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lismembcrment towards Mexico on the mrt of the President, but because Congress was in no way to be deemed to have leen committed to such a purpose. The rar which Congress had recognized and dopted, and for the support of which it tad voted supplies of men and money, was lot, so far as Congress was a party to it, a rar for conquest in any sense, but is to be Icemed to have been prosecuted solely for he purpose of compelling Mexico to come o just terms of accommodation with us; o cease her hostility to us on account of he annexation of Texas; to agree to a list and proper boundary between Texas nd her dominions; and to pay or seure to us, or give us full indemnity for, he demands of our citizens on her jusice. It was a war, so far as Congress r the country was a party to it, which hould have ceased from the hour that leiico was brought to propose, or accede », these terms of accommodation. That oint was carried—that object of the war ras fully gained, as we think we have delotatrated in our former article on the lessage. Mexico was ready to give up eias; to make the desert between the iueces and the Rio Grande the boundary; nd to give us one half of Upper California nd the port of San Francisco, for indemity for our claims. With this the war hich Congress was wajrintr against Mexo should have ceased. It was the fault f the President, and not of Mexico, that

did not cease. He set up new claims id pretensions, to which Congress was

no way a party. He demanded the smemberment of that country—an ob<t of the war to which Congress had ven no sanction—which Mexico could >t.be purchased with money to submit —and for which, on his own responsility, he caused the war to be renewed id prosecuted. And this war it is—a ir having now for its precise object the nsummation of the President's avowed irpose of conquering and dismembering exico—in support of which the Presint invites and demands the co-operation ''■•ngress.

What will Congress do on this moments Issue? How will Whig Senators d a Whig House of Representatives anw the call and demand which the Prcsint now makes upon them? Will they

recognize and adopt this war for the conquest and dismemberment of Mexico? The Issue becomes a practical one, since the question must be met by official action. One way or the other it must be decided,and the decision must stand out before the country in official conduct. The object of the war is clearly set forth in the President's Message—to secure a boundary on the Rio Grande, the whole of New Mexico on both sides of that river, sind the two Californias, by conquest; and, in general terms, the mode or plan of military operations, by which these conquests are to be secured, is set forth.

"I cannot doubt," says the President, "that we should secure and render available the conquests which we have already made; and that, with this view, we should hold and occupy, by our naval and military forces, all the ports, towns, cities and provinces now in our occupation, or which may hereafter fall into our possession. * * * Besides New Mexico and the Californias, there are other Mexican provinces which have been reduced to our possession by conquest. * * * They should continue to be held as a means of coercing Mexico to accede to just terms of peace. * * * What final disposition it may be proper to make of them must depend on the future progress of the war, and the course which Mexico may think proper hereafter to pursue."

The plan of military operations is to subjugate all Mexico—not; the President assures us, ns an end, but as a means. "It has never been contemplated by me, as an object of the war, to make a permanent conquest of the Republic of Mexico, or to annihilate her separate existence as an independent nation." Still he recommends: 1st. That Congress shall permanently appropriate to the United States forthwith, and never to be surrendered, the provinces of New Mexico and the Californias—nearly one-half of the country within the territorial limits of the Mexican empire. 2d. That we should hold on to all the other provinces, ports, cities and places already in our occupation. 3d. That we should prosecute the war "with increased energy and power in the vital parts of the enemy's country,"—of course, to conquer as far ns possible the remaining portions of that country, to be held as the rest, '* as a means of coercing Mexico to accede to just terms of peace." What he means by "just terms of peace," he explains abundantly in the Message. If ever Mexico makes peace with us, it must be by consenting to dismemberment, at least to the extent of losing New Mexico and the two Californias. "What final disposition it may be proper to make of the rest of our conquests must depend on the future progress of the war, and the course which Mexico may think proper to pursue!" The meaning of all this, we say,- is plain enough. The President proposes, as the immediate and first object of the war, recommenced by his orders after the conferences in September, to secure to the United States the permanent conquest and possession of New Mexico and the Californias; and he proposes as a means thereto, so far as taay be found practicable, the entire conquest and complete subjugation of the whole Mexican country—to be surrendered, or held, in whole or in part, hereafter, according as "the future progress of the war, and the course which Mexico may think proper to pursue," shall seem to render expedient and proper.

