power to sell and convey. The conveyance was to him and his successor in trust, and the sheriff of Madison county was empowered to act in the event he declined, or was absent, or unable to act. It was expressly stipulated: "If the party of the first part, or any one for him, shall well and truly pay off and discharge the debt and interest expressed in said notes, and every part thereof, when the same became due and payable, according to the true tenor, date, and effect of said notes, then this deed shall be void." (2) A purchaser under a power purchases at the peril of the sale being void if a material condition precedent to the exercise of the power does not exist. A sale without the existence of such material condition precedent is a sale not authorized by the power, and no title can pass by it. See Perry Trusts, § 785. Payment of the debt extinguished the power of sale; in the language we have quoted from the trust deed, that instrument was thenceforth "void." Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 83 Ill. 307; Wood v. Colvin, 2 Hill, 566; Cameron v. Irwin, 5 id. 272; Jackson v. Morse, 18 Johns. 441; Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 257; Towner v. McClelland, 110 Ill. 542; Redmond v. Packenham, 66 id. 434; see also Jones Mortg., § 1899; Walker v. Carleton, 97 III. 582; Ryan v. Dunlap, 17 id. 40; Harris v. Mills, 28 id. 44. "It is a general principle," said Marshall, C. J., in Williams v. Peyton's Lessees, 4 Wheat. 79, that the party who sets up a title must furnish the evidence to support it. If the validity of a deed depends on an act in pais, the party claiming under that deed is as much bound to prove the performance of the act as he would be bound to prove any matter of record on which its validity might depend. It forms a part of his title. It is a link in the chain which is essential to its continuity, and which it is incumbent on him to preserve. These facts should be examined by him before he becomes a purchaser, and the evidence of them should be preserved as a necessary muniment of title." Ill. Sup. Ct., June 12, 1886. Temple v. Whittier. Opinion by Scholfield, J. SURFACE WATER MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DRAINAGE-DAMAGE TO RIPARIAN PROPRIETOR.-The plaintiff was the owner of land, the rear of which extended back to a brook or drain or ditch. The city of N., in which the premises were situate, for the purpose of draining the surface of certain of its highways, built a drain with catch-basins for collecting the water and turning it into the same, and this drain connected with another drain, which terminated in a catch basin from which the water passed into the rear of the plaintiff's premises; the intention being to empty the water coming through the drain-pipe into the brook or drain before named, and so carry the same to the river. Instead of connecting directly with said brook, the drain-pipe was stopped at the catch-basin, where there was a discontinued blind drain made of rubble stone and dirt, through which only the water could pass to the brook. so that water rose to the surface and spread over the land of plaintiff; and the sand and gravel carried into the brook choked up the culvert at its outlet, so that the water was turned back upon plaintiff's premises. By the construction of these drains water which would not otherwise have flowed toward plaintiff's premises was conveyed there. Held, that the city had a right to drain the surface water of its highways, even if water was thereby turned upon the land of plaintiff, provided the methods adopted were proper, and that the plaintiff could make no complaint of the city for the construction of the catch-basin and drain, and that in the absence of evidence that the defendant had improperly constructed its drain, and in the absence of evidence that the plaintiff was a riparian owner of land bounding on a natural water-course, the plaintiff could not maintain an action against the city for interfering with the water-course so that water which flowed into it could not flow out of it. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 29, 1886. Stanchfield v. City of Newton. Opinion by Devens, J. PARTNERSHIP-PARTNER WITHDRAWING WITHOUT NOTICE, AND LATER PAYING SUBSEQUENT FIRM DEBTS -SURETY-SUBROGATION.-A. was a member of an unincorporated banking association; he sold his interest to one of his fellow members, neglecting however to give due legal notice of his withdrawal, after he withdrew the firm contracted debts and then became insolvent; some of these debts A. paid voluntarily to save costs of suit, and others under stress of legal proceedings. Held, that as to the debts paid by A., his relation to his former partners was that of surety, and he had a right of action over against them to recover the amount of the payments so made by him. It may be stated as a general proposition that whenever one person is legally bound to pay the proper debt of another, the former, in a certain sense, occupies the position of surety for the latter; and if the surety pays the debt, he has a right of action against his principal. This right of action may sometimes be asserted by an independent suit, and at other times in the form of subrogation. By reason of the neglect to give notice of his withdrawal, plaintiff became liable to pay debts, which if the testimony is believed, were