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left bank of the Bravo, as it is of New Mexico, on both sides of that river, or of California. We are bold to say, that no man who has given himself the trouble to understand the facts, and who has any just perception of the difference between meum and tuum, and between right and wrong, can doubt the truth of this position. We know the contrary has been asserted in high places-even by the President of the United States, over and over again, in the most solemn form-as well as by partisans and politicians of high and low degree, all over the land. Nevertheless, the truth is as we have stated it— resting on the plainest facts, open and read of all men, and which cannot be argued off from imperishable records. The question of title does not rest on argument. There is nothing in the case to argue about. Unless a man may give himself a valid title to his neighbor's property, by making a deed of it to himself, neither Texas nor the United States had the slightest claim of title, antecedent to this war, to the country on the left bank of the Rio Grande. The reader who has done us the honor to look into our previous articles in this Journal, in relation to the Mexican war, will not expect, or need, that we should say more on this matter, in this place.

or three inadmissible propositions of minor | country which he demanded, lying on the importance were inserted in the CounterProject of the Mexican Commissioners; but we assert positively that they had no influence whatever in arresting the negotiations for peace. We appeal to the record in the case. We cannot be mistaken. In the last instructions given by the Mexican Government to the Commissioners of that power, dated the day before the CounterProject was presented to Mr. Trist, it was solemnly declared: "In New Mexico, and the few leagues which intervene between the right bank of the Nueces and the left bank of the Bravo, lies the question of peace or war." Mexico presented no other ultimatum-no other condition sine qua non of peace, but this. She presented some claims-she offered some propositions for the consideration and acceptance of the American Commissioner; but they were not to be insisted on. In reference to these, the Mexican Commissioners, after stating the point on which the conferences were broken off, expressly declare: "The other points touched upon in the Project appeared to us easily settled: such at least was the opinion we formed during the conferences.' It is absurd to suppose that Mexico would have allowed the war to go on, some thousands more of her citizens to be sacrificed, her whole army to be cut up and dissipated, and her proud capital to be taken, merely on the claim which she set up to impose import duties over again on foreign goods which had once paid such duties to the conqueror," or on that other claim of damages done to her citizens by the necessary progress of our arms in the war. The matter on which the parties separated --and the whole matter--was the ultimatum of the President, demanding the dismemberment of Mexico far beyond what the Government of that country would consent to.

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There are one or two other points in this connection, about which it is essential we should not fall into error. One of them is this: that the United States had no claim of right-except only what might arise from conquest in war-to any part or portion of the territory which the President thus resolved to force from the unwilling hands of its proprietor and sovereign. And this remark is as true of the

Another point to be noticed here, and firmly fixed in our minds, is this: that the terms of peace offered by Mexico in the conferences with Mr. Trist, having reference to the original subjects of difference or quarrel between the two countries, did not leave an inch of just ground, so far as those subjects of dispute were concerned, for the United States to stand on in renewing and further prosecuting the war. The points of dispute were, 1st. The annexation of Texas to the United States, giving high offence to Mexico, and causing her to put herself in a threatening and war-like attitude. 2d. The question of a boundary between Texas and the Mexican dominions, which Congress, by the Act of Annexation, expressly reserved to be settled by negotiation. 3d. The pecuniary claims of our citizens, which the President has constantly insisted on as the cause for prosecuting the war on our part. the terms of peace offered by Mexico, em

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braced each of these points. In regard to the measure of annexation-so wounding to the pride of the Mexican nation, the source of her irritation and anger, and the primal cause, the causa causans, of the war -she proposed a line of demarkation between the two countries, which would have cut her off forever from the proper territory of Texas, with its boundary on the Nueces, and thus removed completely this matter as a subject of difference or dispute between the two powers. The course proposed to be taken was particularly judicious, inasmuch as it would have left the United States at liberty to look always to the Congressional Act of Annexation, with the assent of the Republic of Texas, as the true ground of our title; while, at the same time, Mexico might console her wounded pride with the belief, if she chose, that, at last, we were only quieted in our possession of that country by the generous cession which she consented to make. In regard to the question of boundary-which we must look at, all the while, as totally distinct from that of annexation-Mexico made an offer which, in its substance and effect, cannot fail to be regarded, by all just minds, as fairly meeting this question with a view to its proper adjustment. She did not propose to cede the country between the Nueces and the Bravo, but she offered to make the desert the actual boundary. What she insisted on was, that she would not abandon her citizens, having their property and rightful residence on the left bank of the latter river, in the State of Tamaulipas; and that a desert a hundred and twenty miles wide, was a safer and better frontier for both countries, than a narrow stream like the Rio Grande. It is perfectly manifest that she cared nothing for the unimportant territory on the right bank of the Nueces, and between that river and the desert, where Texas had some small settlements. A line of demarkation in the middle of the desert would, no doubt, have been perfectly acceptable to her. The offer she tendered made such a line in effect the boundary. Finally, in regard to the pecuniary claims of our citizens, Mexico offered the most ample indemnity, by tendering the cession of one half of Upper California, including the best bay and harbor she had on the Pacific.

