they instructed him to give the command to General Patterson and General Worth. They had previously, by an order from home, assigned the command of the expedition to Tamaulipas and Tampico to General Patterson. And thus it was cunningly arranged, that by detaching from Taylor's column the best part of his army, for an enterprise in which the command was to be given to another, he should be left to stand merely on the defensive, and, so far as they could see, in a state of inglorious inactivity. At the same time, it must be observed, that the projected enterprise itself-that of investing Vera Cruz, with four thousand men-was puerile and contemptible in a military point of view. The notion was, that the city might be taken with that force, and then, with time enough, if the enemy around them would lie still, the Castle of San Juan d'Ulloa might be starved out. And nothing was proposed beyond; it was not to strike at the Capital by way of Vera Cruz, but only to take Vera Cruz, as Matamoros and Camargo and Monterey had been taken, and then sit down, and hope again for peace. In reply to these notable plans of the Government, General Taylor told the Department, that he would march himself on Victoria-the capital of Tamaulipas-which he did; and would send a detachment to garrison Tampico; and he would then hold 4,000 men, of which 3,000 should be regulars, ready to embark for Vera Cruz; but he warned the Government that these 4,000 men must be joined by 6,000 more from home, if they meant to take and hold Vera Cruz, till the Castle of St. John should fall; and if there was any purpose of marching on the Capital, the expedition should not be undertaken with less than 25,000 men.

Before, however, this last dispatch could have been received, which was dated the 21st of November, the Executive Govern ment had waked up to the necessity of some change in its policy, in regard to this war. It now professed to come into the measure, apparently with entire acquiescence and cordiality, which General Scott had been urging upon it in four several memorials, beginning with one on the 21st

* When these memorials come to be read by the public, they will testify very strongly to the great military capacity of General Scott.

October, and the others following on the 12th, the 16th and the 21st of November. This measure was to strike directly at the Capital of the Mexican empire, entering by way of Vera Cruz, and first reducing that city and the Fortress of St. John.* He set down the number of men for this enterprise at 20,000 as the least number, and he proposed that this force should be raised, including volunteers, by adding ten or twelve new regiments of regulars, and filling up and increasing the ranks of the old regiments. This was his plan, and in the night of the 18th of November, the General received an intimation that he might prepare himself for the field, in reference to the execution of it. On the 23d he received his written orders, and immediately left Washington to put himself en route for the seat of war.

And here two things may be observed: First, that the President had manifestly resolved that he would not, willingly, put General Taylor in the way of winning any more battles. By the orders already given, before General. Scott's plan for a march to the city of Mexico had been thus adopted, Taylor had been effectually reduced to stand on the defensive; and on adopting that plan, Taylor was to have nothing to do with it. And next, we find the President seemingly so far reconciled to General Scott, notwithstanding the insubordination and disrespect of which he was accused in the preceding month of May, as to call him to the field for the high and responsible service of conducting a large army to the Capital of Mexico. It is sufficient to say, in this connection, that at this time, the impression was nearly universal-so fickle is popular sentimentand shared no doubt by the President, that General Scott, by a "hasty " letter, containing an unlucky, because unstudied expression, though in all else a letter of characteristic candor, truth, dignity, and sterling sense, had effectually cut himself off, past all redemption, from any pretensions to the Presidency.

Now when General Scott left Washington, everything wore a smooth and fair appearance. We have reason to know that

* General Scott wanted 15,000 men for his landing and attack on Vera Cruz and the Castle; but if he had 8,000 men he would go on, though he expected to be obliged to meet and fight a large army at his landing.

and support, the strongest that words could be found to give utterance to, were tendered him by the President. It was his own plan of conducting the war, just as he had propounded it, that was adopted, or professed to be, with unreserved and hearty approval. And he was himself to command in the campaign, with which the Executive Government at Washington was to have little else to do, than take care that every requisition made by him for the enterprise, whether of force, or of supplies, of whatever kind, should be, as far as possible, promptly and faithfully furnished. This was the voluntary and solemn engagement of the President and Secretary of War. In the written orders with which he was furnished, scarcely exceeding half a dozen lines, he was told :—

"It is not proposed to control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it. It is committed to you in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage."

