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world's clip amounting to approximately 3,000,000,000 pounds grease weight, of which the United States produces less than 9 per cent. On the imports of wool for clothing there is now a duty of 31 cents per scoured pound. In the improbable event of the Capper bill increasing the demand for new wool, the increased supply would come from abroad subject to the Fordney-McCumber duty of 31 cents per scoured pound, this increase in price because of the tariff tax being the same as it is now when two-thirds of our wool supply is imported. Thus America wool growers, who originated and have promoted the agitation for the Grosvenor-Capper bill for the purpose of increasing the prices obtained for their wool, would find themselves balked in this plan to increase the excessive toll that the Fordney-McCumber 31-cent scoured content duty now enables them to extort from the people of the United States.
(9) Lastly, the one certain effect of making the Capper bill a, law would be to give a tremendous impetus to the “ successful selling idea ” embodied in the campaign carried on by Strong, Hewat & Co., in alliance with the wool growers' organizat aon the National Sheep and Wool Bureau, and backed by the indorsement-of the essential portion of that firm's trade-mark by the United States Government in the text of the Capper bill. If this Capper bill becomes a law carrying Strong, Hewat & Co.'s trademark, it will be the first time, and every American with any pride in his country and sense of shame over her disgrace will pray that it may be the last time, that the statutes of the United States have been used to promote an advertising scheme for the enrichment of private individuals at the expense of the people.
LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS OF THE CAPPER BILL.
Under the conditions affecting the campaign for Grosvenor-Capper wool goods labeling legislation during the past 22 years, it is not surprising that so strong a sentiment has been created in its favor, backed as it has been by selfish interests and presented to the consumers with an utter disregard of facts. The feature of the campaign that is not only surprising but discreditable and humiliating is that the Capper bill should have been allowed to come before either branch of Congress without having had its real character thoroughly exposed by some Member of the Senate or House, and its enactment into a law thus made impossible.
The Capper bill is not the first wool goods labeling bill to get through the Senate committee without proper consideration. On April 9, 1913, Senator Myers introduced his labeling bill of the Grosvenor brand, which on March 19, 1914, was referred to the Committee on Manufactures. Like the Capper bill, the Myers bill was in turn referred to a subcommittee for consideration. No public notice of hearings, was given and the first news as to its progress to reach the textile trade was on October 14, 1914, three weeks before a congressional election, when it was announced that the Myers bill had been reported favorably to the Senate by Senator Pomerene, of Ohio. Inquiries then disclosed that the subcommittee had held what they called a “hearing” at which Senator Myers, of Montana, who introduced the bill, and his colleague, Senator Walsh, appeared in favor of the measure, also a so-called expert from the Department of Agriculture, who gave a. kindergarten talk on the manufacture of cloth. That is all the farce called a hearing on the Myers bill amounted to. In the favorable report on the Myers bill Senator Pomerene quoted two letters, one by Carl L. Alsberg, Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry, who told how he. could distinguish “shoddy” from new wool by the appearance of the fibers, and the other from a bionomist in the Department of Agriculture, who advised protecting the public by having cotton goods labeled to show the length of the fibers of which they are made. And when a protest against the department's supposed indorsement of the Myers bill was sent to Secretary of Agriculture Houston he replied as follows:
“ The statements were prepared merely for Senator Myers's information and without specific reference to legislation. The department has not been formally or officially consulted with reference to the bill."
And that was not the worst of it. After these facts had been publicly exposed Senator Gallinger, of New Hampshire, a member of the Committee on Manufactures, made the following statement in the Senate on February 3, 1914, showing that the subcommittee had smuggled the Myers bill through the committee, not only without the knowledge of the public and the textile trade but without the knowledge of members of the committee :
“I find on the calendar Senate bill 646, providing for the labeling and tagging of all fabrics and articles of clothing intended for sale which enter into
interstate commerce, and providing penalties for misbranding. This bill seems to have been reported from the Committee on Manufactures. I am a member of that committee, but I never heard of a meeting of the committee nor was I consulted as to the matter of the report. As I have received communications concerning the bill, in which complaint is made that no hearing was held on the subject and that there are certain parties who desire a hearing, I will ask the Senator from Ohio if it would not be compatible with his views to have the bill recommitted to the committee for the purpose of giving certain interested parties an opportunity to be heard? I thought it was rather remarkable that I had never been notified of the meetings of the committee."
