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Senate alone standing for the State Governments, together constitute the Supreme Authority. This declaration of the equal ity and independence of the State Governments, is quite unnecessary, therefore, and has no weight in the argument.

lawful Will, to put the laws in execution. This necessity recognized, is the natural basis of Presidential Authority.

His election, like that of a Representative, is popular, but with some modifications. For convenience, electors are first It is not necessary to remind any person chosen, who accurately represent the at all read in political affairs, that a power people; the joint majorities of the citizens derived, like that of the House of Repre- of each State, gives a majority of all the sentatives, by an apportioned representa- citizens of the Nation; and in case a mation from all the citizens of the Union, is jority is not had, then the choice is thrown greater in degree, and in kind, than one upon the national representation in the established by perhaps a thirtieth part of House. But here the nature of the election the same, met upon a sectional council for is modified; the House voting not by the discussion of provincial business. This members, but by States, and the election power is greater in degree, because it rep- ceasing to be strictly popular. There is resents a greater territory and vaster popu- recognized, therefore, in the Executive lation; it is greater in kind, because its Power, a State, as well as a National elefunctions are imperial, and that it meddles ment; and this necessarily; for the Presinot with domestic or local matters. It is dent is not only a defender of the National, national, being derived, by an equal repre- but of the State sovereignties, and must sentation, from the vote of each independ- support the authority and the rights of ent citizen. By his electoral vote the choice States. for all officers, of nation, state, municipality, county, town, district, village, hamlet, proceeds from the individual citizen; from him as the independent nucleus-the vital point of power is derived this ray of choice, or of representation.

Upon this ground of individual freedom and power, as on a truly equal basis, making all men peers, stands the power of the House; and because it does so stand, it is purely and absolutely national.

The superior legislative authority of this National House, in its proper sphere, over that of any one House, of a particular State, is secured, not so much by the Constitution, as by the nature of things. The power which establishes it is the same with that which sustains the Constitution,* and of which a part, or section only, gives origin to the House of each Legislative State. Let us consider next, though not in order, the National Executive, both as to its origin, and the powers especially given by that origin; for it is true of every Constitutional authority, that not constitution, but derivation, both establishes and limits it.

The Executive power of the Republic is derived, first, from the necessity recognized by each citizen, for a commissioned and

The Constitution expresses only that which is permanently and continually necessary for the liberty of the Nation.

Thus far we have considered the nature and derivation of the Central Power, as it proceeds from the people in mass-from the Nation. It remains now to look at that of the States, or of the Senate.

It is a fundamental necessity for a government based on representation, that every great political power shall be represented in it.

A government, whatever be its name or power, being a body of men deputed to execute the laws, and to maintain order in society, is distinct from society. It is a power distinct from that of the people. It affects them, is feared and respected by them; it is affected by them, is swayed by and sways them : no state can be said to exist, in which a distinct body as government, either elective or hereditary, is not recognized and maintained.

At the founding of the Constitution, the two great powers recognized in this republic, namely, that of the equal Citizen, and that of the equal State, were distinctly recognized.

The founders supposed, that if the powers of the citizen alone were recognized, and should predominate, the nation would fall together into a centralized Democracy, and end in despotism, The State Governments, on the other hand, would have then become disturbing and disorganizing powers, warring against, and embarrassing,

a government in which they were not represented, and which would become their natural enemy. Had there been a powerful aristocracy, had there been many free commercial cities, had there been a great national church, holding political power; it would have been necessary to the peace of the nation, that these powers be represented in Congress. But, as it happened, there was no aristocracy, there was no powerful church, there were no independent cities, there were only two recognized | powers, first, the body of the nation, peersspeaking one language, and forming that equal band of freemen who fought the battle of the revolution,—and, second, the governing bodies of the States. These latter demanded representation, and reIceived it in the SENATE.

In a government composed in this manner of all the elements of national power, an authority less than imperial cannot be supposed to exist, nor would it require a labored argument to show, that the authority thus constituted is as great as the nation can require, in any exigent of peace or

war.

