the camp to the depots, as often as four or five different times, without receiving their supplies; and I was informed by one corps commander that his wagon train had traveled over 150 miles, to and from the depot, before he succeeded in obtaining his clothing. The corps of General Franklin did not get its clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac and was moving into Virginia. General Reynolds's corps was delayed a day at Berlin to complete its supplies, and General Porter only completed his on reaching the vioinity of Harper's Ferry. I made every exertion in my power, and my quartermaster did the same, to have these supplies hurried forward rapidly, and I was repeatedly told that they had filled the requisitions at Washington, and that the supplies had been forwarded. But they did not come to us, and of course were inaccessible to the army. I did not fail to make frequent representations of this condition of things to the general-in-chief, and it appears that he referred the matter to the quartermaster general, who constantly replied that the supplies were properly ordered; notwithstanding this they did not reach our depots. The following extracts are from telegrams upon this subject: -"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "October 11, 1862-9 a. m. We have been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for this army, and Colonel Ingalls has received advices that it has been forwarded by railroad, but owing to bad management on the roads, or from some other cause, it comes in very slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was anticipated to get articles that are absolutely indispensable to the army, unless the railroad managers forward supplies more rapidly. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major General H. W. HALLECK, “HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "October 11, 1862. "I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing that still exist in some of the corps of this army. Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, who based his calculations upon information received from Washington, that clothing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet arrived. Unless some measures are taken to ensure a prompt forwarding of these supplies, there will necessarily be a corresponding delay in getting the army ready to move, as the men cannot march without shoes. "Everything has been done that can be done at these headquarters to accomplish the desired results. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General H. W. HALLeck, Chief of Staff. "Colonel R. INgalls, “HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "General J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as follows: 'My quartermaster reports that there are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knapsacks, at Hagerstown. He was able to procure only a complete supply of overcoats and pants, with a few socks, drawers and coats. This leaves many of the men yet without a shoe. My requi sitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes.' "Please push the shoes and stockings up to Harper's Ferry as fast as possible. "R. B. MARCY, "Chief of Staf "Colonel R. Ingalls, Quartermaster, Washington." The following statement, taken from a report of the chief quartermaster with the army will show what progress was made in supplying the army with clothing from the 1st of September, to the date of crossing the Potomac on the 31st of October, and that the greater part of the cloth "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, **AMP NEAR Knoxville, October 13, 1852. "Has the clothing arrived yet? if not, do you know where it is? What clothing was taken by she rebels at Chambersburg? Did they cap ture any property that was en route to you? Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg? Sending did not reach our depots until after the 15th an agent over the road to obtain information, of October. and hurry up the supplies. Reply at once. "RUFUS INGALLS, “Lt. Col. & A. D. C., Chief Q'rmaster. "Captain GEO. H. WEEKS, Depot Q'rmaster, Hagerstown.” "SHARPSBURG, Ort. 15, 1862. "I have just returned from Hagerstown, where I bave been for the clothing for this corps. There was nothing there but overcoats, trowsers, and a few uniform coats and socks. There were not any shoes, blankets, shirts or shelter tents. Will you please tell me where and when the balance can be had! Shall I send to Harper's Ferry for them to-morrow? The corps surgeon has just made a requisition for 45 hospital tents. There are none at Hagerstown. "Will you please to inform me if I can get them at Harper's Ferry? “Fielding Lowry, 76,;20|61,900 20 1200 2200 200 2000 2000 97,700 84,500 23125 +190 6250 28,229 45,201|33,889|12,7. 