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this, in the action of this government, be regarded in any other light than as destroying all claim to confidence in any proposition that shall lead to it? We trust our system is not quite so weak, puerile and, we may add, unworthy, as the truth of such a proposition would presuppose it. In our judgment, the point is worthy of serious discussion, only in consideration of the source from which it comes.
We here close what we designed to offer upon the two paragraphs of the Report, whether singly or together; but before leaving the second general proposition which we undertook to discuss, and upon which the two paragraphs referred to have so material a bearing, we shall offer a few general reasons why, in our judgment, that proposition cannot be sustained.
First. It is, to our mind, a most serious objection to the doctrine of the Report, that it is of indefinite application as to the subjects of it. It will be observed that the Report specifically applies the operation of the clause, "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another," only to the power of Congress "to regulate commerce." Now are there not other provisions of the Constitution to which that operation may be applied with just as much propriety as to this? We maintain that there are; and in this, we are borne out by the Report itself, when it declares that there are "various subjects in which the several States are mutually interested in adjusting and regulating," which come within its doctrine. Now there are, at least, a dozen of these "various subjects" which might be mentioned, in entire consistency with the reasoning and admission of the Report, and coming within the doctrine; but we shall name only one. How, then, for instance, stands the clause, that "vessels bound to or from one State, shall not be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another?" To our mind, the application of the principle in question to this clause, forming an exception to it, would be just as legitimate, as it is to the clause giving to Congress the general power to regulate commerce: nay, even more so; for there is a reason of high justice for its application in the former case, if it be applicable in the latter, in the fact, that as, by its latter application, the two States
interested are deprived of the aid of the General Government in necessary improvements of a river for navigation, they would clearly be entitled to levy duties upon vessels coming from other States, in order to supply the means of making such improvements themselves. This power of levying duties, in the case supposed, is manifestly sustained by the just principle of compensation; for, as other States have the advantage of a navigation, made practicable and useful by the sole means of the two States, they are, in equity, bound to contribute in the only way they can, to reimburse those two States the expenditures to which they have been subjected for the general accommodation. Now is Mr. Calhoun prepared for a consequence like this, of the doctrine of his Report 1 We apprehend not. Nevertheless, we sec not how he can escape it, unless by assuming the Constitution to be a mere convenience, to suit particular occasions, such as caprice may select, or a miserable jumble of contradictions, denying the uniform and equal justice which it professes to secure.
Second. In connection with the objection just offered, and without the advantage of the exception suggested in it, in favor of the power of two States, in the <%se supposed, to levy duties, &c, it may be urged as a conclusive and overwhelming argument against the proposition of the Report, that its operation would work the most monstrous injustice upon the States to which its principle would attach. Two States, for instance, as New-York and New-Jersey, border upon the same river. This river is open to the commercial enterprise of all the other States; thousands of the inhabitants of the latter States trace their fortunes to the navigation of it; the nation at large, by universal consent, derive annually millions of profit from it; and yet the two States, at an enormous annual expense, and by a standing compact, (Congress kindly consenting to it,) must keep such river in order! the common national purse giving back nothing of the enormous gains thus constitutionally realized by the whole, confederacy, from the constitutional plunder of a pari! And more and worse than all this: when the two States implore of the nation relief from such a load of injustice, they are insultingly told that, to relieve them, would be to interfere with their State rights! They have exclusive control of the river; and any interference of Congress to remove obstructions from it, for the general good, would be an outrage upon their proper State dignity and honor. We have heard much of State rights, and of nullification to vindicate them. The Report introduces us to a new category—State wrongs; but says nothing of nullification to redress them!
A third objection is, that the proposition of the Report, ascribing the control of Congress over rivers bordered by three States to the power to regulate commerce, cannot stand consistently with the proposition under consideration.
