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MARCH, 1798.]

Foreign Intercourse.

[H. of R.

propriate; otherwise the Executive might absorb all the powers of the Legislature, might form treaties of alliance, maintain an Army and Navy, and expend all the public treasure.

tive, had exhibited an aggregate amount of the salaries of the public officers and contractors in the United States. But a large proportion of these officers were not appointed by the Executive, nor did they feel any dependence upon him. In many Let us consider, on the other hand, the conseinstances they would be found among the most quence of that gentleman's doctrine. Every apzealous opposers of his measures, and enlisted un-pointment made by the Executive becomes a der the banners of his adversaries. Numbers of nullity, unless ratified by that House; in the face them, appointed by the heads of departments, were of the Constitution which excludes them, and unknown to the President, and feeling morally confines this duty to the President, with the adsure of retaining the offices, except in cases of vice of the Senate. gross misbehaviour, they were often led, by the violence of opposition, to prepare for a change of men and measures, and to be more solicitous for the favor of members in that House, who might attempt to raise or diminish their salaries, than of the Executive himself.

After so much had been said respecting the Constitutional right of the House to refuse an appropriation, Mr. O. observed that he should add but a few remarks. To prevent confusion on this subject, it might be well to state the points in which both sides of the House were agreed, and those in which they dissented. It was not denied that the President had the right of nominating public Ministers; nor had it been contended that the House possessed the right of fixing their salaries; the doctrine of his friends was merely that the appointment of a Minister imposed a moral obligation to give a reasonable salary, and that being once determined, it was unjust to reduce it without the best reasons. It was doubted by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, whether the office of Minister was created by the Constitution, and whether it was not competent for this House to fix the destination of a Minister, and it was as serted by him that in all cases the House had an authority to refuse every appropriation. On these last points they were at issue. To explain the reason of his doubt respecting the right of the President to designate the Courts to which the Ministers should be sent, that gentleman had relied that the same clause in the Constitution which gives the power of appointing Ministers to the Executive, also gives that of appointing Judges of the Supreme Court, which he never pretended to exercise until the number of Judges had been ascertained by law. In this argument he hardly appeared to be serious; but he would answer, that the same Constitution provides that " a Supreme Court shall be established by law," and it has no existence until created by law. A Court is a jurisdiction committed to one or more persons; the jurisdiction is constituted by a law, which describes the number of persons to whom it shall be committed; the Executive then appoints those who are to exercise this legal jurisdiction. In case of foreign Ministers, if their destination must be established by the Legislature, the objects of their mission must also be understood and ratified by the same authority, or it must be exercised without discretion; and the whole power of negotiation would thus be attracted as incident to the other.

It was further urged by the same gentleman, that in all cases the House might refuse to ap-|

It was owing to the apparent contradictions arising from a theoretical view of Constitutions like ours, that they were pronounced to be impracticable by some of the best writers of antiquity. And these abstract questions and extreme cases were not calculated to reconcile the minds of our citizens to our excellent form of Government. It is a plain and conclusive reply, by which all such objections are obviated, that the Constitution is not predicated upon a presumed abuse of power by any department; but on the more reasonable confidence that each will perform its duty within its own sphere with sincerity, that division of sentiment will yield to reason and explanation, and that extreme cases are not likely to happen.

One word in relation to the motives of gentlemen, and he would finish his observations, which, he was admonished, by his voice and feelings, had been too much extended. Why, said gentlemen, do you charge us with designs to subvert the Constitution? Have we not our share of wealth and of power? He was not one of those who had imputed such designs to gentlemen; nor would he pretend to say whether the part of the Union represented by those gentlemen was rich or generally involved in debt. But he would say, that wealth was not always a security for public or private virtue. Was not the Duke of Orleans rich? Was not his income equal to the revenue of a kingdom? But he was not satisfied with his elevated rank or princely fortune; he conspired with others, men high in station, who possessed both riches and their share of power, and promoted a revolution, which, like a whirlwind, swept them off into swift destruction. It is not easy to discern, and therefore not always necessary to impeach, the motives of men. When, therefore, a gentleman exclaims, we want no revolution, we wish for no change, we wish to keep things quiet, he was not authorized to dispute the assurance, and say it was not true.