0 39,840 53, 100 8995 $630 80, 270 4450 10,008 7590 92 0 44,060 1000 11,595 16,674| 26:5 Colonel Ingalls, 3500 1200 Received at he Depot. Drawers. Forage Caps. Stockings. Sack Coats. Cavalry Jackets. Canteens. Flannel Shirts, Haversacks. Trowsers (mounted). Boots. Shelter Tents. Camp Kettles. Mess Pans. Overcoats (Foet). Artillery Jackets. Blankets. Overcoats (mounted). Felt Hats. Infantry Coats. Trowsers (Foot). Bootees. Kuit Shir s. Statement of Clothing and Equipage received at the different Depots of the Army of the Potomac, from the 1st of September, 1862, to the 81st of October, 1862. were slow to transport, particularly the Cumber- rebel cavalry raids. My cavalry force, as I land valley road. urged this morning, should be largely and im For instance, clothing ordered to Hagers- mediately increased under any hypothesis, tos on the 7th October for the corps of Frank-whether to guard the river or advance on the hn, Porter and Reynolds, did not arrive there enemy, or both. until about the 18th, and by that time, of course, there were increased wants, and changes in the position of troops, "The clothing of Sumner arrived in great quantities near the last of October, almost too late for issue, as the army was crossing into Virginia. We finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's Ferry, partly on the cars just arrived, and partly in store. The causes of the reduction of our cavalry force have already been recited. The difficulty in getting new supplies from the usual sources led me to apply for and obtain authority for the cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their own horses. The following are the telegrams and letters on the subject: * HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, October 12, 1862-12.45 p. m. It is absolutely necessary that some energetic means be taken to supply the cavalry of this army with remount horses. The present rate of supply is ten hundred and fifty per week, for the entire army here and in front of Washington. From this number the artillery draw for their batteries. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major General HALLECK, **General in Chief." "In regard to horses, you say that the pre sent rate of supply is only 150 per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. I find from the records that the issues for the last six weeks has been 8,754, making an average per week of 1459." One thousand and fifty is the number stated the original despatch now in my possession, and as not only figures were used, but the number was written out in full, I can hardly see how it is possible for the telegraphic operator to have made a mistake in the transinission of the meninge. " HeadquarterS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, October 14, 1862—7 p. m. * * With my small cavalry force it is impossible for me to watch the line of the Potomac properly, ar even make the reconnoissances that are necessary for our movements. This makes it necessary for me to weaken my line very much, by extending the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. This will continue until the river rises, and it will be next to impossible to prevent the “ G. B. MOCLRedan, Major General Major General H. W. HALLEUK, “Commander-in-Chi The following is an extract from the official report of Colonel Ingalls: Immediately after the battle of Antietama, efforts were made to supply deficiencies in clothing and horses. Large requisitions were prepared and sent in. The artillery and cavalry required large numbers to cover losses sustained in battle, on the march and by diseases. Both of these arms were deficient when they left Washington. A most violent and destructive disease inade its appearance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 animals out of service. Borses reported perfectly well one day, would be dead-lane the next, and it was difficult to foresee where it would end or what number would cover the loss. They were attacked in the hoof and tongue. No one seemed able to account for the appearance of this disease. Animals kept at rest would recover in time, but could not be worked. I made upplication to send west and purchase horses at once, but it was refused on the ground that the outstanding contracts provided for enough; but they were not delivered sufficiently fast, nor in suf ficient numbers, until late in October and early in November. I was authorized to buy 2,500 late in October, but the delivery was not com‐ pieted until late in November, after we had reached Warrenton." In a letter from General Meigs, written on the 14th of October, and addressed to the generalin-chief, it is stated: "There have been issued, therefore, to the army of the Potomac, since the battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, nine thousand two hundred and fifty-four horses." What number of horses were sent to General Pope before his return to Washington, I have no means of determining, but the following statements, made upon my order by the chief quartermaster with the army, and who had means for gaining acurate information, forces upon my mind the conclusion that the quarter master general was in error: BORGES "HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAR, "Chief Quartermaster's Office, Oct. 31, 1862. "Horses purchased since 6th September, 1862, by Colonel Ingalls, chief quarter master, and issued to the forces under the immediate command of Major General Geo. B. McClellan... 