The recommendations pf the Secretary of War and of the President, and the measures instituted thereupon in the Senate, by the friends of the Executive, for raising thirty new regiments of men—ten regiments of regulars, and twenty regiments of volunteers—in addition to the large force already in the field, and the further force which may be brought into the field under existing laws—and all this for the avowed purpose of widening and extending our military operations and conquests in Mexico—show demonstrably that we are not mistaken when we say, that the grand design of the President is, whether as a means or an end, or let it lead to what it may, to subjugate all Mexico by the power of our arms, as far as it may be found practicable to do so. A few days ago, in debate in the Senate on this subject, General Cass, Chairman of the War Committee, presented a very meagre extract from a letter which he said the Government had received from General Scott, containing "an estimate of the force he [General Scott] deems necessary to carry into effect the plan of operations which is recommended by the Secretary of War." This extract not only furnishes th* estimate spo

ken of, but shows plainly enough what u. Secretary's "plan of operations" is di signed to accomplish in the subjugaiit of all Mexico:—

"Augment this army to fifty thousand at to enable them to occupy, at the same tia nearly all the State Capitals and other primij cities; to drive guerrilla and other robbing f« ties from the great highways of trade; to sn into our hands all the ordinary revenues of n country, internal as well as external, for tl support of the occupation, and tokeeptbeCa tral Government in constant motion and J.■;. until constrained to sue for peace."

Never was there in so few words, a nw complete picture of a subjugated couna than that presented in this brief extrac as what should be accomplished and wi nessed in Mexico, if General Scott shual be furnished with the requisite army, u instructed to execute the Secretary's yh of operations. And precisely what ti President is now demanding of Congre is, that it shall adopt and sanction tins p'u of operations, and give him the mean.- i carrying it into immediate execution. Wfc shall happen when Mexico shall thus 1 subjugated; when we have permanent, appropriated to ourselves New Mexico *% the Californias, to secure which is the £i avowed object of this complete subjuition; and when " nearly all the State Cai lals and other principal cities" shall i conquered and held under our military c cupation and authority; in short, win Mexico, as a country, shall be conquen and subjugated, all her revenues, inUrt and external, seized into our hands, '. Central Government dissolved, or findi no resting place, and the whole empi indeed, brought under the rule of the ra tary power of this Government—what si happen then, the President professes i to be able to tell. After helping him; to those countries which are his present timatum, it will depend on " the future p

fress of the war, and the course *b lexico shall think proper to pursue," wl disposition shall be made of the residue the empire. Verily, it was no abstract this time, with which Mr. Calhoun i dealing, when, recently, he submitted o tain Resolutions in the Senate, and souno an alarm to the country, lest we shoi shortly find ourselves, with or without I :h purpose, with the Mexican empire on r hands, and the awful question of its posal—how to hold it, or how to get of it—to be met and settled. It was abstraction which deolared, in the lanige of his second resolution, "That no ? of policy in the further prosecution of

* war should be adopted, which may d to consequences so disastrous." There are now in Mexico, and on their iv there, according to official returns, of id forces, about 45,700 men. To these ; to be added 5,000 seamen and males, employed in the same service. In dition to this force, the Executive has ithority by existing laws, to jaise a rtber force of 7,000 enlisted soldiers, d 12,500 volunteers for the war. Here an aggregate force of 70,000 men either the field, or authorized to be called there unediately. And now the President is king for authority to raise an additional rce of 30,000 men! What part of the otive for this extraordinary demand is to s set down to a desire and determination

* make the patronage of the war power his hands, support the war as long as he

looses to carry it on, and for whatever bjecte of conquest and robbery, we canst tell, nor shall we now stop to inquire. Je look at this demand as it bears directly a the great question, now brought home ) the conscience of every member of the Lmerican Congress: Shall this war of the resident's, renewed under his orders after s&t and honorable terms of peace had e*n tendered by Mexico—a war, having w its avowed object the conquest and disnemberment of Mexico, to an extent which lemoQstrates that indemnity for our just tonus has nothing to do with it, by a iton of military operations which contemplates the complete subjugation of that nnpire—shall this war of the President's

* adopted and sanctioned by Congress, riuch is the sole war-making power of iis Government? For ourselves we shall wit, wilh confidence, yet not without deep fcfcitude, for the result of the deliberation! of Congress on this momentous quesfcw- We cannot but flatter ourselves that Uie President is now to be arrested in his ■»d career; that Congress, under the «ad of wise and patriotic counsels, will a<>* take its stand on those high duties imposed on it by the Constitution, and