In consenting to Senator Gallinger's request Senator Pomerene made the surprising admission that he “knew of no objection on the part of any interested parties to the provisions of the bill until very recently and that “the bill seemed to have the indorsement of the department."
We give this somewhat detailed account of the handling of the Myers bill in order to show how a wool goods labeling bill of the Grosvenor-Capper type, promoted by private greed and misrepresentation outside of Congress, was sneaked through a committee inside of Congress.
Fully as discreditable have been the methods by which the Capper bill has been brought before the Senate. One of the fatal objections to the Capper bill is the impossibility of enforcing its provisions by the method it provides, the examination and analysis of samples. The Committee on Interstate Commerce held hearings on the bill, during which the chairman was called upon to submit the bill to a sure test by asking the Bureau of Standards and the Bureau of Chemistry to test and report on the percentages of new wool and recovered wool in samples of wool goods whose component parts were known to the committee but not to the bureaus. The hearings on the Capper bill ended with the agreement that this test should be made, the chairman writing us to that effect.
When it was announced that the Capper bill would soon be reported to the Senate we asked a member of the committee if the tests had been made and received a reply that evaded the question. After the bill had been passed along to the Senate, we wrote to another member of the Committee on Interstate Commerce asking the same question and received the following reply from the clerk of the committee :
“I am acknowledging receipt of your letter of the 26th instant with respect to the truth in fabric bill. Samples of wool goods were not submitted to the Bureau of Standards for the reason that it was generally admitted that there is no way to tell whether cloth contains new wool or reworked wool and the proportions thereof."
What is there to choose between a subcommittee that after a farcical hearing smuggles a Myers labeling bill into the Senate with a favorable report without the knowledge of the public, the textile trade, or even the other members of the committee and a Committee on Interstate Commerce that deliberately passes along to the Senate in silence a Capper labeling bill which the members of the committee know is unworkable?
WHY ARE KNIT FABRICS EXCEPTED?
We could easily extend this statement by pointing out many other serious defects and absurdities of this most defective and absurd Capper bill, such as that of limiting this or any labeling bill, good or bad, to woven wool goods, excepting from its provisions not only wool knit fabrics, felts, and other wool goods but also goods of cotton, silk, linen, hemp, and jute. What, for example, could be more ridiculous than to punish by fine and imprisonment the sale of wool yarn or of cloth woven from such yarn if not marked to show the percentages of new wool and reworked wool, and at the same time allow goods knit from the same yarn to be sold without being marked? If the purchaser of woven wool fabrics and clothing made from them is to be "protected” by Capper labels, why is he or she left without such “protection when purchasing knit wool fabrics and clothing? Why is the hair from the sheep to be dignified by the words “virgin wool,” while the hair from the Angora goat is left to be designated by customary terms of the trade? A list of the many additional absurdities of the Capper bill would, however, only serve to obscure the fundamental and incurable defects of the measure.
We have explained on what the value of wool raw materials depends described and visualized by illustration and samples the superiority of much of
Capper “recovered wool” in comparison with Capper “virgin wool”; pointed out the only means, handling of the goods, by which the consumer can judge of the value of wool fabrics; demonstrated the impossibility of enforcing the Capper bill; pointed out the certain effects of that measure if made a law; showed who are back of the measure, woolgrowers seeking an unwarranted increase in the price of their wool, combined with one firm of wool manufacturers promoting their advertising campaign by connecting it with the Capper campaign, and all of them, woolgrowers and this one firm of manufacturers, misleading the consumers into thinking that this unworkable measure would protect them against misrepresentation and fraud; finally we have shown you that the Capper bill is now before the Senate as a result of the neglect of the Committee on Interstate Commerce to give to it the careful and thoroughgoing consideration that any measure deserves which affects the cost and quality of the clothing worn by 100,000,000 people in the climate of the United States.
IN CONCLUSION, HOW TO PROTECT THE CONSUMERS.
Having proved that the Capper wool goods labeling bill is a delusion and a fraud, promoted by selfish private interests by the deception of the public, brought before the Senate as a result of neglect by the committee in charge of it, and that it deserves no consideration whatsoever, we will in conclusion point out the effective measure that you can provide for protecting the consumers against misrepresentation and fraud in the sale of goods. That measure consists in a law making it unlawful to attach false marks not only to wool goods but to any kind of goods in interstate commerce, this method of protection to be applied by the States in intrastate commerce. Fraud or inisrepresentation in respect to the quality, weight, measure, place of origin or other feature of an article is as reprehensible and as great a wrong to the consumer when practiced in the sale of furniture, foodstuffs, china, mineral water, musical instruments, shoes, leather goods, rubber goods, firearms, tobacco, naphtha, oil, watches, clocks, or any other articles that can be mentioned as it is in the sale of woo con, Ik, linen, or other textile product, whether woven, knit, braided, or felted.
