Mr. AUTRY. Mr. Attorney General, this is a quote from the office of the American Trial Lawyers Association:

The real source of discrimination in jury service

And I think he is speaking of economic discrimination especially— stems from the severe economic burden which falls on the working man and family man who puts his employment and income in jeopardy by the requirement that he serve for 30 days.

Even the $20 per diem is not enough in certain cases to alleviate this hardship. The suggestion is that we reduce service to 1 week or the completion of one case. Do you have any comment on that? Attorney General KATZENBACH. One week minimum or the completion of one case?

Mr. AUTRY. The point is that the juror

Attorney General KATZENBACH. I see the point of it, but what I cannot honestly answer is what that would do in certain districts, whether this would involve such a rapid turnover of jurors in some of the major districts that I do not know what the effect of that would be. We thought 30 days was a pretty reasonable minimum figure. I think my inclination would be that 1 week was too little. I think there could be compromises in between those two.

I might just make a comment on the blue-ribbon point. You could have, by educational requirements, some blue-ribbon effect that could be left to the State. You could require certain educational requirements, as long as they did not bite too deeply into economic status and raise the suggestion that you were discriminating on that score. So in that sense we eliminate it from the Federal system, I do not make too flat an answer in terms of elimination in the State system because objectively applied, educational criteria could be used. Mr. AUTRY. A college education, for instance.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. Could be used in the selection of a jury, as long as in that respect it was not a device used to exclude people because of economic status or race, or something of that kind. Mr. AUTRY. A college education, for instance, would be an objective device for a State.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. I would think that would be going too far.

Mr. AUTRY. Too far.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. It would be eliminating a tremendous amount of your population when you do that.

Mr. AUTRY. The official who intends to testify for the American Trial Lawyers Association in favor of title I, and I think title II also, informs us that he may testify to the effect that he is a member of the bar of both Connecticut and Florida, and that although there is no purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in either State, that there is effective discrimination on the basis of race, but that is probably worse in Connecticut than it is in Florida.

You do not have any surveys or information on the States other than those which you have already provided the subcommittee, do you?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. No. I think Florida was one of the States in there. Mr. AUTRY. Florida was; yes.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. The Negro population in Connecticut is quite small.

Mr. AUTRY. In the cities?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. Yes; it really is quite small, the percentage is really quite small, smaller than I had thought it was when I looked at the actual figures.

Mr. AUTRY. Mr. Attorney General, I think that concludes it, and I am awfully sorry I had to detain you, and I do appreciate your staying and being so courteous.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, June 9, 1966.)

CIVIL RIGHTS

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2 p.m., in room 2228, New Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., presiding. Present: Senators Ervin, Smathers, and Javits.

Also present: George Autry, chief counsel; H. Houston Groome, Lawrence M. Baskir, and Lewis W. Evans, counsel; and John Baker, minority counsel.

Senator ERVIN. The subcommittee will come to order.

I believe counsel has a statement to make with reference to the inability of Senator Hart, who was scheduled to be the first witness, to appear at this time. I will ask counsel to make that statement, and then we will hear from Senator Douglas.

Mr. AUTRY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The first witness originally scheduled for today was Senator Hart, who is the principal sponsor of the administration bill. However, because of his duties today on the floor as manager of another important bill, he has been rescheduled as the first witness for tomorrow morning. Therefore the first witness today will be the Honorable Paul Douglas, Senator from the State of Illinois.

Senator ERVIN. Senator, we will hear your statement at this time. I express the hope on the part of both of us that we won't have any more voting interruptions until you have an opportunity to finish your statement, because I understand you have to go to Illinois as soon as you reasonably can.

Senator DOUGLAS. I will try to give adequate time to the grueling cross-examination which I know I will experience.

Senator ERVIN. Well, sir, I will promise you here and now that I will refrain from cross-examination.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL H. DOUGLAS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Senator DOUGLAS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I am here today to testify on behalf of S. 2923 which I and 20 of our colleagues introduced as early as February 10.

In the areas where S. 2923 overlaps in subject matter with the administration bill (S. 3296), of which I am also a co-sponsor, I believe on the whole that the provisions of S. 2923 are superior. There are some provisions in our bill which are not in the administration bill and our group urgently believes that these should be included in a

meaningful civil rights bill this year. It is possible that the administration bill has copied some of the features of our earlier bill; if so, we are pleased.

In addition, in the administration bill, one provision-title IV; namely, that on housing is not a part of our bill, and I am also here to testify on behalf of that provision of the administration bill. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that we hope we can essentially pass the main provisions of S. 2923, plus the main features of the housing provisions of the administration bill.