It will be observed that the whole force of the argument of the Report, for the discrimination which it sets up between three States and two, in regard to the-power of Congress over rivers, turns upon the assumption that two States may make a compact, but that three or more cannot. It follows, hence, that if three or more States could make a compact, their case in regard to the power in question would stand upon the same ground that the case of two does; and, as the Report excludes the latter from the power, it must necessarily exclude the former also. Now if the "treaty, alliance and confederation" clause were not in the Constitution, it is admitted that three or more States might make a compact, as well as two; and that, hence, in such case, the power in question would be no more applicable to the case of rivers in three or more States, than to that of rivers confined to two. Now, the necessary effect of this view is, to make the power ascribed to Congress over rivers bordered by three or more States, to come, in point of fact, from the " treaty, alliance and confederation" clause. But the Report, in terms, ascribes the power to the clause giving to Congress the power "to regulate commerce among the States." Now, it is quite clear that the power cannot come from both of these clauses; much less, sometimes from the one, and sometimes from the other, as may suit the convenience of some present purpose. It must come certainly, definitely, and under all relations, from only one of them, if it comes from either. Now this power comes from the clause "to regulate commerce," or it does not. If it does, then
the reasoning of the Report, founded on the "treaty, alliance and confederation" clause, must fall to the ground. Bat the reasoning of the Report, upon the matter under consideration, consciously or unconsciously to its author, presupposes that clause, as is shown above; and therefore, for all the purposes of this argument, the clause "to regulate commerce " must be considered as inapplicable. And hence, as without the "treaty, alliance and confederation" clause, three or more States might make a compact; and as it is, According to the Report, because two States may make a compact under the "agreement and compact " clause, that Congress is denied the power over rivers confined to such two States; it follows, that, in the absence of the "treaty, alliance and confederation " clause, (three States being, in such case, enabled to make a compact,) the power of Congress over rivers bordered by such other States, must be denied also—the clause "to regulate commerce" notwithstanding.
Now, this reasoning, to make the Report consistent, requires that it shall abandon either its proposition that the power of Congress over rivers running in three States or more, pomes from the clause "tc regulate commerce," or the propositior under discussion—which claims that tha power does not extend to cases of river running in only two States. Which of th< two propositions the Report shall abandon remains for itself to say. Our purpos' alone is to prove, that its adherence to th first proposition is a conclusive objectio to the tenableness of the last.
A fourth objection to the propositio under consideration is, that it assumes reading of the "agreement and compact clause, which is not borne out by the goc sense of the case, or by acknowledge rules of legal interpretation. This readir limits the application of the clause to tv States only, where there is every reas. for applying it to all of them. When is said that "No State shall, without t consent of Congress, enter into agreemei or compacts with another," we understa the meaning to be, that the States, gen. ally, are prohibited from making agr< ments with each other, in any numb whether two or ten, without the cons* of Congress. This view, we say, is clea. sustained by the obvious reasons for the insertion of the clause, as already explained; these reasons being just as applicable to any other number of States as to two. It is as clearly borne out by acknowledged rules of legal interpretation; for should a law declare that "no man shall do this or that thing," without a certain penalty, every lawyer must say, that it is not one man merely that is embraced in the provision, bat every combination of men, no matter what the number who might, by violating such provision, come within its bearing. The clause in question, we maintain, stands on the same ground.
We proceed now to the third proposition of the Report which we proposed to consider, viz.: That the power "to regulate commerce" cannot be exercised in the construction of harbors for commerce, but only those for shelter.
Three arguments are urged by the Report in support of this proposition: First, tart the States, in the exercise of the power of regulating commerce, never extended it to the improvement or construction of harbors for commerce—neither subsequent to, nor before the Revolution, while '.'•Jonies. This, if true, is an extraordinary fact; but the inference drawn from it is more extraordinary still. No one will be w absurd as to say, that harbors are not indispensable to commerce. The question then is, who shall build them? Undoubtedly the public, through its proper government. You cannot expect individuals •o do it, it being '* beyond their means." Each of the States, then, certainly after the commencement of the Revolution, and Wore the adoption of the Constitution, must have had the power to build them; Md if they did not exercise the power, it was not because they did not possess it, but because they had no occasion to use it. They probably had harbors enough already, and which had grown at different points on the Atlantic coast so gradually, as that their growth was not particularly observed, and made no mark in the tusUjry of the times. There certainly •ere harbors then as there are now; and uwy were built by somebody; and to say d* the particular State governments did not build tbem, is to say what all rational probabilities pronounce to be untrue. But, it any rale, it is no necessary, or at least,
conclusive argument against the existence of a power, that it is not exercised; especially in a case like this, where the necessity of its exercise, in the infant growth of a continent of States, must be so infrequent compared with the whole extent of country, as to make no distinct impression when it occurred. The States, then, we hold, must have possessed the power to build commercial harbors at the period of the adoption of the Constitution; and being so possessed by them, it must, according to the admission of the Report, have passed over to the present national government, under the power " to regulate commerce."
