ported on either side by the beauty and chivalry of his court. And there was the bride-O Higgins, beware! Never before was it permitted mortal to behold so ravishing a spectacle. Thousands and thousands of slender-waisted sprites, fanning themselves with their golden wings, in an air of roses, and talking at a rate we, who have only heard ladies after champagne in supper-rooms, can but faintly imagine. The Prince would have gone and mingled with the nobility around the throne, but Higgins's courage failed him; he was afraid some of those bright eyes would soon ascertain that he carried still a mortal heart, and he should thus bring disgrace on his generous introducer. So they mingled with the crowd, who were gathered to see the show. tle with sharp lances to all comers. For a while, the boldness of the challenge occasioned a silence, and in the meantime the knight's squire, who rode a queer long-legged, spindle-shanked green grasshopper, with antennæ to correspond, which he was perpetually flourishing here and there, threw the whole assembly into shouts of laughter by his extraordinary leaps and summersets; sometimes steed and rider precipitating themselves from one end of the lists to the other, without any apparent object, tumbling heels over head at the end, and instantly recovering themselves as gravely as though nothing had happened. But presently a strong warrior, twice the weight of the silver knight, and mounted on a huge horned beetle, lifted the glove and offered battle. The dispropor For it is the custom with the race oftion was so great there was an uniTillietudlem to celebrate the marriage of any of the royal family with all sorts of pomp and ceremonies, and there was now to be a grand tournament, in which the bravest champions of the realm were to display their prowess. Accordingly, a great space was cleared before the throne for the lists; and, when all was ready, Grayfly, the herald, wound his horn to call the knights into the field. Then came the most extraordinary troop that was ever seen, the warriors being mounted principally on grasshoppers, their squires on blue-bottles, and the pages and retinue on butterflies and moths. Some, however, had trained more formidable creatures to bear them. The games opened by tilts with blunt lances, by knights in green and gold, mounted on the common meadow grasshopper. The shock of their encounter was tremendous, and instantly unseated many of the riders. After them came bolder knights on large gray grasshoppers, caught from sandy roadsides. Higgins grew abstracted with the show, and the Prince left him, while this was going on, without his observing it. Next rode into the lists a knight clad in silver armor, with his visor down. He was mounted on a sprightly black cricket, whom he leaped and curveted around the lists with exquisite courage and gracefulness. Halting at length before the throne, he threw down his glove, and offered bat versal wish that the silver knight might withdraw his challenge. But, though by the law of the lists he might have done so, to the surprise of all, he leaped to his place, and set his lance in rest. The heralds sounded and the combatants met in mid-air with a furious shock. The silver knight's lance shivered against the horny covering of the head of his adversary's steed, while he himself would have been unseated, had not the weapon of the other glanced from his breast. Resuming fresh arms they again met in full career. But this time the silver knight succeeded in dextrously turning his opponent's flank, (whose insect, though of great momentum, and irresistible in direct power, was not easy to rein,) and as he passed under the left, be contrived to give the huge beetle a thrust under the wing, where his armor was weakest, that brought him at once to the ground. Loud viras greeted the victor. who advanced to the foot of the throne. where his grotesque squire relieved him ef his helmet, and to Higgins's great astorb ment, revealed the features of Prince Hobok, who till now he thought had been standing by his side. When the multitude became aware who it was, the acclamations were louder than ever, but Higgins could see the Prince still bowing and coversing among the ladies of the royal car tège, like one accustomed to the homage due to rank and noble qualities. So however, he observed him gazing where he stood, and directing thither the atten- | to the throne, there was an awful explotion of a group of glittering damsels. Higgins grew uncomfortable. He was ever reserved in the presence of many, though with no listeners he could have wooed Semiramis. What was to be done? Concealing himself was out of the question. There was no shift but to face it out. As he expected, it was not long before a page came to conduct him to the royal presence. Now he was in for it indeed. His nervous agitation grew intolerable, and probably would have quite overpowered him, had he not been spared by a most astonishing catastrophe. Just as he placed his foot upon the stairs that led up sion, louder than thunder, in the midst of the palace, and all vanished in hurlyburly! Imagine our friend's astonishment, when on recovering his perceptions, he found himself still sitting in the Café Français. He must have been asleep some time, for the two billiard players had