Having made it unlawful to place false marks on merchandise of all kinds offered for sale, the Government can require the marking of articles to give certain definite information in cases where such information is obtainable and is required in the public interest or for the protection of the purchasers and those who may come in contact with the articles or products.
Such a law, which is based on reason and comnion sense, is no untried measure. For thirty-six years it has been ir force in Eingland, during which time it has been adopted by many of the British dominions, being known as the British merchandise marks act. A number of bills based on this principle of forbidding false trade descriptions of goods have in recent years been introduced in both the House and Senate. The first one (H. R. 13492) was introduced in the House of Representatives February 17, 1914, hy Representative Rogers of Massachusetts at Mr. Dale's suggestion ou January 19 of that year. Two years later Representative Barkley of Kentucky introduced a bill based on the same principle, that of forbidding the false marking of all kinds of goods. There are now pending in the House and Senate bills of the same character, one having been introduced by Mr. Rogers in the House, the other in the Senate by Senator Lodge.
We ask that having put the quietus on the Capper bill, you provide protection to the consumers of the country by a carefully prepared law based on the sound principle of forbidding the false marking of all kinds of goods. Respectfully
CARDED WOOLEN MANUFACTUJRERS ASSOCIATION,
JOSEPH W. KANDALL, Secretury,
MERCHANDISING MARKS Acts, 1887.
CHAPTER 28-AN ACT TO CONSOLIDATE AND AMEND THE LAW RELATING TO FRAUDU
LENT MARKS ON MERCHANDISE-AUGUST 23, 1887.
Be it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
SECTION 1. This act may be cited as the merchandise marks act, 1887.
SEC. 2. (1) Every person who (a) forges any trade-mark; or (b) falsely applies to goods any trade-mark or any mark so nearly resembling a trademark as to be calculated to deceive; or (c) makes any die, block, machine, or other instrument for the purpose of forging, or of being used for forg'ng, a trade-mark; or (d) applies any false trade description to goods; or (e) disposes of or has in his possession any die, block, machine, or other instrument for the purpose of forging a trade-mark; or (f) causes any of the things above in this section mentioned to be done, shall, subject to the provisions of this act, and unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud, be guilty of an offense against this act.
(2) Every person who sells, or exposes for or has in his possession for sale, or any purpose of trade or manufacture, any goods or things to which any forged trade-mark or false trade description is applied, or to which any trademark or mark so nearly resembling a trade-mark as to be calculated to deceive is falsely applied, as the case may be, shall, unless he proves (a) that having taken all reasonable precautions against committ'ng an offense against this act, he had at the time of the commission of the alleged offense no reason to suspect the genuineness of the trade-mark, mark, or trade description; and (6) that on demand made by or on behalf of the prosecutor, he gave all the information in his power with respect to the persons from whom he obtained such goods or things; or (c) that otherwise he had acted innocently, be guilty of an offense against this act.
(3) Every person guilty of an offense against this act shall be liable (i) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a term not exceeding two years, or to fine, or to both imprisonment and fine; and (ii) on summary conviction to imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a term not exceeding four months, or to a fine not exceeding £20, and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction to imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding £50; and (iii) in any case, to forfeit to Her Majesty every chattel, article, instrument, or thing by means of or in relation to which the offense has been committed.
(4) The court before whom any person is convicted under this section may order any forfeited articles to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the court thinks fit.
(5) If any person feels aggrieved by any conviction made by a court of summary jurisdiction, he may appeal therefrom to a court of quarter sessions.
(6) Any offense for which a person is under this act liable to punishment on summary conviction may be prosecuted, and any articles liable to be forfeited under this act by a court of summary jurisdiction may be forfeited, in manner provided by the summary jurisdiction acts: Provided, That a person charged with an offense under this section before a court of summary jurisdiction shall, on appearing before the court, and before the charge is gone into, be informed of his right to be tried on indictment, and if he requires be so tried accordingly.