But when, in the same breath, he heard insinuations comparing the President of the United States to Charles I., and the mild exercise of a Constitutional power to the odious claim of shipmoney, in that reign; and when he heard further, the opposition to the present bill compared to an opposition to that odious measure, he would not say that he discredited the professions of gentlemen; God only knew their hearts, but their language was full of danger.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania had concluded with an invitation to his friends to unite with him in two objects-in preventing the increase of

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foreign influence, and in diminishing the expenditure of the public money. He would meet that gentleman; and, if he and his friends would discover a real disposition to join in measures to prevent the increase of foreign influence, he should almost be inclined to secure that advantage, by consenting, for himself, that they should dispose of the money upon their own plans.

When Mr. Oris had concluded,

Mr. HARPER rose. It was my wish and my hope, Mr. Chairman, when this subject was again called up, some days ago, after an intermission of three weeks or more, that we should at length be permitted to come to a decision without further debate, on a question which had so long occupied the attention of the House, and already, perhaps, exhausted the patience of the public. I, and those with whom I think on this occasion, were willing, for the sake of an early decision, to pass by, unanswered, many things which, though susceptible, in our opinion, of an easy refutation, were calculated to make an impression to our disadvantage. We were even content to leave unnoticed the violent philippic of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. NICHOLAS,) who introduced this motion, and who, in support of it, has allowed himself so great a latitude of invective against its opposers and their adherents. We, therefore, repeatedly called for the question, and did all in our power to close a debate in which such immoderate use had already been made of the indulgence of the House.

[MARCH, 1798.

Though called up, however, Mr. Chairman, by the assertions of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I shall not confine myself wholly to them, but shall incidentally notice such observations of other gentlemen as may appear reducible to any head of argument. There are some parts of the last speech of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. NICHOLAS.) on which, though they appear to have no necessary connexion with the subject, I cannot omit to make some animadversions. Those I shall, in the first place, submit to the committee, and then proceed to other and more important parts of the discussion.

The gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. NICHOLAS.) perhaps, foreseeing that ample retribution of praise which he has since received, employed a considerable part of his last speech in a most pompous panegyric on his friend from Pennsylvania, (Mr. GALLATIN.) Had he stopped here, Mr. Chairman; had he contented himself with extolling the virtues and talents of his friend and political associate, even at the expense of every body else, I should have been disposed to pass it by unnoticed. The gentleman from Virginia, no doubt, entertains this exalted opinion of his friend from Pennsylvania, and I should never deny him the right, or begrudge him the pleasure of expressing it; nor have I any disposition to detract from the merit of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or diminish the reputation which he may be supposed to possess. But the gentleman from Virginia did not But it did not seem good to the gentleman from stop here. Not content with extolling his friend Pennsylvania, (Mr. GALLATIN.) He, vesterday, above all that is great and distinguished in the pronounced a discourse of three hours and a half country, he went on to impute the worst of molong, in which he repeated assertions formerly re- tives, the most base and contemptible passions, to futed, and made them the ground of a long train those who do not partake in his enthusiastic adof reasoning; and advanced many new positions miration. He told us that frequent attacks were equally untenable, but equally capable, if left un-made, in this House, on the gentleman from Penndetected and unexposed, of misleading the mind. These assertions, which the gentleman from Pennsylvania has not attempted to prove, though they are the ground-work of all his reasonings, were advanced with a boldness which nothing but a belief that he was to remain unanswered, could Mr. Chairman, I might, I know, be excused have produced. His speech, when prepared in from taking any part of this observation to myself his closet, was evidently intended for a concluding personally; for it will be remembered that I have speech; and hence he has laid down positions made none of those attacks which are spoken of which he knew to be unfounded, with a boldness on the gentleman from Pennsylvania. Perhaps whereof even he himself has heretofore exhibited this has been because I have, for my part, never no example. On these positions, he has built a felt that superiority, never perceived that pregigantic structure of argument to support the pre-eminence, from which the attacks are supposed to sent motion; a structure which, like a vast edifice resting on loose blocks, must fall and crumble in the dust, as soon as some person shall take the trouble to discover and knock away its frail and temporary props.