finished their games, and the old gentleman his paper, and departed. A new customer had come in who was now drinking soda from a bottle that had just been opened. Higgins reflected a moment, and concluded that it must be near tea-time, and that he would do well to go to his boarding-house, which he accordingly did. G. W. P. FREE SOIL POLICY. A DISPOSITION prevails in certain sections | of the Whig party, to sink all other considerations in order to support the one great measure of opposing the extension of domestic slavery to the territories newly acquired to our nation. Whatever may be the justice or policy of the ultimate measures proposed, however pure may be the intentions of those who propose to sink or swim by them, there are considerations, which if consistency is valued, should not be overlooked or lightly esteemed. We conceive that the course proposed, by which a candidate will be put before the people professedly of the one-idea school of David Wilmot, is a desertion of | principles and professions eminently dangerous in its tendency, while promising no aid to the accomplishment of the designs supposed to justify it. The last consideration we purpose briefly to consider. It will be readily admitted that sacrifices, even great sacrifices, are to be made in order to secure the election of a free soil President. Some go so far as to propose the support of a thorough Democrat by Whig votes, if he only profess the ONE IDEA in its purity. We must then suppose that the election of a President entertaining those opinions will either secure their universal reception, or at least place them in a position ultimately to triumph. Unless such a deduction is established, the reasoning men of the country will not subscribe to that party or its measures. We are prepared to prove by cogent reasoning, that such an expectation is fallacious; that a free soil President can do nothing in aid of the principles he represents. We are also prepared to prove that the interests of free labor are not concerned in either the election or the defeat of the Whig candidate. If the extension of domestic slavery to the territories is to be successfully opposed, it must constitutionally be done through some other authority than that of the executive. We say constitutionally opposed-for we have seen in the examples afforded by President Jackson and his dwindling successors, that in the misuse of the executive functions, there springs up an illegitimate influence equal to the work | of perverting the national councils and corrupting the national morals. To this influence Whigs professing respect for principle are forbidden to resort. We would blush to confess ourselves willing to employ unconstitutional means to accomplish even the most laudable and necessary results. The eagerness with which parties at the present day are wont to grasp at the presidency as the embodiment of power and influence in this democratic republic, renders an examination of the constitutional character of the executive authority of the first importance. It may result with the permission of candor and good sense in turning the eyes of statesmen to that branch of the government which is its great democratic feature, and in directing the hopes of patriots to a source of power constitutionally able to fulfil their expectations. This inquiry may appear useless to those popular-will worshippers who consider usurped authority, and even despotic force, legitimate means, so that they be used in concert with the vox populi. But those who value right and reason, will appreciate their force as well as the necessity of their frequent reiteration. The peculiarity of our Constitution is, that it lodges the whole body of legislative power in the national legislature, composed of the immediate representatives of the people. Within the bounds prescribed by the Constitution, there is no power but theirs. They are the head of the nation-its will-in respect to which the other organic functions of the government are mere mechanical agencies travelling within the circuit of the Constitution, doing what the hands in subjection to the will find to do. By this feature our Constitution is distinguished from the monarchies and despotisms which have usurped the rights of the people. If we have advanced one step beyond the maxims of absolutism, it is in stripping the executive of all authority to force the will of the many to succumb to the will of an individual. We are not always careful to distinguish the English Constitution from our own in this respect. The strong points of resemblance in the two systems are apt to lead he conclusion that there are no essenlifferences between them; a mistake by no means unnatural, though tending to lead us astray from the rule of the Constitution. The individual interests of royalty require that the embryo of legislation should be hatched under the royal care. That which is to become legislative policy, must first become ministerial policy. The influence of the crown moulding public measures at the outset is as obviously necessary to preserve the peculiar interests of monarchy as it is certainly directed towards strengthening the power and influence of the crown and aristocracy. We have no unnatural institutions disturbing the equilibrium of complete political