FROM the formation of the first system of society, the subjects which fall within the province of political philosophy have employed the most powerful intellects of all nations. But though illustrated by the liveliest genius and the profoundest reflection, they have not until a very recent period assumed even the forms of science. We cannot tell what formulæ of economical truth passed from existence in the lost books of Aristotle the father of the peripatetic philosophy undoubtedly brought to public economics the severe method which enabled him to construct so much of the everlasting science of which the history goes back to his times; but whatever direction he gave to the subject, by the investigation of its ultimate principles and their phenomena, his successors, and the writers upon it since the revival of learning, have generally been guided by empirical laws, which in an especial degree have obtained in regard to the economy of commerce. Scarcely any of the literature or reflection upon the subject has gone behind the bold but entirely unsupported hypotheses of free trade theorists, which have been as unsubstantial as the fanciful systems of the universe that were swept from existence by the demonstrations of Newton. Not only have economical systems generally been woven of unproven hypotheses, but they have rarely evinced any such clear apprehension and constructive ability as are essential in the formation and statement of principles; and down to the impenetrable chaos of Mr. Mill's last cumbrous octavos,t there is scarcely a volume on political economy which rewards the wearied attention with any more than a vague under

standing of the shadowy design that existed in the author's brain.

In the eminently original and scientific work before us, we see economy subjected to the fundamental and ultimate methods of investigation of which the results have a mathematical certainty. We have new facts, new reasonings, new deductions; and if the paramount ideas are not entirely original, they are discovered by original processes, and their previous existence is but an illustration of the truth that the instinctive perspicacity of the common mind often surpasses the logical faculty in cognizing laws before they are discovered from elements and relations.

The author has long held a distinguished place among our philosophical and political writers. In the fierce controversies of 1844, he restored, in a series of masterly tracts upon affairs, the name of Junius to its old celebrity and power; in the Rights of Labor, at a subsequent period, he asserted, illustrated, and with unanswerable logic vindicated, the American doctrine of the privileges and dignity of Industry-decreed to be not only the condition of existence, but the source and sign of the highest development of men and states. If we look into any of the numerous works of Mr. Colton, we shall find that their most distinguishing characteristic is in the dences, that he collects, observes and analyzes his facts for himself; that he forms from phenomena disclosed by his own observation the hypotheses with which he constructs his systems. It is to such men as Colton, Carey and Greeley, or Clay, Webster and Evans, with understandings alike practical, discriminative, and logical, that we are to look for the

rescue of public economy from the hands of empirics, whose highest achievements are to bewilder and dazzle the weak and the indolent with phantasmal demonstrations.

Mr. Colton has not rejected the title of "political economy" because he proposed to enter a different field, or because the subject and argument have no relation to political society, but chiefly because the term political has been so much abused in this country by the rude agitation of what are commonly called politics, that he does not think the word now used with us comports with the dignity of the theme; and the second part of his title is adopted from a conviction that the economical principles of states are to be deduced from their separate experience and adapted to their individual condition. The task which he proposed to himself is, the exhibition of the merits of the Protective and Free Trade Systems as they apply to the United States. He expresses at the outset his opinion that the settlement of the question he debates is one of the most desirable, and will be one of the most important results which remain to be achieved in the progress of the country; and we can assure him that the accomplishment of it will be rewarded by the best approval of these times, and an enduring name.

The second chapter of Mr. Colton's work is devoted to a statement of the New Points which it embraces. By new points he does not mean that all thus described are entirely original, though many of them are so; but that on account of the importance of the positions he has assigned them, as compared with the positions they occupy in other works of the kind, they are entitled to be presented as new. Many of them involve fundamental and all-pervading principles, that have not hitherto appeared in speculations upon the subject, but which are destined hereafter to have an important influence in its discussion. Some of the most prominent of these points

are:

I. His definition of Public Economy, that it is the application of knowledge derived from experience to a given position, to given interests, and to given institutions, of an independent state or nation, for the increase of public or private wealth.

II. That Public Economy has never yet been reduced to a science, and that the propositions of which it has been for the most part composed, down to this time, are empirical laws.

III. That the propositions relating to the minor questions in debate have been subjected to the most rigid test of the recognized canons of experimental induction. IV. That labor is capital, and the parent of all other capital.

V. That protective duties in the United States are not taxes, and that a protective system rescues the country from an enormous system of foreign taxation.

