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Crabtree vs. Green.
and 4 Dall. Penn. R. 232, and 2 Dall. 271. Upon these views, we sustain the Court below on the 6th and 10th exeeptions.
The seventh exception was not pressed, and requires no opinion.
18.] The eighth secks to convict the Court below of error, because he refused to hold that the award should be set aside, because it does not describe the land awarded to the plaintiff, with sufficient certainty. The award describes it as part of the land set forth in the plaintiff's declaration, and in the possession of the defendant, by meies and bounds, by landmarks and contiguous possessions, and a map of it accompanies the award. What more could be done? The description is minute, intelligible, and quite sufficient for identification.
[9.] The ninth and last exception, claims the umpirage bad, because the umpire did not decide upon all the matters submitted. The plaintiff, as before stated, being in possession of two hundred acres, less a small part of it, which was in possession of the defendant, brought ejeetment for the whole, and all the matters involved in this suit were submitted. The umpire awarded the small portion, in the possession of the defendant, to the plaintiff, without saying to whom the large remainder belonged, and therefore, says. the plaintiff in error, the award did not pass upon all the matters submitted, and is illegal. The terms of the submission embraced all matters in difference between the parties to the suit, and in relation thereto. Because the plaintiff's declaration went for two hundred acres, it does not necessarily follow that the parties were in difference about all of that land. A plaintiff may sue in ejectment for five thousand acres, and submit proof as to, and recover only five. But in fact, the small amount of land awarded to the plaintiff, was the only matter, so far as the lands are concerned, in difference. To whom that belonged, was the actual question. The possession of the remainder being in the plaintiff-his title pot denied, but admitted by the defendant's counsel-it remained, after the award, precisely in statu quo. An award concerning that, would have been supererogatory. The rule clearly is, that the award must comprehend every thing submitted, and must not be of parcel only. If, indeed, the letter of the submission here embraced all the land, still this award is good; for the rule, as above, is subject to this limitation, to wit: If the words of the submission be more comprehensive than those of the award, yet if it do not appear that any thing else was in dispute between the parThe Mayor, &c. Savannah vs. Hartridge. ties, besides what is comprehended in the award, it will be good. As, if ibe submission be of all actions, personal and real, and tho award be of actions, personal only, it shall be presumed that no actions, real, were pending between the parties. Kyd, 172. Jackson vs. Ambler, 14 Johns. R. 105, 106.. 8 Coke, 98. 19 H. 6, 6, b. Rol. Arb. L. 5. The land awarded to plaintiff, and that alone, was in dispute between these parties. This is manifest in this, that counsel of defendant admitted on the record, that the title to the lands was in Green, in this, that the evidence before the arbitrators was confined to the mere strip, and in this, that the statements of the arbitrators have reference to that only. The case, therefore, falls within the limitations of the rule.
Let the judgment below be affirmed.
No. 3,–Tue Mayor, &c. Savannah, plaintiffs in error, t's.
CHARLES HARTRIDGE, defendant.
[1.] Taxation, in reference to the subject matter, is divided by writers on
political economy, as well as the tax laws of all governments, into three .classes--capitation, property and income; and where one or more is treat
ed of or acted upon, the other is never intended.  The bistory of the legislation of the State, in reference to a particular
subject matter of taxation, may be referred to, as tending to aid in the co struction to be given to the Statute; and where the State has never taxed income, the power to do so in a corporation, most appear by express words
or anayoidable implication. [3.] A charter, anthorizing a municipal torporation to tax real and personal
estate, does not, necessarily, confer' the right to tax income. [4.] In the construction of Statutes made in favor of corporations or particu
lar persons, and in derogation of common right, care should be taken not
to extend them beyond their direct terms or their clear import. [5.] Statutes which impose restrictions upon trade, or common occupations,
must be construed strictly. [6.] Statutes levying taxes should be construed most strongly against thre
Government and in favor of the citizen.
The Mayor, &c. Savannah os, Hartridge.
[7.] Revenue Statutes arc, in uo just sense, remedial laws, audare not, there
fore, to be liberally consirued. [8.] In laws imposing taxes, if there be a real doubt whether the inten
tion of the Act was to levy the tax, that doubt should absolve the tax-payer. [9.] Retrospective Siatutes are forbidden by the first principles of justice.« Certiorari, in Chaiham Superior Court. Decided by. Judge
, FLEMING, June, 1819.
By an ordinance of the Mayor and Council of Savannah, passed 11th November, 1842, a tax was imposed as follows: “Upon all gross income derived from commissions (whether ordinary or guaranty commissions) charged on purchases or sales of any articles whatever, on procuring or collecting freights, on receiving or forwarding goods, on all money negotiations, on the purchase or sale of stocks, or other evidences of debt, on commissions res ceived as executor or executrix, or administrator-or administratrix, and also upon ilie profiis or income arising from the pursuit of any faculty, profession or calling, (the clergy and schoolmasters, excepted) there shall be paid a tax of two and a half per cent. on the gross amount of said liil."
Under tris ordinance, Charles Hartridge returned for "commissions on purchases, &c. $11,248 ;” and having failed to pay the tax, execution issued. Hartridge filed an affidavit of illegality, on the ground that the ordinance was unauthorized by any of the Acts granting power to tax to ihe Council.