The major provisions of our bill include (1) first of all, (title I sec. 101) the improvement of jury selection in Federal courts so as to avoid discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, religious or political affiliation, or economic or social status-in other words, so that juries may represent a true cross section of the population.

Secondly, (title I, secs. 105, 106, 107 and 108) where people have been systematically excluded from grand or petit juries on grounds of race or color in a State or local court and where a showing and proof of such systematic exclusion can be made, then the provisions of the Federal jury selection can apply to the State and local courts, by action of the Federal district courts.

Third, the bill provides (title II, secs. 201 and 206) for the Federal courts to have jurisdiction over certain crimes and trials arising out of civil rights cases where this is necessary to make certain that the Constitution of the United States is carried out. I do not find any equivalent protection in the administration bill and I regard this as vital, although title V of the administration bill, which was added at a later moment than the advance release, does attempt to deal with this matter. We also, under our bill, amend the United States Code to broaden Federal offenses in the area of civil rights (sec. 207).

The bill also provides for civil preventive relief, in the form of injunction, to those who exercise their rights under the 14th amendment (title III, secs. 301-303). The purpose of this provision is to provide for protection in advance of police or private violations against those who are attempting to assert their lawful and constitutional rights. In other words, we would not wait until the crime is committed, but would try to prevent the crime in advance by obtaining a restraining order before a Federal court.

In addition, the bill provides for the removal of defendants from State to Federal courts where it can be shown that there is a segregated and discriminatory system of justice. Later, Mr. Chairman, I will speak about the objective criteria which we attempt to lay down to determine whether or not there is a segregated and discriminatory system of justice.

Our bill also provides for civil indemnification awards where those who are exercising their lawful and constitutional rights can be compensated for injury to them or their property.

Finally, our bill extends the FEPC provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to State and local government units and, especially, to those State and local government units administering justice. These are just a bare summary of the major provisions of our bill.

Now, let me return to the need for and a more detailed description of our bill.

I believe that all of us had hoped, when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were passed, that those

acts would be the last for a rather long period of time and that it would not be necessary for Congress to pass any more legislation in the field of civil rights in the immediate future.

But what has unfortunately happened is that, despite the judicial findings of the Federal courts, and despite the affirmations by Congress in the form of legislation, it has become extremely difficult for individuals to advocate their constitutional rights in certain sections of the South. In fact, over a large portion of the country, men and women do not feel free in asserting their legal and constitutional rights.

It is not my purpose today to call the roll of the brutalities and murders which have been committed, nor cite the instances in which juries have refused to convict when the evidence would seem to the outsider to be clear, nor to go into too much detail and discussion of the composition of those juries and of the influences which were being brought to bear upon them.

I have assembled a large number of such cases and, if challenged, they can be submitted. But in the over 17 years in which I have debated this issue in the Senate, ever since I joined our body in 1949, and in the years that I have discussed this issue in virtually every section of the country, I have been careful not to use any language which might inflame the passions or set one race against another or one section of the country against another.

I know that this is a real world, and that passions exist and that injustices occur, and, as a human being, I, like the vast majority of my fellow Americans, feel keenly about these issues. However, I believe we have been successful in conducting the discussion in the Senate on the basis of logic, with a minimum appeal to the emotionarousing instances which could be enumerated at great length.

Nevertheless, we as Senators cannot pretend to be ignorant of what as men we know is real. We read the newspapers. We read the newspapers. We have friends over the country. We talk to aggrieved parties. We have friends in the South. And so we know what has been going on. What has

been happening is that there is a matter of great risk, in certain sections of the South-I do not say in all-for people to assert their constitutional rights, and it is excessively difficult, even when the case is overwhelming, to get action in State courts, and sometimes in Federal courts.

Those are the clear facts of the situation. They can be documented in great detail. I am not indicting any section of the country. country. The great crime of slavery-and for that crime we have been paying for a century after the abolition of slavery-has poisoned the relationships of people, not merely in the South, but over wide areas of the rest of the country as well. I have often said that in the North and West as well as in the South that if the situations were reversed the people in the North would not behave any better than the people in the South and would, in all probability, have acted in a similar way. The bill, which 21 of us introduced, is a relatively simple bill. It is designed to assure due process of law and the equal protection of the laws where crimes of intimidation, violence, and murder against Negroes and civil rights workers lawfully seeking to enforce the Constitution now go unpunished. I emphasize the words "lawfully seeking to enforce the Constitution."