Containing, in the House, the authority derived from the consent of all the citizens; in the Senate, that which is derived from the governing bodies of the States; and in the Executive, an union of both; and all limited, and strictly subordinated, by a Constitution, anterior and superior to it, this government stands superior in rank and in kind, to that of any one of the

States.

After such a view, the old idea of the federation, that Congress is the creature and tool of the State Governments, falls quite to the ground.

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Though it be unquestionably true, then, as the Senator declares, “ that the States are constituent parts of the common federal government of the Union, and as such are equals in all respects both in dignity and rights," "this relation in which they tasnd to each other furnishes a strong presumption," not only that they have no combined or separate authority over the territory which extends to the prohibition of slave property; but farther, that the States, separately or in combination, have no power whatever over the territories; since this power lodges properly in Congress and the Executive; and only by their

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votes in the Senate have the States any influence in the matter. Senators, in the performance of their duty, defend the rights of their several State governments, but it may well be asked, what good they hope to effect by using a language that implies for the representation of States, in the Senate, a power which belongs to them only in conjunction with the House and the Executive?

And here, in the midst of other matter for question, we stumble upon a new doe trine offered by Mr. Calhoun,-that slave property, "the only species of property recognized," says he, "by the Constitution, (!)-was also "the only one that entered into its formation as a political power," (!) -"and this is the only one that is put under the express guarantee of the Constitution," he adds. And this is offered as a member of an argument limiting the power of Congress over slavery in the territory!

To this the reply is simple,-first, that the word slave' is not used in the Constitution at all, and that it is not literally true that the Constitution recognizes slave property. The Constitution assumed no power over slavery in the States, and would neither recognize, nor not recognize, it. But when it came to apportion repre sentation by population, it was obliged to reckon in all descriptions of persons, with out naming them. Democracy professes to believe that a property representation is a false and unjust representation. It is therefore, necessary for Democracy to explain this slave representation by another theory; and to say that not property but the life and safety of the slave and his master, taken together as one family, or system, was looked to in the apportionment.

After touching upon the foregoing, Mr Calhoun then repeats the question. "But f it cannot be found in either-if it exists at all, the power must be looked for in the compact which binds these States together in a federal Union. Does that instrument contain any provision which gives the North the power to exclude the South from a free admission into the territories of the United States with its peculiar prop erty, and to monopolize them for its ow exclusive use?" To which we reply as be fore, that the Constitution does not know of

any such power as the North, or the South, or the East, or the West. These are very loose terms, and mean much or little according to the mood we are in. It is, therefore, necessary to substitute for the above question, the following:

of royal charters, to the independent colonies, or to the powers of Europe. They became the property of the nation, after the Revolution, by acts of cession on the part of Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, New York, and other States, and by purchase from France and Spain. The charters of the lands of several of the

Has the Government of the United States the power to declare the importation of slave property contraband in its own terri-States extended indefinitely westward, and tory?

Mr. Calhoun several times repeats the question, "where is this absolute power of the North to exclude the South to be found?" To which we reply again, nowhere, and repeat, as before, that North and South are not recognized powers in the government or in the nation. Again, he argues on the passage concerning "rules and regulations:"

“Now, I undertake to affirm, and maintain

eyond the possibility of doubt, that, so far rom conferring absolute power to govern the erritories, it confers no governmental power whatever; no, not a particle. It refers excluively to territory regarded simply as public inds. Every word relates to it in that characer, and is wholly inapplicable to it, considered 1 any other character but as property. Take e expression dispose of,' with which it beins. It is easily understood what it means hen applied to lands, and is the proper and atural expression regarding the territory in at character when the object is to confer the ght to sell or make other disposition of it. it who ever heard the expression applied to vernment, and what possible meaning can it ve when so applied? Take the next exession, to make all needful rules and reguions.' These regarded separately might leed be applicable to government in a loose ise; but they are never so applied in the Istitution. In every case where they are ed in it they refer to property, to things, some process, such as the rules of the court, of the House of Congress, for the governat of their proceedings, but never to governnt, which implies persons* to be governed. , if there should be any doubt in this case, words immediately following, which restrict n to making 'rules and regulations respectthe territory and other property of the ted States,' must effectually expel it. They rict their meaning beyond the possibility of ot to territory regarded as property."

