The Mayor, &c. Savannah vs. Hartridge. 2 Speers, 729 to 735. 4 Hill, N. Y. 83, 4. 4 Peters, 168. 1 Halsted, 352. 1 Blackf. 336. 1 McLean, 41. 16 Peters, 447. 12 Mass. 252. 17 Ib. 461. Ang. & Ames, 373. Dudley, Ga. 132. 1 McMullan, 413. 6 John. 93. 1 Hill's S. C. Rep. 36. 1 McCord, 346. 3 McCord, 374. 1 Nott & Mc C. 527, 8. at Large of S. C. pp. 366, 414, 487, 497, 529, 628. 671. Frederick vs. The City Council, 5 Ga. Rep. 561. 26.8. By the Court.-LUMPKIN, J. delivering the opinion. Statutes 2 Bailey, 12 Mass. This writ of error is brought to test the validity of an ordinance of the corporation of Savannah, laying a tax upon income; and the single question I propose to discuss is, Have the Mayor and Aldermen of that City the power, under their charter, to impose this tax? It will not be disputed that income is a legitimate subject of taxation. The State of Georgia, in the exercise of its law-making power, may assess such a tax, and may delegate the authority to do so to a municipal corporation. The only inquiry here is, Has the right been conferred in the present instance? Now, the burden is upon the corporation to show the grant, by express words, or necessary implication. For, otherwise, it cannot be justified in the exercise of this high prerogative of sovereignty, of taxing private property without the consent of the owner. We will proceed, then, to examine, in their chronological order, the several Acts of the Legislature, passed in reference to this subject, to ascertain what taxing power has been bestowed by the Legislature upon this corporation. There are four Statutes upon this subject; the first, the Act of 1787, (Mar. & Crawford, 121;) the second, the Act of 1805, (Clayton, 243;) the third, the Consolidation Act of 1825, (Dawson, 464;) and the fourth, the Act of 1838, (Pamphlet Laws, p. 64.) It is conceded that these Acts are all in force; and, consequently, if the power is in either of them, it may be rightfully exercised by the Mayor and Alder men. The 4th section of the Act of 1787 provides, "that it shall and may be lawful for the said Wardens, or a majority of them, yearly and every year, and oftener, if occasion may require, to make, lay and assess one or more rate or rates, assessment or `assess The Mayor, &c. Savannah vs. Hartridge. ments, upon all and every person or persons, who do or shall in- ́ habit, hold, use or occupy, possess or enjoy any lot, ground, houses or place, building, tenement or hereditament, in any square, street or place, within the limits of the Town of Savannah, or hamlets thereof, for raising such sum or sums of money as the said Wardens, or a majority of them, shall, in their discretion, judge necessary for and towards carrying this Act into execu tion." The construction of this Act came directly before the Convention of Judges, in the case of the Bank of the State of Georgia vs. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, in 1832, (Dudley, 136;) and that able Bench there held, that the Act of 1787, "authorized a tax only upon lots of ground or buildings within the City, or upon persons, in respect to this species of property, by reason of their owning, occupying or inhabiting the same." This interpretation we believe to be correct; and the procurement of the passage of the subsequent Acts of 1805, authorizing a tax upon "all persons and property," and of 1825, to tax "all real and personal estate,” is conclusive that the corporation itself put this restrictive meaning upon its own powers under the previous charter. We conclude, then, that the power to tax income is not found in this Act. The 1st section of the next Act, of 1805, authorizes the Mayor and Aldermen to raise and establish a regular watch, and for the purposes of paying and maintaining the same, the second section declares that they may "assess and levy an annual tax on all persons and property within the said City, liable to pay tax, by the general tax law." Here it is admitted, power is conferred to tax all persons and property; but the power to tax property, is expressly limited to such property as was liable to pay tax, by the general tax laws of the State. But income was not liable to pay tax, by the general tax laws of the State, in 1805; nor, indeed, at any other time. Therefore, the power to tax income, was not included in this grant. The 7th section of the Act of 1825, authorizes the Mayor and Aldermen, for certain purposes therein enumerated, to raise any sum or sums of money, "by a poll tax, or by tax and assessment, upon all real and personal estate, within the corporate limits of the City."" Does this power to tax property, generally, The Mayor, &c. Savannah vs. Hartridge. here denominated real and personal estate, confer the right to tax income? [1] The subject of taxation has been, very properly, divided into three classes-capitation, property and income; and this distinction is recognized, not only by all writers on political economy, but in the general tax laws of all Governments and when one, or more, is mentioned, or treated of, the other is never intended. And the point to be decided is, not whether income may not, possibly, be comprehended under the general name of property, but whether such is its meaning, and such was the design of the Legislature, in this Act? [2.] I am aware that it has been held in South Carolina, that the City Council of Charleston, under their charter, to make assessments on the inhabitants of Charleston, or those who hold taxable property within the same, have authority to tax income and very properly; for income is taxable property by the gener al tax laws of that State-and had been, if we mistake not, from the first Act upon the subject, in 1777, down to 1783, the year when the charter to the City of Charleston was passed. But, in Georgia, notwithstanding the mind of the Legislature has been, at each successive session, intensely occupied with this most exciting and engrossing topic, to-wit, the best mode of raising taxes; still, up to the year 1825, and even to the present period, the