9 1756. JOURNAL of the PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES in the POLITICAL CLUB, Continued from our ApPENDIX to laft Year, p. 609. I shall now give you the Subftance of a Debate or two we had in our Club, upon the Bill pafed laft Seffion into a Law, intitled, An Act for Eftablishing, Maintaining, and well Governing a Nightly Watch within A the City of Bristol. Our first Debate upon this Bill was upon the Queftion, whether the Power of eftablifbing, maintaining, and governing this Nightly Watch, fhould be lodged in the Magiftrates, or in the Inhabitants, that is to fay, in Trufees chofen by the Inhabitants of the City of Briftol; and the first that foke upon this Occafion was P. Furius Philus, whofe Speech was to this Effect. Mr. Prefident, A B year, if by their conduct they have rendered themfelves difagreeable to their fellow-citizens: Nay, even thofe magiftrates that are chofen for life, fuch as the aldermen of the city of London, may be made very uneafy, and very infignificant, by their fellow-citizens, if they behave in an infolent or oppreffive manner, or become fufpected of being ready to facrifice the liberties of their country, or the rights of their fellow-citizens, to the ambitious or arbitrary defigns of a prime minifter; of which we have feveral recent examples, efpecially in the city of London. This power, Sir, which the governed have over their governors, naturally and neceffarily produces a C continual good correfpondence between them; for it prevents any unreasonable or groundless jealoufies arifing in the breafts of the former, and it obliges the latter to behave not only in a juft but in a modeft and complaifant manner, in the exercife of that power with which they are intrusted. But by the unfortunate and fingular form of government established in the city of Bristol, the magiftrates are quite independent of their fellow-citizens, either as to their being chofen into office, or as to their continuance in power after being chofen. To illuftrate this, I muft beg leave to give a fhort account of their prefent form of government; and fhail firft obferve, that the chief power is lodged in a court, which confifts of a mayor, 12 aldermen, and 30 other commoncouncil-men, in all 43 perfons. The mayor is chofen annually, not by the citizens as in other corporations, but by the majority of the other members of this court, all of whom, after being once chofen, continue for life, or S Bristol is fuch a large, opulent, and flourishing city, it is highly reasonable, and even neceffary, that they fhould have a nightly watch, therefore, I believe, no gentleman would think of oppo-D fing a proper bill for this purpose. Indeed, I am furprized, that they have not long fince had fuch a bill paffed into a law; and, I believe, the chief caufe of this neglect, has been the contention that has been introduced by the unfortunate and fingular conftitution of the government of that city, between the magiftrates and inhabitants; which contention must always fubfift whilit the constitution of their government remains the fame, as is evident from the petitions now lying upon our table. In all, I believe, or at least in moft of the cities of this kingdom, the inhabitants or freemen have the privilege of chufing their own magiftrates, and may change or turn out most of them at the end of every January, 1756. F B duri 10 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. B D during their good behaviour. When Jan. common-council feems to be confirmed. From this account of the form of government established in the city of Bristol, it is evident, Sir, that the citizens have nothing to do with the government of their city, nor have their magiftrates the leaft dependance upon them, either for their acquifition of power, or for their continuance in On the conpower. trary, the government of that city muft always neceffarily continue to be a fort of oligarchy; for when two or three men have once got the leading of the court of common-council, they may eafily, and they certainly will take care, that no new man fhall be brought into it, who is not flavishly attached to them; and if they fhould ever find themselves mistaken as to any fuch new member, they will take methods to get him removed, or to make him fo uneafy, that he shall be glad to resign. How this oligarchical form of government came to be introduced into the city of Bristol, does not appear from any hiftory of that city; for from their old charters it is plain, that this was not originally their form of government. In a charter granted by Henry III. the burgefles of Bristol and their heirs, burgeffes of the fame town, are impowered to chufe a coroner: In a charter granted by Edward I. it is faid, that as often as the burgeffes (meaning the citizens) fhall chufe a mayor, they fhall prefent him for admiffion before. the conftable of the castle of Bristol, inftead of prefenting him as formerly, at the Exchequer : And in the famous charter granted by Edward III. the burgeffes and commonalty were every year to chufe three perfons, Gone of whom the crown was to appoint as fheriff for the year enfuing; and the mayor and fheriff, with the confent of the commonalty, were to chufe 40 of the better fort of men in the town, who with the mayor and theriff, were to have the chief go F 、vernment. In 1756. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. In fhort, Sir, from all the old charters of this city it appears, that all the magiftrates and chief officers were originally chofen by the citizens in general; for tho' their aldermen from their first inftitution in the reign of Henry VII. were to be A chofen by the mayor and commoncouncil, yet by the fame charter it is directed, that the members of the common-council fhall be chosen with the affent of the commonalty of the B faid town, and confequently every free citizen had originally a fhare, by means of those I may call their representatives, in the choice even of their aldermen; therefore I muft conclude, that if ever the mayor, aldermen, and common-council of the city of Briflol, affumed fuch a fole and abfolute power as they now exercife over their fellow-citizens, before the 36th year of the reign of Charles II. when that famous new charter was granted to them, upon their having refigned their former. I fay, if they ever affumed fuch a power before that time, it was an ufurpation upon the rights and privileges of their