not his own, but the personal debts of those who continued to compose the firm, and as partners contracted them after he had withdrawn from the association. Being so liable for debts, which as between them and himself were theirs, and not his, he was at least quasi surety for them. In other words, as between themselves, the debts were theirs, and ex æquo et bono, they ought to have paid them. The present suit, as we have seen, does not relate to debts or obligations contracted while plaintiff was a member of the association, but to such ouly as were contracted afterward, and for which plaintiff, by reason of his having been a partner, and not having given notice of his withdrawal, became liable, but which as between himself and defendants, the latter were clearly bound to pay. As to those debts, plaintiff's relation to the defendants was that of surety, and when he was compelled to pay, or voluntarily paid such debts, he had a right of action against defendants to recover the amount so paid for them. Penn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 15, 1886. Shamburg v. Abbott. Opinion by Sterrett, J. DEED OR MORTGAGE IN FIRM NAMERIGHTS OF PARTNERS.-A conveyance or mortgage of real estate, in which a partnership, by its firm name, is named as grantee or mortgagee, operates in law, only in favor of a partner whose name is in the firm name, and not in favor of a partner whose name is not contained in the firm name. The rule was recognized in Morrison v. Mendenhall, and iu Tidd v. Rines, 26 Minn. 201, it was decided that a conveyance to a partnership by its firm name did not vest in it any legal title or estate, because a partnership, as such, is not recognized in law as a person; so that even had it been stated in the mortgage that the name inserted as the mortgagee was that of a partnership, it would not have made the partnership mortgagee. Nor as we think, would the individual partners (other than the one named) be the mortgagee. It is true that the grantee in a conveyance need not be named, provided he be described with sufficient definiteness and certainty, as where he is indicated by a title, or an office, and there is but one such; as in Lady Superior v. McNamara, 3 Barb. Ch. 375, where a conveyance to the "Lady Superior" of a designated convent was held good to vest the title in a person then lady superior; but the court referred with approval to Duncan v. Beard, 2 Nott & McC. 400, in which it was held that a conveyance to one and his "associates" vested title in none but the person named, the term "associates" being too indefinite to carry the title to the persons intended by it. There are some authorities which seem to hold that such a conveyance would be good to the persons so designated, and that it may be proved by parol who they are; but we think these cases go a great way toward holding that a conveyance of real estate may vest partly in parol, and when we consider the infinite confusion in titles to real estate-in which there ought to be great definiteness and certaintysuch a rule might let in, we do not hesitate to decide that the proposition that such a designation is too indefinite and uncertain rests in better reason and authority. Where the style of a partnership is inserted as a grantee, and it contains the name or names of one or more of the partners, there is no reason why the title should not vest in the partners so named; and the authorities are to the effect that it would. Minn. Sup. Ct., July 7, 1886. Gille v. Hunt. Opinion by Gilfillan, C. J. ΤΑΧΑΤΙΟΝ -EXEMPTION OF CHURCH PROPERTY TITLE MUST BE IN CHURCH SOCIETY.-In order to make property exempt from taxation as church property under the provisions of the Constitution and revenue act, the title to the property must be in a religious corporation or church society as a body. A church edifice, and the lot upon which it stands, owned by a citizen individually, and regularly used for religious services, is not exempt from taxation. The fact that such property has been dedicated to religious uses, by the holding of religious services of a dedicatory character therein, is immaterial to the legal question conceruing its exemption from taxation. Ill. Sup. Ct., May 14, 1886. People v. Anderson. Opinion by Craig, J. TRESPASS-CUTTING TIMBER-DAMAGES-VERDICT. -The only error alleged is the refusal of the court to treble the damages found by the jury. The action was for trespass for the defendant's cutting timber trees standing and growing on the lands of the plaintiffs without the consent of the latter, and for carrying away, converting and disposing of the same to the use of the defendants. The presumption of law is that the jury gave all the damages authorized by the statute. Campbell v. Finney, 3 Watts, 84; Hughes v. Stevens, 36 Penn. St. 320. This presumption can be rebutted only by showing that the jury gave single damages. This fact must be shown by the verdict. It must expressly appear by the finding of the jury. Id. Without this there is no power in the court to double or treble the damages. It is claimed by the counsel for the plaintiffs here that the note made by the stenographer of an agreement of counsel is sufficient to prove that the jury assessed single damages only. In this view we cannot concur. It does not appear that such fact was brought to the attention of either the jury or the court. Without