It is for this purpose, that I now rise once more to trespass on the indulgence of the committee. The loose blocks which support this edifice I mean to knock away; an operation which requires neither strength nor skill, which may be performed by any person who stands near enough to discover the defect; and then it will be seen with what speedy ruin a structure so large, and appearing so solid, when viewed from a distance, will tumble to the earth.

sylvania, and that those attacks, proceeding from envy of his superior talents, were a tacit acknowledgment of that pre-eminence of ability, which every day's debate rendered more and more conspicuous.

proceed. That the gentleman from Pennsylvania has merit nobody will deny, and nobody can be less disposed to deny it than me; but I confess that I have never observed that superiority over many other members of this House, much less over all, whereby the gentleman from Virginia has been so much dazzled. And I would remind that gentleman, that all greatness is by comparison, and that the comparison, in cases of this kind, is generally made, not between a man and his antagonists, but between him and his associates. Even a rush-light may seem a resplendent luminary, when compared to a glow-worm; and in a dark room, the smallest spark becomes bright and distinguished. I would submit it to the gentle

MARCH, 1798.]

Foreign Intercourse.

[H. OF R.

the name of Washington, I should apply expressions to the gentleman from Virginia little suitable to the dignity of this place, and little consonant with the respect which I entertain for his personal character. But I will repress them; and instead of giving vent to a just and natural indignation, I will content myself with repelling this rude, this unlooked-for attack upon the administration of this Government, and its late venerable and

man from Virginia whether he has not commit-
ted some mistake of this kind. Amidst the thick
gloom that is observed to rest on a certain descrip-
tion of persons, a certain class of political opinions
in this country, I will not say in this House, is it to
be wondered at, if the glimmerings of sense and
capacity which are sometimes emitted from that
quarter by the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
should dazzle the eyes of his associates? But
they must not judge of the eyes of the commu-illustrious Chief.
nity by their own eyes, nor conclude that the
brightness of the sun is to be found in those flash-
es of light which, undiscernable amidst the full
blaze of day, are indebted for all their apparent
resplendency to the blackness of that night from
whose bosom they are sent forth. Let me advise
the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Chairman, to
forbear his panegyrics. They produce no effect
on the decision of the American public, before
which the gentleman from Pennsylvania, with
his associates, and his opponents, stands to be
judged. This judgment will be formed on better
premises than the panegyrics or the invectives
pronounced in this House. It will place the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania, and those who appear
with him on the political scene, in their true po-
sitions; it will not only be impartial, but final and
conclusive; and to it all of us, whatever we may
think or say of ourselves, or of each other, must
implicitly submit.