VI. That different states of society require a corresponding adaptation of the systems of public economy to each.

VII. That popular and general education is a fundamental element of public economy.

VIII. There are new points on the subject of money and a monetary system, which are regarded by the author as vital and fundamental in public economy, and exhibited under new and impressive aspects.

IX. That freedom is a thing of commercial value.

X. That protection as opposed to free trade is identified with freedom, and with the principle of the American revolution.

XI. That the history of freedom for centuries, for all time, shows it to be identical with protection.

XII. That the American revolution is the opening of a new era in the history of freedom, demonstrating that the protective principle lies at the bottom of the struggles after freedom.

XIII. The history of the rise and progress of the free trade hypothesis is made a point of importance, and of much interest and instruction.

XIV. The interests of the American people are represented as necessarily wedded to the protective principle, and the masses who have been for a time seduced by the deceptive promises of free trade, are supposed to be after protection under false colors.

XV. The different cost of money and labor in the United States, as compared with their cost in the countries with which we trade, is made the foundation of the necessity of a protective system; and this necessity is averred to be the result of the

called a contingent basis, itself subject to a variety of contingencies. In Free Trade, we have only to understand its propositions, and then we know what they prove, or pretend to prove. But in our theory of public economy, we consult facts, experience, under a given state of things, in order to form the right propositions. In Free Trade, the propositions lead; in our system, they follow. In the former, the propositions determine results, or affect to do so; in the latter, facts, by their practical operation, determine the propositions, because they determine results. In the former case, the theory, or, rather, the hypothesis, is first, and the results are hypothetical; in the latter, the theory is last, and is made to depend on the facts. Our theory, therefore, is not one of propositions, formed irrespective of facts, but a theory growing out of facts.

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"It will also be seen, that, from our definition, as a starting point, the field of public economy opened by it is entirely new. It is not the world, it is not all nations, it is not any two nations; but it is one nation in particular. The law of the definition necessarily brings the subject within these limits. This imparts an entirely new character to the argument. With general propositions, we have nothing to do; it is a particular case. It is a system of public economy for the United States alone, which we are required to frame. It has been shown above, that it is not possible to construct one for all nations, nor even for two. All pretensions of this kind are utterly baseless, and can do nothing but evil so far as they are influential."

in our classification of the laws of public economy, in their historical condition down to this time, as being empirical, let them tell us under what category of dogmas they should be ranked; or let them say, if they choose, that they do not all belong to this class. We are not tenacious on that point. We only say, they have never yet been reduced to a science. That is evident, because there is no certainty of science in them. There is no uncertainty in figures, in mathematics, in geometry, in astronomy, or in the physical sciences generally, so far as their respective domains have been explored; nor is there uncertainty in any science, the elements of which have been ascertained and adjusted in scientific order and relations. There can be none. It is the very nature of science to realize its predictions. We do not affirm confidently, that all the dogmas which ever have been uttered on public economy, will fall within the logician's definition of empirical laws: but we think they will generally be found there; nor can we conceive how a more respectable rank could fairly be assigned to them. It is not simply for the convenience of classification, that we have put them there; but because we could not find a more legitimate place.

"Now, let us consider what the characteristic of an empirical law is, as presented in the above citation, [from John Stuart Mill:] The property of being unfit to be relied on beyond the limits of time, place, and circumstance, in which the observations have been made.' It may not always be so good as this; but it cannot be better. It must be seen, therefore, that it entirely cuts off the generalizations of Free Trade,

"Both the novelty and importance of the position here taken, demand some exposition. If it be well authorized, true in fact, for the purpose we have in view, it cannot be too well understood. When Free Trade economists have arrogated the high and dignified title of a science for their theme, one naturally asks, what sort of a science is it? In what is its artificial structure apparent? Where are the principles and rules by which we arrive at infallible conclusions? A science, well and truly formed, can predict results with certainty; it is the very nature of science to do this, and any pretension of this kind that fails in its predictions, is thereby proved false. Have the laws of public economy ever yet been so adjusted as to produce this result? Manifestly not. If they had, all the world would have known it, and there would be no controversy. The truth is, the whole subject still remains a wide field of empirical laws, not entirely useless, but yet unadjusted as to scientific order and relations, having not the slightest claim to the dignity of a science. If any should think we have failed

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No law of public economy can be safely trusted except for the time, place, and circumstance, in which the observations have been made ;' that is, the observations which have established the law. The principle necessarily restricts every system of public economy to one nationto that nation where the observations that have dictated its laws, have been made. Within these limits empirical laws may be serviceable, and by proper attention may be reduced to a science. For a wider range it is not possible that a science should be made of them on this subject. In the language of Mr. Mill, it is not simply absurd, but abstractedly impossible.'"