fellow-citizens, without any colour of law, or the authority of any charter. C E thereof to exclude their fellow-citizens from any fhare in the government of the faid city. But in that year, I fuppofe, they were threatened with fome fort of profecution for having acted thus illegally, therefore they applied for a new charter, and by that charter they took care to get all the powers granted them by king Charles the Second's charter confirmed, together with a release of the power of interpofition referved by the former charter to the crown, and a pardon to the magiftrates and offcers for having executed their refpective offices contrary to that charter, as alfo fome new additional powers never before granted. Nay, what is ftill more, Sir, even during the time that they were acting in a manner for which they afterwards thought it neceffary to have a pardon, they applied to parliament, and obtained a very great increase of their power; for in the 11th and D12th of king William, they applied to parliament, and obtained an act, intitled, An Ad for the better preferving the Navigation of the Rivers Avon and Frome, and for cleanfing, paving, and enlightning the Streets of the City of Bristol; by which act the power of the magiflrates of Bristol, efpecially the mayor and aldermen, who are the only juftices of peace within the city, was very confiderably increased in many respects, as every gentleman who confiders what power the juftices of peace have in their respective precincts, may easily imagine; and every fuch gentleman muft fee, how dangerous it would be to the people of any county, to give the juftices of peace the fole power of chufing and removing one another, which is now really the cafe with regard to the city and county of Brittol; therefore in that city it may be fuppofed, that no man can expect much relief by appealing from any two of the justices of peace to the next quarter sessions. But, Sir, when men have once got poffeffion of power, however illegally obtained, from the example of Bristol we may fee how loth they are to part with it, how apt they are to endeavour to increase it; for the magiftrates of Bristol having, by this anti-conftitutional charter granted F them by Charles II. obtained the pretence of a right to continue themselves and pofterity for ever in the magiftracy of that city, unless prevented by the interpofition of the crown, for which a power was in that charter reserved to the crown, G and being well affured that this power would never be exercifed by the crown after the revolution, they continued to act in pursuance of this charter, until the 11th year of the reign of queen Anne, and in virtue 12 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Jan. A feveral former bills of the fame nature, that they may be more praperly and more conveniently trusted in the hands of the inhabitants, or trustees chofen by them, than in any other hands whatfoever. The inhabitants are certainly most interest. ed in the prefervation of thenfelveş and thofe that come to fojourn in their city, and it is they who must fupport the expence: Their own fecurity will oblige them to appoint a fufficient number of watchmen, and to chufe the most proper perfons for the purpofe, and their own intereft will prevent their appointing a greater number of watchmen than may be neceflary, or allowing them higher wages than the fervice may deferve; therefore from the nature of things the inhabitants are the only proper perfons in whofe hands the powers intended to be granted by this bill fhould be ultimately lodged; and that they have always been thought fo by this houfe appears from the feveral acts that have D been paffed for eftablishing and regulating a nightly watch in several of the parishes of Westminster, in every one of which the powers necefiary for the purpofe are all ulti mately lodged in the inhabitants of the refpective parishes. C Having thus, Sir, explained the prefent form of government in the city of Bristol, and the means by which it was establifhed, I think myfelf obliged to take notice, that I do not do fo with any intention to reflect upon the conduct of the prefent or any late magiftrates of that city; for I muft fay, that confidering the extraordinary powers they are invested with, and their abfolute independency for their continuance in that power, not only upon their fellow-citizens, but even upon the B crown itfelf, they have hitherto exercifed that power with great juftice and moderation. My objection therefore to the bill now before us, does not arife from any misconduct in the prefent or late magiftrates of Briftol, nor from my thinking that a nightly watch is not neceffary for that city, or that any powers are intended by this bill but what must be lodged some where or other. But, Sir, the general nature of mankind makes me think it dangerous to truft too much uncontroulable power in the hands of any man, or any fet of men whatever. Infolence in power too often follows clofe upon the heels of an increase of power: A man may be moderate in the exercife of a little power, and yet may become tyrannical if you make but a very E fmall addition. For this reafon, whilft the form of government in Bristol continues to be the fame it is at prefent; whilft the magiftrates and chief officers continue to be fo independent of their fellow-citizens as they now are, I fhall always be F against investing them with any new powers, or extending any of those they are already poffeted of. This, Sir, fhall with me be a ge neral rule with refpc&t to every new power that may hereafter be thought neceffary for the good go-G vernment of that city; but with refpect to the powers to be granted by this bill, I must conclude not only from the nature of things, but from Therefore, I hope, Sir, that the prefent magiftrates of Bristol, will either content to the restoring the ancient form of government in that city, and bringing it as near as poffible to the model now established in the city of London, which would greatly add to their own characters, and very much, I am fure, to the future peace and quiet of their city; or otherwife, I hope, they will excufe ine for propofing, that this bill fhould be fo altered as to lodge the power of eftablishing, maintaining, and well governing a nightly watch within that city, in a certain number of trustees to be annually chofen by the veftries, or by the inhabitants of each refpective parifh, Upon |