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ly settled, orders and instructions have been, and will be, given to the Chiefs of the general staff at this place, and the routes of march and water conveyances, together with the dépôts of supplies of every description, are finally to be communicated to the unknown commanders of volunteers whose services are to be accepted."

This sketch is sufficient to show, though very imperfectly and faintly, how General Scott was occupied at Washington, and how necessary it was that he should continue on the spot until all these preliminary arrangements were completed, and the necessary orders under them given; and both the fact of his incessant occupation, and the necessity of his continued presence at Washington, was as well known to the President and Secretary, as to the General himself. Their interviews and discussions had been frequent, frank, and so far as he was concerned, without reserve. Everything in fact, at Washington, in reference to the projected movement and campaign, was going on under his immediate counsel and direction. Neither Mr. Polk, though the constitutional head of the army, nor the Secretary of War, knew the first letters of the alphabet of military science. Neither of them had the slightest acquaintance with the first necessary practical steps, in detail, to be taken to bring the new army into the field, with the necessary supplies of all descriptions, for active operations. They depended upon General Scott, the real Commander-in-chief, and who was on the spot for suggestions and advice in every material step that was to be taken. The labors in which he was actually engaged, with their knowledge and approbation, show conclusively that he was the soul and the centre of all the preliminary arrangements, and practically, of everything that was projected and done to set this campaign in motion.

In this state of things, it may well be supposed that it created not a little sur prise on the part of General Scott, when he was told on the evening of the 20th of May, by the Secretary of War, that much impatience was felt at his occupations and delay at Washington. He understood, and it has never been denied, that this impatience was felt, or pretended to be felt, both by the President and the Secretary.

Ive seen what occurred on the 18th, › days before, when a record was

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made of the facts, perfectly well understood, and acquiesced in by all concerned, that the army was not expected to be placed on the Rio Grande in force before about the 1st of September, and that the General was not to be there much in advance of the troops. Personal interviews had been held in the mean time, and it was perfectly well known how effectively and indispensably General Scott was employed at Washington. What, then, was the meaning of this sudden notification of the displeasure of the President and Secretary, because he had not already taken his departure for the Mexican frontier? It was significant certainly, and indicated a great deal more than was expressed. The circumstances and the manner in which the notification was conveyed to the General, made it a rebuke, and it was intended that he should receive and feel it as such. It was saying to General Scott, We, your superiors, have come to the conclusion, that you are committing a fault by delaying to take the field: They knew very well in their souls, at the same time, that he was committing no fault, but was actually rendering the Government, with their own express approval, the best service, in the best place, and in the best way; and they knew that he could not fail to feel this charge as an indignity and an insult. They expected one of two things to happen from it-for we have not a doubt that the next resolution of the President, already taken when this rebuke was prepared for General Scott, was to withdraw upon some pretext or other, if he could safely do so, his offer and promise to send him to the field: they expected, either that he would promptly and peremptorily decline this service after such a proof of the treatment he might expect to receive from them when in the field, or that, with the frankness of a soldier, apt to be "sudden and quick in quar rel," giving utterance to his honest indig nation at a gross insult and injury, he would commit himself to some expressions, of which, by the aid of the cool, calculating ingenuity of the Secretary, the President might avail himself, as an apology for his change of purpose in regard to the com mand of the army. The plot succeededbeing exactly such a one as suited the low characteristic cunning of the President Early the next morning, the 21st, thr

General addressed a letter to the Secretary, which in due time, though not immediately, was seized upon as affording a sufficient pretext for the treachery which the President had been meditating.

The foregone design of the President in this matter is too plain to admit of question, and the active part taken by the Secretary does not leave us at liberty to believe, as we should have been glad to do, that he was not cognizant from the beginning of that design. We proceed with our exposition of the case.