The second argument of the Report against the power of Congress to build harbors for commerce, viz., that they must necessarily be located within the limits of individual States, and therefore be controlled by them, has already been answered in what we have said in relation to the regulation of commerce within the limits of a single State. A harbor must have a locality within a single State, or nowhere. And to say that because it is so, therefore it is not a proper subject of congressional legislation, is simply to beg the question; and there we leave it.
The third argument, viz., that the Constitution discriminates between the powers of a State to levy duties on imports and exports on the one hand, and on tonnage on the other, giving the net proceeds of the first to the national treasury, and reserving those of the last to the treasury of the State, appears to me to be founded in perfectly arbitrary conjecture, sustained neither by the history of the government, nor the reason of the thing. There are a hundred purposes to which a tonnage duty might be applied with equal propriety as to that of building harbors; and it is worthy of a moment's thought, that harbors must be built before the duty can be levied; so that the question stands open for discussion before the fact can exist upon which the argument is predicated. Why it should be assumed and asserted as a fact that the tonnage duty which might be levied by a State, was intended for the single purpose of building harbors, and for no other, we cannot comprehend; and before we will believe the fact, we demand the proof; and until this comes, we shall regard the assertion of it as another begging of a question. But, further, it must be borne in mind, that "the consent of Congress" must precede this levying of a tonnage duty by a State; and as this consent may be refused, the argument in hand is liable to the objection already urged against the argument deduced, for another purpose, from the power of two States to make a compact, to which the same contingency is attached. The distinction between a harbor for commerce and a harbor for shelter, is, to our apprehension, utterly without meaning, The only possible difference between the two, that we can see, is, between a vessel's lying at a wharf to take in lading for a voyage, and her lying at the same place to wait the passing of a storm. There is a wharf in either case, and it serves both purposes equally well; and why we should not be permitted to call that a " facility" to commerce which gives the convenience of shipping the freight that is the substance of it, as well as that which protects from the winds the vessel in which such freight is shipped, may be a curious question for the wits of a metaphysical de
bating club of very young men, but, in oar judgment, is utterly unworthy a moment's attention of a practical statesman.
We here conclude a discussion—alreadytoo long protracted—which we regret has not fallen to abler hands. There are those who think the Report which we have examined, refutes itself, and therefore requires no elaborate criticism to expose its errors. This may or may not be just. Whether so or not, however, there is a power about Mr. Calhoun's name and position, which would make it worse than in bad taste, to regard any state paper slightingly thtt comes from his pen. He is, without doubt. one of the master minds of this country and age; and thousands take their law implicitly from his opinions, however extravagant in themselves, or feeble in the argM ment that would sustain them. It is tc such, that we would especially address whai we have said, in the hope, that though v may not succeed in producing conviction we shall not entirely fail to awaken though
W. 0. Cincinnati, Dec, 1847.
THE ANGLO-SAXON RACE.
AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAU8E8 OF ITS UNRIVALLED PROGRESS, WITH SOME CONSIDI ATIONS INDICATIVE OF ITS FUTURE DESTINY.
The present age is developing, with startling rapidity, the national characteristics of races which must ultimately be subordinated to one. Inquiry has recently received a new impulse, and the future complexion of society is rousing the attention of the statesman, the philosopher and scholar. Whatever results may spring from their investigations, it is obvious that, even now, the means of stimulating and directing successful inquiry are neither few nor sparsely distributed. On the other side of the Atlantic societies have been formed, and volumes published,* for our information as to the long-neglected literature of " our noble ancestors , and we propose to furnish some brief indicia to a more intimate
• Among others, Patgrave't and Allen'; (noticed in Warren's Law Studies, pp. 161,162,163 )
understanding and appreciation of their bors and wants—to seize some promin traits of social excellence early exhibit and trace them through all the vicissitM of time down to our own age.
