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metal with the use of dies by the process of stamping, and has not been advanced beyond the condition of "pressed, sheared, or stamped shapes." We sustain the contention of the importers that the merchandise is dutiable at the applicable specific rate according to value per pound under paragraph 135 of the tariff. Our present ruling is in harmony with the decision of the Board on precisely the same kind of goods, G. A. 6293 (T. D. 27131). This former ruling was the subject of proceedings on appeal, and the decision of the Board was affirmed by the United States circuit court, southern district of New York, in United States v. Veith (T. D. 29674), following which we sustain these protests so far as they relate to the items specified in the schedule. In all other respects the protests are overruled. The decisions of the collector are modified accordingly.

(T. D. 29760-G. A. 6908.)

Automobile tires.

AUTOMOBILE TIRES IMPORTED WITH CAR-ENTIRETY.

An automobile or a chassis on wheels, with the tires therefor, whether the latter are on the wheels or separately packed, constitutes an entirety and should be treated as such in the assessment of duty.-United States v. Auto Import Company (T. D. 29599), affirming G. A. 6567 (T. D. 28044), followed.

United States General Appraisers, New York, May 17, 1909.

In the matter of protests 226175, etc., of American Locomotive Automobile Company et al. against the
assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York.
Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and DE VRIES, General Appraisers; DE VRIES,
G. A., absent).

FISCHER, General Appraiser: The merchandise here in question consists of automobiles, each accompanied by a full set of rubber tires which are detached from the wheels and which are separately itemized on the invoices.

Duty was assessed on the articles as entireties at the rate of 45 per cent ad valorem under the provisions of paragraph 193, tariff act of 1897, as manufactures in chief value of metal, not specially provided for; and the claim in the protests is that the rubber tires should be separately assessed at the rate of 30 per cent under paragraph 449 of said act as manufactures of india rubber.

The issue presented relates to the proper classification for customs purposes of certain automobiles and the rubber tires therefor. The articles are entireties as imported, and there is no reason why any particular part should be segregated from the rest and a separate duty taken thereon. It is evident that an automobile requires a set of tires so as to be available for use, and in our opinion such tires, when imported with the automobile, constitute one of the assembled parts, without which the machine would be deemed to be incomplete. The weight of authority is against the contention of the importers herein, and the collector's assessments are in strict accordance with repeated

decisions of the courts and the Board, notably United States v. Irwin (78 Fed. Rep., 799), on gun barrels and gunstocks, with locks, etc., constituting all the parts of breech-loading shotguns; United States v. Leigh (159 Fed. Rep., 314; T. D. 28688), on carding machines with card clothing therefor, and G. A. 6489 (T. D. 27759), on a road roller packed in parts. In G. A. 6567 (T. D. 28044) the precise issue here raised and in reference to similar merchandise was decided by the Board adversely to the importers. Upon review the decision of the Board was reversed. Auto Import Company v. United States (T. D. 29123). On appeal from the latter ruling the United States circuit court of appeals, second circuit, reversed the decision of the circuit court. United States v. Auto Import Company (T. D. 29599).

In view of the rulings referred to, it is now well settled that when incomplete automobiles and the tires necessary to put the cars in running order are imported together in the same vessel, by the same. importer, and entered at the same time, the parts are dutiable as a whole, though before the machines are ever used other tires may be substituted, and though it may appear that prior to importation the rubber tires had not been fitted to the wheels of the automobiles they accompany. We hold, therefore, in these cases that the collector's assessments are correct, and overrule the protests. The decisions of the collector are affirmed.

(T. D. 29761-G. A. 6909.)

Trimmings and galloons.

Narrow woven fabrics made wholly or in chief value of silk, with characteristic designs worked thereon in the form of superimposed ornamentation, are not ribbons and are properly dutiable under paragraph 390 as "trimmings" or "galloons."-Naday v. United States (164 Fed. Rep., 44; T. D. 29252; affirming 155 Fed. Rep., 303; T. D. 28329) followed.

United States General Appraisers, New York, May 17, 1909.

In the matter of protests 196110, etc., of Sundheimer Brothers et al. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York.

Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and DE VRIES, General Appraisers; DE VRIES, G. A., absent).

FISCHER, General Appraiser: The merchandise consists of lengths of narrow woven fabrics of silk, classified as silk trimmings or galloons under paragraph 390, tariff act of 1897. These narrow woven strips have superimposed ornamentations of a different color from the ground fabric worked thereon, and some of the articles have scalloped edges. Duty was assessed at the rate of 60 per cent ad valorem, and the merchandise is claimed by the importers to be dutiable (1) under paragraph 389 as bandings or beltings, or (2) under paragraph 391 as manufactures of silk, on the ground that the goods are ribbons.

This identical question has been passed upon by the courts in the second circuit and in regard to merchandise differing in no particular

from the exhibits that we have before us in the cases at bar. In Naday v. United States (155 Fed. Rep., 303; T. D. 28329), the court said: It has become well established that ribbons that must be made up into bows, rosettes, and the like, before being used for the purpose of trimming or ornamentation, are not to be included under the provisions of paragraph 391 as trimmings; but if the article in question is manufactured with ornamentation and with characteristic design, to be used as a trimming and intended to be sewed directly upon a garment, without being made into something else before being appended thereto, it is specifically provided for in paragraph 391 as a trimming.

This ruling applies directly on the so-called ribbons that we have before us. It affirmed a ruling of the Board, G. A. 5923 (T. D. 26049), wherein such merchandise was held to be dutiable under paragraph 390 as "trimmings" or "galloons." The decision of the circuit court was affirmed in Naday v. United States (164 Fed. Rep., 44: T. D. 29252). Note also rulings of the circuit court following the Naday case (suits 3916-17, 3919-21, and 4039; T. D. 28330).

The rule of stare decisis puts upon the importers in these cases the burden of proving clearly by new evidence that the previous rulings were wrong. In an apparent effort to meet this, it is sought to distinguish between articles of the kind here in question shipped from Germany and similar articles shipped from France. The former may be termed the "Barmen" variety and the latter the "St. Etienne. The exhibits in the case represent both kinds. We are of the opinion that no distinction can be drawn. We find from the testimony and the samples in evidence that the goods are narrow woven fabrics composed of silk, with ornamental designs worked thereon, used in the trimming and adornment of women's garments, and we find further from the testimony here offered that these silk articles were at and prior to the passage of the present tariff act known, generally dealt in, and commercially recognized as "galloons" or "trimmings." The collector's assessments are affirmed, the protests being hereby overruled.

(T. D. 29762-G. A. 6910.)
Lithographed wall pockets.

WALL POCKETS-LITHOGRAPHIC PRINTS-MANUFACTURES OF PAPER.

Wall pockets made in part of lithographic prints and in part of mirrors, thermometers, and pincushions, are dutiable as manufactures of paper at 35 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 407, tariff act of 1897. Similar articles consisting merely of lithographic prints pasted on cardboard, having no other articles attached thereto, are dutiable as "lithographic prints" under paragraph 400.— Knauth v. United States (155 Fed. Rep., 144; T. D. 28184).

United States General Appraisers, New York, May 18, 1909.

In the matter of protests 175107, etc., of Knauth, Nachod & Kühne against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York.

Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and DE VRIES, General Appraisers; DE VRIES, G. A., absent).

FISCHER, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question consists of wall pockets, a class of articles made out of cardboard, on which

have been printed or pasted lithographic prints, and on some of which have been added printed calendars, mirrors, thermometers, and pincushions. They are described on some invoices as "wall pockets" and on others as "wandtaschen." Duty was assessed thereon at the rate of 6 cents per pound under the provisions of paragraph 400, tariff act of 1897, as lithographic prints, and the importers claim that the said merchandise is dutiable properly either at the rate of 25 per cent under paragraph 403 as printed matter, or at the rate of 35 per cent under paragraph 407 as manufactures of paper, not specially provided for. The protests also cover certain "calendars and other articles," but the importers limit their claim and proof to the wall pockets.