These Acts are as follows: The Act of 1787 granted power “to lay and assess one or more rate or rates, assessment or assessments, upon alfand every person or persons, whodo or shall inhabit, hold, use or occupy, possess or enjoy any lot, ground, houses or place, building, tenement or heriditament, in any square, street or place, within the limits of the Town of Savannah,” &c. The Act of 1805 grants power " to assess and levy an annual tax on all persons and property within the said City, liable to pay tax by the general tax laws." The Act of 1825, by the serenth section, grants power to raise money "by a poll tax, or by fax and assessment, upon all real and personal estate within the limits of the City.” By the fifteenth section, the Council are authorized to“ tax pedlers within the jurisdictional limits of the corporation of Savannah, and to tax all and every person or persons vending
The Mayor, &c. Savannah vs. Hartridge. any goods, wares or merchandize in the City of Savannah or hamlets thereof."
The Mayor and Aldermen, in Council, overruled the affidavit of illegality, and Hartridge carried the case before the Superior Court, hy certiorari. On hearing the certiorari, the same was sus: tained by the Court, and the decision of the Council reversed.
This decision is alleged as error.
S. COHEN, for plaintiff in error.
The Acts of the Legislature, viz: the Act of the 10th February, 1787, and the Act of 20 December, 1805, and the Act of 24th December, 1825, give to the corporation the right to enforce the tax in question. Marbury & Crawford, 121. Clayton, 243. Daroson, 464. • Defendant is a factor and vendor of goods, wares and merchandizė, and therefore liable to the tax. Clayton, 226, 229. Dawson, 420. Hotchkiss, 131, 132. . And that this is not a poll tax. '16 Peters, 435, 446.
Income is properly classed under the word property, and is, therefore, a snbject of taxation. 2 Blackstone, 103, 17. Linning vs. City Council of Charleston, 1 McCord, 345, 349. Bank of the State of Georgia vs. The Mayor and Aldermen, Dudley, 130, 131, 137. Portland Bank vs. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252, 6, 7. 16 Peters, 435, 445, 446. 3 McCord, 374, 5, 6.
The "charter of the City of Charleston authorizes the City Council “ to make assessments on the inhabitants of Charleston, or those who hold taxable property within the same," and it has been decided that this grant of power gives full power to tax all subjects of taxation. 1 Nott & McCord, 527, 28, 30. 1 M Cord, 245, 7, 8, 9.4 Wheaton, 429. 16 Peters, 435, 445. 3 McCord, 374, 5, 6. - And, finally, the Legislature, at its late session, has given a legislative interpretation to the various Acts of 1787, 1805, 1825, confirmatory of the power, and our own Supreme Court is liberal in its construction of City charters. 5 Kelly, 546, 561, 66, 67.
WARD (representing MCALLISTER) and Law, for defendants, cited :
The Mayor, &c. Savannah vs. Hartridge. 2 Speers, 729 to 735. . 4 Hill, N. Y. 83, 4. 4 Peters, 168. 1 Halsted, 352. 1 Blackf. 336. 1 McLean, 41, 16 Peters, 447.
. 12 Mass. 252. 17 Ib. 461. Ang. & Ames, 373. - Dudley, Ga. 132. 1 McMullan, 413. 6 John. 93. i Hill's S. C. Rep. 36. 1 McCord, 346. 3 McCord, 374. 1 Nott 8. McC, 527, 8. Statutes at Large of S. C. pp. 366, 414, 487, 497, 529, 628. 2 Bailey, 671. Frederick vs. The City Council, 5 Ga. Rep.561. 12 Massa 868.
By the Court.-LUMPKIN, J. delivering the opinion.
This writ of error is brought to test the validity of an ordinance of the corporation of Savannah, laying a tax upon income ; and the single question I propose to discuss is, Have the Mayor and Aldermen of that City the power, under their charter, to impose this tax?
It will not be disputed that income is a legitimate subject of taxation. The State of Georgia, in the exercise of its law-making power, may assess such a tax, and may delegate the authority to do so to a municipal corporation. The only inquiry here is, Has the right been conferred in the present instance ? Now, the burden is upon the corporation to show the grant, by express words, or necessary implication. For, otherwise, it cannot be justified in the exercise of this high prerogative of sovereignty, of taxing private property without the consent of the owner.
We will proceed, then, to examine, in their chronological order, the several Acts of the Legislature, passed in reference to this subject, to ascertain what taxing power has been bestowed by the Legislature upon this corporation. There are four Statutes upon this subject; the first, the Act of 1787, (Mar. & Crawford, 121;) the second, the Act of 1805, (Clayton, 243;) the third, the Consolidation Act of 1825, (Dawson, 464;) and the fourth, the Act of 1838, (Pamphlet Laws, p. 64.) It is conceded that these Acts are all in force; and, consequently, if the power is in either of them, it may be rightfully exercised by the Mayor and Aldermen.
The 4th section of the Act of 1787 provides, that it shall and may be lawful for the said Wardens, or a majority of them, yearly and every year, and oftener, if occasion may require, to make, lay and assess one or more rate or rates, assessment or assess