wisely. They set out with a large representation, in conformity to the sentiments of the people at the moment; but, on experience, finding the number too great, they have reduced it from twelve hundred to about two hundred and fifty. He believed that the general sense of the people was against a large representation in Congress; the inconveniences experienced from numerous bodies in the State Legislatures has led several of the States to lessen the number. He instanced Georgia, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania.

Mr. BALDWIN was opposed to the motion. One Representative for thirty thousand, appeared to him by no means a great representation. The opinion that, of late, had been so often advanced from the press, and in public discussion, for reducing the Representative branch in Government to a small number, he held to be full of dangerous error. He was sensible that the terms great and small were so merely relative in their signification, that it was difficult precisely to understand each other in the use of them. Perhaps they may most properly, both of them, be considered as extremes. No doubt representation, which of late seems to be used as the character of Republican Government, is a great improvement upon Democracy, or legislation by the whole body of the people. He could conceive that a representation might be so large as to partake of the evils of assembling the whole body of the people; but it was a very improbable and not a dangerous extreme: the other extreme was full of danger. These observations acquire much force, when applied particularly to the Governments of this Country: enfeeble the Representative part of them, and you sap the very principles of life. They stand on a different basis from the Governments which have gone before them, and may justly be said to be new experiments in Government; time, as yet, has scarcely given room to judge of the probable issue; but this we may pronounce with much certainty-Let the principles of representation languish, and they have no chance of success.

[H. of R.

was sensible that was a point that did not admit of being determined by any conclusive reasoning; it was a mere matter of opinion; sound judgment only is to be used, time and experience will come on and confirm or correct the opinion. In such a case, it is wise to inquire how this has been judged of by others who have had a Representative body. In France, one thousand two hundred was not thought too great a representation in forming their National Assembly; and the number established by their new Constitution for their stated Legislature was not two hundred and fifty, as the member last up had stated, but, if he had not been misinformed by the publications in this country, it was nearly seven hundred and fifty.

In the Kingdom of Great Britain, five hundred is not thought too great a representation: and can one hundred and thirteen, which is the greatest number contended for, be considered in this country as a huge and impracticable mass of representation?

It had ever appeared to him to be among the strongest marks of our youth and inexperience, that we grow wise too suddenly. He was afraid this instantaneous wisdom which sprung up so at once, and set at nought, or removed to the extreme of absurdity and folly, the deliberate and tried opinions of the most profound and enlightened among men, in circumstances peculiarly favorable to honest decision, will itself be left by time on that extreme.

And how does this compare with the opinion and experience of this Country in the State Governments? The idea had before been called up, but in his opinion justice was by no means done to the comparison. It had been said, that the States in general had found their representation too large, and were diminishing it. Let another view be taken of the comparison: A state will not suffer the ordinary business of its own internal legislation to be intrusted to fewer Representatives than from one to two hundred, and in some instances more, and yet in the Federal Government they are obliged to submit to a legislation which can much more substantially affect their happiness and prosperity, and perhaps they have there but a single Representative, or at most but five or six. The slightest comparison shows, that there is no manner of proportion between them; that they are irreconcileably distorted. Surely gentlemen of the opposite opinion will not have the effrontery to attempt to draw an argument from that source for diminishing the present representation.

It had not been found practicable to ground representation in the Federal Constitution upon any other principle than that of numbers; but extent of territory is unquestionably one of the natural principles on which it rests, and should if possible be regarded. One for thirty-four or thirty-five thousand may be deemed a proper representation in the Kingdom of France, or of Great Britain. The four millions which compose the United States, compactly settled where there was great sameness in the country, and pretty equally dis- The several State Conventions which had tant from a common centre, would be properly thought proper to animadvert at all upon the represented by a smaller number than in their Federal Constitution, had pretty uniformly expresent sparse settlement. But, still further: the pressed their wish that the representation should settlement of the United States is a fillet stretched be increased. Theorists in Government, so far as along the sea-coast for seventeen hundred miles, he had been informed, had generally given their comprehending as great a variety of climate and opinion that this part was too small, and out of interests as one of the other quarters of the globe. proportion. He was as far from venerating mere It is difficult to conceive of a situation which calls theories of Government as any man, and was senfor a greater extension of the principle of repre-sible they must adjust themselves to the times and circumstances of the people. But it would not be It has been said, that one for thirty thousand useless to inquire-How does this appear in pracwill make too large and unwieldy a body. He tice? He could say, for himself, that it brought

sentation.