It was in the full confidence, and with the buoyant hopes, inspired by treatment and assurances apparently so full of generosity, undoubting trust and implicit reliance, that General Scott took the field in command of an expedition, first for the prompt reduction of the city of Vera Cruz, and the strong Fortress of St. John, and then for a victorious march upon the Mexican Capital. And who now could be made to believe, but for facts too flagrant and notorious for contradiction or dispute, that at the very moment of dismissing General Scott to his command, with all these protestations and promises of implicit confidence and full and vigorous support, the President had asked for, and received, from another source, and had actually approved and adopted, another plan of military operations in Mexico, in some material respects different from, inconsistent with, and opposed to that of General Scott; and was then actually under promise and engagement to the individual from whom this plan emanated, a citizen in civil life, to give him the command in Mexico, over General Scott, and all others, by making

soon as the assent of Congress, then about to meet, could be obtained! The settled purpose and the perfect good faith with which this engagement was made, are shown in the fact of the open and strenuous efforts made by the President, and his partisans and friends, through the whole ensuing session of three months, to push a measure through Congress, by which he should be enabled to carry his undertaking into effect. A more bold and shameless game of deception, falsehood and purposed treachery, than this towards General Scott, was never played, by any man, or set of men, in any government, however corrupt, degraded and debased, on the face of the globe.

But we must not leave this matter to rest in generalities. We must come to particulars. The war policy of the Executive Government was especially vacillating and uncertain along in the autumn of 1846. They did not know what to do. They settled and unsettled plans in quick succession. Even their projected expedition to Vera Cruz with 4,000 men, was not a fixed purpose. The order to General Taylor, of the 22d October, was to hold the 4,000 men "ready to embark for Vera Cruz, or such other destination as may be given them." And it is quite certain that after that, for a period, the conclusion was to stand still and do nothing. A writer, known to speak by the book, wrote from Washington to the New York Journal of Commerce, on the 7th of November:"There will be no expensive movements -no energetic movements-made before the meeting of Congress. *** The whole responsibility of further action will be thrown upon Congress." And so late as the 11th of November, the Secretary of War answered an application from a gentleman in Kentucky, who proposed to raise a company of volunteers for a reduced regiment then in Mexico, by saying,—" It is not contemplated to fill up the regiments that have been reduced. The amount of force already in service is deemed sufficient for the prosecution of the war."

But, somehow, a sudden change came over these gentlemen; for on the 16th of November, only five days after the Secre tary's letter to Kentucky, an order and requisition was issued by him for nine ad

ditional regiments of volunteers to serve during the war! This was two days before General Scott received his first intimation that he might be called to the field. What had wrought this sudden and extraordinary change? Two of General Scott's memorials were then before the Government; had they suddenly yielded their convictions to his arguments? Was it then, was it on the 18th, or was it on the 23d of November, when he received his final or ders, the real purpose of the Government, in good faith, to adopt his plan of campaign; and was it with a view, bona fide, to the execution of this plan, that these nine regiments of volunteers were called for, and ten regiments more of regulars were immediately demanded from Congress? If such was not the real intention, then General Scott was basely cheated and deceived; and that it was not-except contingently, and as a pis aller-is demonstrable from incontestible facts. We call SENATOR BENTON to the stand as a witness, and refer to his testimony at large, given in the Senate of the United States on the 25th of January, 1847. It may be found in the Congressional Globe of that date.

Mr. Benton was in Washington on the 9th of November, as appears by a published letter of his of that date. He relates that the day after his arrival in Washington, he called on the President, who then asked him to give him a plan for the future conduct of the war. "I gave it to him," says the Senator, "first in speech, face to face, and afterwards in writing; and here it is-[holding up a roll of paper]-for I chose to retain the original for myself, while sending a copy to him."

Mr. Benton refused to reveal what his plan was, in detail, but so much he does reveal: That his plan was different from that of either General Taylor or General Scott, both of whose plans he disapproved and condemned; that he would have nothing to do with either, and especially he would have nothing to do with an "attack upon the idle and solitary Castle of San Juan of Ulloa;" that his plan "looked to a result and promised an issue;" that his war in Mexico would support itself; that it was to be a union of policy and of arms, of diplomacy and of battle-peace for the peace party in Mexico, and "endless war"

for the war party; that his plan required "a head to the army--one head to the whole body" and this was to be supplied, and all difficulties about rank avoided, by the creation of a LIEUTENANT

GENERAL.

Mr. Benton further relates, that his plan was APPROVED by the President; and to show that it was ADOPTED also, and agreed to be carried into prompt and complete execution, to the entire exclusion of every other plan, Mr. Benton still further relates, that the President tendered to him the office of Lieutenant-general contingent only on obtaining the authority of Congress for creating such an officer-and that he agreed to accept the appointment.

