test; she accepted the fact when accomplished; she raised no discussion on the subject with the United States, nor even addressed a single observation to their Government. M. Guizot had accordingly felt surprised at the language used by the President in his message, and he had considered it his duty to claim in reply for France an entire independence of action. He next examined the commercial reasons which had induced France to recognise the independence of Texas in 1838, and rendered her anxious to maintain it in 1845. The political considerations had been of a still greater weight. There were at present, he said, three powerful nations intent on aggrandizing beyond measure their territories-England, Russia, and the United States. France was not extending her dominions. In Africa she had made a conquest it was her honour and interest to preserve, but the bounds of which she would not overstep. of the highest importance to France that those three nations should balance each other's power, and that none of them should obtain a preponderating influence. She was consequently interested in protecting the independence of the American States. M. Guizot then proceeded to explain the nature of the relations existing between England and France. They were placed, he said, on the most intimate footing, and he was happy and proud to declare it. The alliance of the two countries, their good understanding, their intimacy, were necessary for the preservation of the general peace. Their indifference towards each other would endanger its continuation. That intimacy had not impaired in the least the independence of the

It was

For the last

policy of France. five years it had existed entire, and it was only those utterly ignorant of the facts who could contest it. On every part of the globe where the policy of France and England had been at variance, in Africa, Spain, and Greece, France had freely and boldly followed the course pointed out by her interests, without compromising in the least the friendly relations between the two Governments, thanks to their intimacy. M. Thiers had declared that the two countries were displeased with each other. He (M. Guizot) contended that the two countries, so far from being displeased and irritated against each other, entertained, on the contrary, the most friendly feelings towards one another. (Some murmurs here arose on the Opposition benches, when M. Guizot, turning towards the Left, exclaimed, "You are not the country.") He then proceeded to enumerate the difficulties between England and France, which had been amicably adjusted, contrary to the expectation of the Opposition, amidst the applause of his friends in the Centre. M. Guizot then, reverting to American affairs, described the endeavours made by France to maintain peace. But if war should break out, the sole equitable, and useful policy, the only one conformable to the national interests, was that of neutrality. That policy would be beneficial to the cause of civilization and it would secure to France the blessings of peace and procure for her immense commercial and political advantages. The conduct of France had been in nowise hostile to the United States; she had taken no part against them, she had evinced a deter

mination to remain neutral, and would persist in that determination, because he considered it the most profitable, the wisest, the most honourable, and the best calculated to put a period to the war.

M. Billault, who rose to reply, began by contesting the commercial advantages accruing to France from the independence of Texas. The commercial relations between the two countries in 1845 had been, he said, confined to the exchange of two vessels; the quantity of cotton imported from Texas had only amounted to 53,000 kilogrammes, whilst France annually drew from the United States 57,000,000 kilogrammes of that article. The proceeds of the trade with Texas had been under 200,000 francs, whilst the commerce of France with the world exceeded 2,000,000,000 francs. M. Billault having asked M. Guizot what he should have done had Texas given herself to England?.

M. Guizot replied, that he should have held the same language, followed the same conduct, given the same advice, and stopped at the same point.

M. Billault then proceeded to describe the gigantic power of England, enumerating the military positions occupied by her in every sea and quarter of the world, and asked if the maritime balance of power was not actually destroyed by Great Britain? Ministers, however, were too desirous to preserve her alliance to venture a remonstrance on the subject. M. Billault next showed the interests of England and France everywhere at variance. The power of England depended, he said, on the development of her manufacturing, commercial, and maritime interests, and the day she found no markets

for the production of her industry, there would be an end to her power. He next adverted to the conduct of the Cabinet in American affairs, and contended that it had not exerted itself to reconcile the two parties, but had sided with England, to the great detriment of the interests of France.

The general discussion on the address terminated on the 23rd of January, and that on the separate paragraphs commenced. When the first paragraph was proposed,

M. Isambert moved the following addition after the word "prosperity:"

"By correcting, in our laws, enactments calculated to injure the regular development of those institutions, and by discussing the organic laws promised by the Charter of 1830, for the consolidation of those liberties.'