In reference, then, to the original subjects of dispute or quarrel between the two countries, we repeat that the terms of peace offered by Mexico in September last, did not leave an inch of just ground for the United States to stand on in renewing and prosecuting the war. These terms were tendered, as we have every reason to say, in perfect good faith, and with an anxious desire to close the war and restore the relations of peace. No one can read the last letter of Instructions from the Minister, Pacheco, to the Mexican Commissioners, or that of the Commissioners to Mr. Trist, accompanying their Counter-Project of a Treaty, without being struck with the marked change of tone, so strikingly dif ferent from that which has always, heretofore, characterized the diplomatic correspondence of the Mexican authorities. There is an earnestness, a directness, a manifest sincerity, a nobleness of sentiment, and even a pathos, in the communications we refer to, which, especially if we take into the account the unhappy and distressing circumstances under which they were written, we venture to say, cannot be read by any just-minded person, enemy though he be, without exciting within him a strong feeling of sympathy, and a sentiment of disgust towards that cold-blooded, calculating policy of the President, which could spurn the submission Mexico offered to make, and turning haughtily away, deliberately proceed with his measures of blood and devastation to complete her degradation, and reduce her to the last stage of wretchedness and despair.

Let it, then, be distinctly observed, that when the war was renewed, after the conferences in September, Mexico had tendered her submission to every just demand which the United States had to make upon her, in reference to every original ground of difference between the two countries; and from that time, this nation cannot justly consider the war as prosecuted for any of those objects which, before that period, were regarded as lending a sufficient sanction to its operations. As a national war, as a war waged for national objects, it had already met its complete accomplishment, only that the President refused to make peace on the terms of submission to which the enemy had been brought. We say, with

out a doubt, that as between us and Mexico, the sense of national justice and honor would have been satisfied, when Mexico had submitted to our annexation of Texas, had offered us the desert this side the Rio Grande as a frontier, and had tendered us ample indemnity for our pecuniary claims; and that the further demands on which the President insisted were altogether his own, in which he has never yet received, as we trust he never will receive, the countenance of Congress or the nation. The war having been begun, Congress made, and hitherto has continued to make, the necessary appropriations for carrying it on. It did not prescribe and limit its operations or its objects; but every thing was done under the repeated and solemn pledges made by the President, that peace should be made as soon as terms could be obtained to satisfy the honor and justice of the country-pledges constantly accompanied with the most explicit disclaimers of any purpose to turn the war into one of conquest and dismemberment. We say, with perfect confidence in the indisputable truth of what we assert, that neither Congress nor the country entered into this war with any purpose of conquest and dismemberment. Conquest has not been the object, nor one of the objects, which Congress-the only war-making power in this country-has had in view. It never has been its purpose to demand, as a condition sine qua non of peace, that Mexico should cede to the United States the Californias, or New Mexico, or even the belt of country on the left bank of the Rio Grande, or any other territories whatever, properly belonging to her, unless it might be, at her own option, such moderate portion, convenient both to her and to us, as might suffice for indemnity for her indebtedness to our citizens. Congress has been a party to the war only to obtain a peace on just terms, having special reference to the particular matters in dispute between the two powers. It was no party to a war for the conquest and dismemberment of Mexico, such as the war became, expressly and exclusively, after the conferences in September, and which has made it, as we insist, virtually a new war, of which the President is the sole author, and thus far the sole prosecu- The President was the sole author

of the war in the beginning; but Congress became a party to it by a formal recognition of it, and by furnishing the necessary supplies to carry it on. Still, however, there was a virtual limitation and restriction, in the employment of the means placed in the hands of the Executive by Congress for the war, in regard to the objects for which it should be prosecuted. And the President had no more right to undertake, after these objects had been attained, or were within his reach, to employ the means in his hands, and prosecute the war against Mexico, for other objects, not within the well understood designs of Congress, than he had to turn the arms of the United States entirely in some new direction, and find or make some new enemy to conquer, in some other quarter of the world. He knew that Congress had never authorized a war of conquest and dismemberment to be carried on against Mexico; and when he contrived and undertook to carry on such a war, he set himself above his office, and above the Constitution, and trampled every moral and every political obligation belonging to his station, wantonly beneath his feet.