And we have abundant proof that the President adhered firmly and pertinaciously to his adoption of Mr. Benton's plan of a campaign, and to his understanding and solemn agreement with that gentleman. The Annual Report of the Secretary of War recommended the increase of the regular army by ten regiments. On the 29th of December, the President sent in a special Message to Congress, urging prompt action on this recommendation, and asking authority for the "appointment of a general officer to take command of all our forces in the field." It was in reference to this "general officer," that Mr. Benton's explanation and avowals were made; it was the Lieutenant-general in question. The Ten Regiments Bill was clogged, and its passage delayed, by the obstinate efforts of the President's friends to carry the Lieutenant-general along with it, or upon it as a rider. And when this effort failed in the House, a Bill was promptly presented in the Senate by General Dix, for the appointment of a Lieutenant-general, eo nomine. This Bill was urged with all the strength and zeal of the peculiar and confidential friends of the President and Secretary of War. And, finally, when this failed, another mode of reaching this object was resorted to. The House had in January, by a vote of 120 to 90, refused to give the President authority to appoint a Lieutenant-general; and before the close of the session, this body had been so disciplined by Executive appliances, as to give the President power in a Bill for the appointment of additional general officers, to designate and

Thus strictly and earnestly did the President adhere to his engagements with Mr. Benton, and to his plan for conducting the war in Mexico. Nor did his efforts stop here. The Bill for the appointment of new Major-generals was passed, and Mr. Benton was promptly appointed a Majorgeneral, and a commission tendered to him. A serious design was entertained of finding in existing laws, or pretending to find, or of assuming, authority in the President, to assign Mr. Benton to the command over General Scott, and all others in Mexico, in spite of the refusal of Congress to sanction such a proceeding. Mr. Benton signified to the President, in a note, with characteristic modesty, that his acceptance of his commission would depend on the question, whether he should have "the command of the army, and authority to sign preliminaries of peace." And to this the President, on the 9th of March, replied:Immediately after your nomination as Major-general had been confirmed by the Senate, I carefully examined the question, whether I possessed the power to designate you-a junior Major-general-to the chief command of the army in the field. The result of this examination is, I am constrained to say, a settled conviction in my mind, that such power has not been conferred upon me by existing laws."

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Never was a scheme of treachery more pertinaciously prosecuted than this of the President's towards General Scott. And it was a scheme of treachery and bad faith which, in active and labored efforts to consummate it, covered the whole period of time from the 18th of November, when he informed him that he might prepare for the field, down to the 9th day of March, when he was actually engaged in disembarking his troops for the attack on Vera Cruz. Nor, though the particular scheme of treachery finally fell through on the latter day, did the disposition and will of the Executive Government, to wound, insult, neglect, disappoint, and betray General Scott, ever desert them, through his whole

achievements almost unparalleled in the annals of war, when they consummated their infamous treatment of him, and gratified their venom and their spleen, by dismissing him-ignominiously they intended it to be-from his command, and handing him over, as a criminal, to a military Inquisition, compounded and packed by themselves, in its majority, so as exactly to fit it to the malignant uses which it was designed to subserve.

That this scheme of treachery-the design to supersede General Scott, both in his command and in his plan of campaignexisted in the beginning, when he was first ordered to take the field and his plan pretended to be approved and adopted, and every protestation made of confidence and support, admits of no doubt from the testimony of Mr. Benton, and the dates he gives us.

He was in Washington early in November; his first interview with the President on the subject of his plans, was the day after his arrival-not later, certainly, than the 10th; and so taking were they, that no time was required for deliberation. They were approved and adopted, and he was to be made a Lieutenant-general, to carry them into execution.

And here the question presents itself,Why was General Scott dispatched to the field, as if for the prosecution of another and a different plan of his own, if the parpose all the time was to supersede him and his plan, by Mr. Benton and his plan, as soon as the necessary authority could be obtained? To our mind, the answer is not difficult. Mr. Benton's plan, it is manifest, contemplated an invasion of Mexico, at some point on the Gulf coast, and a march upon the Capital, as General Scott's did, though by way of being original, he would leave "the idle and solitary Castle of San Juan of Ulloa" standing unconquered i in his van! He would require much the same force in the field that General Scott required, for a movement towards the Capital. It would probably, however, be late in the winter, or the time might run quite into the spring, before the President could obtain the necessary authority for sending him to the field, and it was quite important that as much of the force required by him as could be collected in the mean time, should be on the spot, organized and dis