M. Isambert said, that the promises made in the charter of 1830, and sworn to at that period both by the Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom and the King of the French, had not been fulfilled. Ministerial responsibility was to this day an idle word; the law which was to have fixed the convocation of the electoral colleges in the chief towns of each department had not been presented; the country still awaited the law on individual liberty; the imperial law which prohibited twenty persons from meeting together without an authorization of the police was still in force; freedom of conscience was not guaranteed by any legal provision.

M. Corne supported the amendment, and imputed certain illegalities to the Prefect of the department of the Pas de Calais, by which a number of citizens had been deprived of their electoral rights.

M. Duchatel, the Minister of the Interior, contested the truth of M. Corne's assertions, and maintained that the prefect of that department was one of the most loyal and impartial functionaries in France.

After a few words from M. Corne in reply, the amendment of M. Isambert was put to the vote, and rejected by a considerable majority.

In the course of the discussion, an important paragraph was proposed by M. Berryer to be inserted in the Address. It referred to the unsatisfactory state of the relations between Great Britain and the United States, on account of the dispute about the Oregon territory. The amendment was as follows:

"Should peace be disturbed by the conflicting pretensions of two great nations, France will reserve to herself the mission of preventing all infringement on the principles of the public law, which protects, on the seas, the liberty and dignity of international relations.

M. Berryer, having ascended the Tribune, said that a few days before the opening of the Session, a document of the highest importance had been received, the message of the President of the United States, in which that exalted functionary declared that the right of the union over the contested territory of Oregon was absolute. The President next referred to the annexation of Texas, and complained of the conduct of France, the natural ally of the United States, and like them interested in defending the principle of the liberty of the seas, for joining England in such a question. The Speech of the Queen of Great Britain, on opening Parliament,

stated that the negotiations, relative to Oregon, had not yet been brought to a close; and M. Guizot, in a recent speech, delivered in the Chamber of Deputies, had declared that, in the event of a war between England and the United States, France should observe a strict neutrality, it being the only course becoming her dignity and conducive to her interests. Those declarations, made before the Parliaments of the three nations, he added, should not be passed over in silence, and it was to supply an omission in the Address that he had moved his amendment. M. Berryer then proceeded to examine the probable result of the difference existing between England. and America, and concluded that there was a probability of its not being amicably adjusted. France should accordingly provide against that contingency, and proclaim the course she intended to pursue. The first step taken by the Cabinet in the American question had been one of ill omen. France, being totally disinterested in the annexation of Texas to the American Union, should not have joined England to prevent it; and the theory of the American balance of power, declared by M. Guizot, was no justification of her conduct. For his part he could not understand what was meant by an American balance of power. In North America there were only two great possessors, the United States and England, which owned a territory larger than that of the American Union itself. Would that balance be destroyed by the latter encroaching on the dominions of Great Britain? The Cabinet, he contended, had not been guided in its determination by any French motive or interest; for France had

no earthly reason, commercial or political, to oppose the annexation; a desire to be agreeable to England alone induced it to espouse a quarrel, which was that of England and her peculiar interests. The Cabinet had not, as asserted by M. Guizot, confined itself to giving advice; it had taken an active part in the question; and to prove it, he would cite a despatch from M. Alley de Ciprey, the French Chargé at Mexico, in which that Envoy informed the Pesident of Texas, that, on his proposition, the Mexican Government had consented to recognise the independence of Texas, on condition that the latter should not give effect to its project of uniting itself with the American republic. That despatch, dated the 20th of May, 1845, was delivered to the Texan Government by Captain Elliott, the English Chargé d'Affaires, who had dared to menace that Government in the names of both France and England. M. Berryer then proceeded to discuss the course pursued by the Cabinet in respect of Monte Video, where, he said, it had abandoned French citizens who had armed themselves for the defence of their lives and property, threatened to deprive them of that nationality, and forbidden them to hoist the tricoloured flag. That policy had been persevered in for years, and it was only when England had been wounded in her interests and honour, in the River Plate, that the Cabinet determined to assist her in avenging her wrongs. The same had been the case at Madagascar. France's right of possession and sovereignty over that island was undeniable. England, it was true, had protested against it in the disastrous years of 1815, 1816, and 1817;