This I am fortunately enabled to do, in a manner the most easy and complete; for the late Minister to France has written a book. "O that mine enemy might write a book!" was the affecting exclamation of a virtuous and suffering man of old, unjustly accused, but conscious of rectitude, and wishing ardently for an opportunity of confounding his accusers out of their own mouths! "Oh that mine enemy might write a book!" ought also to be the exclamation of the American Government; which, to use the expression of its late illustrious Chief, "requires nothing but a knowledge of the truth to justify its measures, and cannot but be desirous of having this truth frankly and fully displayed." The American Government has been more fortunate than Job. His enemies wisely confined themselves to the strongholds of dark, vague, and general abuse. They practised the Ambiguas in vulgum spargere voces" of the poet, and wisely avoided the open field of facts and The gentleman from Virginia, having paid this specific accusations. But not so the late Minlarge tribute of flattery to his friend from Penn- ister to France. Prompted by that restless vanisylvania, who, to do him justice, has not been un-ty for which demagogues of an inferior order are mindful of the proper retribution, went on to se- always remarkable, he has rashly and foolishly lect from among his political associates another challenged his enemy to combat on the open plain object of enthusiastic adulation, whom he has of dates and facts, and has written a book. In extolled in terms still more extravagant, and with this book is to be found the most complete justifiallusions still more offensive. I mean, sir, the late cation of the Executive for his recall, in every reMinister to France; and as I shall have occasion spect, except that it was so long delayed; for the to make some observations, of no very startling most singular display of incapacity, unfaithfulness nature, on the conduct of that gentleman, I beg and presumption, of neglect of orders, forgetfulleave to remark, in the first place, that for any-ness of the dignity, rights, and interests of his own thing which I may say here, I shall not claim the country, and servile devotedness to the Governprotection of my seat, or shelter myself under its ment of the country to which he was sent, that privileges. can be found in the history of diplomacy. By this book, it appears that the late Minister to France took every occasion of thwarting the views of the Government by which he was sent, that he forebore to do much that he was ordered, and did much that he was expressly forbidden; that he, in all cases, set up his own judgment above the judgement of his Government; that he assured France, "that this country was ready to submit to any violation of its rights, to any infractions of its treaties which she might think fit to practise, and that, if she thought these violations and infractions advantageous to herself, she ought to persist in them, for in that case, we should not only submit, but acquiesce with cheerfulness and pleasure: " that he made a direct attempt to render this country tributary to France, in order to gain her assistance for accomplishing, by force, objects which our Government was then striving to accomplish, and actually did accomplish, by amicable negotiation: that he did everything, in his power, to involve this country in a war against England,

The gentleman from Virginia has represented the talents and accomplishments of this person, the late Minister to France, as so pre-eminently superior, not only to the distinguished character (General Pinckney) who was sent to succeed him, but to every other character in this country, to any person who might have been sent, his qualifications as so extraordinary, his services as so great, and his conduct as so exemplary, that his recall could be considered in no other light, than. as the act of an assassin. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Virginia has declared that the recall of the late Minister to France, was the act of an assassin. And who is this assassin? It is Washington: for by Washington, this Minister was recalled; and for this exercise of his Constitutional powers as President, he is branded by the gentleman from Virginia with the name of assassin. Mr. Chairman, were I to give way to the feelings which naturally arise in the breast of an American, at hearing the epithet assassin affixed to

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pursuant to the wishes and policy of France, and directly contrary, not only to what he knew to be the desire and determination of our Government, but to the express letter of his instructions. All this, Mr. Chiarman, appears from this book; and it is but a small part of the catalogue which might be presented. The book lies before me; its disgusting pages I will not open to the House; the members, no doubt, have perused it, and to their own recollection I refer for the truth of all that I have advanced. The late Minister to France stands self-convicted of everything short of selling his country for a price. Of this I do not accuse him, but nothing else, which his incapacity permitted him to do, has he left undone.

And this, Mr. Chairman, is the man, for recalling whom the epithet of assassin is applied to the name of Washington!

[Mr. NICHOLAS explained, by saying, that he had said that after the full disclosure of the conduct of Mr. Monroe, he was sorry to find that gentlemen thought it necessary to make insinuations against him; but that since gentlemen made it necessary to give an opinion on the subject, he had no hesitation in declaring that, in his opinion, the publication had proved that it was in the power of the Executive to have preserved peace with France, but that they had wantonly thrown it from us. He had said that he was convinced that the discovery was a very unpleasant one to gentlemen who had advocated certain measures; but he thought it could not be condemned after the attacks made on that gentleman; and that the effect was like the wounds of the assassin, who finds his enemy unexpectedly prepared.]

I do not think (continued Mr. HARPER) that the gentleman from Virginia has made the matter better by his explanation. It appears, by that very explanation, that he did apply the term assassin to General Washington for having recalled the late Minister to France; a term which, some years ago, surely could not have been expected ever to be applied to that name within the United States, much less within these walls.

