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Of the three peculiarities here specified, | the existence of the first is, as we shall soon see, exceedingly problematical; the consequence of the second was directly the reverse of what Polybius represents, for the Spartans came to be remarkably venal and avaricious; the third, if correctly stated, as regards the Cretans, certainly constitutes an important difference. It must be borne in mind, that Aristotle is comparing analogous institutions, and the state which he considers analogous to Crete and Lacedæmon, is Carthage, which certainly had nothing Doric or Spartan in its national character or social institutions, though some of its political institutions resembled the Spartan-the diarchy, for instance, though even here the resemblance was by no means complete, as the suffetes, so far from succeeding hereditarily, were not even chosen for life. On a similar system of partial comparison, we might class the British government with those of Spain and Prussia, in respect of its principle of hereditary succession to the chief magistracy, and with our own in respect of its representative system, free press, freedom of travel without passports, &c. So, too, we might call the Norwegian government a monarchy or a democracy, looking at it from different points of

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many, the principle of reciprocity in human dealings appears, when conceived in theory, odious and contemptible, and goes by some bad name, such as egoism, selfishness, calculation, political economy, &c.; the only sentiment which they will admit in theory is, that the man who has, ought to be ready at all times to give away what he has to him who has not, while the laiter is encouraged to expect and require such gratuitous donation."

Exactly the social economy of the Sue and Dickens school. It is worthy of observation also, that some of the most enlightened nations of the present day have not yet got rid of those barbarous absurdities, the Usury Laws.

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Lycurgus does not try to make the poor rich, nor the rich poor; but he imposes upon both the same subjugating drill-the same habits of life, gentleman-like idleness and unlettered strength the same fare, clothing, labors, privations, endurance, punishments and subordination. It is a lesson instructive, at least, however unsatisfactory to political students, that with all this equality of dealing, he ends in creating a community in whom the love of money stands powerfully and specially developed." Grote, vol. ii. p. 548.

ments in it is variously represented: thus in the passage of Aristotle above quoted, the Ephoralty is represented as a democratic institution, while in Plato's Laws, (iv. 112,) one of the speakers says that this institution of the Ephori is "marvellously despotic," (auparsiv is supavvivóv.)

Indeed, these Ephori are very troublesome people to deal with. That from being a subordinate magistracy of some sort, they managed to engross the chief power in the state, is well known, but the details respecting them are very vague and contradictory. On this point, neither of our historians are as full as we could wish. Thirlwall says scarcely anything; and we are surprised that Mr. Grote has made not the least allusion to the theory advocated by Muller and others, that the Ephors were originally a civil court, who gradually usurped criminal jurisdiction, and through criminal jurisdiction, political power. "It was the regular course of events in the Grecian states, that the civil courts enlarged their influence, while the power of the criminal courts was continually on the decline. As in Athens, the Heliæa rose, as compared with the Areopagus, so in Sparta, the power of the Ephors increased in comparison with that of the Gerusia."* This view is rendered extremely probable by a comparison of Aristotle's, (which Muller must have had in his mind, though he does not directly cite it,) where he says distinctly, that the magistracy of the hundred and four at Carthage closely resembled the Ephori, except that the mode of election was different. Now we know that the hundred and four was a civil court, and the great difference in the numbers of the two bodies is only proportioned to the difference in the population of the two states. Thirlwall seems to incline to Muller's opinion, for he states that the Ephors "appear from the first to have exercised a jurisdiction and superintendence over the Spartans in their civil concerns." We must be careful, however, not to involve in our adoption of this position the reception of another which Muller connects with it, namely, that the Ephors were the " "agents

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F

and plenipotentiaries of the popular as-
sembly," answering to demagogues and
exercising a democratic tyranny. His mo-
tive for wishing to make this out is clear
enough. That the rule of the Ephori
came to be tyrannical and mischievous, all
authorities are agreed; and, of course, it
is a great point for him if he can put all
this evil on the head of his bête noire, de-
But there is really no reason
mocracy.
to suppose that the popular assembly, in
which there was no discussion, and not often
adivision, ever had any independent weight,
much less predominance, in the govern-
ment; and the indisputable fact, that when
Agis III. and Cleomenes III. wished to re-
form the government on the most demo-
cratic basis, the principal resistance offered
to them was by the Ephori, is utterly irre-
concilable with Muller's supposition. If it
were perfectly certain that these officers
were chosen upon the most democratic
principles from among the people, as he
states, it would certainly give plausibility
to his argument, but even this is by no
means clear. How they were elected is
very uncertain. Not by lot, for Aristotle's
testimony is positive to the effect that no
officers were appointed by lot in Sparta,
yet Plato speaks of the Ephoralty as close-
ly approximating to an office appointed by
lot, (yrus rus xλnpwrns duváμews.) Else-
where Aristotle speaks of the manner of
election as "particularly childish."* Our
own suspicion is, that there was some
dodge about the matter, some specious
contrivance, which pretended to give the
choice to the people, but really lodged it
with the oligarchy. A contrivance of this
kind would be favored by the secrecy of
the Spartan government, which was noto-
riously close and silent in all its transac-
tions as much so as that of Venice or
Russia. And this incidental mention of
Venice reminds us of a not inapposite il-
lustration of our meaning, a plan most
elaborately fair in appearance, but practi-
cally amounting to no security against the
evils which it was supposed to prevent
we mean the method of electing the doge;
the working of which is thus described by
Lord Brougham:-