but, in 1818, France had asserted her right by forming a number of establishments at Madagascar. Since then serious attempts were directed against the rights of France; and it was only when England herself had to complain of spoliation from the Hovas, that France made common cause with her, and their combined squadrons bombarded Tamatave. M. Berryer then advocated the necessity of his amendment. A declaration of neutrality, he said, was an act of hostility against the United States, as the declaration of neutrality of Washington, in 1793, had been an act of separation from France. It behoved France to assume a position conformable to her dignity and security, by proclaiming, in the face of the world, that she would maintain the maxim of the old monarchythat free bottoms make free goods

that no blockades should be respected except real blockades-and that she would take under her protection the navies of all neutral powers. M. Berryer, nevertheless, was of opinion that no war would ensue; that the negotiation would be resumed; that the Americans would not yield, and that England would be too happy to accept the 49th parallel of latitude as the boundary line of her possessions in the contested territory.

M. Guizot commenced by observing, that the question of Texas had been already discussed in the Chamber, and that he had nothing to add to the reply he had already made on the subject. That as to the questions of La Plata, Madagascar, and the right of search, they would find their place in the debate on the Address; and that feeling much fatigued, he would at once enter upon the amendment proposed by M. Berryer.

"I pray the Chamber," continued M. Guizot," to remark that this amendment does not present any immediate necessity. War between the United States and England is an hypothesis, which, in the opinion of the honourable M. Berryer, is not probable, and in that opinion I coincide with him. Consequently the amendment of M. Berryer is a reservation made with a view to an hypothesis, and not with a view to an actual necessity. I assert that this hypothesis is improbable, and I add that the reservation is use. less, because it is a matter of right. No one could ever have imagined that, if a conflict should unfortunately occur between England and the United States, France would abandon the maxims which she has constantly professed and maintained, with respect to the liberty of the seas and the right of neutral powers.

The matter reserved

is a matter of right; it has no need to be written. France will not change her maxims, and the Government of the King is in that respect as decided as M. Berryer himself. When I ascended the Tribune to announce the policy of neutrality, I meant that neutrality should really be maintained and exercised. The policy of neutrality is

-on one hand, not to make war, and on the other, to maintain the rights of neutral powers, for without that neutrality could not exist. At the very moment that I announced the policy of neutrality, I by that fact announced that France would maintain the rights of neutrals and the principle of the liberty of the seas. The hypothesis is improbable: the reservation proposed is useless. But has it not its inconvenience, that is the true question? Why did I, during one of your late sittings, proclaim beforehand

the policy of neutrality? For two reasons:-First, because I believe that if unfortunately a conflict should arise, it would be more difficult to establish the policy of neutrality in the midst of the excitement of passions than at present. Wishing really and seriously for neutrality, I did not desire to wait for the most difficult moment to announce and to adopt that policy. That was my first reason; but my second reason is still more serious. It is that when the chance of war is still distant and improbable, the declaration of a policy of neutrality made beforehand is a means of peace, and a means of influencing the deliberations of the two nations." M. Guizot, in continuation, said that he was aware there were persons both in England and in the United States who entertained illusions as to the neutrality of France in case of a war, and for that reason he wished to assure them beforehand that he would take part with neither one nor the other, and that he trusted this declaration would weigh in the balance and contribute to the maintenance of peace. M. Guizot concluded by again repeating that the policy of neutrality was the true interest of France. "I conjure the Chamber," said M. Guizot, "not to suffer itself to be induced to utter a word which might enfeeble or change that attitude of neutrality which I have wished to maintain.'