellor committed him to the Fleet, during pleasure. "Ludford, 24th October 1836. "Sir, I am informed by my solicitor, that the inclosed memoranda appear on the statement of facts submitted 1836. Mr.LECHMERE Case. submitted to you in the case of the Ludlow charities, which induced your clerk to say, that he believed that the trustees were appointed. Permit me to say, this CHARLTON'S is exceedingly unfair; nay more, it is practising a deception on me that is unwarrantable, and which entitles me to call on you for an explanation; in doing which, I hope I shall not exceed the limits that are allowed to a gentleman who feels himself to have been undeservedly aggrieved. As a mere barrister, advocating the cause of my clients, I question if I have any right to dispute, in this stage of the business, your authority, your law, or your decision, in a private communication, as there is another tribunal open to me for appeal; but, in the present case, I maintain that I am justified in adopting this mode of proceeding, because you have in these notes that are ascribed to you, either stated what is not true, or you have drawn conclusions from my statements and affidavits, which are at variance with the facts, and which, directly or indirectly, cast an imputation on my character as an advocate, or as a gentleman. First, with respect to the word settled,' I assert that the matter was not settled, and I have your authority for saying it was not settled. You told me, and I dare you to deny it, that if my reply would take up a long time, you must defer it; and you must recollect that it was only on this express understanding, that I refused to depart without having your permission to take out another warrant, which you allowed. With what propriety then, I ask, did you write the word 'settled?' But let me remind you of another circumstance. Mr. Romilly made a long speech to prove that the estate derived from Edward the Sixth was for corporate' as well as for charitable' pur 6 semblance of proof, was in evidence in support of this assertion 1836. Case. assertion, save and except a single sentence in the report of the charity commissioners, which, so far from bearMr.LECHMERE CHARLTON'S ing out the assertion of Mr. Downes and the logic of Mr. Romilly, proves, if it proves anything, directly the reverse of what they would infer. Well, when Mr. Romilly had done, and proposed his pure disinterested squad for trustees, did you not say Let us first go into the question of the merits of the respective trustees proposed by each side; after which you' (addressing yourself to me) will have the opportunity of replying as to the proper disposal of the estate in question?' That reply I have never had; it was deferred at your own request, because you said you had no time to hear it, if it would take up much time. With what propriety or justice, then, do you say that the question at issue is 'settled?' And now to your other memoranda. You assign two reasons for not appointing any members of the old corporation, which, if they are intelligible, (and it is really with some difficulty that I make them out) are untrue. You say that the deeds, &c. were deposited in the Ludlow bank, under the advice of Mr. Serjeant Merewether, and that I admitted it to be true. I say I did no such thing. Read the report in the Times newspaper, the reporter of which was happily present to confirm the accuracy of my statements. Mr. Serjeant Merewether merely advised that the books and deeds which related to the charity property should not be given to the new council. It was the old corporation, in their capacity of trustees, that deposited the property confided to their care in that place that was most secure from any lawless violence that the rabble may attempt. You next refer to my affidavit as the ground on which you refuse to make any of the old corporators trustees, which is unfair and unjust towards me. My affidavit goes to prove that the old corporators, as trustees of the charity estate 1836. Mr.LECHMERE Case. estate under the Municipal Act, did no more than fulfil the trust reposed in them without fear or favour; and I defy you to point out a passage that impugns their CHARLTON'S past conduct or their eligibility for the future. I now come to your ' addition.' You assert that the old corporation are in contempt.' This is not true; and I need only recal to your recollection what passed, to satisfy you that it is not true. I stated that I was prepared in the first instance, to maintain, among other reasons to which I should advert, that they were not in contempt, because Mr. Downes, by adding what he had to your order without your permission, had weakened, if he had not destroyed, its effect. I stated that I had in my possession affidavits from the parties concerned, which they had left to my discretion to produce or not to produce as I thought fit; and I was proceeding in my argument, when Mr. Romilly interrupted me, and remarked he would pass the subject over for the present; in reply to which I said, I would not agree to such an arrangement; that is, that he should pass it over altogether, or he should then proceed with the charge. You then interposed and said, that it appeared better to pass it over altogether, as you understood that the business could proceed without the papers in question; and it was on this understanding, namely, that it should be passed over altogether, that the matter proceeded. With what propriety then, I ask, do you assert that the old corporation are in contempt'? It is, however, on these grounds that you say you have named none of the old corporators as the new trustees, when there is not a shadow of blame imputed to them in the affidavits; and in the inferences. that you have drawn, you are wholly unsupported by facts. And who is it that you propose to appoint in their places? Every one of the persons recommended by the new council, to the number of ten, every one of the |