his own mind to the same conclusion, that it was the part of the Federal Constitution, of all others, most defective and insecure. Thirty-three members had formed the House, seventeen was a majority, and equal to the decision of any question. Questions had already occurred, involving property to the amount of from fifty to eighty millions of dollars, and much of it in the hands of the most daring individuals, rendered desperate by their speculations. He did not say there had been any foundation for uneasy apprehensions from that quarter; but he did say, that in other countries it would be supposed to be a most dangerous experiment upon the passions and imperfections of human nature. But it had been said, and with an unexpected assurance, that increasing the numbers did not increase the security against these evils. If so, why not reduce it at once to the venerable number thirteen; or, indeed, three; which would give us as great a security as the whole body of the people? It is idle to pursue observations on such a point: the mind that can ask for reasoning upon it, can scarcely be supposed in a situation to be benefited by reasons.

The Federal Government, it must be admitted, is in fact pretty highly seasoned with prerogative; practice has already evinced the necessity, in many instances, of increasing it, by devolving much of the Legislative power upon the Executive Department, arising from the difficulty of making particular provisions and details in our laws, and accommodating them to the various interests of so extensive a country.

[NOVEMBER, 1791.

JOHN W. KITTERA, from Pennsylvania, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House to-day.

MONDAY, November 14.

A petition of James Jackson, of the State of Georgia, was presented to the House and read, complaining of the undue election and return of ANTHONY WAYNE, one of the members returned to serve in this House for the said State.

He

Mr. BALDWIN moved that the petition should be referred to the Committee of Elections. offered several observations to show the propriety of giving early attention to the business, particularly as the contested election took place in the remotest part of the remotest State in the Union. It was observed that a reference to the committee appointed to bring in a bill for establishing an uniform mode of proceeding in cases of contested elections, appeared to be the most eligible. A reference to the Committee of Elections was objected to, as the subject did not come within their cognizance, as that committee can only determine respecting the certificate, &c., which are required from the Executive of the State to entitle to a seat in the House. A reference to the committee appointed to report a bill was also objected to, as that committee was not authorized to take notice of past transactions, or to report a retrospective regulation. A select committee was mentioned, agreeably to the mode adopted in the two contested elections which occurred in the first ConThe other branch of the Legislature has many gress; but, it being observed that the petition was traits of a perpetual-at least of a very solid con- unaccompanied with the requisite documents menstituent part of the Government. He did not mentioned in it, Mr. B. withdrew his motion, and the tion these as imperfections in the Government; they are perfections, if the other parts can be in due proportion: but it is surely à sound reason against taking positive measures at this time to diminish the Representative branch. For his own part, he was not well satisfied as to the intention. If there is any reason to apprehend that the Government will depart from the point on which it was first placed, he could scarcely suppose that any one could be honestly alarmed with the fear that the departure would be towards Democracy. He concluded, by expressing his hopes that the representation to the next Congress would be fixed at one for thirty thousand, as it had hitherto been, and that the motion for striking out would not prevail.

At this point the Committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

FRIDAY, November 11.

The House met pursuant to adjournment; but as a great proportion of the members were on committees, who were not ready to report, Mr. STEELE moved that, in order to afford those committees time to prepare and bring in their respective reports, the House should adjourn until Monday next; which motion was unanimously agreed

to.

petition was laid on the table.

A petition of Moses Hazen was presented to the House and read, praying the settlement of a claim against the United States as an officer in the late army.

Ordered, To lie on the table.

A Message was received from the President of the United States by Mr. Secretary Lear, with a copy of a resolution of the Legislature of Virginia, ratifying the first article in the amendments proposed by Congress to the Constitution of the United States; also, sundry papers relative to a purchase of land on the Great Miami, by John C. Symmes.

Ordered, That the papers relating to the Miami purchase be referred to the committee appointed to prepare and bring in a bill or bills to establish offices for the purpose of granting lands within the territories of the United States.

The petition of Stephen Zachary, merchant, of Baltimore, was read, stating that, in consequence of an unintentional error in a bill of sale of a vessel purchased at Port-au-Prince, he had been obliged to pay extra tonnage duties, and praying relief. On motion, this petition was referred to a select committee, consisting of Messrs. FITZSIMONS, HUGER, and GILMAN.

A petition of the distillers of spirits in the town of Baltimore was presented to the House and read, praying a reduction of duties, and farther re

NOVEMBER, 1791.]

Ratio of Representation.