The President, it seems, at the very time when he was giving Congress and the country to understand, by his repeated disclaimers, that he had no purpose of conquest in the conduct of the war, was all the while nourishing this design; and he gave his Commissioner, Mr. Trist, positive instructions not to make peace with Mexico, unless she would consent to dismemberment, exactly on his own terms. His ultimatum embraced territory, having an aggregate area of more than 625,000 square miles. For this territory he was willing to pay twenty millions of dollars, besides the amount of the indebtedness of Mexico to our citizens, which, by an exaggerated estimate, might be five millions. By his own computation, then, one fifth part of the territory he demanded as his ultimatum, or 125,000 square miles, was enough for indemnity-and much more than this was offered to him by Mexico for the sake of peace-and the residue, 500,000 square miles of Mexican territory, more than equal to ten States of the size of New-York or Pennsylvania, was demanded to be delivered up to the United States, on a forced sale, without any the remotest

reference to indemnity, or to anything else that had ever been set up or suggested as a cause or pretence for the war. And it was upon this precise demand of dismemberment, and because it was not submitted to by Mexico, that the war was resumed. But there is a wide difference to be taken notice of here, between the terms of peace offered to Mexico by the President at the conferences in September, and the objects he proposes now to accomplish by the war, as explained in his late annual Message, since those terms were rejected. The contumacy of Mexico on that occasion effectually closed the door to the grace and clemency of the President. He has now greatly advanced his demands, which, in truth, partake very little of the moderation which characterized his ultimatum at the conferences. Then, with a boundary on the Rio Grande, and the territory of New Mexico, he was content to take only Upper California. Now, he must have Lower California also. Then, if Mexico had agreed with her adversary while she was in the way with him, he was content to bear his own expenses of the war, and pay her besides twenty millions of dollars for the territory he demanded, as the value of the cession, over and above indemnity. Now, he will have more territory still, and he will take possession avowedly as CoNQUEROR, and there is no longer any talk or pretence of purchase and payment. On the 6th of September, 125,000 square miles of territory might have been enough to take in the name of indemnity for the claims of our citizens, if only Mexico had consented to sell us at the same time 500,000 square miles more, for twenty millions of dollars. But things have changed since that day; and now the President demands something less than 700,000 square miles of territory, wholly in the name of indemnity. In September, the United States would have paid their own expenses of the war; now, Mexico must pay them by indemnity in territory. See with what a just sense of truth, innocence and injury, and with what firmness of purpose and conscious dignity, this change in the policy and demands of the President is announced! --we quote from the late Message:

"Since the liberal proposition of the United States was authorized to be made in April last,

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large expenditures have been incurred, and the precious blood of many of our patriotic citizens has been shed in the prosecution of the war. This consideration, and the obstinate perseverance of Mexico in protracting the war, must influence the terms of peace which it may be deemed proper hereafter to accept. Our arms having been everywhere victorious, having subjected to our military occupation a large portion of the enemy's country, including his capital, and negotiations for peace having failed, the important questions arise-in what manner the war ought to be prosecuted? and what should be our future policy? I cannot doubt that we should secure and render available, the coNQUESTS which we have already made; and that, with this view, we should hold and occupy by our naval and military forces, all the ports, towns, cities and provinces now in our occupation, or which may hereafter fall into our possession." * * * "Had the government of Mexico acceded to the equitable and liberal terms proposed, that mode of adjustment would have been preferred. Mexico having declined to do this, and failed to offer any other terms which could be accepted by the United States, the national honor, no less than the public interests, requires that the war should be prosecuted with increased energy and power, until a just and satisfactory peace can be obtained. In the mean time, as Mexico refuses all indemnity!! we should adopt measures to indemnify ourselves, by appropriating permanently a portion of her territory. Early after the commencement of the war, New Mexico and the Californias were taken possession of by our forces. * * * ** These provinces are now in our undisputed occupation, and have been so for many months. * * * * I am satisfied that they should never be surrendered to Mexico. Should Congress concur with me in this opinion, and that they should be retained by the United States as indemnity! I can perceive laws of the United States should not at once no good reason why the civil jurisdiction and be extended over them. To wait for a treaty of peace, such as we are willing to make, by which our relations towards them would not be changed, cannot be good policy. * Should Congress, therefore, determine to hold these provinces permanently, and that they shall hereafter be considered as constituent parts of our own country, the early establishment of territorial governments over them, will be important.