equality, and therefore we need no such feature in our Constitution. We have no desire to create such inequalities, and therefore avoid an institution tending to such a result. Political equality enables to enjoy the blessings of untrammelled legislation. But granting that no evils would result from intrusting our Executive with the same influence upon legislation that is conceded to the crown and ministry, its constitutional character is such that similar powers could not be exercised. The President is indeed surrounded by a cabinet in many respects analagous to the ministry, but unlike the ministry they have no direct communication with the legislature, through which their influence on legislation could be exerted. This direct communication is the lever by which the crown moves Parliament. The absurdity of such a communication between the President and Congress is too apparent to need conment. Our judicious Constitution, for the wisest reasons, studiously avoided an institution at war with the democratic principles upon which our government stands. The early constitution of the State of New York, while it remained a colonial possession of Great Britain, received from the model of the mother country the idea of a ministry in the council that surrounded and aided the governors. While we re mained a colony, the pliancy of the counc in the hands of the colonial governors and the home government, satisfied the expec tations of its European projectors; but as the democratic element became more per fectly developed, the council became merged in the senate, stripping the gov ernor of everything except his strictly | been procured by corruption. Differences executive functions. It is impossible by any construction of the Constitution to concede to the President the right to interfere in the ferments and discussions that precede the final action of the Legislature, preparatory to submitting acts of legislation to him for his constitutional sanction. Such a construction has not yet been, and, probably, never will be attempted; but, unless it is successfully accomplished, the position we have assumed is unimpeachable. It may be urged that the Constitution, in assigning to the President the duty of presenting to Congress at its opening a statement of the condition of the country, and of submitting to their consideration measures suitable for legislation, intended to place him in communication with Congress, and to give him weight in their deliberations; but the argument will be found upon examination to be fallacious. The President, from his elevated position overlooking the interests of the whole nation, is supposed to acquire much in formation suitable to inform the deliberations of Congress. Whether the supposition is correct, and whether the President in reality possesses a clearer insight into the state of the country than the prominent political men who compose the Legislature, may be questioned; but the provision is harmless, and the whole system would appear incomplete without it. With the simple suggestion ends the legitimate duty of the President. The Legislature would justly be impatient of receiving advice from even so respectable a source; much less would submit to dictation. The Executive veto cannot be urged as an objection to this position, as to the right of the Executive to interfere with legislation. The President cannot make a law nor fashion one already made. For the wisest ends he is intrusted with the power of opposing a temporary clog to legislation, which becomes powerless if a sufficient proportion of the Legislature choose to overlook his objections. This authority can only be exercised under the Constitution in three cases: when an act of legislation is in violation of the Constitution; when it tends to disurb the equilibrium of the organic funcions of the government; and when it has of opinion exist in relation to this subject, which we will not undertake to reconcile at this time; but we assume with abundant reason that in this limitation of the veto to the enumerated cases the great body of the Whigs and most intelligent Democrats will agree. We will in vain look for illustrations of this distinction to the practices of the last Presidents; but if we look back to the times of the early Presidents, who yielded respect for the Constitution to no behests of party policy, or individual ambition, we shall find these principles operating in their purity. If we have established that the interference of the Executive with legislation is inconsistent with the prerogatives of Congress, it is no less apparent that such an assumption of power is inconsistent with the position and duties assigned to him by the Constitution. The Executive, in order to fulfil the expectations of the Constitution, must hold himself aloof from all sectional partialities, and one-idea partisanship. That degree of confidence in him which is necessary to the harmonious conduct of public affairs, can only be drawn forth from every section of the country, by strict impartiality in the administration of government. In order to secure permanence and efficiency to the government, the best understanding must exist between the Executive and every section of the country. Our peculiar Constitution renders it of the utmost importance that he should