"In 1249 a new and very complicated manner of exercising the elective power was devised, which continued to be practiced as long as the republic lasted; that is, till the year 1798. First of all, thirty of the Council were drawn by lot, and these again were reduced by lot to nine, who selected, by a majority of seven, at least, of their number, forty of the Council, and those were by lot reduced to twelve. These twelve elected twenty-five of the Council, which were reduced by lot to nine, and the nine selected forty-five, of whom eleven drawn by lot selected forty-one of the Council to be electors of the doge. A majority of twenty-five of these electors required to join in choosing the doge. The prevailing view in this combination of choice and chance must have been twofold -to prevent the combination of partisans, and thus neutralize or weaken party influence, and should elect, and thus frustrate or obstruct the to prevent the knowledge of the parties who exercise of bribery or other undue influence. The first of these objects could not be at all secured by the contrivance, the second could only be most imperfectly attained. 1. In order to try its effect upon party, we must suppose cil; suppose, too, an aristocratic, which for two or more factions to divide the great Coun

The

shortness we shall call the Whigs, and a monarchical, the Tories, and first, suppose them unequal in the proportion of two to one. chances are, that the first lot gives twenty Whigs to ten Tories, and the second, six Whigs to three Tories. As seven must then concur to choose the forty, it is certain that the minor

ity may make terms; but nothing can be so improbable, as that they should obtain, by holding out, any proportion of the forty which could affect usefully for their purpose the next or fourth operation, the lot reducing the forty to twelve; for unless they get so many of the forty as to give them a fair chance of having seven out of the twelve, they do nothing, a bare majority of the twelve being enough to choose the twenty-five by the fifth operation. The twenty-five then will be all Whigs, and so will of course the nine to which they are reduced by lot. These by the seventh operation will choose eleven Whigs, whom the lot reducing to eight, these eight will choose fortyone, all Whigs, twenty-five of whom will therefore by the tenth and last operation choose a Whig doge. In fact, the whole result is certain, notwithstanding the complication after the two first lots; and the complication then becomes useless. **2. It may be admitted that the lot threw some impediment in the way of corruption and intimidation, preventing those undue influences from being used towards the greater number of the Council. When, however, the thirty were once drawn and then reduced to nine, it is not easy to see Aristot. Polit., ii. 6, 16, iv. 7, 5. Plato, Leg., of the candidates. Even if they were to vote how those nine should be exempt from the arts

iii. p. 692.

* *

secretly, the bargain might be made by the candidate or his party that the bribe should only be paid if earned, that is, upon the final election taking place. If we suppose seven of the nine to be thus bought, it is clear that they could secure the event by choosing as many of the forty as made it certain a majority of the twelve should be friendly, and then the election was certain, always supposing, as we have done, that there were a sufficient number of sure votes in the Council itself."--Political Philosophy, vol. ii., pp. 269, 599.

Such a system certainly seems to us Tardapions Xiav, but it was once lauded as the highest refinement of political wisdom. And that some such trickery, some specious and delusive plan which looked like an open election, but in reality was not, governed the election of Ephori, we more than half suspect.

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We have an idea (partly suggested by the term πολιτικὴ χώρα in the passage of Polybius which we have had occasion to quote) that there may have been a similar misapprehension in relation to Sparta; that there may have been a distribution of public land made among the poorer citizens. But as this is a mere conjecture founded only author, and not supported by any positive on analogy and a chance expression in one authority, we should never have ventured to express it, had we not found an almost identical opinion propounded by Dr. Thirlwall. He says:--