At the very outset of this business, on the 15th of May, an understanding was had between the President, the Secretary, and General Scott, that General Wool should be called on to take the command of one of the three columns destined for the invasion of Mexico, and accordingly he was immediately written to by the Secretary. He arrived in Washington on the 17th, and was informed by General Scott of the service designed for him. A day or two afterwards, probably on the 19th, he was told by the Secretary that his ultimate assignment to such command was doubtful, inasmuch as it was probable that "other generals might be authorized and appointed for the army, and called into service from the States." On that day, (the 19th,) a Bill was introduced into the Senate at the special instance of the Secretary of War, if not directly drawn by him, to provide for the appointment of two new Major-generals, and four Brigadiers, for the regular army, and, in addition, authorizing the President to select State Generals for the command of the volunteers. Here, then, was a disclosure altogether unmistakable in its import. No increase of the regular army had been authorized, or was then contemplated, beyond the filling up of the ranks as it then existed; and yet the President and Secretary demanded two new Major-generals, and four Brigadiers-not for the volunteers-it was proposed that the President should select Generals for them from the States-not for the volunteers, but for the regular army. Nobody can doubt, who considers the political character of the Administration, that the design at that time was to make these appointments chiefly, if not wholly, from civil and political life, and to give such new-made officers the conduct

of the war. For what purpose else were they to be created? Not certainly to be kept at home, and out of employment. And after providing Major-generals and Brigadiers, in full complement, from the States, for the command of all the volunteers, it was not certainly intended to place all the Major-generals and Brigadiers of the regular service in the field--numbering, as they then would, three of the former (to say nothing of Brevets) and six of the latter, to command a body of not more than 7000 men--for that was all the regular force, as, the law then stood, which would be brought into the field for the contemplated campaign. Some Generals, then, were to be left at home, and nobody can be stupid enough to believe that they would be the new-made Generals. The Secretary told General Wool, that if this project of a law, concocted and urged by him, was passed, it was doubtful if he would be employed as it had been proposed he should be; and we have not a doubt that he might have said the same thing to General Scott with equal, if not greater truth. It was General Scott, no doubt, at whom the plan was mainly aimed. As soon as it became known in Washington in the political circles of the President's partisans and confidential friends, that he had it in contemplation to send the General-in-chief to the field, a clamor is well known to have been raised against the policy of such a procedure. This clamor, so far as it came to the General's ears, took the direction of a complaint against him for his delay and stay in Washington. The real meaning of the whole of it was, which the President understood very well, that he was committing a great error in proposing to give General Scott an opportunity, in some brilliant actions, of "conquering a peace" in this Mexican. business, who would then, it might be, with the prestige of his victories and exploits, turn round and push him, and his party, from their stools. Even the remote hazard of such a consummation was to be devoutly avoided. Mr. Polk was of this opinion, and hence, beyond all question, his sudden change of front. Hence this Bill thrown into the Senate, and dry-nursed by the Secretary, for the appointment of new Generals.

It is true that they waited four days

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after General Scott's letter of the 21st of May, before giving him notice that he was not to be allowed to command in Mexico; but this delay is easily accounted for. The Bill for the creation of new Generals could not be hurried through Congress, as the Bill adopting the war had been. It met with delay, and symptoms of opposition were manifested. Without a new batch of Generals, the President might be forced, after all, to send General Scott to the field. Taylor was as yet, so far as was known at Washington, comparatively untried, and it was too soon to determine that it would do to intrust him with the command of a large army, and the conduct of an important campaign. But on this point, all doubt was suddenly dispelled by the news of his splendid victories of Resaca de la Palma and Palo Alto, the particulars of which reached Washington on Tuesday, the 24th. The resolution of the President was then taken, and the Secretary was set to work to concoct his letter of the 25th. Taylor had now shown himself to be a skillful and able commander, and the conduct of the war, in the new campaign, at least if the President should be unable to give the command to some new pet General of his own creation, might be safely confided to him-especially as it was not then dreamed of, that his victories, however multiplied and glorious, were going to make him a dangerous popular candidate for the immediate succession to the Presidency. On this conclusion it was, that the Secretary's let ter of the 25th of May was written—a letter, having as little to do with truth, candor, and honest dealing, as any that Machiavelli, or Talleyrand, or Ignatius Loyola, ever wrote, or instructed others how to write. If ever language was employed, either in speech or on paper, according to the Prince's notion of its true use-to disguise or conceal the real sentiments and designs of the party using it--it was so employed on this occasion.