1,200 "Issued and turned over to the above force "Total purchased by Colonel Ingalls, and 2,261 3,818 "Tieut. Col. and Quartermaster." This official statement, made up from the reports of the quartermasters who received and distributed the horses, exhibits the true state of the case, and gives the total number of horses received by the army of the Potomac and the received by the army of the Potomac and the troops around Washington, during a period of eight weeks, as seven thousand one hundred and seventy-six, or two thousand and seventyeight less than the number stated by the quartermaster general. J In a letter dated October 14th, 1882, the general-in-chief says: "It is also reported to me that the number of animals with your army in the field is about 31,000. It is believed that your present proportion of cavalry and of animals is much larger than that of any other of our armies." What number of animals our other armies had I am not prepared to say, but military men in European armies have been of the opinion that operations in the field, should have a cavalry an army to be efficient, while carrying on active force equal in numbers to from one-sixth to onefourth of the infantry force. My cavalry did not amount to one-twentieth part of the army and hence the necessity of giving every one of my cavalry soldiers a serviceable horse. Cavalry may be said to constitute the antennæ the flanks, and in rear of the advancing columns, of an army. It scouts all the roads in front, on and constantly feels the enemy. The amount of labor falling upon this arm during the Maryland campaign was excessive. To persons not familiar with the movements of troops, and the amount of transportation required for a large communications, the number of animals menarmy marching away from water or railroad tioned by the generel-in-chief may have appeared Supposing that fifteen hundred were issued to takes the trouble to enter into an accurate and unnecessarily large, but to a military man who the army under General Pope previous to its re-detailed computation of the number of pounds turn to Washington, as General Meigs states, of subsistence and forage required for such an there would still remain five hundred and seventy-eight horses which he does not account army as that of the Potomac, it will be seen that the 81,000 animals were considerably less than for. was absolutely necessary to an advance. As we could not be depended upon for any of our supwere required to move through a country which plies, it became necessary to transport everything in wagons, and to be prepared for all emergencies. I did not consider it safe to leave the river without subsistence and forage for ten days. The letter of the general-in-chief to the Secretary of War, on the 28th of October, and the letter of General Meigs to the general-in-chief on the 14th of October, convey the impression that, upon my urgent and repeated applications for cavalry and artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, I had received a much greater number than was really the case. gen It will be seen from Colonel Myers's report, that of all the horses alluded to by General Meigs, only three thousand eight hundred and thirteen came to the army with which I was ordered to follow and attack the enemy. Of eourse the remainder did not in the slightest degree contribute to the efficiency of the cavalry or artillery of this army, with which I was to cross the river, neither did they in the least facilitate any preparations for carrying out the order to advance upon the enemy, as the eral-in-chief's letter might seem to imply. During the same period that we were receiving the horses alluded to, about three thousand of our old stock were turned into the quartermaster's department, and one thousand five hundred more reported in such condition that they ought to be turned in as unfit for service, thus leaving the active army some seven hundred short of the number required to make good existing deficiencies, to say nothing of providing remounts for men whose horses had died or been killed during the campaign and those previously dismounted. Notwithstanding all the efforts made to obtain a remount, there were, after deducting the force engaged in picketing the river, but about a thousand serviceable cavalry horses on the 21st day of October. This The official returns of that date show the ag gregate strength of the army for duty to have been about 110,000 men of all arms. did not include teamsters, citizen employees, officers' servants, &c., amounting to some 12,000 men, which gives a total of 122,000 men. The subsistence alone of this army for ten days required for its transportation 1,880 wagons at 2,000 pounds to the wagon, and 10,980 animals. Our cavalry horses at that time, amounted to 5,046, and our artillery horses to 6,836. To transport full forage for these 22,862 animals for ten days required 17,832 additional animals, and this forage would only supply the entire number (40,694) of animals with a small fraction over half the allowance for the time specified. It will be observed that this estimate does not embrace the animals necessary to transport quartermaster's supplies, baggage, camp equipage, ambulances, reserve ammunition, forage for officers' horses, etc., etc., which would greatly augment the necessary transportation. It may very truly be said that we did make the march with the means at our disposal, but it will be remembered that we met with no serious opposition from the enemy, neither did we encounter delays from any other cause. The mads were in excellent condition, and the troops marched with the most commendable order and celerity. If we had met with a determined resistance from the enemy, and our progress had been very much retarded thereby, we would have consumed our supplies before they could have been renewed. A proper estimate of my responsibilities as commander of that army did not justify