knowledge of [any such agreement, the jury could not have been influenced thereby. When after the verdict it was first suggested to the court, the latter appears to have denied all previous knowledge thereof. There is certainly nothing in the charge of the court to the jury recognizing the for reversal. Obviously this charge does not state the law accurately, and in view of what may be fairly said of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence, it must have been hurtful to the defense. No doubt it is true a party may be so diseased mentally as not to be of sound mind, and yet he might possess what the law terms a "disposing mind;" that is, the mental capacity to know and understand what disposition he may wish to make of his property, and upon whom he will bestow his bounty. It is a rule of law that a person who is capable of transacting ordinary business is also capable of making a valid will. In Meeker v. Meeker,75 Ill. 260, it was held by this court the derangement or imbecility to incapacitate a person from making a valid will must be of that character which renders him incapable of understanding the effects and consequences of his acts. A test usually recognized is, the party must be capable of acting rationally in the ordinary affairs of life, so that he may comprehend what disposition he may wish to make of his property, and be able to select the subjects of his bounty. Nothing more is required, and so the authorities in this State uniformly hold. Meeker v. Meeker, supra; Rutherford v. Morris, 77 Ill. 397, and subsequent cases that follow the doctrine of the cases cited. Medical testimony in this record is to the effect that in all cases of diseases of the body the mind is in some degree affected, and the party might be said to be of "unsound mind, "and still be capable of transacting ordinary business such as is done in daily life. In this case the testa. tor suffered greatly from severe bodily disease, and no doubt his mind was affected to a degree it might be, at least in a partial sense, unsound; but the jury should not for that reason alone be told, as a matter of law, that would incapacitate him to make a valid will. That would be to state the rule of law on this subject broader than the authorities in this and other States will warrant. Ill. Sup. Ct., June 12, 1886. Freeman v. Easley. Opinion by Scott, J. LIFE --POWER OF DISPOSAL ACCOMPANYING ESTATE-INTENT.-Where a power of disposal accompanies a bequest or devise of a life estate, the power of disposal is only co-extensive with the estate which the devisee takes under the will, and means such disposal as a tenant for life could make, unless there are other words clearly indicating that a larger power was intended. (2) Where the life tenant is given a power of disposition for a certain purpose, which it would be impossible to accomplish by a sale of the life estate, and which can be accomplished only by a disposal of the fee, the power must be held to be that which is necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. And where the life estate is, in the main, in unimproved and unproductive realty, and the purpose is the support of the family, the power will be held to allow an absolute disposition. Ill. Sup. Ct., July 12, 1886. Kauff man v. Breckenridge. Opinion by Sheldon, J. HE OUR NEW YORK LETTER. existence of such an agreement, nor is there any thing occasional allusions of this Journal to the fit which limits them to finding single damages only. Penn. Sup. Ct. Clark v. Sargeant. Clark, J. Opinion by WILLS-UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND FROM DISEASE. -An instruction which directs the jury that if they believe that at the execution of the instrument in question, the testator was so diseased mentally as not to be of sound mind, they must find for the contestant, is inaccurate, and in a case where the evidence is conflicting, ground ness and qualifications of Esek Cowen, Esq., of Troy for a seat on the bench of the Court of Appeals of this State have been received by the members of our New York bar, who are familiar with his record in that court, with every indication of approval. Mr. Cowen has the reputation here and elsewhere of being one of the best equipped and most able lawyers in the State, and his selection as a candidate for that position would reflect great credit upon the party putting him in nomination. The decision of Judge Daniels to decline to allow his name to be used as a candidate has been heard here with regret. He is very much respected by our bar as a conscientious, able and industrious judge, and his promotion would have been a well earned one. The arrangement made between our Supreme Court judges to have their places filled at Chambers during the summer months by their up-river brethren proves to be a very pleasant one. It permits our resident judges to go up into the hills for a much needed change, and enables those from the interior to get a breath of salt air. Judge Peckham held chambers here last month, and during August Judge Potter of the fourth judicial district will officiate in that position. Judge Potter has frequently held court here and is very popular with our bar. He is located at Long Beach, where he seems to enjoy the life at this delightful resort exceedingly. Judge Barrett is resting after the laborious work of the past year at Litchfield