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And I recommend that such territorial governments be established."

So much of the Message of the President as we have just quoted, may be read as setting forth the avowed and ostensible object of the war, since the conferences in September. We shall see, by and by, that even this avowed object, monstrous

and atrocious as it is, is by no means comprehensive enough to embrace the whole designs of the President. At least he entertains certain speculative purposes, which, if they should ever be realized, would make the design he has deigned to disclose appear tame indeed. But first let us endeavor to settle exactly in our minds the avowed object for which the war is now to be prosecuted, since the failure of the negotiations in September, and the terms upon which alone peace is to be made with Mexico-provided the President shall find himself sustained by Congress, as well in the object avowed by him as in the mode of conducting operations and the means of carrying them

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The plain proposition presented by the President to Congress is this: That we now proceed at once to appropriate permanently to the United States, in full , property and sovereignty, and never to be surrendered, the province of New Mexico and both the Californias, holding, besides, the country on the left bank of the Rio Grande, comprising parts of the three Mexican States of Tamaulipas, Coahuila and Chihuahua, for our State of Texas. This is the proposal. New Mexico and the Californias are the countries he refers to, as "the CONQUESTS which we have already made," and which we are now to secure and render available." By a rule of the Law of Nations, perfectly well settled, the title which a conqueror acquires in war to real property, or territory, amounts to no more than a mere temporary right of possession, until confirmed by a treaty of peace. The title may be confirmed in either of two ways in a treaty by an actual cession to the conqueror, or by the silence of the treaty in regard to the property or territory, the conqueror at the time holding the possession. This last is the rule of uti possidetis, and gives as valid and complete a title as actual cession. In one of these two modes every title to real or fixed property, begun in conquest, must be confirmed. Until such confirmation, the right is a mere usufruct; the conqueror cannot sell and give an absolute title; for, if it should happen, after all, in the chances of war, that peace should come as come it must, some time or other-without bringing to the con

queror confirmation of his title, the right of the original proprietor and sovereign, which is called his right or benefit of postliminy, becomes paramount, and the pur chaser loses his title. When, therefore, the President proposes to Congress that the United States should proceed at once to appropriate to themselves, permanently, the provinces already conquered in war, in full property and sovereignty, and to establish provincial or territorial governments over them, he means to, and he does, in fact, lay down this fundamental position, as the unalterable basis on which our national policy in regard to this war shall rest, now and forever hereafter: That peace shall never be made with Mexico until she shall consent to give up all claim or pretension to these conquered countries. He proposes that we shall enter now, by anticipation, into that full and complete proprietorship and sovereignty, which we can only have in reality, by the law of nations, under a treaty of peace.

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To wait for a treaty of peace," he says, | "such as we are willing to make, by which our relations towards them [these territories] would not be changed, cannot be good policy." He proposes an ultimatum, a condition sine qua non of peace, not rest- ing in the mere will of the President, or of the treaty-making power-the President and Senate-which possibly, some day or other, might be yielded, but resting in the solemn action of the whole government, and in the recorded will of the nation, and placed beyond the possibility of recall. He proposes to hazard everything, and dare everything, for this object of the war. In his desperation, on account of the mazes of perplexity into which this war of his own seeking and making has brought the country, he proposes to plunge headlong into the profound deep of measures, the bottom of which, or the end of which, neither his own nor any mortal eye may discover. The first conqueror of Mexico chose to cut off all possibility of retreat for his companions in arms, by destroying the ships which had brought them to its shores. The second conqueror of Mexico, more than three centuries in advance of the other in point of time-how much in advance of the other in point of civiliza tion and Christian principle let history an swer-proposes to imitate this example

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