"If we suppose the inequality of property among the Spartans to have arisen chiefly from acts of usurpation, by which leading men had seized lands of the conquered Achæans, which belonged of right to the state, their resumption Another hypothetical ultra-democratic might afford the means at once of correcting institution of Sparta, Mr. Grote totally an evil which disturbed the internal tranquillity disbelieves in, though it is generally spoof Sparta, and of redressing a wrong which ken of as one of the fundamental enact- provoked discontent among her subjects. The ments of Lycurgus—the alleged redivision, kings, we are informed, (Xenoph. de Lac. Rep. c. 15,) had domains in the districts of several namely, and equal distribution of landed provincial towns; similar acquisitions may have property. His arguments on this point, been made by many private Spartans before the which are exceedingly clear and forcible, time of Lycurgus; and his partition may have are briefly these: That all historical evi- consisted chiefly in the restoration and distridences show decided inequality of prop-bution of such lands." (Vol. i., p. 305.) erty among the Spartans; that the historical and political writers who treated of the Spartan constitution previous to Aristotle, viz., Hellanicus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon and Plato, say nothing of this equal distribution; and that Aristotle, in discussing the scheme of equality of possessions, expressly mentions Phaleas of Chalcedon as the author of it. He con

cludes that the idea must have originated in the reveries of Agis and Cleomenes and their reforming friends. It is certainly unfortunate for the "land-reformers" and "vote-yourself-a-farm" people, that the precedents in ancient history to which they sometimes appeal, should turn out, on examination, to be no precedents at all. Thus the famous Licinian law at Rome, so long supposed to limit the amount of real estate which an individual might own, has been proved to refer not to private proper ty at all, but to the occupation of public land-ager, without any qualifying epithet, standing for ager publicus, and possidere being the technical term for to occupy.*

*Such, at least, is now the opinion of scholars

Mr. Grote, however, rejects this supposition as "altogether gratuitous."

Whatever opinion our readers may think it worth their while to adopt on the many disputed points connected with the Spartan government, a few of which we have been tempted briefly to examine, they will probably be disposed to coincide in Mr. Grote's designation of it, as "a close, unscrupulous and well-obeyed oligarchy." With this oligarchy the Athenian constitution, republican as constituted by Solon, purely democratic as re-constituted by Clisthenes, who "took the commons into partnership," stands in marked contrast. In neither of our historians do we find the fashionable comparison of the merits of these two celebrated governments; but Mr. Grote evidently has something of the kind of his intention to defend the most notoriin view, and from an intimation he gives us ous Athenian demagogues, Cleon and

throughout England, and all over Germany, excer to use Niebuhr's own expression "in some obscure, and isolated corners of Austria."

Hyperbolus, he may be expected to take the extreme Athenian side. The great argument in favor of the Spartan constitution is its stability, a test which would make the Chinese polity the best on earth. Stability may be the accident of a liberal government like the English, or a despotic government like the Russian; it is not absolutely and necessarily desirable of itself. If a government is decidedly bad, its stability is only an additional evil: the best thing that we can wish for such a government, is that it should be unstable. Heaven forbid that we should do anything to underrate or palliate that fickle and hasty legislation, which has too often been the curse of popular governments, and led many a man to adopt in bitterness of spirit, the sentiment which Thucydides puts into the mouth of one of his characters, that "a city with worse laws, if immovable, is preferable to one with good laws that be not binding;" but it were folly to run into the other extreme, and make a blind conservatism atone for all sins of omission or commission. The barbarous cruelty of the Spartans to their serfs, their savage illiberality to strangers as exhibited in the Xenelasia, their systematic ignorance, and discouragement of all art, and literature, and eloquence, of all talent except military, are too well known to need more than 3 passing allusion. The best thing to be said of them--and it certainly is very much to their credit-is that the Spartan women were admitted into something like their legitimate sphere, and not treated as mere pieces of household furniture, according to the practice of most nations of that time. And yet, after all, this liberty could only improve the physique of the race, without ading them morally or intellectually, since the women were no better off for education than the men, all the Lacedæmonians being illiterate on principle. IIliterate on principle-how much lies in these few words! If the Athenians had been like the Spartans, how much should

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we have had of Greek philosophy, or history, or poetry? Should we ever have had Homer preserved for us? Nay, further, what would have been the effect on the Roman mind, which was conquered by conquered Athens ? What upon the modern nations, who in their turn received the impulse from Rome? The inquiry may be extended indefinitely. Spartan fortitude has indeed passed into a proverb; but the influence of Athens on the human intellect is bounded only by the limits of civilization.

The preservation of the regal office was peculiar to Sparta. In the other Greek states the regular course was from monarchy to oligarchy, and through oligarchy, with occasional interludes of usurpation by a despot, to democracy. We have here a wide field for political speculation and remark. Thirlwall has done little more than translate and explain Aristotle, but he has done this admirably. We shall make no apology for transcribing so much of his tenth chapter, as treats of that ultimate condition to which the Hellenic cities naturally tended-democracy :