avoid incurring the distrust or resentment of any State or section of the Union. Composed as the federal Union is of free sovereign States, held together by a sense of mutual dependence and interest, watchful and distrustful of the sovereignty they have voluntarily erected over themselves, the confidence of all should be sedulously cultivated rather than impaired. By this means the natural jealousy which must exist between the superior and the subordinate sovereignties may be held in check, and made a source of the greatest benefit, instead of danger to the Union. Shall attention to these facts secure the harmony of the national family, or shall their neglect be suffered to foment disagreement and end in dissolution? The Executive is in great measure re- | topic, for we are inclined rather to exalt the sponsible for the feeling which prevails office by remembering the dignity it attaintoward the general Government. The Le-ed under the first Presidents, than to hegislature is in session during a portion only mean it by recalling the littlenesses which of the year; it is then dissolved, and its have soiled it in the hands of their degenmembers are returned to mingle with the erate successors. people in the ordinary avocations of life. Its political acts survive its official dissolution, and live in the policy of government. The Executive, on the contrary, throughout the whole of his official career, is identified with the government. In his hands the wheels of government are kept in motion, after the power which originated their motion has for all substantial purposes ceased to exist. He gives vital power to their abstract determinations. Through him the policy of the government is felt in its application to persons and property. Consequently he can by just and impartial administration soothe the irritation excited by an unpopular law, or throw the country into discontent with the wisest legislation by the misuse of his powers. In this view of the position of the Executive, it is apparent that distrust of the man must reflect odium apon the government administered by him. If the President is known to have strong local attachments, we look for discrimination in application of the laws favoring the objects of his affection. If he entertains strong resentments, the eye is turned to the quarter lying within the ban of his displeasure, to see the visitations of his resentment in the form of onerous discriminations and unfavorable constructions. The President has within his actual, though not his constitutional power, the ability to favor particular States or local interests, in the application, or rather misapplication, of the laws. If he entertains partialities strong enough to corrupt his integrity, he has the means of gratifying them. If he is influenced by prejudice, or dislike, he finds frequent opportunities of indulging them. As an instance of this kind, we may point to the comparatively recent exhibition of Executive recklessness, which forced the necessities of western navigation to yield to the conveniences of more favored portions of the country. InInstances of this kind are so abundant, and fresh in the minds of our readers, that further particularity is unnecessary. We are glad to forbear pressing this Let it be borne in mind, that the Union can only be maintained by constantly bringing government back to the purity of the Constitution. Occasional departures may not produce its overthrow, but if they are suffered to widen and deepen without correction, the point of safety will be passed much sooner than is generally supposed. Agitations have arisen at different periods of our national existence, both at the North and at the South, produced by no griev ances justifying their severity, yet evincing the startling fact that the Union is unsafe from the moment an impression arises, that the course of government is hostile to any section of the country. We will not help to write the darkest part of our history, but leave it to the recollection of the wellinformed, to point to those instances of dissatisfaction to which we refer. In view of these facts, it is fearful to observe sections of country having interests at variance with their neighbors striving to elect a representative of their individual opinions. This effort is the more dangerous, as passions aroused in such contests spread their infection to the breasts of the most patriotic citizens, and deepen the breach with a rapidity soon placing the malady beyond the power of remedy. We may again turn for instruction to the English Constitution, where this danger is skilfully avoided. The King is professed of no party. He surrounds himself by ministers representing the predominatig policy. With changes of policy, the m istry rise and fall-one day centering themselves the hopes of the country, the next borne down by the weight of pepar displeasure. The King only remains changeable-the father of his countryattached to no party, bound by no pledges Such at least is the impression wiz that Constitution aims to create. Accord ingly those political overthrows which = the most conservative of the enlighte nations so often overtake the ministry, pros trating it under a weight of odium, do reach the authority or the influence of the crown. Were the King identified with par P C |