[H. OF R.

vision and amendment of the act passed at the ations in France and in Ireland; the former had last session, for laying duties upon spirits distilled framed a Constitution in two years for twenty-six within the United States. Referred to the Secre- millions of citizens, and provided for securing the tary of the Treasury. Liberties of their Country-and the latter had The Speaker laid before the House a Letter and proved a successful barrier against the encroachReport from the Board of Commissioners for set-ments of the arbitrary power of England. He tling the accounts between the United States and concluded, by asserting that the voice of the peothe individual States; which were read, and or-ple was in favor of the amendment proposed to dered to lie on the table. the Constitution, which would give one Representative to every thirty thousand persons.

A member, in his place, produced certain papers respecting the sale and disposition of the marine hospital in the State of Virginia; which were read, and ordered to be referred to the Secretary of the Treasury, with instruction to examine the same and report his opinion thereupon to the House.

A petition of sundry persons, citizens of the State of New York, who are holders of certain bills of credit emitted under the authority of the late Congress, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty, was presented to the House and read, praying that adequate provision may be made for the redemption of the principal and interest of the said bills of credit, and that they may be put on a footing with other public creditors of the United States.

Ordered. To lie on the table.

The House proceeded to consider a Report of the Secretary of War on the petition of Rufus Hamilton, which was made to the House of Representatives the twenty-second of June, one thousand seven hundred and ninety, stating sundry reasons in opposition to the claim of the said Rufus Hamilton. Whereupon,

Resolved, That the prayer of the said petition cannot be granted.

RATIO OF REPRESENTATION.

Mr. GILES said this subject had struck him in two points of view: whether Congress are not precluded from exercising any discretion on the subject? and whether, if they are not, it is expedient for them to exercise this discretion at this time? The ratio of representation is a Constitutional, and not a Legislative act. He referred to the Constitution, in which it is said that there shall be one Representative to every State; and secondly, that until the enumeration, the number should be as therein appointed to each State. After the enumeration, the number is mentioned below which it shall not be placed; but there is a negative power to increase the ratio, and from this negative power, a positive discretionary power is inferred. But, he observed, that Congress had precluded itself from a right to exercise this discretionary power, by sending out to the several State Legislatures an amendment on this very subject. This amendment he considered in a serious point of view; and had this idea been attended to at the commencement of the discussion, he conceived that it would have prevented the opinion from being brought forward, whether it was expedient that any change in the ratio of the representation should take place. The idea of one to thirty thousand, he considered as fully settled in the minds of the people; and a change on the part of the Government would indicounsels, which is but another name for weakness. The sense of the people has been resorted to by gentlemen on both sides of the question. This, if it can be ascertained, is undoubtedly the best guide; and he thought those in favor of one to thirty thousand had with great propriety referred to the Conventions, and to the acts of Congress itself. But the amendments are said to have been The representation ought as nearly as possible a matter of compromise, and were insincerely acto express not only the will, but to participate in ceded to by the majority; but even on this ground, the wishes and interests of the people. A large he conceived, that the sense of the people was representation embraces these interests more ful-equally as well declared. He, however, differed ly, and is more competent to giving and receiving information. The objects of legislation are such as come home to the doors, to the feelings of every man; the Government ought therefore to secure the confidence of the people by a large representation. The expense he considered as trifing compared to the benefits-and the people expect and are willing to pay for being well governed, and having their liberties secured. An increased representation, is an additional security against corruption. As to delays occasioned by a numerous body, he observed, that the Representatives were chosen to deliberate and to mature every subject before decision; he instanced the advantages derived from the numerous represent

The House again resolved itself into a Com-cate a changeable disposition, and a mutability of mittee of the Whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.

Mr. FINDLEY declared himself to be in favor of one Representative for every thirty thousand perThe opinion of the people should be the guide of the committee; that opinion, he conceived, to be in favor of the ratio he had mentioned.

sons.

from gentlemen in respect to the motives which produced those amendments. In the State he came from, both Federalists and anti-Federalists are fully of opinion that further security as to the representation is requisite.

The numerous representations of the States, whatever inconveniences may attend them, plainly show the sense of the people on the subject.

Mr. G. then took a view of the objects of legislation to the State Assemblies, and of those of the General Government. In the former, above one thousand persons are employed, though their attention is confined to their internal police. Those of the General Government, on the other hand, are on the great objects of the whole finance of

November, 1791.]

Ratio of Representation.

[H. OF R.

