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DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.

362 U.S.

of the equipment. Yet whether fine or imprisonment is considered, the effect on the federal certificate will be crippling. However the issue in the present case is stated it comes down to making criminal in the Port of Detroit the use of a certificate issued under paramount federal law. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, upheld the requirement of a state inspection certificate where a federal certificate might have been, but was not, issued. Cf. California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 112. Never before, I believe, have we recognized the right of local law to make the use of an unquestionably legal federal license a criminal offense.

What we do today is in disregard of the doctrine long accepted and succinctly stated in the 1851 Term in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 566, “No State law can hinder or obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act of Congress.

The confusion and burden arising from the imposition by one

* Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, is not to the contrary. There a vessel enrolled under the laws of the United States was allowed to be forfeited by Maryland for dredging for oysters in violation of Maryland law. But the enrollment of vessels serves only a limited purpose. Smith v. Maryland, supra, was explained in Stewart & Co. v. Rivara, 274 U. S. 614. The Court said, “The purpose of the enrollment of vessels is to give to them the privileges of American vessels as well as the protection of our flag.” Id., at 618. Enrollment without more did not give the enrolled vessel a license to disregard the variety of pilotage, health and other such local laws which the opinion of the Court in the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (written by Mr. Justice Curtis who also wrote for the Court in Smith v. Maryland), had left to the States to be obeyed by all vessels. The local regulations approved in the Cooley case never qualified the license to ply as a vessel nor penalized its movement on navigable waters. The federal license in the instant case, however, specifically describes the only equipment and fuel which these vessels are allowed to use, and Detroit is permitted to make their use criminal.

440

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.

State of requirements for equipment which the Federal Government has approved was emphasized in Kelly v. Washington, supra, in the passage already quoted. The requirements of Detroit may be too lax for another port. Cf. People v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 280 N. Y. 413, 21 N. E. 2d 489. The variety of requirements for equipment which the States may provide in order to meet their air pollution needs underlines the importance of letting the Coast Guard license serve as authority for the vessel to use, in all our ports, the equipment which it certifies.

Per Curiam.

362 U.S.

PHILLIPS v. NEW YORK.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

No. 497. Argued April 18, 1960.—Decided April 25, 1960.

Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.
Reported below: 6 N. Y. 2d 788, 159 N. E. 2d 677.

Henry W. Schober argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Anthony T. Antinozzi and Frank A. Fritz, Jr.

Joseph I. Heneghan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Manuel W. Levine.

PER CURIAM.

After hearing oral argument and fully examining the record which was only partially set forth in the petition for certiorari, we conclude that the totality of circumstances as the record makes them manifest did not warrant bringing the case here. Accordingly, the writ is dismissed as improvidently granted.

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CERMINARO v. URBAN REDEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

No. 654, Misc. Decided April 25, 1960.

Appeal dismissed.
Reported below: -- F. Supp. ---

Louis C. Glasso for appellant.
Theodore L. Hazlett, Jr. and David Stahl for appellees.

PER CURIAM.
The appeal is dismissed.

CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. v.

CITY OF EUCLID, OHIO, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

No. 740. Decided April 25, 1960.

Appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
Reported below: 170 Ohio St. 45, 162 N. E. 2d 125.

John Lansdale for appellant.
Paul H. Torbet and John F. Ray, Jr. for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

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MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA MILK PRODUCERS

ASSOCIATION, INC., v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 62. Argued January 19-20, 1960.—Decided May 2, 1960.*

The United States brought a civil antitrust action against an agricul

tural cooperative marketing association composed of about 2,000 Maryland and Virginia dairy farmers supplying about 86% of the milk purchased by all milk dealers in the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area. The complaint charged that the association had (1) monopolized and attempted to monopolize interstate trade and commerce in fluid milk in Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act; (2) through contracts and agreements combined and conspired with Embassy Dairy and others to eliminate and foreclose competition in the same milk market area, in violation of $3 of the Sherman Act; and (3) bought all assets of Embassy Dairy (the largest milk dealer in the area which competed with the association's dealers), the effect of which might be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in violation of $7 of the Clayton Act. The District Court dismissed the charge under $ 2 of the Sherman Act; but it found for the Government on the charges under § 3 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act and granted part, but not all, of the relief sought by the Government with respect to those charges. Held:

1. Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act, which authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a cease-and-desist order upon finding that a cooperative has monopolized or restrained trade to such an extent that the price of an agricultural commodity has been "unduly enhanced," does not exclude all prosecutions under the Sherman Act. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188. Pp. 462–463.

2. Neither § 6 of the Clayton Act nor $ 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act leaves agricultural cooperatives free to engage in practices against others which are designed to monopolize trade or to restrain and suppress competition. Pp. 463–468.

*Together with No. 73, United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Association, Inc., also on appeal from the same Court.

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