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signed to the command in Mexico, and were feeling so "interested" for his "success and glory," did you know that it was intended, and did you intend, that he should be superseded at the earliest day possible? Did General Scott understand from you explicitly, that he was sent to Mexico in good faith, to execute, at his own discretion, his own plan of reducing Vera Cruz and San Juan d'Ulloa, and then marching on the Mexican capital? If so, was there at the time, a syllable of honest truth in the assurances thus given him? If Mr. Benton's plan was preferred by you, who proposed to let "the idle and solitary Castle of San Juan of Ulloa" alone, were you then particularly "interested' to have General Scott reduce it? How, in this particular, did your feelings "harmonize with the full and fair discharge of your duty" to General Scott? If General Scott wanted certain large transport vessels from the north, and wanted one hundred and forty surf boats, and a large siege train, when Mr. Benton did not want any of them, and you preferred Mr. Benton's plan of operations to General Scott's, how did it "harmonize with the full and fair discharge of your duty" to General Scott, to furnish him with these useless supplies? Did you inform General Scott, in any way, or at any time, of the plot, or design, to supersede him in the command? Was it honest to send him off in ignorance of it? If this design, known to you at the time, did not command your approval, did it ever occur to you to express, or feel, any indignation at being made the chief instrument in playing off so gross a cheat, such a piece of dastardly treachery, on General Scott-in whose "success and glory" you were so deeply "interested?" Did you remonstrate-did you threaten to throw up your office?

We think, when the Secretary shall have answered these significant questions, and some others like them, which will be found in the mind of every intelligent person who understands the facts of the case, and shall have answered them satisfactorily, that it will be quite time enough then for him to expect to be heard with favor, or even with patience, by an enlightened country, either in an attempted vindication of the conduct of the Executive Government towards General Scott, as the Com

mander of our forces in the field, or in bringing criminating or scandalous charges against the military conduct and operations of that eminent soldier.

Our remaining space does not allow us to notice, as we could wish to do, the Secretary's manifesto of the 21st of April. From the opening paragraph in it, to the closing sentence, facts are either misstated, misapplied, or perverted; false imputations are made, false premises laid down, and false inferences drawn. All the materials for a full exposition of this extraordinary paper, though well known to the Secretary, are not yet at our command. In the mean time, little more can be necessary, than to let that document be read in the light of the plain relation of facts which we have now laid before our readers. Only let it be remembered that General Scott was sent to Mexico, with a scheme already laid and matured, by the Executive Government, for betraying and superseding him; and "the neglects, the disappointments, injuries and rebukes," charged to have been inflicted on him, will be seen to be only the natural and necessary sequents of that original policy of imposition and fraud. It is not our purpose-and we are sure it was never General Scott's-to hold the War Department responsible for any failures merely accidental or unavoidable. Such must always occur. Only let the Department show what failures did occur in this way.

The Executive Government did not desire or mean to furnish General Scott, or allow him to supply himself, with a chief of staff in the department of Orders and Correspondence, such as he asked for and was entitled to have, and who should be at once an accomplished officer, a confidential friend, and a practiced writer. They preferred to compel him, as far as they could, to write everything himself. amidst the distractions of his campaign, and thus take the chance of catching him on the hip with some "hasty" letter. Here is the true reason, petty and contemptible as it may seem, why they refused to give him an Assistant Adjutantgeneral-whether major or captain-as he had asked them to do. They refused him such an officer, though there was a vacancy-unless he would take one of their choice, and not of his own. Taylor

had a major of his own selection in this | capacity, and Wool had a captain. Scott could have neither. And they have the impertinence to put their refusal on the false ground of their delicate regard for the rights of rank in the army-they who have nearly broken the spirit of the whole army by their repeated and shameful violation of the rights of rank in behalf of pets and favorites-they who regretted and lamented that they could not send a junior Major-general to the field with rank over all his seniors!*

When General Scott, at an early period, preferred charges against a General, and a subaltern officer, "for conduct endangering in a high degree the success of the impending campaign," no notice was taken of his charges either then or ever-except finally to trump up the absurd apology for this neglect and insult, that officers could not, at the time, be spared from the field of Buena Vista, to form a court; when that battle was not fought for a month after the charges were received in Washington, and was no more anticipated or dreamed of at the time, than a battle in the regions of the moon! But this General, and subaltern, were favorites at Washington, we believe; and the Government was not at that time particularly "interested" in enabling or assisting General Scott to maintain the necessary discipline of his army. They were then pushing the Lieutenant-general.

for an elaborate rebuke, conceived in utter ignorance of all military usage, just by way of showing how the " feelings" of the Government harmonized with the full and fair discharge of their duty" towards the General they had sent to the field with every protestation of confidence and support.