But, not to take up the precious time of this under the present Government. We are told, House with relations of facts to show what was however, that to avoid expense the people wish and is the opinion of our fellow-citizens on this it; and that to avoid confusion in this House we interesting subject, I will only state a few argu- should comply with that wish. With respect to ments which have weight with me as being in the article of expense, I think we may with prothemselves evident truths, viz: Our Constitution | priety make use of arithmetical calculations, and being framed by the people, and introduced to us to find how much at six dollars per day paid to in their name, and Congress being the creatures one Representative it would cost the thirty thouof their will, spoken into existence by the word of sand, divide six hundred cents by thirty thousand, their power, for Congress to lessen their weight, the number of citizens-and we have one-fiftieth to diminish their importance, and to exclude them of a cent per diem, the expense of each citizen, if from as full a share in their own Government as to be equally divided amongst them; that is, one can be consistent with the nature of it, and indeed cent for every fifty citizens per diem, or which from that share which they claim, must be im- must be the same thing, one cent must be paid by politic and dangerous. each citizen for every fifty days session of their But, granting that the people wished not a Representative in Congress. Sir, I have the congreater share in the General Government than is solation to find that if our Constitution had one proposed by the amendment, as it is impossible, Representative for every fifteen, instead of thirty in a country like the United States, that one man thousand, they could well afford to pay them, and can be sufficiently informed of the opinions, wishes, that if it were even more expensive as to the payand real interests of thirty-five thousand of his ment of members, yet the people would most cerfellow-citizens, and therefore laws might be en-tainly be better satisfied with the laws which they acted contrary to the opinions, wishes, and inter- would then have so great a share in framing. The ests of the people, in which they might neverthe-people see that if their interests are not well guardless acquiesce, sacrificing their interests for the sake of peace and quiet to the wills of their Representatives, one thirty-five thousandth part of their own number, what friend to his country would wish to see such a dangerous influence on the one hand, and such a blind submission on the other? How long could an enlightened people remain in such a state of insensibility and torpor? And what might not be the consequence of their awakening from their lethargy? If not an expensive revolution, an expensive repeal of laws. And here I will remark, that the smallest number of Legislators, and they, too, well selected for their wisdom and respectability, if unacquainted with their constituents, might pass well-framed laws, founded on the wisdom of other countries, and yet find them disagreeable to their constituents, and be under a necessity of repealing them; but this could not be the case, if the people had in that Legislature a sufficient number of Representatives on whose fidelity, attachment, and disinterestedness they could rely. This, sir, is a truth worthy of our attention-an ignorance of which, or inattention thereto, I suspect has been the occasion of much political evil in the world. Happily for France, the people had such a number of Representatives in the National Assembly as could engage their feeling, inform their judgment, attach their interest, and establish their confidence in their fidelity and disinterestedness; had that number been much smaller, it is probable France would never have been delivered from oppression by their exertions.

I believe the National Assembly have judged about seven hundred and fifty members sufficient to represent their people, which on a supposition that they amount even to twenty-six millions, will be one Representative for every thirty-four thousand; a larger representation than is proposed by the amendment before us; but, sir, it is not and cannot be the interest or wish of the people at large to have a small representation in Congress

ed by a sufficient number of their fellow-citizens, who have a fellow-feeling, a common interest, they may be sacrificed to the ambition of some, or the vanity of others. I trust, sir, that they know too well the high price they have paid for the purchase of their Liberties, to be unwilling to pay a few farthings for the only possible means of preserving them. They see now that the Monarchical and Aristocratical part of Government is to be restrained the former from absolute tyranny, and the latter from an insufferable insolence, by a very numerous body of the Representatives of the people alone. Americans know, sir, that Monarchical Governments were necessary for the protection of weak, ignorant people, against the encroachments of ambitious and ferocious neighbors; and for the preservation of order amongst themselves: that an Aristocratical form became convenient to protect them against the oppression of tyranny springing up out of Monarchy; that this form was adapted to a small progress in the science of Government, and that these two forms properly checked and controlled by the Democratical form, is still better suited to a general knowledge of that science; that a Representative Government, such as their own is, every part of which is more or less pervaded by the spirit of representation, cannot by any other means be so perfectly secured, as by their having at least as full a share as they have claimed in the Democratical branch of their Government.

I know, sir, that many friends of our Constitution thought that the Convention did not pay a sufficient attention to the interests of their constituents, when they restrained them from having more than one Representative for every thirty thousand citizens. I know that there is a report that the people are indebted to their President, even for this share in their Government; and ĺ believe, sir, if this report be true, that whatever has been so justly said of him, as compared to Fabius, to Hannibal, to Alexander, may be forgotten, when this instance of his wisdom, disin