State has never adopted the policy of gathering taxes from pursuits and employments. And if she has not seen fit to tax the commissions of executors and administrators, in any other part of our widely extended limits, why should she delegate this power, to be exercised over this class of citizens, in the City of Savannah? I can readily conceive, that there may be local subjects of taxation, which would not apply to any other place or section, or any other portion of our people; but this is not true of callings, common to all; and to warrant such a supposition, the power thus claimed should most manifestly appear to have been delegated. Nothing short of express words or unavoidable inference, will answer the purpose. The history of the legislation in the State, in reference to the subject matter of a particular Statute, may be referred to, as tending to aid in the construction to be given to the Statute. Henry vs. Tilson, 17 Vermt. R, 479.. [3.] But when we scrutinize closely other portions of this Act, we are fully pursuaded, that the Législature did not intend to in The Mayor, &c. Savannah vs. Hartridge. clude income, under the grant to tax "real and personal estate.” By subsequent sections of the Act of 1825, the regulation of taverns and granting licenses, taxing vendue masters and peddlers, and persons yending goods, wares and merchandize, in the City, are powers specifically conferred. But this would have been unnecessary, if, under the general grant to tax all' real and personal estate in the previous section, the corporation had the power to tax all private business. "We apprehend it cannot be pretend. ed," say the Convention of Judges, in the case already cited, "that under a general power to tax real and personal estate, the City acquired a right to tax offices, professions and employments of every description; and it was not the legislative understanding, as is manifested from the special authority given in the same Act, to tax particular occupations. The distinction is clear and sound between what may be properly and strictly considered property, and rights and interests which are only the sources of emoluments and profits, and from which property may be derived." Dudley, 137, 138. Again. There is a locality given to the real and personal estate to be taxed. It must be within the corporate limits of the Citythat is, visible possessions; and by the repetition of the same terms, in the very next section, a key is furnished to the understanding of the Legislature, in the use of the words, "real and personal estate." In construing Statutes, Courts will look to the language of the whole Act, and take it for granted, that the same expressions import the same sense, whenever they occur in the same Act, unless there be something which requires them to be used in a different meaning. Now, in the very next section (8th) power is given to the City of Savannah, and the hamlets thereof, "to purchase any real or personal estate, for the use and benefit of the corporation." Here, undoubtedly, income was not intended to be included in the expression, real and personal estate; hence, we infer, that it was not in the mind of the law-maker, when the same phraseology was employed in the preceding section. Taking the two sections together, we cannot resist the belief, that it was the design of the Legislature to authorize a tax merely on real and personal property, which was visible-which was located within the City-and which, too, was the subject matter of sale and transfer. Such are the words, in their ordinary sense, and such the spirit of the Act. The Mayor, &c. Savannah vs. Hartridge. [4.] This may be thought a close construction of the charter; but when we recollect that, in the construction of Statutes made in favor of corporations or particular persons, and in derogation of common right, care should be taken not to extend them beyond their express words, or their clear import: 4 Mass. Rep. 145. Ib. 473. 2 Cowen, 42. - [5.] And that Statutes which impose restrictions upon trade or common occupations, and which levy an excise or tax upon them, must be construed strictly: 9 Pick. 414. 16.] And that Statutes, levying duties or taxes upon subjects or citizens, are to be construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor of their subjects or citizens; and their provisions are not to be extended, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used: 3 Story, 369. [7.] And that revenue laws are neither remedial Statutes nor laws founded upon any permanent public policy, and are not, therefore, to be literally construed :- ¿ bèra cu [8.] And hence, whenever there is a just doubt, that doubt should absolve the tax-payer from his burden: 1b. We will hold that the Legislature intended nothing beyond what their language, in its fair and usual meaning, will indicate; and, if the terms of their enactment have not embraced the object contended for, the power is with them, by additional Act or Acts, to extend them. The construction which would confound income with property in a tax law, is quite too refined and subtle, when designed to operate upon the public at large, and where they are supposed to be used in the senses belonging to the popular language of common life and every-day business." In construing these several Statutes, we have confined our examination to the subject matter only. But we must not overlook the objects for which the taxing power is conferred; for, while the Legislature may have been willing to grant the right to tax, for one purpose, it may have refused to bestow it for another and different object. Hence, we find that each of the three Acts which we have had under consideration, are limited as to the objects for which the tax authorized to be levied was to be imposed. - The Act of 1787 empowered the assessment of the taxes therein specified, "to carry into effect such regulations as might be conducive to the good order and government of the Town of Savannah, and the hamlets thereof." The Act of 1805, was "to assess and |