he lands which pass under the general of "Territories belonging to the UniStates," belonged originally, by virtue

* See page 112 (2).

the lines of these lands crossed each other, so that it had become impossible to make a fair adjustment of the separate claims. Those States that possessed no territory, having made common cause in a war which secured their sister sovereignties in quiet possession, thought it unjust that they themselves should have no share. The controversies on this subject were finally set at rest by acts of cession on the part of several States, by which their private and separate claims to property and jurisdiction were vested in the nation. New York was the first to set the example of moderation, and other States followed it at intervals. Out of the territory thus acquired by the people of the United States, were formed the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and others, and the territory west of these. North Carolina ceded the territory that is now the State of Tennessee. The cession of her own territory by Georgia, in 1802, concluded this difficult series of transactions, by which, more than by any other acts of the States, the nationality of all was settled and confirmed forever.

While the territories remain uninhabited, or are in process of occupation by emigrants, the people of the United States, as a nation, possess a three-fold interest and right in them.

1. First, as the imperial control over all national affairs has been acquired by the act of union or nationalization, which confers upon the general government the powers enumerated and implied by the Constitution.

2. As particular States or foreign sovereigns have ceded their chartered or legitimate sovereignty over their several territories. By these acts of cession, all the powers of a king or a sovereign state over its territory were necessarily transferred to the people or nation of the United States.

3. As owners of the soil, so far

as it has not become the property of individuals, the people, by their Congress, exercise certain rights, limited only by the common rules of ownership, and of purchase and sale.

It appears by this examination, that the authority of the government of this nation is perfect, over the territory which they have acquired, within the guarantees of the Constitution; for it includes the threefold power of imperial control, of state sovereignty, and of ownership.

These three powers of imperial control, of state sovereignty, and of ownership, as they were vested in the nation by a process of law, and are made good by the principles that lie at the foundation of all governments, may, by the same principles, be transferred to other powers; the principles of law and the rule of salutis populi presiding over such transactions in as strict, though in a nobler sense, than over those of individuals.

Thus, if the Congress see fit by treaty to cede the imperial control over any portion of their unoccupied territory to another republic, they can do so; for as they acquired, so they may dispose of the right. Or if government think best to sell the territory which they have in trust for the nation, they can do so without diminution of their imperial and state rights.

And when a certain portion of the national territory is settled by emigrants, able to constitute a government, they can recognize in such persons, and acknowledge by charter or by grant of a constitution, certain rights of franchise and jurisdiction constituting a territorial government, with or without representation in Congress, and limited in such a manner as may seem best; but never with such conditions or limitations affixed, as shall violate rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Finally, if it be shown to Congress that those in whom they did recognize certain rights by granting them franchise and jurisdiction, have so organized their society as to be fully able to protect the inherent liberty of individuals among themselves, to maintain public and private credit, and to administer justice with the requisite authority, Congress may then cede to them in full, that sovereignty which was formerly ceded to the nation, and so constitute them, in every sense of the word, a STATE.

But the peace of society, and the liberty and prosperity of citizens, which gover ments are intended to maintain, is not es tablished by the sole power of isolated and independent States. Single States, whethe free or despotic, standing alone, exist o in a condition of perpetual war, or perpe ual alarm.

For the same reason, therefore, that is necessary for individuals to combine and form States, it is necessary for States to combine and form EMPIRES. The perfection of any empire, or imperi government, is when the separate f States or kingdoms maintain their libe ties, without detriment to the Constitu tion under which they live, be that free or a despotic Constitution. T lives of the great lawgivers have be spent in efforts to devise the most pers systems of union, for groups of indepe ent states or kingdoms.

So far, the form of empires and state unions is one and the same, bet systems of their government monarchs or free. But in their internal organizau we find them affected by various and posite principles.

In monarchical empires, as in that of t East under Justinian, founded original upon force, all power was supposed flow from the monarch, and his will, ur the form of a decree, became and coast tuted the law.