Two pretences are set forth in this letter, as the grounds on which the President had determined to keep General Scott at home. First, it was pretended that the President had discovered that the General's letter of the 21st contained "the most offensive imputations against the Executive Government," and which had

therefore given him the highest displeasure. There was something plausible in this, though it was wholly without any real foundation. The other pretence was merely contemptible: it was that General Scott's object in writing the letter of the 21st, desiring ignobly to escape the responsibilities of command in the field, had been to induce, or compel, the President to change his determination of sending him to Mexico. This was so utterly at variance with all probability, and with the known truth, as to be merely ridiculous. As to the first pretence, that was bottomed on a studied and ingenious perversion of the language and plain intent and purpose of the letter of the 21st.

The truth is, that in writing that letter, General Scott, though feeling that he had suffered an egregious indignity, was, at the time, so far deceived in regard to the real motives and designs of the President and Secretary, as to believe that, under the influence and complaints of those about them to this effect, they had really begun to feel, at least in some degree, the impatience they expressed on account of his delay in Washington. He gave them credit for sincerity; and his letter was an effort to remove the unfounded and injurious impression which he believed was beginning to possess their minds, and which, if left unchecked and subject to the clamor against him out of doors, would grow into an intolerable evil, not merely annoying to him, but interfering with and disturbing his plans and operations, and utterly destroying his efficiency, and perhaps his success, in the arduous service he had entered upon. It was likely to begin with driving him from his position in Washington before his necessary preliminary arrangements could be half completed, and, following him to the field, compel him to do everything, or attempt everything there, with only half the necessary precaution for efficient action and assured success; and of course, in all cases, to win success, if at all, at such a dreadful and unnecessary cost of human life, as no humane and Christian commander would willingly be responsible for. Going to the field, he would leave his superiors behind him-those who had, or would assume, a constitutional right to interfere with his plans and operations, and who, if indulg

ing in prejudice against him, if disposed to prejudge him and condemn him beforehand, would not fail to give him infinite trouble, on account as well of their prejudice as of their ignorance of military affairs, and perhaps to bring him and the arms and honor of the country together, into disgrace and degradation. His letter was written expressly to deprecate, and if possible to counteract and remedy, such an unhappy and desperate state of things. No honest and unprejudiced mind could give any other meaning or character to it. "Not an advantageous step can be taken," says this letter, "in a forward march, without the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that quarter, no General can put his whole heart and mind into the work to be done in front. I am, therefore, not a little alarmed-nay, crippled in my energies--by the knowledge of the impatience in question." *** "As a soldier, I make this assertion without the fear of contradiction from any honest and candid soldier. Against the ad captandum condemnation of all other persons--whoever may be designated for the high command in question-there can be no reliance (in his absence) other than the active, candid and steady support of his Government."

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| ington, and the proper period for his departure, he put on record, in this letter, this explicit declaration :

"My intentions have been, after making all preliminary arrangements here, to pass down myself by correspondence, that the volunteers, the Ohio and Mississippi, to see, or to assure on whom we are mostly to rely in the prosecution of the existing war, are rapidly assembling for the service; to learn the probable time of their readiness to advance upon Mexico; to ascertain if their supplies, of every kind, are in place, or are likely to be in place, in sufficmonize the movements of volunteers, and modient time; to hasten one and the other; to harify their routes (if necessary) so that all, or at least a sufficient number, shall arrive at the indicated points on the Mexican frontier, at the best periods, and, as far as practicable, about the same time.".

Now it was this letter of General Scott, sent in from his office, a room in the War Department, to the Secretary's room in the same building, which, after four days-the news of Taylor's victories on the Rio Grande having arrived in the mean timewas discovered by the Secretary to be a paper "reflecting upon the motives and objects of the President in tendering to you [General Scott] the command in Mexico," and conveying "the strongest suspicion, It was in this connection, and directly not to say a direct imputation, of most following these explicit declarations, that unworthy motives in the Executive Governhe spoke of, and deprecated, "a fire upon ment-of bad faith towards yourself-of his rear from Washington," while he a reckless disregard of the interests of the should be engaged with the enemy in country-of a design to carry on a war Mexico. This fire upon him had been be- against you, while you are sent forth to gun already by the expression of a most carry on a war against the public enemy. unreasonable impatience at his stay in We do not hesitate to affirm, that not a Washington; and it proceeded from the line, phrase, word or syllable, can be found President and Secretary, who, from their in General Scott's letter, which by any inpersonal knowledge of the indispensable genuity can be tortured into a reflection on necessity of his engagements at general the "motives and objects" of the President, Head-quarters, ought to have met and or as casting upon him an imputation, or silenced the senseless clamors against him suspicion, of "unworthy motives," of "bad from without, instead of yielding to them faith," of a "reckless disregard of the inand joining in them, as they had done-or terests of the country," or of any "design" professed to do. This sort of treatment, if whatever, to carry on a war against Genit was to be continued when he should be eral Scott. The motives-the faith-the in the field, would be "a fire upon his designs--of the President were not within rear," paralyzing his efforts and his ener- the possible scope of the plain objects of gies, instead of that "active, candid and this letter. The letter assumes, in perfect steady support of his Government," which good faith, that the President and Secrehe had a right to expect and demand. To tary were sincere and honest, though very nake his plans distinctly known to the unreasonable, in the fault they had beExecutive, in regard to his stay in Wash-gun to find with him; at any rate their