"The term democracy is used by Aristotle sometimes in a larger sense, so as to include several forms of government, which, notwithstanding their common character, were distinguished from each other by peculiar features; at other times in a narrower, to denote a form essentially vicious, which stands in the same relation to the happy temperament to which he gives the name of polity, as oligarchy to aristocracy, or tyranny to royalty. We shall not confine ourselves to the technical language of his system, but will endeavor to define the notion of democracy, as the word was commonly understood by the Greeks, so as to separate the essence of the thing from the various accidents which have been sometimes confounded with it by writers who have treated Greek history as a vehicle for conveying their views on questions of modern politics, which never arose in the Greek republics. It must not be forgotten that the body to which the terms oligarchy and democracy refer formed a comparatively small part of the population in most Greek states. since it did not include either slaves or resident free foreigners. The sovereign power resided wholly in the native freemen; and whether it was exercised by a part or by all of them, was the question which determined the nature of the government. When the barrier had been thrown down by which all political rights were made the inheritance of certain families-since every freeman, even when actually excluded

from them by the want of sufficient property, was by law capable of acquiring them-democracy might be said to have begun. It was advancing, as the legal condition of their enjoyment was brought within the reach of a more numerous class; but it could not be considered as complete, so long as any freeman was debarred from them by. poverty. Since, however, the sovereignty included several attributes which might be separated, the character of the constitution depended on the way in which these were distributed. It was considered as partaking more of democracy than of oligarchy, when the most important of them were shared by all freemen without distinction, though a part was still appropriated to a number limited either by birth or fortune. Thus where the legislative, or, as it was anciently termed, the deliberative branch of the sovereignty was lodged in an assembly open to every freeman, and where no other qualification than free birth was required for judicial functions, and for the election of magistrates, there the government was called democratical, though the highest offices of the state might be reserved to a privileged class. But a finished democracy, that which fully satisfied the Greek notion, was one in which every attribute of sovereignty might be shared, without respect to rank or property, by every freeman.

"More than this was not implied in democracy; and little less than this was required, according to the views of the philosophers, to constitute the character of a citizen, which, in the opinion of Aristotle, could not exist without a voice in the legislative assembly, and such a share in the administration of justice as was necessary to secure the responsibility of the magistrates. But this equality of rights left room for a great diversity in the modes of exercising them, which determined the real nature of a democratic constitution. There were indeed certain rights, those which Aristotle considered as essential to a citizen, which, according to the received Greek notions, could in a democracy only be exercised in person. The thought of delegating them to accountable representatives seems never to have occurred, either to practical or speculative statesmen, except in the formation of confederacies, which rendered such an expedient necessary. Where all the powers of the state were lodged in a certain number of citizens, though they were elected by the whole body of the people, the government was looked upon as an oligarchy; and in fact it seems that in all such cases, the functions so assigned were held for life, and without any responsibility. But still, even in the purest form of democracy, it was not necessary that all the citizens should take an equally active part in the transaction of public business; and the unavoidable inequality in the advantages of fortune and of personal qualities fixed a natural limit to the exercise of most

political rights. The class which was raised by its station above the need of daily labor. seemed to be pointed out by nature for the discharge of all offices, and duties which required leisure and freedom of thought. It could only be on extraordinary occasions that the poor man could be willing to leave his field, or his workshop, to take his place in the legislative assembly or the court of justice; and the control which his right, however rarely it might be called into action, gave him over the public officers, who were the men of his choice, was a sufficient safeguard against every ordinary danger to be apprehended from them. But the principle of legal equality, which was the basis of democracy, was gradually construed in a manner which inverted the wholesome order of nature, and led to a long train of pernicious consequences. The administration of the commonwealth came to be considered, not as a service in which all were interested, but for which some might be better qualified than others; but as a property in which each was entitled to an equal share. The practical application of this view was the introduction of an expedient for levelling as far as possible the inequality of nature, by enabling the poorest to devote his time without loss, or even with profit, to publi affairs. This was done by giving him wages for his attendance on all occasions of exercising his franchise; and as the sum which could be afforded for this purpose was necessarily smal it attracted precisely the persons whose attendance was least desirable. A farther application of the same principle was, as much as possible, to increase the number and abridg the duration and authority of public offices, an to transfer their power to the people in a mass On the same ground chance was substitute for election in the creation of all magistrate whose duties did not actually demand either th security of a large fortune or peculiar ability and experience. In proportion as the popu assembly, or large portions detached from it f the exercise of judicial functions, drew all th branches of the sovereignty more and mer into their sphere, the character of the procee ings became more and more subject to th influence of the lower class of the citizers which constituted a permanent majority. thus the democracy, instead of the equality ui was its supposed basis, in fact established the e cendency of a faction, which, although gr preponderant in numbers, no more represent the whole state than the oligarchy itself; which, though not equally liable to fall inte mechanism of a vicious system, was more par to yield to the impulse of the moment, easily misled by blind or treacherous guidand might thus as frequently, though n deliberately and methodically, trample not er on law and custom, but on justice and huma ty. This disease of a democracy was som times designated by the term ochlocracy, or

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