save the country from the degradation and ruin which the President and his infatuated party are certainly preparing for it. When the House of Representatives shall be called on for supplies of men and money for this war, we look for an answer from rthe majority of that body worthy of their noble principles, and of the high trust committed to them. It is not for us to suggest the mode of meeting their responsible duties in this regard. They will find a"way of doing all their duty—to our gallant army in Mexico—to the country engaged in war with a foreign power—until a peace, really just and honorable to both parties, shall be effected; they will find a way of doing this, without making themselves, or allowing Congress to make itself, a party to a flagrant war of conquest and robbery, waged upon a weak and almost defenceless power. They will take a fit occasion to announce, by some authoritative action, on the part of that body with whom all supplies must originate, for what objects of the war they will, and for what objects they will not, give the President the means of carrying it on. We cannot entertain a doubt that we speak the common sentiment of the Whig party in Congress and throughout the country, when we say, that in the offers made by the Mexican Commissioners to Mr. Trist in September last, a basis was proposed for a peace between the two countries on just terms, which ought to have resulted in a treaty of peace, and which would have resulted in such a treaty, free from every exceptionable condition or demand on the part of Mexico, and entirely acceptable to the people of the United States, if the President had not set up an impertinent and unjustifiable demand, as an ultimatum, for the further dismemberment of Mexico, after she had tendered a cession of territory far exceeding in value the demands he made upon her for indemnity. Such, as we believe, being the settled and abiding sentiment of the Whigs in Congress, they will support the war just so far as it may be necessary to bring Mexico to make a peace with us on terms like these, or on terms equally moderate and just; but they will support no war for the conquest and subjugation of the Mexican nation, or for the destruction, dismemberment or robbery of the Mexican empire. D.D. B.

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. —.« ut. Always mine!

Not lingering or in chill decline,
Till snowy locks, and tears of rheum,
Declare me ripened for the tomb.

"No! rather, let my sun descend

Through azure skies to instant night;

As days in burning tropics end,
Unfelt the dull decay of light.

But while on life's bright shore I dwell,
Be mine the splendor and the glow—

Be mine, in golden song, to tell
Thine even balanced joy and woe.

The apparent, heaven-descended, power,
The vision, and the light divine,

Thou gavest me in my natal hour—
O be these gifts forever mine!

HAMLET.

COHTIRUBD FROM PAGE 9 9.

"The spirit I have seen May be a devil; aua tlie devil hath power To assume a pleasing shape, yea, and, perhaps, Out of ray weakness and my melancholy, ; As he is very potent with such spirits,) Abases me, to damn me."

Thus the hope that the ghost's tale may

be false, and the fear that it may be true,

unite to send him in quest of other proofs.

The probability seems at once too strong

> justify the abandonment, and too weak

) justify the execution of the deed. The

nth is, the ghost develops Hamlet, and

le development it works within him.- is

war with the injunction it lays upon

m. Its supernatural revelations bring

rth into clearer apprehension some moral

sas which before were but dim presenti

aits within him; and its requisitions are

waited by the very truths which it sug

sts and unfolds to him, and by the train

reflections which it sets a-going in his

ad. Under the disclosures made to him

m beyond the grave, his mind attains a

d or degree of development not ordi

fly vouchsafed to our earthly being. It

* if he were born into the other world

ore dying out of this. But the words

n that other world must be confirmed by

U from this, before he can bring him

. to trust in them; and therefore

"The play's the thing H'herein he'll catch the conscience of the king."

When, however, he has caught the king's '•onscience; when, by holding the mirror up to his soul, he has forced "his occulted ijuilt" to "unkennel itself;" along with

* *rtainty of the crime, he gains food for ?till further reflection. The demonstration

• •f his uncle's guilt arrests the very purpose for which that demonstration was sought. His own conscience is but startled into a dread of the retribution he has disclosed in the conscience of another. He has -rought grounds of punishment in the manifestations of remorse; and the very proofs which, to his mind, justify the in

VOL. I. 50. II. NEW 8ERIES. 9

Aiding of death, themselves spring from a worse death than he has power to inflict. It is thus that Hamlet is distracted with a purpose which he is at once too good a son to dismiss, and too good a man to perform. Under an injunction with which he knows not what to do, he casts about, now for excuses, now for censures, of his non-performance; and religion prevents him from doing what filial piety reproves him for omitting. While he dare not abandon the design of killing the king, he is at the same time morally incapable of forming any plan for doing it. He can only do it, and he does only attempt it, under a sudden frenzy of excitement, caused by some immediate provocation; not so much acting as being acted upon; as an instrument of Providence, rather than as a self-determining agent.

And this view of Hamlet is rather confirmed than otherwise by the motives which he assigns for sparingthe king, when he finds him praying. That these motives, too horrible even for a fiend to entertain, are not his real motives, is evident from their extravagance; for if such motives would keep him from doing the deed then, assuredly no motives could have kept him from doing it before. These motives are but the excuses wherewith he quiets his filial feelings without violating his conscience. He thus effects a compromise between his religion and his affection, by adjourning a purpose which the one will not suffer him to execute, nor the other to abandon. The question, "Is it not perfect conscience to quit him with this arm?" which he afterwards puts to Horatio, while relating the king's plot against his own life, proves that he had not even then overcome his moral repugnance to the deed.

Properly speaking, therefore, Hamict lacks not force of will, as some have argued, but only force of self-will; that is, his will is strictly subjected to his reason and conscience, and is of course powerless when it comes in conflict with them ; where they impede not his volitions, he seems, as

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