sincerity and honesty in the matter are in no way impeached or questioned. And this, undoubtedly, is the very mistake, and the only mistake, the letter makes. If General Scott had flatly told the President--Sir, you are acting towards me from most unworthy motives, and in bad faith; I understand your design perfectly, which is nothing less than to find, or make, some plausible excuse for withdrawing from me your tender and promise of the chief command in Mexico; if he had said this, it might not have been very respectful to the Constitutional Commanderin-chief, but it would have been literally true. And it was only the consciousness of unworthy motives, and bad faith, and a dishonest design, which enabled the President, or the Secretary in his behalf, to fancy that they could discover any imputations of the sort in this letter. The charge is a self-betrayal, and a confession of guilt. The whole case stands just here The President had come to think that sending General Scott to Mexico might result in endangering his own succession, or that of his dynasty, to the Presidency. He resolved to endeavor to get on without him in the field, and to keep him at home, where he could have, without any hazard, all the benefit of his great capacity and experience in the formation of plans, and in the home management of details and operations for prosecuting the war. To some new Major-general, if he could get one-which was his first plan-or to General Taylor, on whom he settled down after his victories on the Rio Grande, he resolved to intrust the command-at least of the forces destined to enter Mexico by the way of that river.

With the clear exposition which we have here made of the insincerity, bad faith, and false pretences, practiced towards General Scott by the Executive Government, in this first transaction, at the commencement of the war, we are prepared to enter on some inquiry into the treatment he has received at its hands since he has been actually in the field.

And the first inquiry which presents itself is, how came General Scott to be employed at all in the field, after what had transpired in May, 1846? The explanation is not difficult.

The campaign of 1846 was drawing to

a close, and peace seemed no nearer being obtained than when the war began. The President became alarmed at last, at the obstinacy of the enemy, at the enormous cost of the war, and the heavy sacrifice of life made in prosecuting it. The prospect was a gloomy one, and the President was in deep perplexity.

On the 11th of October he received the news and particulars of the capture of Monterey, after three days of hard fighting, and a great loss of life. But this victory, any more than previous ones, did not bring peace, or any prospects of peace. This was the constant disappointment after every victory, and every successful movement of the army; and still the Government went hoping on, and expecting peace from the next and the next isolated movement. They thought peace would come if Taylor would send a force to take military possession of the State of Tamaulipas, and occupy Tampico, and they sent him instructions to this effect, written on the day on which he began the battles of Monterey-the 22d of September. Two days after receiving the news of the fall of Monterey--the 13th of October-these instructions were renewed, and General Taylor was informed that they had also under consideration a plan for investing Vera Cruz. Finally, on the 22d of October, explicit instructions were prepared and sent to Taylor, unless it should materially interfere with his own plan of operations, or weaken too much his present position, 'to make the necessary arrangements for having four thousand men, of whom fifteen hundred or two thousand should be regular troops, ready to embark for Vera Cruz, or such other destination as may be given them, at the earliest practicable period."

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But at this period, and earlier indeed, the President was laboring under another embarrassment, besides what concerned merely the successful prosecution of the war. Taylor was becoming too popular, and was already much talked of for the Presidency. The Government was getting tired of his successes. They promptly sent him a rebuke for his temporary truce at the capitulation of Monterey. They advised him pretty strongly against making any further attempts beyond Monterey, while, for the expedition to Vera Cruz,

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