where he is enjoying a well earned rest. If he were not such an invaluable man at nisi prius he would probably be put forward as a candidate for Court of Appeals honors. The bill relating to imprisoned debtors signed by the governor at the last session of the Legislature, is to operate very unfavorably to judgment creditors in some cases. An instance may be cited: A young man doing business in Chicago induced a man there, by making certain false representations, to give him the custody of a large sum of money which he converted to his own use and fled to New York. An action was brought here for the recovery of the money, and an order of arrest was issued and served, the defendant being released on bail. The order of arrest was sustained on review. At the trial of the action a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for the full amount claimed, and an execution was thereafter duly issued against the person of defendant, when he again gave bail. After waiting the statutory ninety days he applied by petition to the Court of Common Pleas for his discharge from imprisonment as provided by section 2200 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The testimony of the defendant taken in the course of these proceedings showed that he had a large part of the money in his possession after his arrest, and that a part of it he devoted to the support of his mother's family. Mr. Justice Van Hoesen, in an opinion denying the petition, says: "The evidence at the trial tended to prove and was sufficient to establish that the defendant obtained from the plaintiff by false pretenses, the money to recover which the action was brought. The case then is one in which the defendant obtained the plaintiff's money by fraud. We have repeatedly held that a defendant cannot obtain his discharge from imprisonment on an execution against his person by merely proving that he has spent for his own purposes the money of which he defrauded the plaintiff. We hold that it is not just and fair of an imprisoned debtor to spend for his own gratification money that he obtained from the plaintiff by fraud. The petition of the imprisoned debtor is denied." By operation of the bill referred to the defendant debtor will be released in a few days, and the plaintiff will lose all chance of ever recovering a cent of the money taken by the defendant. He would be unable to sustain any criminal action against the defendant in this State, and practically he is debarred from proceeding any further in any direction. Much mawkish sympathy was aroused for many alleged unfortunates said to be imprisoned for debt. None of the imprisoned debtors in Ludlow street were merely unfortunate commercial debtors, as imprisonment for debt was long since abolished as is well known, and the law afforded reasonably prompt release to any imprisoned debtor who would consent to disgorge his ill gotten gains, and comply with the terms it wisely imposed. The senior counsel for the prisoner in the Jaehne case is said to be awaiting the decision of the Court of Appeals with "serene composure." Mr. Convict Jaehne doubtless "views it with alar-um," and the staff of the district attorney's office await it in hopeful expectation. The boycotter, anarchist and socialist fiends have received little encouragement to "stay in our town" lately, and are likely to take themselves and their methods elsewhere. The prompt trials, and severe sentences imposed by our judges have made the Red Flag hang rather limp of late, and it is doubtful whether we shall for a long time be troubled by these pestiferous people again. In the recent death of Mr. Tilden the bar loses one of the few remaining lawyers of the old school of which Mr. David Dudley Field and John Graham are almost the only survivors here. There was probably no lawyer of his day more fertile in resources, more industrious or more generally successful. As a railroad lawyer he had few superiors in this country and in manipulating railroad enterprise through the machinery of the courts he was the possessor of more ingenuity than any practitioner of his time. He was not a great lawyer, but his wonderful analytical powers enabled him to succeed in winning many complicated cases. Mr. Tilden's reputation as a lawyer will mainly rest on his success in the Flagg case, the celebrated Cunningham-Burdell case, and his masterly defense in the Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. D. & H. Canal Co. His services in the Tweed cases, particularly in connection with the accounts of the ringsters with the Broadway Bank, revealed his wonderful power of analysis. Mr. Tilden was the counsel of whom an opponent once said in a railroad litigation: "My learned opponent's plan in these cases is first to dig a big hole, get in himself and pull the railroad in after him." Mr. Tilden's fortune, estimated at $9,000,000 or $10,000,000, is probably the largest ever accumulated by a practicing lawyer, although a great part of it was made in speculating prudently. The courts look deserted now. Judges and lawyers are away on vacations, many in Europe, more in the hills and at the sea side of our own beautiful country. Nearly every member of the bar here, unless he is a lawyer for revenue only, who can collect that last bill of costs has pigeon-holed briefs and bills, and left the office to the care of faithful