I must beg leave, Mr. Chairman, to conclude these remarks with the declaration wherewith I began them, that I do not intend to shelter myself under the privileges of my place for anything that I have said on this subject. If the remarks which I have made on his friend should appear harsh to the gentleman from Virginia, let him recollect that he himself provoked and gave occasion for them, by declaring that General Washington had acted the part of an assassin.

Having disposed, Mr. Chairman, of this part of the subject, I will next advert to the Constitutional ground taken by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GALLATIN.) That gentlemen prefaced his observations by declaring that the amendment under consideration went no further than to reduce the salaries of certain Ministers Plenipotentiary from $9,000 to $4,500; but, unfortunately, he forgot his tenet before he arrived at the middle of his speech, for he soon confessed that the object of the amendment was to restrain and control the Executive in the exercise of the

[MARCH. 1798.

power of appointing foreign Ministers, which is vested in it by the Constitution; and, having made this acknowledgment, so contradictory to his first position, the gentleman from Pennsylvania proceeded to show, by the utmost exertion of his powers, that it was right and proper for the House thus to interfere, thus to control the Executive, and to use its power over appropriations for effecting that purpose. Indeed, the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. NICHOLAS,) at the outset of the business, expressly stated this to be the sole object of his amendment. With a candor and openness characteristic of his usual conduct he avowed that his object was not to save money, but to restrict the President in the exercise of this power. He told us that the diplomatic corps had been improperly increased; that the number of Ministers had been improperly extended; that there was danger of a further extension, whereby a dangerous Executive influence in the House was likely to be produced; and that it was right for the House to interfere, prevent this extension, and bring back the establishment to its original limits. This he stated to be the object of his amendment. Hence, then, Mr. Chairman, it is manifest. not only from the arguments of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, but from the express declaration of the mover of this amendment himself, that the question now agitated is a question of power, and not a question of money. It is manifestly not a question to know whether a Minister Plenipotentiary shall have this, that, or the other salary, but whether this House shall direct the President where he shall appoint Ministers Plenipotentiary, where Ministers Resident, and where no Ministers at all. The question goes this whole length; for if the House say, as the amendment declares it can and ought, that no Minister Plenipotentiary is necessary at Lisbon or Berlin, it can say, with the same propriety, and on the same principle, that no Minister Plenipotentiary is necessary at London, Paris, or Madrid, or that no Minister is necessary anywhere.

That such is the object of the amendment, that the question between us is a question of power, and not of money, is further evident from the mode of argument whereby the amendment is supported. Gentlemen do not pretend that nine thousand dollars is too much for a Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon, or Berlin-on that ground we should cheerfully meet them, and agree to a reduction of the salary, if it should appear to be too high; but they tell us, and attempt to prove, that there is no need of a Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon, or Berlin. In answer we allege, that, by the Constitution, the President and Senate are solely authorized to judge where Ministers of this, that, or the other grade ought to be employed, and that this House has nothing to do with the business but to fix their salaries, which it is bound to do in a suitable manner. This gentlemen deny; and thus the question of power, the sole question which has been agitated, or is considered of any importance, arises between us.

I say "the only question which is considered as important;" because the supporters of the amend

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ment have laid no stress whatsoever on the question of expense. They have, on the contrary, shown themselves ready to abandon it, for the sake of gaining the least additional chance of support in the great question, the question of power. This is manifest from the motion of the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. S. SMITH,) which was immediately agreed to by the mover of the amendment. By the amendment, as first proposed, Ministers Plenipotentiary were to be allowed only at London and Paris. The gentleman from Maryland proposed to allow one at Madrid also, because he had observed that the impropriety of recalling our Minister from that Court had been particularly insisted on by some who opposed the amendment. The gentleman from Virginia immediately consented to modify his amendment, so as to locate a Minister Plenipotentiary at Madrid. From which it would appear most evidently, if we did not know it before, that gentlemen care not how many Ministers Plenipotentiary there are, nor how much money is spent in maintaining them, provided the House of Representatives can obtain the power of controlling and directing the appointment. It is to obtain this power, and not to save public money, that gentlemen struggle; and, provided the principle can but be established, they are content to have as many Ministers Plenipotentiary as anybody pleases; for they know that the principle may be as completely established in the case of one Minister, as by turning out the whole diplomatic

corps.