We have spoken already of the utter failure of the Government to furnish General Scott with transport vessels of proper size, with surf boats, and with a siege train, according to promise. The fact of the failure is not denied, and the main excuse for it is, that the requisitions were too large. Mr. Polk and Governor Marcy draw on their great military experience, to determine the question of supplies for the siege and reduction of the second most formidable fortress on the Continent of America, in opposition to General Scott's requisitions, and as an excuse for having forfeited the promise they made him in this regard! But how much too large were his requisitions? Only one-fifth of the siege train had arrived when the enemy capitulated! They had not to be made, they had only to be sent. From the time General Scott left Washington to the capitulation of Vera Cruz, was more than four months! yet out of forty or fifty mortars of ten-inch calibre promised, only ten or twelve of the number had arrived and were in position at the capitulation. More came straggling along after the affair was Very much in the same way, and about all over. General Scott demanded and the same time, they manifested their was promised one hundred and forty surf "sympathy and support" of General boats, to cost $200 each, or $28,000; the Scott, by an impertinent intermeddling Department furnished about 70, at a cost with one of the most sacred rights of a of $950 each, or $66,500. For this, there commander in the field, conducting a crit- does not remain the slightest excuse or ical campaign that of selecting his own apology. We have the best authority for commanders of particular corps. This saying that General Scott's estimate for particular case that of Colonel Harney--the cost of such surf boats as he wanted, showed that while General Scott could was over rather than under the mark, and perform a stern duty where he believed the good of the service required it, it was not in his generous nature to do the smallest injustice to any meritorious officer. Yet the case was seized on as a fit occasion

The Secretary says, evasively, there was no vacancy" with the rank of Major.' An Act passed in the summer of 1846, authorizing four additional Assistant Adjutants-general. It was perfectly competent to the President, and proper, to nominate any one of these, or all, if the good of the service required, to the rank of Major by brevet.

that they could all have been furnished in one month, without the slightest difficulty. As for the ten large transport vessels from the north required and promised, they had been tardily ordered by the Department, and then, without the knowledge of General Scott, the order was countermanded from Washington. They were expected and waited for more than a month. Writing from Lobos, February 28th, General Scott said:-"Perhaps no expedition

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was ever so unaccountably delayed, * * * and under circumstances the most critical to this entire army; for everybody relied upon knew, from the first, as well as I knew, it would be fatal to attempt military operations on this coast, after, probably, the first week in April, and here we are at the end of February!" And for this the only excuse the Department has to offer is, first, that General Scott must have known of the order countermanding the transports, and therefore wantonly delayed his own expedition! and, next, that the whole Quartermaster's Department, with the Chief at its head, was under his immediate orders, without any control, or interference, from Washington, and therefore, it was his own fault if the expedition was delayed; and this assertion is seriously made by the Secretary in the face of his own admission, that he had himself countermanded the order for transports from the north! The order for these transports had been given by the Secretary, through General Scott; the countermand was given by him direct to the Quartermaster General, then in the field, professedly under General Scott's orders, and without notification or warning to General Scott! A great part of the transports finally used, were small trading craft, picked up as they could be found on and near the spot, extremely hazardous and wholly unfit for the purpose-twenty or thirty of which were at one time actually driven ashore in a norther.

Very soon after the contemplated treachery of "heading off" Gen. Scott by a Lieutenant-general, had been defeated, the Executive Government had the news of the fall of Vera Cruz, and the Castle of St. Juan-a most brilliant operation, conducted with infinite skill and judgment, and for which little thanks were due to them. But immediately that same hope, with which they had so often cheated themselves before-that of having an offer of submission from the enemy since a new success had been achieved-was revived.

Captain Hetzel, A. Q. M, in a memorandum for the Commanding General, dated February 9, states that these ten transports, as he supposed, by a note from the Adjutant-general, Jones, to General Scott, had then actually sailed, and might soon be expected. So General Scott understood from the same pote, or report; vide his letter to the Dent of 28th February.