From under the third head, where the recognized canons of experimental induction are cited, and according to which the author professes to have constructed his general argument, we make the following extracts:

"We for a long time thought that public economy never could be made a science in the

strict sense of the term. But that position can hardly be maintained, if it be allowed that everything is a subject of science, and capable of being brought into its place as such; and if, moreover, it be considered, that it is a part of science to adapt itself to the nature of the subject. A science of contingent propositions, for aught that can be seen, is as supposable as one of uniform and immutable propositions. The propositions of public economy, as we hold, must necessarily change with a change of data; and it cannot be denied, that such changes are constantly transpiring in every commonwealth. It will be found that this principle of a liability to a change of data, presents itself on the threshold, and that it lies at the foundation of the science of public economy. It is impossible to cast it aside, or turn the back upon it, with any hope of a successful investigation, or useful result. A public measure required at one time, may, by events, or even by its own operation in the complete fulfilment of its purpose, require to be modified, or suspended, or superseded, at a subsequent period; and the same measure may be of the greatest importance to one nation, which would be injurious to another, possibly to all others. Nothing can be more contingent than the propositions of public economy.

"It must be admitted, that nothing is more desirable, in public economy, than that the certainties of science should be brought to bear upon it; and nothing is more evident than that, hitherto, they have never been so directed. The reasons are obvious, as shown in our citations, here and there, from Mr. Mill. It was impossible that a science on this subject should be constructed out of the common experience of nations for common use, or out of the experience of one nation for the use of another. It is only in the line of the experience of one nation that the rigid principles of such a science can be applied, and for that nation only. All beyond this field is a region of empirical laws, as before shown; and of that precise category of empirical laws, which are utterly incapable of being reduced to a science."

In the chapter devoted to labor, one of the longest and strongest of the work, besides presenting his subject in many novel aspects, Mr. Colton avers that heretofore labor has occupied a false position in systems of public economy, and that a vast amount of doctrinal and practical error has been the result; in short, that, as labor is so important and all-pervading an element in public economy, any system which does not give to labor its true position, must necessarily be vitiated to its core and foundation. "Labor," says fr Colton

"Labor is capital, primary and fundamental. The position which is usually awarded, in sys tems of public economy, to what is called cap ital, as if labor were not capital, and capital of the most important kind, has tended to degrade labor, and to strip it of its essential attributes as the producer of all adventitious wealth, or of that state of things which distinguishes civilized society from barbarism. It has also tended to cloud one of the most important branches of public economy in obscurity, and led to much embarrassment in the consideration of others. The natural order of things is thus reversed; that which ought to be first, is put last; the cause stands in place of the effect; the agent is taken for the instrument; the producer for the thing produced.

"Although it will be convenient in this work, in order to avoid frequent repetition and unnecessary circumlocution, to employ the customary phrase, capital and labor, in the usual sense, it is due to a just consideration of the comparative claims of these two things, to assert the prior and paramount rights of labor, as to the position to which it is entitled in a system of public economy. Labor is capital of its own kind, not as a subject to be acted upon for the increase of its own value, but as an agent that imparts value to every other kind of capital which it creates, or which, after having created, it employs as an instrument, or takes in hand for improvement. It is doubtless true, that the faculties or powers of labor are subjects of culture and use, for the increase of their skill and effectiveness; and in this sense are subjects of action for the increase of their value. In this particular, the faculties or powers of labor occupy the position of any other kind of capital, as subjects of improvement by labor itself. It will be observed, however, that it is not labor, but the faculty of labor, the value of which is thus increased.

"European economists, for the most part, if not universally, regard labor as a mere power, like horse-power, or any other brute force; and what Ricardo and the Adam Smith school mean by the proportion of the whole produce of the earth allotted' to labor, is simply that which is necessary for its subsistence, as for that of a horse, an ox, or any other brute. The three chief elements of public economy, as taught by Smith, Ricardo, and others of the same school, are 'rent, profit and wages.' It must be seen that a system of public economy, constructed on such principles, is entirely unsuited to American society; and though its doctrines in the abstract may often be correct, its whole must be totally inapplicable to a state of things radically, fundamentally, and essentially differ ent from that for which such a system is designed. It was morally impossible, from the social position of these economists, that they should be able to adapt a system of public ec omy to American society, not having thought