And, notwithstanding all this, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GALLATIN) tells us that this is merely a question about salaries, a question of saving nine thousand dollars, and wonders how it could lead to a controversy about the Constitutional powers of the President and the House! This proves that the gentleman from Pennsylvania intended his speech for a concluding speech, or that he entertains a most contemptuous opinion of the understanding of the House.

[H. OF R.

give or refuse this assent, it must be guided solely by its own discretion, by its own opinion about the necessity or utility of the object for which an appropriation is wanted. If it should think this object unnecessary, or hurtful, it is bound in duty to withhold the appropriation. Consequently, it may refuse to appropriate for a Minister to Lisbon, Berlin, or any other place, if it should think such Minister, though appointed by the President and Senate, unnecessary or injurious. This I take to be a fair state of the argument.

But gentlemen, while they lay such stress upon this part of the Constitution, seem entirely to forget another part-that part which provides that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint foreign Ministers and Consuls." It will, however, be admitted that these two parts of the Constitution are equally authoritative, and must both have effect; that the whole instrument, like all other instruments, must be taken together, and so construed that none of its provisions may be defeated or rendered nugatory. These two powers, therefore-the power of appointment by the President and the Senate, and the power of appropriation in the House, must be reconciled to each other-must be made to act as mutual helps, not as mutual obstructions. How is this to be done? Certainly not by admitting the doctrine of this amendment, which would utterly destroy one of the powers-would give the House an absolute control over the appointment of Ministers, and reduce the President and Senate to the mere power of making a nomination, which the House might refuse or agree to, according to its good pleasure. This is the plain and necessary consequence of admitting the principle, contended for in support of this amendment, that the House, when called on to appropriate for an officer, legally appointed, may, in the first place, inquire whether the appointment is necessary.

Some other way of reconciling these powers must, therefore, be found out; and which is it? I shall, therefore, Mr. Chairman, consider this We contend, Mr. Chairman, that it is thus: An amendment as having for its object, and its sole office must first be authorized by law; for nobody object, too, the establishment of this principle: pretends that the President and Senate can create "that the House of Representatives, by its power offices. When the office is thus authorized, the over appropriations, has a right to control and di- President and Senate exercise their power of aprect the Executive in the appointment of foreign pointment, and fill the office. The House of ReMinisters." I shall treat the question which arises presentatives then exercises its Constitutional upon this amendment as a question of power be- power over appropriations, by providing an adetween this House and the President and Senate, quate compensation for the officer. In the exerand I shall endeavor to show that the amend-cise of this power, they cannot inquire whether ment, if carried, would be a direct breach of the Constitution, an alarming usurpation by this branch on the Constitutional powers of the Executive Department.

The supporters of this amendment, avowing its object to be the establishment of a control over the appointment of foreign Ministers, contend that this House have a right to exercise that control, and rely on that part of the Constitution which provides that "no money shall be issued from the Treasury without an appropriation by law." As this House, say gentlemen, must concur in passing all laws, it follows that it may refuse its assent to appropriations. In judging whether it will

the office was necessary or not; for that has already been determined by the law which authorized it. Neither can they inquire whether the office was properly filled; for that would be to invade the powers of the President and Senate, to whom, by the Constitution, the right of choosing the officer is exclusively referred. What, then, is their power, and into what may they inquire? They may inquire what is a proper and adequate compensation for such an officer. They may fix the amount of his salary; and, in fixing it, they must be guided by a proper discretion, by a sense of duty, by the nature of the office, the circumstances of the country, and the public service.

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