A mortgage on property exempt under the homestead act can not be
enforced; and the owner of such property may sell the same, free
from the mortgage he has imposed on it.
Jacob C. Van Wickle vs. Alcée Landry, 330.
The homestead law embodies, in part, the public policy of the State,
and rights acquired un ler it can not be waived by any convention
of parties.
Mrs. Hardin vs. Wolf & Cerf, 333.
The widow's claim under the homestead act ranks all privileges, except
that of the vendor.
The fact that a debtor has other property than his homestead, or has
fraudulently disposed of other property, does not affect the exemp-
tion of the homestead, if his condition brings him within the oper-
ation of the homestead law.
The preference on the proceeds of his debtor's property, which a credit-
or has aequired by procuring the cancellation of a fraudulent mort-
gage on that property, is inferior in rank to the widow's claim
under the homestead law.
Succession of H. T. Cottingham. Opposition of the Widow, 669.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
The surviving husband is absolute owner of one half the community
property, and life-time usufructuary of the other half, which latter
half the heirs of the deceased wife can not set up any claim to
during his life.
Succession of Carmelite Planchet, 520.
When husband and wife are co-defendants in a suit they may be legally
served by a citation to each, or to the husband alone.
When husband and wife are co-defendants he sufficiently authorizes
her, by appearing in the suit, and aiding her in her defense.
Jordan & Co. vs. Anderson, 749.
The purchaser of a cemetery lot, whether he acquire an absolute or
qualified property therein, is entitled to the equitable remedy of in-
junction, to protect him in the full enjoyment of the lot.
Burke vs. Wall, 38.
Where the defendant, who has been cast, fails to appeal, or to join in
the appeal taken by the plaintiff, and thereby acquiesces in the
judgment, he can not, after this court has affirmed the judgment
and the plaintiff proceeds to execute it, enjoin its execution; even
though it appear that the plaintiff issued his fieri facias before the
judgment of this court was filed and recorded in the court below.
Jourdain Savoie, Administrator, vs. P. A. Thibodaux, 51.
The whole object of a rule nisi, in matters of injunction, is to enable the
defendant to show, if he can, that on the face of the papers, the in-
junction ought not to be granted. On the trial of the rule, no affi-
davit from either side, bearing on the truth of the allegations of the
petition, will be admitted in evidence.
The refusal of the court, on a rule nisi, to grant an injunction, may be
appealed from.
L. Heyniger & Co. vs. A. Hoffnung et al., 57.
Where the process of the court, in an injunction, does not seem to be
seriously abused, special damages need not be imposed.
The sureties on an injunction bond can not be held liable for the amount
of the judgment enjoined, unless it be proved that the judgment
was lost in consequence of the injunction.
An injunction will not lie on account of an excessive seizure under a
fieri facias.
When it appears that an injunction has not been wantonly issued, but
that plaintiff has resorted to it under a mistaken but honest belief
that he was entitled to do so, only such damages will be allowed on
its dissolution as cover the court costs, and counsel fees of defendant.
A. Hefner vs. S. Hesse and H. Vergez, 149.
An injunction will not issue, at the instance of the taxpayers of a muni-
cipal corporation, to prevent the officers of that corporation from
holding an election, under the authority of a legislative act, to ena-
ble the citizens of the corporation to vote to levy, or not levy, a cer-
tain tax on themselves. The action is premature. No right of the
plaintiffs is, as yet, invaded, and the danger they seek to shun is
too remote, and contingent, to warrant the issuance of an injunc-
tion.
L. C. Roudanez et al. vs. the Mayor and Administrators of the
City of New Orleans. New Orleans and Pacific Railroad
Company. Intervenors, 271.
The release of an injunction by bond, is a matter confided to the dis-
cretion of the lower court.
State of Louisiana ex rel. F. Comminge et al. vs. the Judge of
the Superior District Court, 360.
A party applying for a writ of injunction, who has complied with all the
conditions prescribed by law for its issuance, has a right to it, and
courts have no legal power to refuse it.
Damages can only be allowed by the decree dissolving an injunction,
when the judgment which has been enjoined is for money.
Sheen vs. Stothart, 630.
Where a policy of insurance stipulates for payment of losses sixty days
after adjustment, and the assurers make reasonable efforts to effect
an adjustment, they will not be liable for interest from the expira-
tion of the sixty days, but only from judicial demand.
Gettwerth and Wife vs. Teutonia Insurance Company, 30.
The defense that plaintiff has violated, in some particular, the policy of
insurance sued on, must be proved by the defendant.
A wife holding property in her own name, donated to her by her father,
during marriage, has an insurable interest in it.
Breard vs. Mechanics' and Traders' Insurance Company, 764.
Before a third person can sue on a policy of insurance to which he is not
a party, no matter what his interest in the insured property may be,
it must be shown that the policy was assigned to him with the
written consent of the assurer, and that the property assured had
been assured as his property.