[June,

tomed infirmity of purpose produced by In this contemptible idea, and the accusit, all effort towards sustaining Gen. Scott in his critical position, or towards furnishing him with the necessary men and supplies to enable him to retreat from the destructive vomito on the coast, and push forward his conquering column in the direction of the Mexican Capital, seems to have been, for a time, wholly given up. The new regulars, as fast as they were raised and organized, were dispatched, not to Gen. Scott, but to the line of the Rio Grande-not to the point where they were wanted, and had been promised, but where they were not wanted at all. This policy was obstinately continued long, long after every apology for it had been taken away by the knowledge at Washington of the utter annihilation of the enemy on the line victory of Buena Vista.** of the Rio Grande consequent on the grand forcements coming to General Scott in April Instead of reinand May to give him his promised army of 20,000 men, it was not till the 6th of August that recruits reached him at Puebla in sufficient numbers to give him a force of 10,000 men, to begin his march on the compelled, both from necessity and humanCapital. In the mean time, having been ity, to send home seven regiments of old volunteers, as early as the month of May, he was obliged to cut himself off from Vera Cruz, and make his army a

from the north were to be sent to the Brazos.

original understanding was that all the troops * The Secretary, in his defence, insists that the This is said with his accustomed candor. No troops from the north, destined for Vera Cruz, ade to do. Besides, he had notice from Geuwere to be landed at the Brazos, as the Secretary had ordered General Cadwallader and his brig probably require all troops from the north, as they eral Scott, before he left New Orleans, that he should

came to New Orleans, to rendezvous at Lobos, and from the Rio Grande had all actually left the Brazs not off the Brazos at all. After the troops drawn for rendezvous at Lobos, it is absurd to say that ought first to go to the Brazos. But after Vera any troops from the north, destined for Vera Cruz, Cruz and its Castle had fallen, and Scott was on his march for the Capital, troops which ought to have gone to him, were sent to the Rio Grande!

† After every effort to induce these troops to re-engage, General Scott said in public orders that he could not "in humanity and good faith honorable discharge, to advance further from the cause regiments, entitled, in a few weeks, to an coast in the pursuit of the enemy, and thereby throw them upon the necessity of returning to embark at Vera Cruz, at the season known to be, at that place, the most fatal to life." For this act the humane Secretary of War reproaches him!

"self-sustaining machine" in the heart of | have been utterly unwilling to understand the enemy's country. He was as ill-sup- and acknowledge, what sort of authority it plied for the road, as he had been for is which belongs necessarily to a commantransportation by water. The chief Com-der-in-chief in the field, conducting a cam

missary had not received a dollar of money since they landed at Vera Cruz. Four months' pay was due the soldiers. The army was destitute of necessary clothing, and even the new troops arrived as destitute as the rest. A thousand hands had

to be employed on the spot in making shoes and pantaloons, out of the worst materials, to cover the nakedness of the troops!

But if the Executive Government did not send to General Scott troops, and money, and necessary supplies, there was one thing they did send him-they sent him Mr. Trist. On the 12th of April they received the intelligence of the fall of Vera Cruz and the Castle, and on the 14th Mr. Trist was dispatched with a missive to General Scott, declaring their expectation that Mexico would now "be disposed to offer fair terms of accommodation," and that Mr. Trist was sent forward to "be in readiness to receive any proposals which the enemy may see fit to make for the restoration of peace." Instead of reinforcements, they sent an agent to receive the submission of the enemy-and such an agent! It was not a national Commission, composed of such men as Crittenden and Benton, or Mangum and Calhoun, but it was Mr. Nicholas P. Trist, a clerk in the State Department, and selected seemingly because he was known to entertain at that time a petty spite and enmity to General Scott, who was sent on this errand, as a "confidential agent" of the Government, to the head-quarters of that Commander. General Scott could not be intrusted with this authority, to receive proposals from the enemy, and make a preliminary treaty of peace, under instructions, though this very power was to have been conferred on Mr. Benton, if he had taken the field as Lieutenant-general. It was too important a service to be intrusted to General Scott, though not too important to be committed to Mr. Nicholas P. Trist.

The sequel of the infamous treatment of General Scott by the Executive Government has been answerable to its beginning and its progress. They have been utterly incapable of understanding, or rather, they

paign in the heart of an enemy's country. The Head of Discipline, he has found it impossible to maintain discipline on account of the ignorant, partial, and malicious interference of the political government at home. They have abetted and justified, against the Commander, the outrageous conduct of a fighting General, a gallant soldier enough, but notoriously the most factious and impatiently ambitious man of the army. Arrested by his Commander, the Executive interposes to restore this new political favorite to his command, without a trial, and even without inquiry; and not content with this, he affects to consider the very act of this officer, which was the ground of his arrest-an act of gross insult and outrage to his Commander, and of insubordination hardly short of mutiny-as a rightful and proper and formal exhibition of charges and specifications against his superior; and thereupon he proceeds, first, to dismiss General Scott from his high command, and thenthe punishment having first been inflicted

places him before a Court, picked and packed by the Executive,* for inquiry into the pretended charges against him! It should excite no surprise when we find the Executive, through his Secretary of War, intimating, what he dared not directly assert, that this dismissal of General Scott was only relieving him from command at his own request. Marlborough, after some successful battles, including that of Blenheim, was created a Duke, received vast estates as gifts from the nation, and had a magnificent palace built for him at the public expense. Wellington, at the close of his campaigns in Spain,