The reason of this derivation is not har to find; for in the formation of desp states we observe that the law of cong lies at the root of the Constitution; r and franchises are but allowed, and o be resumed, at the pleasure of the impe will.

In free empires, on the contrary, or they are usually styled, United Provis States, or Leagues, the rights of s State are supposed to be inherent a inviolable. In our own system, begin with the individual, we concede to a zens a necessary and inherent liberty: jes in other Leagues and Unions, or constit: Empires, an inherent and inviolable sev." eignty and liberty has been conceded to separate States or members of the lea

The imperial system of the Union ** established on a singular, and hitherto t known principle; namely, the inher" liberty of the individual, and his inv:

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bility by any power not flowing out of the direct necessity for preserving and maintaining rights and liberties in all. Every law, under this system, restraining the liberty of any person, is supposed to be necessary to the safety of all. Thus, if it be shown that the unconstitutional freedom of any person endangers the lives, properties, and libèrties of citizens, the spirit of our system requires that such person be not allowed his liberty. And if a territory petition to become a free sovereignty, and it be shown, that the petitioners are not powerful or numerous enough, or sufficiently trained and organized, to maintain credit and justice, a Constitution cannot justly be granted them; for the power of the Union was established for the maintenance of order and liberty, and it cannot resign or cede its power into incompetent hands.

For, while the Declaration and the Constitution are founded on the general idea of an inherent right to liberty in every individual, and of an inherent right to Sovereignty in every freely organized body of citizens, living under a regular form of law; necessity, and the nature of things -necessity for maintaining liberty and justice in the whole, and the imperfect naure of man, which often disables him from asing and enjoying his equal and inherent ights as man-require that great caution and reserve be used, in recognizing these deal rights; and that in no case they be admitted in practice, until their reality and apability appears in fact; for by acknowldging rights merely ideal, we do but force ature, and destroy that necessary order nd gradation by which society is main ained.

No territory, therefore, can be made a overeignty until it be proved capable, and otwithstanding all demonstration of inheent rights, no liberties can be conceded; or, indeed, the inherent rights of all are › be considered, and the greater necessity xtinguishes the less, according to a maxim -Salus, et libertas, Populi suprema lex. Whether, therefore, the Constitution Decify or not that the nation shall have ower over its own territory, is a question f subordinate interest. Such power is herent in the nature of all government, nd, in this particular instance, there is no mit imposed upon it by the Constitution.

In conclusion, we are obliged distinctly to disallow what Mr. Calhoun contends, that the system and spirit of this Government limits its power over its territory in the instance before us.

Mr. Calhoun asserts that the North are in error in supposing that slave territory will be closed to the white labor of the South; that "there is no part of the world where agricultural, mechanical, and other descriptions of labor, are more respected than in the South, with the exception of two descriptions of employment-that of menial and body servants." To this we reply, that it does not affect the question. The facts are that freemen will not work on farms, or any employment, in company with slaves. And that is the reason why it is necessary that territories adapted to free labor be guarded. If slavery will not naturally extend itself above 36° 40', then the South will be no loser by that exclusion; but as it has extended itself much farther, and might, for aught that is known to the contrary, take strong root in regions farther north to the ruin of territories unfitted by nature (like Kentucky) for its existence, it was a measure of safeguard to propose a line of division. As this question can never be "settled," but by the greatest forbearance on both sides, and, as Mr. Calhoun argues, that if it be not settled once for all, ruin must ensue; let us then, in some equitable way, make a good ending of the business, and leave each side to work out its own destiny undisturbed by jealousy of the other.

Mr. Calhoun's next argument in order is derived from the clause granting "exclusive legislation" to Congress over the dockyards, arsenals, &c., and "other property belonging to the United States;" which clause he says does not confer what he calls "governmental powers"-a new phrase, and here used in a peculiar sense, in fact, starting a new distinction of powers.

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Congress," says the Constitution, "shall exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over the District, &c., and over all places_purchased, &c." But says the Senator, Congress may not exercise " ernmental powers over places so purchased or ceded. Now of the powers of government there are three kinds, legislative, executive, judicial; they are neces

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