clerks, to spend the month of August by "the deep sounding sea," or in some mountain region where he used to catch trout when he was a boy, which reminds me that I must look up that last bill of costs. NEW YORK, Aug. 4, 1886. DEMOT EN MOT. CORRESPONDENCE. "THE WORLD" ON LAWYERS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In a recent issue of the New York World I find an allusion to the " "indirection and trickery of which almost any lawyer will be guilty for the sake of a fee." Suppose that a lawyer should make the public statement that "almost any" editor wil publish the blackest falsehoods about a political opponent, without making the slightest investigation as to their truth; that "almost any "editor will spread before the youth of the country the minute details of the most disgusting scandals, if it will enable him to sell his paper, and brag about its circulation; that "almost any" editor will send reporters to play the spy upon the private life of public men, to pander to a depraved appetite for gossip; that "almost any editor" will select bits of fulsome flattery of himself from remote and obscure newspapers, and nauseate his readers by reproducing them in his own columns; that "almost any" editor will fill his paper, day after day, with the vilest abuse of some person against whom the said editor has a private grudge, about which his readers know little, and care less; would not the New York World be the first to condemn such a sweeping denunciation of an entire profession? I think I observe lately an increasing disposition on the part of certain editors to attack the legal profession upon all occasions, with or without reason. It is true however that it would be impossible for them to think worse of the lawyers than the editors think of each other. Those who are curious on the subject can ascertain what editors think of each other by comparing the statements of that able and excellent newspaper, the New York World, of and concerning the private character of Mr. William Dorsheimer, with the comments of that other able and excellent newspaper, the New York Star, upon the private character of Mr. Joseph Pulitzer. But another consideration is that the editors do not really need to discuss the conduct of the lawyers. There are other subjects which are fitter marks for the keen edge of their scorn and the polished shafts of their satire. The millionnaire plumber, who "steamfits" and "gas-fits" the house of the unsuspecting citizen, and takes the house, and lot too, in payment of his bill; the mother-in-law, who makes the life of the newly-wedded benedict a burden and a loathing; the colored brother, who raids the garden and henroost of his neighbor in search of the succulent watermelon and the adolescent fowl; the small boy, who shrinks under the pangs of cholera morbus, induced by unripe apples, stolen at that; the youth who leaves the presence of his charmer, impelled by the toe of the "old man's" boot; the other youth who leaves a portion of his most indispensable garment in the mouth of the family bulldog; the third youth, who by "indirection and trickery" gets his "best girl" past the open door of the ice-cream saloon; the servant girl, who "climbs the golden stair" by the aid of the traditional can of kerosene-all these are topics calculated to develop and invigorate to the utmost degree both the style and the intellect of the average editor. And when all these fail, the editors have still that exhaustless mine of contempt and scorn-their private opinion of each other. I hope the LAW JOURNAL will persuade them to be content with their natural victims, and to let up" on the lawyers. NOTES. SCENE IN AN ENGLISH JURY BOX. A Letter to the Editor of the St. James Gazette. SIR-I was present in court when the following incirecord. I am, sir, dent occurred. Perhaps you may think it worthy of Your obedient servant, H. May 17. Scene-Derby Assizes; Samuel Lowe and James Halligan charged with stealing a ham. Clerk of Assize-Do you find the prisoners guilty or not guilty? Foreman of the jury-We find as one on 'em stole it, and the other received it, knowing it to have been stolen. Clerk of Assize-Who do you say stole it? Foreman Nay, I can't say which stole it. One on 'em brought it home under his arm, and the other took it from him. Mr. Justice Matthew-That man is Lowe, and that is Halligan. Now which stole it? Foreman-I don't know; I warn't there. How can I say? If they didn't steal it, why should they have it? Judge-Gentlemen, this is your foreman! Is there no one of you who can say whether Lowe is guilty of stealing or not? Foreman-Yes, Lowe stole it. Chorus of jurymen-No, the other stole it. Clerk of Assize-And is that the verdict of you all? CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AS IT WAS. Were ever brought by knaves who sought For sundry wise precautions Discreetly framed whereby they aimed For lest some sturdy criminal The court should overreach, The court assigned his counsellors Yet lest their mildness should perchance To show him the indictment they But still, that he might understand -Law Magazine, 1846, page 191. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, AUGUST 28, 1886. CURRENT TOPICS. THE meeting of the American Bar Association at Saratoga last week was more largely attended than usual. It is said that early in the session there were one hundred and fifty members in attendance, but they dwindled to about one hundred before the close. The increase in attendance was probably due to the interest taken in the main subject of discussion, Codification. We have been accused of lack of courtesy toward the association. Until lately the association has not been entitled to "curtesy," for it has had no "living issue;" but now that it has given up groping and stumbling among the graves, and has found a live issue for consideration, it and its deliberations are entitled to respectful consideration, and may have some influence, although the delegations at its meetings are too small to hope for any very great or immediate effect on the bar or the people. -- We publish in full this week the address of the president, Mr. William Allen Butler, perfectly admirable in spirit, classification and treatment. We had the pleasure of listening to the annual address by Mr. Thomas J. Semmes, of Louisiana, on the influence of the civil law on the common law, a very learned and elegant production by one of the most accomplished legal scholars of this country. Mr. Semmes showed very conclusively the practicability of codification. The association elected Mr. Semmes president for the ensuing year. We also listened to the report of the committee on law reform, read by Prof. Baldwin and Mr. Hitchcock. The committee reported - very inconclusively, it seemed to us against the policy of allowing a simple contract creditor to maintain a creditor's bill before judgment. They also reported very properly, it seems to us in favor of a plan of revision of proposed legislative enactments by a joint standing committee. They also reported against the practicability of a uniform system of preferences in the distribution of decedent's estates, on account of the various preferences in the payment of debts as now existing in the different States. They also reported-horribile dictu !— in favor of establishing the punishment of flogging for certain crimes, particularly wife-beating. How an eminent lawyer and learned teacher like Prof. Baldwin, of Yale, could gravely and earnestly advocate this return to barbarism, passes our comprehension. In spite of the fact that it has recently been adopted in Maryland, we do not believe it to be constitutional - it is certainly "unusual," and we think "cruel." The statistics cited from that State are not convincing. Any police officer would tell the learned Professor that the apparent decrease of wife-beating in Baltimore is not due to seven lashes on a negro and twenty on a white man the only VOL. 34-No. 9. instances of the infliction of the punishment cited but to the indisposition of wives to complain of their husbands when flogging is the punishment. A wife will bear any thing rather than have her husband flogged, and pointed at by other women. The law is really hard on wives. It will be a long day before the Professor induces any calm and intelli gention, and we were adopt his monstrous recommendation, and we were glad to hear Mr. Willis of New York denounce it as it deserved. Mr. King, of Ohio, read the report of the committee on judicial administration and remedial procedure, advising against the adoption of indeterminate sentences. (We wish we could set Mr. King trimming Mr. Evart's rhetoric.) The chief interest centered in the discussion of codification, or to be more exact, on the recommendation of the committee that "the common law, so far as its substantive principles are settled, should be reduced to the form of a statute." We listened to the debate on Thursday, and are bound to say that it did not meet our expectations. What it may have been at the closing session on Friday, we cannot say, but we never listened to a more trifling debate than that on Thursday on the part of the opponents, and in candor we must confess that the codifiers did not greatly distinguish themselves. With two or three exceptions, none of the speeches on either side showed much evidence of knowledge of the subject, of consideration, or of any attempt at methodical presentation. Judge Dillon opened the debate, but we have heard him more convincing and effective. We think Mr. Frankenheimer of New York made the best and most effective speech on the part of the codifiers, and on the other part Mr. Nash of New York made a very adroit, keen and apparently moderate speech, decidedly the best on that side. Mr. Budd of Philadelphia also made a good speech on that side. Judge Green of Ohio, and Messrs. Abbott and Willis of New York, put in some heavy blows for the resolution. On the other hand, Mr. Garnett of Washington, who " distinguished" himself last year, did even worse this year, by moving the adoption of the resolution, with the qualification that the association did not commit itself in favor of or in opposition to codification! Mr. Nash was too cunning for such patent assininity as this, and so he moved that the subject of codification was "irrelevant" to the subject of "delays in the administration of justice." Mr. Turner, who never spoke in the association before, to our recollection, came all the way from New York to protest against the introduction of this "apple of discord" in the happy family of mutual admirers, and to show his own good nature proceeded to revile and abuse Mr. Field and his lifework, and to drag in the New York city quarrel by |