me in basing my preparations for the expedition upon the supposition that I was to have an uninterrupted march. On the contrary, it was my duty to be prepared for all emergencies, and not the least important of my responsibilities was the duty of making ample provision for supplying my men and animals with rations and forage. Knowing the solicitude of the President for an early movement, and sharing with him fully his anxiety for prompt action, on the 21st of October I telegraphed to the general-in-chief as follows : “ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "October 21, 1862. "Since the receipt of the President's order to move on the enemy, I have been making every exertion to get this army supplied with clothing absolutely necessary for marching. This, I am happy to say, is now nearly accomplished; I have also, during the same time, repeatedly urged upon you the importance of supplying cavalry and artillery horses, to replace those broken down by hard service, and steps have been taken to insure a prompt delivery. Our eavalry, even when well supplied with horses, is much inferior in numbers to that of the ene my; but its efficiency has provod itself superior. So forcibly has this been impressed upon our old regiments by repeated successes, that the men are fully persuaded that they are equal to twice their number of rebel cavalry. Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in picketing the river, I have not at present over about one thousand horses for service. Officers have been sent in various directions to purchase horses, and I expect them soon. Without more cavalry horses our communications, from the moment we march, would be at the mercy of the large cavalry forces of the enemy, and it would not be possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary information of the position and movements of the enemy in such a way as to insure success. My experience has shown the necessity of a large and efficient cavalry force. Under the foregoing circumstances I beg leave to ask whether the President desires me to march on the enemy at once, or to await the reception of the new horses, every possible step having been taken to insure their prompt arrival. “G. B. MCCLELLAN, " Major General Comďg. Major General H. W. HALLECK, "General-in-Chief, Washington.” has no change to make in his order of the oth inst. If you have not been, and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities; but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity. "Telegraph when you will move, and on what lines you propose to march. “H. W. HALLECK, "General-in-Chief. "Major General MCCLELLAN." that it was left for my judgment to decide From the tenor of this despatch I conceived whether or not it was possible to move with safety to the army at that time, and this sponsibility I exercised with the more co dence in view of the strong assurances of dence in view of the strong assurances of which the President had seen fit to honor trust in me as commander of that army, during his last visit. advance would have been in the highest degree The cavalry requirements without which aa injudicious and unsafe, were still wanting. enemy The country before us was an enemy's commtry, where the inhabitants furnished the enem every possible assistance, providing food for men and forage for animals, giving all information concerning our movements, and rendering eve aid in their power to the enemy's cause. It was manifest that we should find it, as we subsequently did, a hostile district, where we could derive no aid from the inhabitants that would justify dispensing with the active co-o eration of an efficient cavalry force. Accordearliest date at which the forward movement ingly, I fixed upon the 1st of November as could well be commenced. The general-in-chief, in a letter to the Seonetary of War on the 28th of October, says: "La my opinion, there has been no such want supplies in the army under General McClellan, as to prevent.his compliance with the orders advance against the enemy." Notwithstanding this opinion expressed hy such high authority, I am compelled to y again that the delay in the reception of neces sary supplies up to that date, had left the army in a condition totally unfit to advance against the enemy; that an advance under the existing circumstances would, in my judgment, have been attended with the highest degree of peril, with great suffering and sickness among the men, and with imminent danger of being cut off from our supplies by the superior cavalry force of the enemy, and with no reasonable prospect of gaining any advantage over him. dismiss this subject with the remark, that I have found it impossible to resist the force of my own convictions, that the commander of an army, who, from the time of its organization, has for eighteen months been in constant communication with its officers and men, the greater part of the time engaged in active service in On the same day General Halleck replied as the field, and who has exercised this command follows: "WASHINGTON, Oct. 21, 1862-3 p. m. "Your telegram of 12 M. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he in many battles, must certainly be considered competent to determine whether his army is in proper condition to advance on the enemy or not; and he must necessarily possess greater facilities for forming a correct judgment in re |