When charges were preferred against Colonel Harney, and it became the duty and the right of General Scott to detail a Court Martial for his trial, with characteristic delicacy and generosity, because there had been previously some personal difference between them, the General requested and directed Colonel Harney to select or name his own Court. Not to be outdone in generosity, the gallant Colonel declined to do so. They have been, we believe, Secretary, in their generosity, assign General Towson, the best of friends ever since. The President and and General Caleb Cushing, to be the triers of General Scout! Even the trial, in form, of General Pillow, is the trial of General Scott, and so intended, before such a Court.

was created a Duke, and the nation made him a present, in a single gift, of two millions of dollars. Scott, at the close of his campaign in Mexico, had, in his whole military career, rendered as much signal service, and gained as much glery for his country, by his mighty achievements in war, as Marlborough or Wellington had done for theirs, when they received the rewards we have mentioned; and he receives from his Government, as his reward,

a contemptuous dismissal from his command, and an arraignment before two tribunals-the one military and packed for the occasion, and the other popular-in both cases on charges equally false and frivolous, and also in both cases sought to be pushed against him with whatever vigor, ability, and influence the Executive Government can command for the purpose. But our space is exhausted, and we must conclude. D. D. B.

WUTHERING HEIGHTS.*

RESPECTING a book so original as this, and written with so much power of imagination, it is natural that there should be many opinions. Indeed, its power is so predominant that it is not easy after hasty reading to analyze one's impressions so as to speak of its merits and demerits with confidence. We have been taken and carried through a new region, a melancholy waste, with here and there patches of beauty; have been brought in contact with fierce passions, with extremes of love and hate, and with sorrow that none but those who have suffered can understand. This has not been accomplished with ease, but with an ill-mannered contempt for the decencies of language, and in a style which might resemble that of a Yorkshire farmer who should have endeavored to eradicate his provincialism by taking lessons of a London footman. We have had many sad bruises and tumbles in our journey, yet it was interesting, and at length we are safely arrived at a happy conclusion.

The first feeling with which we turn back

1846.

to recall the incidents passed through, is one of uneasiness and gloom; even the air of summer, so reviving to city dwellers, does not dispel it. To write or think about the tale, without being conscious of a phase of sadness, is impossible; which mood of the mind, if it appear to the reader, let him not attribute to an over susceptibility, unless he has read the book with no such impression himself.

We shall take for granted that a novel which has excited so unusual an attention, has been or will soon be in the hands of most of our readers of light literature, and shall therefore write rather from than upon it. We will not attempt an outline of the story; it is so void of events that an outline would be of small assistance to any who have not read it, and would only be tedious to those who have. It is a history of two families during two generations, and all transpires under their two roofs. The genealogy is a little perplexing, and as an assistance to the reader's recollection we give it in a note.†

If we did not know that this book has

Wuthering Heights. A Novel. By the Author of "Jane Eyre." New York: Harper & Brothers + Old Mr. Earnshaw of Wuthering Heights has two children, Hindley and Catherine. He finds Heathcliff, a gipsy boy, in Liverpool streets, and brings him home. When he dies, Hindley brings home a foreign wife, Frances. Old Mr. and Mrs. Linton, of Thrushcross Grange, have two children, Edgar and Isabella. In 1778 Hindley's wife gives birth to a son, Hareton, and dies. Old Mr. and Mrs. Linton die, and Edgar Linton marries Catherine Earnshaw. Heathcliff marries Isabella. Mrs. Linton (Catherine) gives birth to a daughter, and dies; the daughter takes her name. Heathcliff's wife dies, leaving a son, Linton. Hindley Earnshaw dies. Heathcliff's son, Linton, marries Edgar Linton's daughter Catherine. Edgar Linton dies. Heathcliff's son dies. Heathcliff himself dies; and finally Hareton Earnshaw and the widow of Heathcliff's son are left with a fair prospect of a happy marriage.

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