SEC. 3. (1) For the purpose of this act the expression “trade-mark means a trade-mark registered in the register of trade-marks kept under the patents, designs, and trade-marks act, 1883, and includes any trade-mark which, either with or without registration, is protected by law in any British possession or foreign State to which the provisions of the one hundred and third section of the patents, designs, and trade-marks act, 1883, are, under Order in Council, for the time being applicable:
The expression “trade description" means any description, statement, or other indication, direct or indirect (a) as to the number, quantity, measure, guage, or weight of any goods, or (b) as to the place or country in which any goods were made or produced, or (c) as to the mode of manufacturing or producing any goods, or (d) as to the material of which any gods are composed, or (e) as to any goods being the subject of an existing patent, privilege,
or copyright, and the use of any figure, word, or mark which, according to the custom of the trade, is commonly taken to be an indication of any of the above matters, shall be deemed to be a trade description within the meaning of this act.
The expression “false trade description" means a trade description which is false in a material respect as regards the goods to which it is applied, and includes every alteration of a trade description, whether by way of addition, effacement, or otherwise, where that alteration makes the description false in a material respect, and the fact that a trade description is a trade-mark, or part of a trade-mark, shall not prevent such trade description being a false trade description within the meaning of this act.
The expression goods,” “ manufacturer, dealer or trader,” and “proprietor " include any body of persons, corporate or unincorporate.
The expression ” includes any abbreviation of a name.
(2) The provisions of this act respecting the application of a false trade description to goods shall extend to the application to goods of any such figures, words, or marks, or arrangement or combination thereof, whether including a trade mark or not, as are reasonably calculated to lead persons to believe that the goods are the manufacture or merchandise of some person other than the person whose manufacture or merchandise they really are.
(3) The provisions of this act respecting the application of false trade description to goods, or respecting goods to which a false trade description is applied, shall extend to the application to goods of any false name or initials of a person, and to goods with the false name or initials of a person applied, in like manner as if such name or initials were a trade description, and for the purpose of this enactment the expression “false name or initials” as applied to any goods, any name or initials of a person which (a) are not a trade-mark or part of a trade-mark, and (b) are identical with, or a colorable imitation of the name or initials of a persons carrying on business in connection with goods of the same description, and not having authorized the use of such name or initials, and (c) are either those of a fictitious person or of some person not bona fide carrying on business in connection with such goods.
SEC. 4. A person shall be deemed to forge a trade-mark who either (a) without the assent of the proprietor of the trade-mark makes that trade-mark or a mark so nearly resembling that trade-mark as to be calculated to deceive; or (6) falsified any genuine trade-mark, whether by alteration, addition, effacement, or otherwise; and any trade-mark or mark so made or falsified is in this act referred to as a forged trade-mark: Provided, That in any prosecution for forging a trade-mark the burden of proving the assent of the proprietor shall lie on the defendant.
Sec. 5. (1) A person shall be deemed to apply a trade-mark or mark or trade description to goods who (a) applies it to the goods themselves; or (6) applies it to any covering, label, reel, or other thing in or with which the goods are sold or exposed or had in possession for any purpose of sale, trade, or manufacture; or (c) places, incloses, or annexes any goods which are sold or exposed or had in possession for any purpose of sale, trade, or manufacture, in, with, or to any covering, label, reel, or other thing to which a trade-mark or trade description has been applied; or (d) uses a trade-mark or mark of trade description in any manner calculated to lead to the belief that the goods in connection with which it is used are designated or described by that trademark or mark of trade description.
(2) The expression covering includes any stopper, cask, bottle, vessel, box, cover, capsule, case, frame, or wrapper; and the expression “label includes any band or ticket.
A trade-mark, or mark, or trade description, shall be deemed to be applied whether it is woven, impressed, or otherwise worked into, or annexed, or affixed to the goods, or to any covering, label, reel, or other thing.
(3) A person shall be deemed to falsely apply to goods a trade-mark or mark, who without the assent of the proprietor of a trade-mark applies such trademark, or a mark so nearly resembling it as to be calculated to deceive, but in any prosecution for falsely applying a trade-mark or mark to goods the burden of proving the assent of the proprietor shall lie on the defendant.
SEC. 1, Where a defendant is charged with making any die, block, machine, or other instrument for the purpose of forging, or being used for forging, a trade-mark, or with falsely applying to goods any trade-mark or any mark so nearly resembling a trade-mark as to be calculated to deceive or with applying