A consignee who fails to insure property shipped to him and received by
him, after having been instructed to insure by the shipper, is liable
for any loss resulting from his not having insured.
A consignee who has insured a consignor's property in his, consignee's,
name, and fails to collect the insurance money, becomes liable him-
self as insurer.
Gordon & Gomilla vs. Wright & Clark, 812.
In a suit for interdiction the fullest investigation into the motives of the
plaintiff will be allowed.
In passing on the issue of interdiction, the court will not be controlled
by the opinions of experts, but giving to them a respectful considera-
tion, and to every fact bearing on the issue its legitimate weight, will
form, and decree its own conclusions.
Mere weakness of mind in the defendant will not justify a decree of in-
terdiction, when in view of all the evidence adduced, such decree is
not necessary either for the protection of the defendant's property,
or person, or of society.
Justus Francke vs. His Wife, 302.
INTEREST, AND COMPOUND INTEREST.
Where a factor's account is closed, stated, and rendered, at the end of
the commercial year, and not objected to by his client, showing a
balance in his favor composed of principal and accrued interest, on
such balance interest may be charged in any subsequent accounts
between the parties. Interest on such a balance is not compound
interest.
Sentell & Co. vs. Mrs. M. G. Kennedy and Husband, 679.
The judge of a court who has rendered a judgment which is null and
void, can not, as creditor of one of the parties, avail himself of the
nullity.
Osborn vs. Segras, 291.
The judge a quo may make any ruling as to the manner of conducting
a trial, in order to secure a prompt decision, which is not prohibited
by law, and which works no prejudice to the accused.
State vs. Mollie Robinson, 364.
When he is neither "personally interested" in the case, nor connected
by blood or marriage with a prisoner arraigned before him, the
judge must, on being recused, appoint a lawyer of proper qualifica-
tions to sit in his stead.
The law which empowers judges to suspend sheriffs from office, on ac-
count of the latter's neglect, or refusal to perform their duties, is
constitutional.
State ex rel. Frank Vaughan, District Attorney pro tempore,
vs. W. L. Richmond, Sheriff, 705.
Section 1068 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, providing for the inter-
change of two neighboring district judges, when one of them is re-
cused, is unconstitutional.
When a judge is recused in a case in which he is not personally inter-
ested, he must select a lawyer, of proper qualifications to try it.
When he is personally interested, the parish judge must preside in
in his stead.
State ex rel. Hunter vs. the Judges of the Ninth and Seven-
teenth Judicial Districts, 785.
On the recusation of a district judge in a particular case, an attorney at
law can not be compelled to accept the appointment of judge ad
hoc, to try the case in place of the recused judge; nor to act, even
after having accepted the appointment, and passed on some pre-
liminary questions in the case.
State ex rel. Fuqua, Tutor, vs. Brame, Special Judge, 816.
It is not necessary for a judge to give a statement of reasons, in an or-
der of seizure and sale.
Garrish vs. Hyman, 28.
In a suit brought to revive a judgment no plea will be entertained, and
no evidence considered, which assails the validity of the judgment
sought to be revived.
Nelson McStea vs. Rotchford, Brown & Co., 69.
No correction, or alterations of a judgment can be made by the court,
ex proprio motu, after the judgment has been entered on the minutes,
except such as are merely clerical, or rectify errors of calculation.
No change in the substance of a judgment can be made, save by
means of another formal decree, rendered after a new trial of the
Judgment can not be had on a debt not yet due and exigible.
W. E. Wamsley vs. J. A. Hunter et al., 628.
The nullity of a judgment, or of a judicial sale, can only be demanded by
one, who has used due diligence to prevent, what he seeks to annul.
Jouet vs. Mrs. Mortimer, 206.
A judgment homologating the account of an administrator, where no
evidence has been adduced to show the correctness of the account,
is invalid.
Succession of James Cloney, 327.
A judgment in favor of a party who has subrogated another to his claim
is illegal.
Jones vs. Succession of Hoss, 564.
A judgment of this court, rendered for or against a person dead, and not
represented here, is an absolute nullity.
Any judgment absolutely null may be attacked collaterally, and by
any one against whom it is sought to be enforced.
Adeline Edwards vs. Whited, 647.
A judgment rendered on a prescribed note is not an absolute nullity.
Gillis vs. Carter, 698.
Notice of Transfer of Judgment.
The notice of transfer of a judgment against a deceased person, served
on the widow, and natural tutrix of the decedent's children, even be-
fore she has received her letters of tutorship, is sufficient to perfect
the transfer.
F. Aufenkolk vs. P. Montegut et al., 257.
What Judgments may and what may not be Rendered in Vacation, and in
Chambers.
A judgment homologating the account of an administrator can only be
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