These lithographically printed wall pockets were the subject of this Board's ruling, Abstract 9467 (T. D. 26939), wherein they were held to be dutiable as lithographic prints, but upon appeal to the United States circuit court, southern district of New York, that decision was reversed. Knauth v. United States (155 Fed. Rep., 144; T. D. 28184). The Government appealed from the latter decision to the circuit court of appeals, but subsequently withdrew the same for the purpose of making a new case and presenting a fuller and more complete record. The cases at bar arise in consequence of that arrangement. Many witnesses were examined in this proceeding, and the Government has endeavored to prove by their testimony that the term "lithographic print" had a well-known, uniform, and general trade meaning, and that it included articles of the kind here in question. A careful reading of all the evidence in the case convinces us that there is no uniform and general trade understanding covering the term "lithographic print." It may be remarked, however, that it would seem impossible to establish terminology for a provision framed in the language of paragraph 400. The provision reads "lithographic prints from stone, zine, aluminum or other material." The expression is purely descriptive and not denominative, and we must therefore construe the provision according to the ordinary meaning of the words there used. While we believe that the term "lithographic print" is not susceptible of a commercial definition, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the term. is not to be restricted to lithographs printed on an original thickness of paper or cardboard, but applies as well to such articles after they have been mounted on heavier paper, embossed, etc. All prints on paper made originally by the lithographic process, though they may subsequently be mounted, or the cardboard cut out to follow the figure of the design, are still covered by the phrase "lithographic print" so long as their character as lithographs is not interfered with or altered. It does not follow that a lithographic print ceases to be a lithographic print for tariff purposes and is dutiable as a manufacture of paper not specially provided for, when it has been mounted on cardboard or has been embossed, or has been cut out, and this view applies with especial force to the lithographically printed wall pockets entirely of paper

made in two pieces and imported in a knocked-down condition. In Hamilton v. United States (167 Fed. Rep., 796; T. D. 29519), the circuit court of appeals, second circuit, in passing upon certain paper articles known as "tops," "doilies," etc., embossed and cut out of paper or stamped out of sheets of imitation of lace, and used for the tops of boxes or baskets filled with fruit or candies, etc., said: Except for the pleasing effect, it has been in nowise changed. It is still paper; it has not been made into an article having another use, as it would if manufactured into an envelope, a bag, or a box * (citing Dejonge v. Magone; 159 U. S., 562). * The same principle has found expression in numerous other cases, where the original material has been improved without interfering with its distinguishing characteristics.

* *

* *

Viewed in the light of the above ruling, a lithographed wall pocket made of paper and consisting of two flat sheets of paper not attached together as imported, is not necessarily changed in character by being stamped, embossed, or cut out. As it is common practice to print on either the cardboard direct or on the paper which is afterward pasted on cardboard, we can see no reason why the former should be a lithographic print and the latter a manufacture of paper. This view would result in making the same article dutiable at different rates. Both are printed on "paper or other material" as provided for in paragraph 400. The necessity of distinguishing between paper made of one thickness from the pulp and paper made from several layers or sheets joined together no longer obtains, and the pasting together two sheets of paper does not alter the character of the paper as "paper." Drakenfeld v. United States (167 Fed. Rep., 798; T. D. 29520). This treatment of lithographs is identical with the treatment of etchings, woodcuts, and engravings. All of these are particular kinds of prints. Yet no one will seriously contend that pasting etchings, woodcuts, or engravings on cardboard for their ultimate use takes them out of their class and alters their designation or character as such. Nor is a print obtained by a lithographic process taken out of the class of things commonly known or recognized as such, because designated by some narrower and more specific name, such as signs, calendars, show cards, labels, wall pockets, etc., because these names merely describe the particular variety of lithographic prints.

Counsel for the importers urges that as the wall pockets made up by the addition of other articles are taken out of the class of articles describable as lithographic prints, they are dutiable as "printed matter" upon the ground that "printed matter" is a narrower and more specific provision, and he refers to the fact that printed books, while they are in a sense manufactured articles by reason of assembling and binding, are undoubtedly covered by the phrase "printed matter.” The answer to this contention is that lithography is a certain specific kind of printing which is carved out of the general provision for printed matter not specially provided for, and the provision “lithographic

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