It is wise, at times, to fathom the n tic future; to scan the coming age, sketch its characteristics and destii through the light of the present, though the veil which conceals its imj be closed to our view by an all-wise F idence, yet nature instinctively urges i trace the influence of the present oi future history of our descendants, the closing prayer of the patriot to his ccssors, remember the deeds of your /ai and by them receive guidance for the Ji
When man first issued forth from bel's plain, his domains were assigned Each form where blend the lily and the rose was fixed in a cool and fertile clime.* Each frame whose swarthy hue distinguished its possessor from his "fellow dust," departed for the torrid vales of Africa. Yet, age after age and convulsion after convulsion have passed, and the former have retained the most of their primitive excellence wherever fate may have cast their lot. And now the European sweats under Congo's sultry sky, or shivers beneath the polar blast. The Englishman and American of the nineteenth century meet amid the palmy groves of Ceylon, or the coral isles of the Pacific, and hail each other brother. Over "the steppes" of Central Asia, or through the forests of the wild New-Hollander, they shout the watchword, Onward, onward.
There must be some elements which furnish the key to such a vast superiority over their fellows; as we shall carefully establish hereafter. These will meet us—they have forced themselves upon the notice of every other race; and we shall consider these characteristics somewhat more in detail. It is (among other causes, less obvious, though, perhaps, not less important) to their moral integrity, their ceaseless enterprise, (their roving habits stimulated by natural inqiiisitiveness, and improved by their advantages,) their intellectual activity, and, lastly, to the social elevation of icomen, we assign this pre-eminence.
1. At present it might appear as singular as it will be found true, that the AngloSaxon race has ever been distinguished from all others, by moral elevation, by religious fervor. How much of this should be attributed to a direct interposition of the Deity in their behalf.f and how much, on the other hand, belongs to their own silent efforts, we need not determine. But if an attentive view be cast upon them in their earliest and most simple "strivings" after the sublime idea of a God, in their more remote endeavors to grasp that of "the Increate," not dimly seen by them in His works—a hope would arise that such an investigation may be amply repaid.
•Tor/iufacl Humboldt ascribes the superiority of the inhabitants of temperate climes over oil oth
ers. (Am. Review, June, 1846, p. 600 > "Though the desire and feeling be common to all, they alone ue able to satisfy U.
t Something strongly confirmative of this conjecture may be found ia Ward's' Lectures nn A ncient Isr*el,'noticed in The Anglo-Amer:can,Van.24,18-16.
"Our first authentic accounts of England, are at the landing of Ca>sar, nearly two thousand years ago." The merest school-boy is familiar with the pages of the author-warrior, and we need not dilate upon the character and spirit of the ancient Britons. Yet we cannot pass over the Druids—whose name generally awakens vague conceptions of barbaric priests chaunting their hymns to some bloody deity in the recesses of the forest, and, amid the over-hanging reeks, invoking his protection, or soliciting his favor by the sacrifice of human victims. Perhaps our minds will start at the idea, that they were the political soul and guides of their several tribes, the life-blood of civil liberty, the unswerving champions of their people against the tyranny of the Romans; and yet such may have been the case—if we believe Caesar and Tacitus, such was the case.* The stern, mysterious rites of the Druids—with all their folly—reveal a spirit of religious activity only too widely stimulated. The direction of the current was right, but its impetuosity engendered the most terrible outrages. Then all England was a living representation of that vast, intangible and darkly impressive idea, a God—whose attributes corresponded to their own rude, mysterious feelings. Each plain was redolent with sacrifices—was vocal with the Druids' nightly reverence ascending to Him. Such ideas and expectations derived a thrilling imprcssiveness from their mighty, dark, and solemn forestsf—their ceremonies performed during the hours sacred to repose, in the solemn shades of night, combined with the constant presence of His ministers among the people. To them the intercourse of their hoary priests seemed like a near approach from heaven, too dread and too sublimely real to be neglected. Whatever we may think of them as Christians, we cannot refuse the meed of praise to such pure-minded though heathen patriots. We can well sympathize with the heroic devotion of the Druids; for the religious teachers of our ancestors could "fight" as well as preach: they cherished a wild, patriotic